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Summary 
Background 
Safety culture is considered to be an essential element of patient safety. Several tools are 
available to assess patient safety culture in hospitals. One of the most common methods of 
assessing safety culture is the use of safety climate questionnaires. 
Research question 
Is there an existing patient safety culture measure that can be demonstrated to be a valid and 
reliable tool for use with the workforce in hospitals in Saudi Arabia? 
Aim and objectives 
This study aims to identify whether there is an existing English language tool that would be 
suitable for assessing patient safety culture in Saudi context. The objectives of the study are: 
1. To select an appropriate questionnaire to assess hospital patient safety culture. 
2. To evaluate the face validity of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire. 
3. To assess the psychometric properties of the selected patient safety climate 
questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
4. To develop the most appropriate measure for assessing patient safety culture for use 
in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
Methods 
Qualitative methods were used to evaluate face validity (n=12 hospital staft). Quantitative 
methods were used to assess psychometric properties (n=862 doctors and nurses in three 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia). 
Findings 
Evaluation of face validity identified a need for minor changes to the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) questionnaire wording before it was used to collect data for 
psychometric assessment. The results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CF A) and reliability 
analysis showed an unsatisfactory fit for the factor structure of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire to the Saudi data. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EF A) was used on one half of 
the Saudi dataset to produce an optimal model(s). This was followed by CFA of the resulting 
measurement model on the second (validation) half of the data to test the fit of the resulting 
optimal factor structure. The result of EF A showed that eight factors (23 safety climate 
items) is the optimal model to the Saudi data. 
I 
All factors consisted of two to four items. The items loading were between 0.43 and 0.97. 
The result of CF A confirmed the eight factors solution (CF A=O.94, RMSEA=0.045, 
SRMR=O.040, TLI=O.97). The results of EFA, CFA, correlation and reliability analysis 
(Cronbach's alpha) showed that the optimal model for the Saudi data consists of eight patient 
safety culture dimensions (23 safety climate items). 
Conclusion 
This is one of very few studies to provide an assessment of an American patient safety culture 
tool using data from Saudi Arabia. The results indicate the importance of appropriate 
validation of patient safety climate questionnaires prior to applying them to populations 
outside contexts in which they were developed. The validated Saudi English language 
version of the HSOPSC questionnaire is an appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire to 
assess patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. 
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Glossary 
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2009). 
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situations (Field, 2009). 
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an instrument and refers to how well the items in a particular dimension of a scale fit together 
(Pett et aI, 2003). Within the validation literature this is commonly referred to as reliability 
but this differs from the use described above. 
Cronbach's alpha (<<): is widely used measure for assessing the internal consistency of a set 
of items (Pett et aI, 2003). 
Factor analysis can be used for theory and instrument development and assessing construct 
validity of an established instrument when administered to a specific population (Pett et aI, 
2003:3). Factor Analysis is a statistical technique widely used in psychology and social 
sciences. It is used for development and evaluation of instrument. There are two basic types 
of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory (Pallant, 2007). 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA): is used to identify how many factors (dimensions) are 
necessary to explain the interrelationships among a set of items (Pett et aI, 2003). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CF A): is used to assess the extent to which the 
hypothesized structure of identified factors (dimensions) fits the data (Pett et aI, 2003). 
AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structures): is a popular statistical package for undertaking 
structural equation modelling. It is a more recent package, because of its user-friendly 
graphical (Arbuckle, 2005). 
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rejected. These include: 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI): The 
goodness of fit index "is a measure of the relative amount of variances and covariances 
jointly accounted for by the model" (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986: 41). The closer the GFI is to 
1.00, the better is the fit of the model to the data. 
Chi-square test statistic: A fundamental measure of fit used in the calculation of many other 
fit measures. Conceptually it is a function of the sample size and the difference between the 
observed covariance matrix and the model covariance matrix. In the case of the chi-square 
statistic, smaller rather than larger values indicate a good fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
Root Mean Residual (RMR): is the mean absolute value of the covariance residuals. Its 
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variables. The closer RMR is to 0, the better the model fit. One sees in the literature such 
rules of thumb as that RMR should be < .10, or .08, or .06, or .05, or even .04 for a well-
fitting model (Hu & Bender, 1998). 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, Standardized RMR (SRMR): SRMR is the 
average difference between the predicted and observed variances and covariances in the 
model based on standardized residuals. The smaller the SRMR, the better the model fit. , 
SRMR = 0 indicates perfect fit. A value less than 0.05 is widely considered a good fit and 
below .08 adequate fit. In the literature one will find rules of thumb setting the cut-off at 
< .10, .09, .08, and even .05 (Schreiber et aI, 2006). 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI): Also known as the Bentler Comparative Fit Index. CFI 
compares the existing model fit with a null model which assumes the indicator variables (and 
he~ce also the latent variables) in the model are uncorrelated (the "independence model"). 
CFI should be equal to or greater than 0.90 to accept the model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA): is also called RMS or RMSE or 
discrepancy per degree of freedom. There is good model fit if RMSEA is less than or equal 
to 0.05. There is adequate fit if RMSEA is less than or equal to 0.08. More recently, it has 
suggested RMSEA ~.06 as the cut off for a good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
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Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) or Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI): a TU close to 1 indicates a 
good fit. Some authors have used a cut-off as low as 0.80, while others suggested it should 
be greater than 0.9 for a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Principle Axis Factoring: is "a method of identifying the relationship between these factors 
and the observed variables from the observed correlations between the variables" (Waterson 
et aI, 2009:3). 
Kaisers (eigenvalue >1) criterion: is "a method for deciding how many factors underlie the 
observed variables, based on extracting only factors that explain more variability than any 
single observed variable would" (Waters on et aI, 2009:3). 
Cattcll's screen plot: is "a method for deciding how many factors underlie the observed 
variables, based on using a plot to identify at which point subsequent extracted factors 
explain only spurious extra variability, and hence should not be retained" (Waterson et aI, 
2009:3). 
Oblique factor rotation: is used to aid interpretation of factors through rearranging the 
variance explained between them. It allows factors to be correlated when the expected 
underlying dimensions are probable to be related (Waterson et aI, 2009:3). 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO): measure of sampling adequacy ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.6 
suggested as the minimum value for a good factor analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
Factor loadings: are the correlations of the variables with the factors (Kline, 1994). 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with investigating the measurement of patient safety culture and the 
aim of the research is to identify a suitable tool for assessing the patient safety culture in 
Saudi hospitals. This chapter provides an overview of the subject matter of the thesis and the 
current study. It outlines the study, including the background, research problem, research 
question, research aim and objectives and the significance of the study. It also offers insights 
into the Saudi healthcare system and patient safety in Saudi hospitals. The thesis structure is 
also outlined. 
1.1 Background 
Healthcare organisations are considered to be high-risk environments in terms of safety 
incidents (Colla et aI., 2005). There are many interrelated factors that make healthcare a 
complex and risky process. These are organisational factors (e.g. policies and procedures), 
human factors (e.g. workforce and patients), and material factors (e.g. medical equipment). 
All of these factors might increase the probability of risk and errors which can cause 
significant harm to patients in this kind of environment. Therefore, patient safety is a very 
important issue in healthcare organisations as a means of preventing potential harm to 
patients that may result from healthcare delivery. 
The Institute of Medicine report (2000), To Err Is Human, estimated that between 44,000 to 
98,000 Americans die each year because of medical errors; this makes medical errors the 
eighth leading cause of death in the USA. In terms of cost, these medical errors translated 
into $29 billion annually in lost income, disability and health care costs. Since the 
publication of this report, patient safety has become an issue for discussion amongst 
healthcare providers. Healthcare organisations are generally showing a greater awareness of 
patient safety as a means of preventing the potential harm to the patients (Walshe and Boaden, 
2006). Different interrelated factors influence patient safety improvement such as people 
(workforce), working conditions and the processes of the healthcare system. Most of these 
factors are related to safety culture as an important element of patient safety measurement 
and improvement. 
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Many researchers have discussed the importance of assessing safety culture as a tool to 
improve patient safety in healthcare organisations (Nieva and Sorra, 2003; Singer et al., 2003; 
2007; Flin et al., 2006a). The UK Health and Safety Commission (1993) defined safety 
culture as: 
"The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety management. Organisations with 
a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual 
trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the 
efficacy of preventive measures" (HSC, 1993:23). 
An annual assessment of safety culture is considered a priority within patient safety goals of 
the USA's Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organisations (JCAHO) 
(Pronovost and Sexton, 2005). This indicates the importance of measuring and understanding 
safety culture to enhance patient safety in healthcare. A patient safety culture involves shared 
attitudes, values and norms of staff related to patient safety. It is characterized by a number 
of positive features such as open communication about safety problems, effective teamwork 
and management commitment to patient safety as top a priority (World Health Organisation, 
2008; Sorra and Dyer, 2010). It is widely agreed that patient safety culture can be assessed 
using patient safety climate questionnaire to assess workers' perceptions of patient safety 
climate in their healthcare organisations (Sexton et al., 2006; Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). 
However, although the measurement of patient safety climate by researchers and healthcare 
professionals is increasing (Kirk et al., 2006), there is limited research on the understanding 
of the measurement of patient safety climate and the usefulness of using different patient 
safety climate questionnaires in different contexts. There is a lack of provision of complete 
data relating to psychometric properties (validity and reliability) of patient safety climate 
questionnaires when applied in different contexts beyond their origin, such as USA 
healthcare contexts (Waterson et al., 2009). Therefore, this study focuses on the 
psychometric properties of the American Hospital Survey on Patient Culture (HSOPSC) 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and its suitability for use within the Saudi healthcare context. 
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1.2 Research problem 
Patient safety problems are a major concern for healthcare organisations around the world in 
both rich and poor countries (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). Healthcare organisations aim to care 
for patients in a safe manner and have made patient safety a top priority in their healthcare 
processes. Patient safety culture is considered as important area in the field of patient safety. 
The Institute of Medicine (lOM, 2000) proposed that healthcare organisations should focus 
closely on improving their patient safety culture. A number of tools are available for 
assessing patient safety culture in hospitals, one of the most common of which is patient 
safety climate questionnaires. 
Increasingly, there is an awareness of patient safety in Saudi Arabia; however, currently the 
problem is the lack of validated tools that are known to be suitable for assessing the patient 
safety culture in Saudi hospitals. Therefore this study is concerned with identifying a suitable 
tool for assessing patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. 
1.3 Research question 
Is there an existing patient safety culture measure that can be demonstrated to be a valid and 
reliable tool for use with the workforce in hospitals in Saudi Arabia? 
1.4 Research aim and objectives 
This study aims to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient safety culture for use in 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The main objectives of the study are: 
1. To select an appropriate questionnaire to assess hospital patient safety culture. 
2. To evaluate the face validity of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire. 
3. To assess the psychometric properties of the selected patient safety climate 
questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
4. To develop the most appropriate measure for assessing patient safety culture for use 
in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
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1.5 Significance of the study 
Saudi hospitals, like all hospitals worldwide, need to prioritise patient safety as an important 
issue and work towards improving it. However, there is limited research on patient safety 
culture in Saudi hospitals. In addition, there is a lack of patient safety climate questionnaires 
validated for use in the Saudi hospital context. This study seeks to contribute to the 
knowledge base by assessing the validity and reliability of an appropriate patient safety 
climate questionnaire for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. It is hoped that the knowledge 
generated will contribute to the scientific literature on the measurement of the patient safety 
culture, in particular in Saudi Arabia, thereby supporting the creation of a safer environment 
for patients in hospitals. Furthermore, this thesis is also intended to promote a greater 
understanding of the use of different patient safety climate questionnaires in different 
contexts, bearing in mind that some patient safety culture tools such as the HSOPSC have 
been used in many counties outside their original context in which they were developed 
(Smits et aI., 2008). 
1.6 The Saudi health care system 
Saudi healthcare services are provided through a number of government and private agencies. 
Healthcare services in Saudi Arabia, which started with limited resources and very small 
clinics, have been the subject of many development plans. The Saudi government has 
worked to improve the healthcare system by delivering healthcare services and developing 
polices and plans which aim to improve those services in the country. The healthcare system 
in Saudi Arabia can be described as a universal and comprehensive system which operates 
through many independent government and private health agencies that deliver primary, 
secondary and tertiary healthcare services (Roemer, 1991). 
The ministry of health operates as a national health service by delivering primary, secondary 
and tertiary care to the entire population. It is considered to be the lead government agency 
responsible for all aspects of the health care system. These responsibilities include financing, 
effective management, directing, planning and regulating of the entire health care system. It 
also supervises the healthcare services that are provided by the private sector (Statistics 
Directorate, 2009). 
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1.6.1 Patient safety in hospitals in Saudi Arabia 
Hospitals are considered to be the second line of treatment provision as they accept only 
referrals from primary care clinics or emergencies. Large numbers of hospitals are spread 
over the different parts of the country; more than 400 hospitals and a number of private 
clinics provide health care to around 26 million people (Statistics Directorate, 2009). These 
nationwide facilities employ around 500,000 people from more than 80 different countries 
(Alanazy, 2006). 
Saudi Arabia has modem hospitals equipped with advanced medical technology, and 
qualified medical staff and many of these hospitals are operated to American and Western 
standards. Many Saudi hospitals have received accreditation by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO), including the King Fahad Hospital 
National Guard in King Abdualsis. Medical City, King Fasial Specialist Hospital and 
Research Centre and King Fahad Medical City. The Saudi hospitals are characterised by 
features such as: 
1. The large size of the workforce. 
2. The wide variety of employees from different countries. 
3. The complexity of tasks that are performed especially advanced surgical procedures, 
for example open-heart surgery and organ transplant operations. 
4. The increasing number of patients, which leads to an increased workload. 
These factors may contribute to medical errors and, thus, threaten the safety of patients. 
Therefore, preventing medical error and keeping patients safe is a top priority in Saudi Arabia. 
Although the government of Saudi Arabia has not yet established a national patient safety 
organisation with responsibility for national patient safety policy, healthcare organisations are 
currently prioritising the provision of safe patient care (Alahmadi, 2010). On the whole, 
Saudi hospitals aim to provide safe and good quality healthcare. To this end, a number of 
patient safety and medical errors conferences have been held in various Saudi hospitals, for 
example, the Arab and Gulf Conference on Healthcare Quality and Safety 2009, under the 
slogan "Deep in the Challenges of Patient Safety" I. However, the research into patient safety, 
in particular patient safety culture is still in its early stages in the Saudi context. 
I 
www.hcqs.eu 
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1. 7 Thesis structure 
This thesis comprises eight chapters and appendices. The current chapter has presented a 
background to the research and an overview of the current study. Chapter two provides a 
review of the literature related to safety in organisations, specifically patient safety in 
healthcare organisations, safety culture and safety climate, and measurement of patient safety 
climate. Chapter three describes the methodology employed in the study. Chapter four 
describes the process of choosing an appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for use 
in the study. Chapter five describes the process of data collection by using the HSOPSC to 
collect the questionnaire data from the hospitals in Saudi Arabia. Chapter six reports the 
results of the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
in Saudi hospitals in Riyadh using Saudi data. Chapter seven discusses the research findings 
that emerged from this study whilst chapter eight presents an overall summary and the 
conclusion of the research. 
1.8 Summary 
Patient safety is an important aspect of healthcare. Patient safety culture assessment is a new 
field in the Saudi context and few studies have been published in Saudi Arabia on this critical 
component of patient safety. Therefore, the current study focuses on the assessment of 
patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals to identify a suitable questionnaire for measuring 
patient safety climate for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. In the next chapter, the relevant 
literature of patient safety culture assessment will be reviewed. 
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Chapter two: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature associated with 
organisational safety, safety culture and the measurement of patient safety climate. This 
chapter reviews relevant literature in relation to a patient safety culture assessment based on 
the measurement of patient safety climate using a patient safety climate questionnaire. The 
chapter is composed of five sections. After presenting a brief introduction, section 2.2 
discusses organisational safety in order to provide the background of safety in organisations, 
safety in healthcare organisations and patient safety in healthcare organisations. 
Section 2.3 discusses safety culture and safety climate. This section aims to provide an 
overview of safety culture, to discuss the debate on safety culture versus safety climate, and 
the assessment of safety culture with a focus on the patient safety culture in healthcare. 
Section 2.4 is concerned with the measurement of the patient safety climate in healthcare 
organisations including a discussion of the development and validation of patient safety . 
climate questionnaires, existing patient safety climate questionnaires and their characteristics 
and the selection of a suitable questionnaire for measuring patient safety climate. Section 2.5 
concludes with a brief summary of the literature review. 
2.2 Organisational safety 
This section focuses on the review of safety In organisations including healthcare 
organisations and patient safety including the background to patient safety, the importance of 
patient safety and patient safety failure in healthcare organisations. 
2.2.1 Safety in organisations 
Safety cannot be viewed as just the total lack of mistakes and an absence of errors, but that 
safety has multiple dimensions and many possible outcomes. Reason (1990) defines error as 
the failure of planned action to achieve an aim without an unexpected event happening or the 
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use of a wrong plan. This concept of error is a challenge for organisations (work 
environments) in tenns of causality and consequence. Safety is a major concern for 
organisations and has attracted much attention across a wide range of industries, including the 
nuclear energy field, chemical processing, aviation and health care settings. The primary goal 
of safety within organisations is to prevent accidents and injuries. Safety is important to the 
welfare of the workers and customers of organisations and it is essential to a safe organisation 
(Dalling, 1997). Safety is an issue for organisations therefore, safety measures are 
particularly important to assess safety performance. 
Considerable attention has been paid to the assessment of safety in high hazard industries 
such as aviation and nuclear energy. According to Weick et al. (1999) safety measures have 
moved from a focus on retrospective data of employee injuries and accidents to safety 
measures that focus on organizational, managerial and human factors rather than simply on 
technical failures that cause accidents in organisations. There are two main approaches to 
measuring safety performance: reactive (retrospective) and proactive (prospective). Reactive 
approaches are based on retrospective data (lagging indicators). In recent years there has 
been a movement away from relying on safety measures such as accident rate because it 
measures historical events of safety (past safety problems), towards pro active approaches that 
are based on the assessment of current safety culture (leading indicators) such as the 
measurement of safety climate (Flin et aI., 2000; Choudhry et aI., 2007). The proactive 
approach relies and focuses on current safety activities to determine system success rather 
than system failure (Cooper and Phillips, 2004). In this sense, the assessment of safety 
culture is categorized under the proactive approach of safety performance which relates to the 
measurement of safety climate. According to Cooper and Phillips (2004) both proactive and 
reactive approaches can help organisations to determine the effects of their safety activities. 
There are two types of failure identified in the safety literature, active and latent failures. 
Active failures can be classified as unsafe acts by someone whose actions can have an 
immediate and serious effect, they include: 
1. Slips or errors such as using the wrong tool. 
2. Failures of a cognitive nature, such as lapses in memory, lack of concentration and 
mistakes through ignorance or in accurate assessment of situation. 
3. Deviations from safe rules, operating practices, procedures, or standards. 
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A latent failure is seen as something that can remain inactive (invisible) for years before 
combining with an active failure to cause an accident. Many conditions lead to a latent 
failure, such as excessive workloads; lack of knowledge or experience; a stressful workplace; 
rapid change within an organisation; ineffective communication and poor leadership (Vincent 
et aI., 1998). 
Reason (1997, 1998) suggests that there are two kinds of accidents or errors that can happen 
in organisations: individual accidents and organisational accidents. There are two main 
approaches to investigate these accidents, the person approach and the system approach. The 
person approach places emphasis on blaming individuals for forgetfulness, loss of 
concentration, inattention, ethical weakness or other human attributes when they make errors. 
It concerns the actions of individual people when they do things wrongly. The system 
approach focuses on creating effective conditions under which individuals work and try to 
build defences in order to avoid errors or reduce their effects. In this approach, errors are 
viewed more as results of a problem rather than its causes. Moreover, this approach concerns 
not only the individual, but also the role of organisational factors (Reason, 2000). 
In this sense, errors in organisations usually happen due to poorly designed systems rather 
than poorly functioning human beings (I0M, 2000). The system approach to error is widely 
used in organisations and is becoming increasingly used in health care (Currie and Watt, 
2007). The best examples of the system approach are High Reliability Organisations (HROs). 
They expect the worst and prepare themselves to deal effectively with it throughout the 
organisation (Reason, 2000). HROs have professional team strategies to deal with problems 
when they arise in order to decrease the probability of error and manage unexpected events 
(Mckeon et aI., 2006). 
There has been a shift in focus within the safety literature away from individual level factors 
that might be responsible for accidents, such as error or non-compliance with safety 
procedures, towards organisational factors, such as safety climate (Reason, 1990). A 
literature review of safety identifies the factors that contribute to errors, such as lack of 
teamwork, communication, leadership and poor decision making (Flin and Yule, 2003; Yule 
et aI., 2006). All these factors tend to be related to the organisational level rather than the 
individual level. A number of studies showed that the majority of errors are caused by 
organisational factors. For example, Vincent et al. (2000) reported that organisational 
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problems such as deficiencies in training and supervision, and poor communication emerged 
as likely causal factors. Dean et al. (2002) identified organisational factors such as: work 
environment, workload, lack of knowledge and lack of team communication as contributory 
factors. 
The safety literature also emphasises the influence of organisational factors on measures of 
system safety, such as accidents and near misses (Hofinann et al., 1995; Hofmann and Stetzer, 
1998). Tomas et al. (1999) identified organisational factors such as organisational climate as 
a critical element involved in safety, training and education programmes, management 
attitude to safety as a top priority in organisation (work environment). All these factors seem 
to be important to the understanding accidents and play an important role in improving safety 
in the organisation of work. They (Tom as et al. 1999) argued that accidents in organisations 
are caused by unsafe actions by workers due to organisational factors (e.g. ineffective 
communication, weak leadership role, and unclear safety regulations) rather than human 
factors (e.g. lack of concentration, inattention and careless). 
A number of studies have also discussed organisational factors, such as safety climate. For 
example, Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) argued that safety climate is an organisational factor 
and it is proposed to influence safety performance by influencing the context within which 
workers and teams work. Neal et al. (2000) examined the effects of general organisational 
climate on safety climate as organisational factor and safety performance. They concluded 
that general organisational climate can influence perceptions of safety climate, and that these 
perceptions of safety climate influ~nce safety performance. Zohar (2002) argued that 
leadership style, concern for safety and safety priority as organisational factors influence 
safety performance of groups of workers in an organisation. Studies have highlighted the 
identification of organisational, managerial and environmental factors that influence accident 
causation (Oliver et al., 2002; Flin et al., 1996; Cheyne et al., 1998). Other factors identified 
as having an impact on error rates in work environment such as teamwork, communications, 
work environment workload and training (Helmriech, 2000; Mearns et al. 2001; Dean et al. 
2002). From the above it is clear that the organisational factors are important factors 
influencing safety performance within organisations. In general, safety is a very important 
issue in organisations, especially a high risk organisation such as healthcare organisations, 
where significant hazards often occur that could harm patients (Colla et al., 2005). 
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2.2.2 Safety in health care organisations 
Healthcare contains all the goods and services designed to promote health, including 
''preventive, curative and palliative interventions, whether directed to individuals or to 
populations" (World Health Organisation, 2000:6). Safety is a complex product consisting of 
the different integrated components of a system (people, job and organisation), particularly in 
complex environments such as healthcare organisations. Healthcare is concerned with 
preventing medical errors in order to provide safe and quality care for patients (Hudson, 
2003). At the same time, healthcare is considered to be a high risk industry because it 
involves high risk of morbidity and mortality of patients (Colla et aI., 2005). 
Safety in healthcare differs. from safety in other organisations in some aspects such as the 
nature of the services provided and the healthcare workers. Timely and effective use of 
healthcare services (preventive and treatment of illness) delivery can influence lives of 
patients. Healthcare workers are professionals who apply knowledge, adapt learned 
procedures, and use judgment at each step of the health care care process (Mary et aI., 2005). 
The health care process focuses on a patient who is the recipient of healthcare services and is 
the person at the centred of most safety discussions in healthcare. Moreover, there are a 
number of factors such as workload (increasing number of patients), different specialities 
with different characteristics (e.g. surgery and intensive care) and complex technology which 
may lead to unsafe practice within healthcare organisations. 
Incidents resulting from health care processes can harm both patients and staff, so safety in 
healthcare involves the safety of both healthcare workers (e.g. needle stick injuries, back 
injuries) and patients (safety events). Safety of staff and patients are very important in 
reducing the medical errors and injuries to both patients and workers (Flin, 2007). The IOM 
(2000) suggests that the healthcare system should be focused on patients in the right time, in 
an effective and fair way, with safety as the main aim. It suggests that organisations should 
creatively redesign their system to meet these aims. In particular, safety means that patients 
should not be injured by the healthcare they receive. It is thus necessary that healthcare 
providers should engage in patient safety. Patient safety outcomes are characterised by a 
decrease in medical errors and opportunities for risk, in other words, the result of minimizing 
medical errors and hazards (Flynn, 2004). 
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Unfortunately errors associated with healthcare cause significant hann to patients and 
increase the costs of healthcare (lOM, 2000). Consequently, patient safety is a very 
important issue and a goal for health care organisations in order to prevent hann happening to 
patients during the healthcare process. Patient safety will be examined in this study, in 
particular patient safety culture, and with a particular focus on the measurement of patient 
safety climate. 
2.2.3 Patient safety in health care 
Background 
Patient safety is a cornerstone of quality in health care (James and Thrall, 2004). Keeping 
patients safe is the responsibility of healthcare providers. Patient safety in healthcare 
organisations has developed in stages. By the late 1980s, the concept of patient safety 
emerged in Australia in 1987 with the establishment of the Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation (Runciman, 2002). Through the 1990s, researchers published a number of 
studies (for example, Brennan et aI., 1991 and Leape et aI., 1991) that highlighted the 
significance of patient safety to prevent errors or decrease their effects. Nevertheless, 
healthcare organisations did not seem to pay much attention to patient safety until the lOM 
published the report, 'To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System in 2000'. Since then, 
patient safety has gained importance and global awareness. The World Alliance for Patient 
Safety (2004) states that healthcare organisations should concentrate their efforts on 
preventing potential hann to patients which may result from unsafe healthcare practices. 
Patient safety definition and medical errors 
There are a number of definitions of the concept of patient safety. For example, the lOM 
(2000) defined patient safety as the condition of not having to receive an accidental injury 
due to medical care, or medical errors. The National Patient Safety Agency (2003) 
considered patient safety to be any incident which may cause hann to patients. These 
definitions or other definitions include some key tenns such as medical errors, adverse events 
and a near miss. Medical error is described as the failure of planned action to be completed 
as intended or the use of incorrect plan to achieve an aim (lOM, 2000). Reason (1990) 
defines error as the failure of planned action to achieve an aim without an unexpected event 
happening or the use of a wrong plan. 
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An adverse event is any injury whereby a patient is hanned by their care or treatment and is 
not due to the patient's disease or condition (Mohr et al., 2004). Some adverse events are 
preventable, while others are not. Adverse events that can be prevented and result in harm 
are classified as errors (Regenstein, 2004). A near miss is described as any unforeseen 
incident which could have potentially hanned a patient but was recovered in sufficient time 
before it did (Currie and Watt, 2007). 
Leape et al. (1993) have characterised the different kinds of medical errors as: 
1. Diagnostic, such as error or delay in diagnosis or misinterpretation of results. 
2. Treatment, such as incorrect procedure of an operation and error in the dose or drug. 
3. Preventive, such as ineffective follow-up of treatment plan. 
4. Other, such as lack of communication or equipment failure. 
These errors can lead to adverse events for patients and a waste of resources. Inevitably, the 
quality of healthcare is reduced and presents barriers to healthcare organisations in providing 
safe patient care. 
Importance of patient safety 
There is considerable evidence to show that errors in the healthcare field can cause significant 
hann to patients. For instance, in the USA it is estimated between 44,000 and 98.000 
hospitalised patients die annually due to medical error (I0M, 2000). In the UK, Vincent et al. 
(2001) examined the feasibility of detecting adverse events through record review in two 
British hospitals. They found 10.8% of patients experienced an adverse event. In Australia, 
the Quality in Australia Health Care Study in 1995 showed that 16.6% of all patients 
admitted to hospital had adverse events of which 51 % could be preventable (Wilson et al., 
1995). This percentage was reduced to 6.8% (Ehsani et al., 2006). This evidence highlighted 
that healthcare is a high risk environment and requires a focus on ensuring patient safety. 
Moreover, the significance of patient safety has now been recognised by healthcare 
organisations. 
In global terms, patient safety has become an important issue in many countries across the 
world. Patient safety is a worldwide problem affecting both rich and poor countries (Pittet 
and Donaldson, 2006). Consequently, a number of countries have established national 
patient safety agencies, for example, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in the U.K, 
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the National Steering Committee on Patient Safety (NSCPS) and the Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute in Canada, the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) 
in Australia, and the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) in the USA (Arah and 
Klazinga, 2004). 
Patient safety failure and medical errors 
As mentioned earlier, there are two approaches to investigate safety failure. In terms of 
patient safety failure, the person approach focuses on the actions of the individual and tends 
to blame them when things go wrong. This approach is based on a belief that freedom from 
error is possible. On the other hand, a system approach focuses on the chain of events 
leading up to an error. This approach is based on a belief that people are fallible so errors are 
expected to occur (Reason, 1997). 
Johnson (2004) reported that a number of organisational factors can play a significant role in 
patient safety failure such as a lack of communication or miscommunication, lack of attention 
to safety procedures, poor supervision, deficiency of care and concern, excessive workload, 
and shortage of staff for specified tasks. Patient safety research addresses a number of 
important issues that cause a threat to patient safety, such as breakdown in communication, 
leadership, teamwork, lack of awareness level, poor planning and decision-making (Flin and 
Yule, 2003; Yule et aI., 2006). In addition, impro:vement of patient safety requires focus on a 
number of elements, such as teamwork and organisational learning in the delivery of 
heaIthcare and concentrating on systems not just on individuals (Firth-Cozens, 2001). 
Threats to patient safety may arise from organisational factors (Amanda, 2006). The majority 
of these organisational factors relate to safety culture (Singer et aI., 2003). Healthcare 
organisations have been focused on the importance of safety culture as a way of improving 
the safety of patient care. The usefulness of safety culture assessment as a tool for improving 
safety of patient in health care organisations generated much discussion and research (Nieva 
and Sorra, 2003; Singer et aI., 2003; 2007; Pronovost and Sexton, 2005; Flin et aI., 2006 a). 
It appears that these studies have stressed in the importance of safety culture as a tool for 
enhancing patient safety in healthcare organisations. Safety culture refers to the shared 
employees' attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values in relation to safety (Cox and Cox, 
1991). This concept is discussed in detail in section 2.3. 
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It is widely accepted that safety culture is an important element in patient safety. The lOM 
report "To Err Is Human" concluded that "Health care organisations must develop a culture of 
. safety" (lOM 2000: 14). This is reflected in the way that national patient safety organisations 
are developing. For example, in the VK, the NPSA identifies building a safety culture as the 
first step of its seven steps guide to improving patient safety. Similarly, the Canadian 
Council on Health Services Accreditation (CCHSA) identifies safety culture as the first of 
five goals on patient safety (Fleming, 2005). 
Summary 
Safety is a concept that has attracted much attention across a wide range of industries. 
Organisational factors play a critical role in the state of safety in organisations. Those 
organisations with good safety may reflect organisational characteristics, such as good 
communication, management commitment to safety and organisational learning from errors. 
Safety in healthcare involves the safety of both healthcare workers and patients. Patient 
safety is increasingly recognised as an important issue and there is growing awareness of the 
importance of safety culture in order to improve patient safety in healthcare organisations. 
The next section will examine safety culture. 
2.3 Safety culture 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of safety culture, to discuss safety culture 
versus safety climate, and the assessment of safety culture. Lastly it focuses on patient safety 
culture in healthcare. 
2.3.1 Overview of safety culture 
The term safety culture originated from industrial engineering and has more recently been 
applied to healthcare. The concept of safety culture first appeared in 1986 following the 
Chemobyl nuclear power accident (Gadd and Collins, 2002). Since that time, it has received 
considerable attention in theoretical and research literature (e.g. Cox and Cox, 1991 ~ Pidgeon, 
1998; Lee et al.~ 2000; Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). The work of these studies and 
others are reviewed below. 
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The literature includes a number of definitions of safety culture. For example, Cox and Cox 
(1991) proposed that safety culture refers to the shared employees' attitudes, beliefs, 
perceptions, and values in relation to safety. Similarly, Pidgeon (1991) indicated that safety 
culture is the set of employees' beliefs, attitudes and practices that are concerned with 
handling risk and hazards in the workplace. Lee (1996) proposed that safety culture is related 
to the product of individual and group of values, attitudes and behaviours that detennine the 
commitment to safety in an organisation. Mearns et al. (1998) indicated that safety culture 
refers to the attitudes, values, nonns and beliefs that workers share with respect to risk and 
safety. 
These definitions point to common elements of safety culture. These commonalities include 
the shared attitudes and beliefs among members of an organisation, which impact on how 
workers perceive and act at work. This interpretation is supported by number of studies that 
indicated to a link between attitudes and beliefs in the workplace. Guldenmund (2000) and 
Hale (2000) proposed that the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by workers which 
detennine how they act and react in relation to safety and risk issues in organisations. 
Recently, Choudhry et al. (2007) review numerous definitions of safety culture and they 
conclude that these definitions tend to reflect the view that safety culture refers to the beliefs, 
attitudes and values of members of an organisation regarding safety. Furthennore, they claim 
that safety culture is something in an organisation (the beliefs, attitudes and values of workers 
with respect to safety) rather than something an organisation has (the structure, policies and 
practices to improve safety). The UK Health and Safety Commission (1993) produced the 
most widely accepted definition of safety culture as: 
"The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety management. Organisations with 
a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual 
trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the 
efficacy of preventive measures"(HSC, 1993 :23). 
This definition is comprehensive and covers a number of issues. Firstly, it includes the 
common elements of safety culture that were mentioned in other definitions of safety culture 
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which are workforce attitudes, perceptions and behaviours. Secondly, it highlights the 
characteristics of a positive safety culture (more details of the characteristics of a positive 
safety culture are discussed below). Most importantly, this definition can easily be adapted to 
the context of patient safety in healthcare and patient safety culture as it covers dimensions 
assessed by patient safety climate questionnaires (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). 
It seems that the commonalities across most of definitions are to do with attitude and 
behaviour being important elements of safety culture in organisations. These common 
elements refer to the psychological aspect of safety culture in terms of how workers perceive 
and act towards safety and risk issues in organisation. This aspect refers to highly related 
concept known as safety climate. Safety climate is most commonly assessed by safety 
climate questionnaires to measure workforce attitudes and perceptions of safety (Gadd and 
Collins, 2002). 
Although safety climate is a measurable aspect of safety culture, there are other aspects of 
safety culture. The literature focuses on the three aspects of safety culture as identified by 
Cooper (2000): situational, behavioural and psychological. A number of qualitative and 
quantitative tools are available for measuring these different aspects of safety culture. The 
situational aspect of safety culture focuses on the structure of organisations such as working 
policies and procedures, whilst the behavioural aspect can be evaluated through various 
measures, such as self-report measures, outcome measures and observations. Finally, the 
psychological aspect relates to people's norms, values, attitudes and perceptions of safety in 
their workplace, which is the aspect most commonly measured by safety climate 
questionnaires. Similarly, Lee and Harrison (2000) proposed that safety culture is expressed 
as the product of multiple interactions between people (psychological), functions 
(behavioural) and organisations (contextual). Fernandez-Muniz et a1. (2007) indicated that 
safety culture can be viewed as a part of the organisational culture that refers to the 
individuals, jobs, and organisational characteristics that affect employees' health and safety 
in workplace. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that safety culture is a comprehensive concept that reflects the 
interaction between workers and activities with regard to safety issues. It consists of 
common elements referring to the shared employees' attitudes, beliefs, behaviours, and 
perceptions towards safety issues in the workplace. These elements refer to the psychological 
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aspect of safety culture in terms of how workers perceive and act towards the state of safety 
of an organisation which is called safety climate. The importance of safety culture in relation 
to improving safety in organisations is discussed below. 
Importance of safety culture 
Safety culture plays an important role in ensuring that the work environment is safe (Clarke, 
2003). It can be regarded as a fundamental and important aspect of an organisation's ability 
to manage the safety of its operations (Cox and Flin, 1998; Cox and Cheyne, 2000). A series 
of major accidents such as the Chernobyl disaster, the King's Cross underground fire in 
London and the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion in the North Sea, highlighted the role of 
safety culture in improving workplace safety rather than concentrating on technical issues and 
individual human failures to prevent accidents. Poor safety culture was found to be a key 
contributory factor in all these accidents (Pidgeon, 1998). 
A poor safety culture is characterised by a number of features, such as barriers to 
organisational learning from previous mistakes, absence of an incident reporting system and 
teamwork failure (e.g. lack of commitment and support from management to safety, 
breakdown in communication between workers and lack of coordination and communication 
at different levels of members of organisation) (Johnson, 2002). Helmreich (2000) pointed 
out that a breakdown in teamwork and communication has been identified as major factor in 
aviation accidents. 
Mearns and Flin (1999) have identified important factors that contribute to accidents and near 
misses such as: employee experience; knowledge, skills and attitudes to safety; work 
environment and nature of tasks; safety culture and the safety management system. They 
also indicate that management commitment to safety has an effect on workers perceptions of 
safety issues. Cox and Flin (1998) argue that management's commitment to safety issues is 
essential to the overall state of safety in organisations. 
The perceived importance of safety culture in preventing accidents and improving safety in 
complex and high-risk systems such as aviation, chemical and nuclear industries, and 
healthcare, has resulted in an increased numbers of studies examining safety culture (Cooper, 
2000; Guldenmund, 2000). As a result, the World Health Organisation (2006) has 
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emphasized the importance of safety culture In decreasing medical errors and keeping 
patients safe in healthcare organisations. 
A number of industries have shown an interest in safety culture as a means of reducing 
accidents in the work environment (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007). Safety culture is a very 
important issue in relation to safety in the work environment at all levels of an organisation, 
individuals, teams and management. The commitment and actions of management in relation 
to safety issues are important aspects of safety culture and have an effect on the perceptions 
of work force with regard to safety. Jointly, management and the workforce can minimise the 
number of accidents and improve the state of safety within an organisation. Thus, safety 
culture can be considered an important management tool in identifying workforce beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviours towards safety in the workplace (Beck and Woolfson, 1999). 
Safety culture can be good or poor depending on the way in which safety is managed and to 
what extent the safety culture dimensions are operating in the work environment (Pidgeon, 
1998). Ostrom et al. (1993) argue that the safety culture of an organisation may be 
influenced by values and beliefs of its leaders. Moreover, in an organisation with a good 
safety culture, the management encourages workers to report errors, pay attention to safety 
issues and to minimise risk in the work environment, and supports safe work practices. 
Overall, safety culture influences safety practices in the work place. A poor safety culture is 
a significant risk factor that can threaten the state of safety in organisations. A good (positive) 
safety culture is a key factor that can improve safety in organisations. The characteristics of 
positive safety culture will be discussed in the next section. 
Characteristics of positive safety culture 
There is a large body of research evidence to suggest that a positive safety culture may help 
to enhance the state of safety of an organisation (Gadd and Collins, 2002). Vecchio-sudus 
and Griffiths (2004) argued that developing and maintaining a positive safety culture can be 
an effective tool for improving the state of safety in an organisation. 
A positive safety culture is defined as: 
"A set of values, perceptions, attitudes and patterns of behaviour with regard to safety 
shared by members of the organisation; as well as a set of policies, practices and 
procedures relating to the reduction of employees' exposure to occupational risks, 
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implemented at every level of the organisation, and reflecting a high level of concern 
and commitment to the prevention of accidents and illnesses." (Fernandez-Muniz et 
aI., 2007:628). 
According to Ostrom et al. (1993) the aim of a positive safety culture is to create a climate, in 
which employees are aware and concerned about the risks and safety in their workplace in 
order to maintain the state of safety, avoid any unsafe actions, and to prevent accidents. Cox 
and Cox (1991) argue that the workforce's attitudes and perceptions of safety constitute the 
most important aspect of safety culture. 
A number of earlier studies have discussed the characteristics of positive safety culture. For 
example, Zohar (1980) mentioned a number of characteristics of positive safety culture such 
as the priority given to safety by management and workers; the importance of the reporting of 
incidents and open lines of communication between management and employees as being 
related to good safety practices and performance. According to Pidgeon (1991), positive 
attitudes to safety among the workforce are a reflection of good safety culture in the work 
environment. 
Reason (1997) argued that the characteristics of a positive safety culture are justice (no 
blame), flexibility (to adopt changes for safety), learning (learn from errors) and systematic· 
(have a system to manage hazards). Dalling (1997) reported a number of characteristics of a 
positive safety culture such as: encouraging workers to anticipate and manage risks and 
threats to safety; improving working practices and continuing to improve safety; concern and 
commitment to safety as a top priority at all levels of workforce; learning from mistakes and 
open communication. Clarke (1998) proposed that the key characteristics of positive safety 
culture which improve safety in organisations are: management's commitment and support 
for safety, encouraging workers to report incidents (no blame culture), improving 
communication based on open and honest communication, enhancing levels of trust between 
workers. 
Clarke (1999) argued that a positive safety culture is a result of a number of factors such as: 
good communication between staff and management, agreement across all levels of the 
organisation on the importance of safety and confidence amongst workers that safety 
measures are adequate. 
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Recently, a number of studies discussed the characteristics of positive safety culture. For 
example, Leape and Berwick (2000) stated that leadership, communication and preventive 
safety measures are positive characteristics of safety culture. Hale (2000) identified a number 
of characteristics for a positive safety culture, these include safety as a top priority, 
importance of safety, participation of workers at all levels, trust and cooperation among staff, 
communication openness and continues safety improvement. Sorensen (2002) identifies a 
positive safety culture as including good communication, organisational learning and 
management's commitment to safety. According to Pronovost et al. (2003) the 
characteristics of a positive safety culture include management commitment to discuss and 
learn from errors, encouraging teamwork, reporting and analysing errors, documenting and 
improving safety and encouraging employees to improve safety. Harvey et al. (2004) refer to 
the importance of managements' commitment to safety; leadership and communication are 
basic factors that constitute a positive safety culture. Kirk et al. (2006) identified a number of 
characteristics of a positive safety culture as follows: 
1. The shared perceptions of workers regarding the importance of safety. 
2. Good communication among workers based on mutual trust and openness. 
3. The smooth flow of information within the team. 
4. Leadership playing a role in giving direction for safe practice. 
S. Effective preventive (safety) measures being applied. 
6. Latent threats or causes that might lead to accidents being pro actively identified. 
7. Organisational learning. 
8. Recognition that errors cannot always be avoided or stopped from happening. 
9. The adoption of incident reporting and analysis instead of blame and a punitive 
culture. 
Choudhry et al. (2007) noted that a positive safety culture compromises five characteristics 
which include management commitment to safety, management concerns for the workers, 
mutual trust between management and workers, workforce empowerment and continues 
improvement of safety in workplace. It is argued that an organisation's positive safety 
culture reflect a number of dimensions such as senior management commitment to safety, 
organisational learning (feedback and learning from mistakes), safety as a top priority and 
leadership (Pidgeon and O,leary, 2000). 
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In general, it seems that there is wide agreement acros~ the majority of earlier and more 
recent studies regarding some of the common characteristics of positive safety culture. 
Review of these 13 studies (see footnote2) shows that there are some common characteristics: 
1 Open and honest communication between workers (mentioned in ten studies). 
2 Priority given to safety by management and workers of organisation (importance of 
safety in organisations) (mentioned in nine studies). 
3 Management commitment to safety (mentioned in eight studies). 
4 Importance of reporting incidents and analysing them and giving feedback (mentioned 
in six studies). 
5 Organisational learning to learn from errors (mentioned in six studies). 
6 Teamwork (trust and cooperation among staff) (mentioned in five studies). 
7 No blame culture (mentioned in four studies). 
8 Effective leadership role (mentioned in three studies). 
The presence of these factors creates effective conditions which help workers to improve 
safety and avoid errors in work environment. In other words, all these characteristics create a 
positive safety culture that prevents accidents and maintains good safety within organisations 
(Clarke, 2003). It appears that a positive safety culture is characterised by organisational 
factors that play an important role in safety in organisations and most of these organisational 
factors have led to greater focus on safety climate as a related concept to the safety culture in 
organisations. Safety climate is an organisational factor that can influence safety 
performance (Hofinann and Stetzer, 1996; Flin et aI., 2006a). 
However, there is considerable debate in the literature regarding the relationship between 
safety culture and safety climate (Cox and Flin, 1998; Flin et aI., 2000). A number of authors 
(e.g. Cox and Flin, 1998, Mearns and Flin, 1999) proposed that there is considerable overlap 
between the concepts, causing confusion for the reader, and this is evidenced by the fact that 
the two terms are highly related and often used interchangeably. According to Glendon and 
Stanton's (2000) argument that safety culture and safety climate are at an early development 
stage, it is appropriate to recognise the difference between the concepts of safety culture and 
2 Zohar, 1980; Pidgeon, 1991; Reason, 1997; Dating, 1997; Clarke, 1998; Clarke, 1999; Leape and Berwick, 
2000; Hale, 2000; Sorensen, 2002; Pronovost, 2003; Harvey et aI., 2004; Kirk et aI., 2006; Choudhry et aI., 
2007. 
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safety climate, which have elements in common. The following section is concerned with the 
relationship between safety culture and safety climate. 
2.3.2 Safety culture and safety climate 
The concept of safety culture is derived from extensive research on organisational culture and 
climate. Therefore, terms such as culture, climate, organisational culture, and organisational 
climate play a role in defining and describing the relationship between safety culture and 
safety climate (Gonzalez-Roma et aI., 1999). The following section discusses the distinctfon 
between the two concepts, culture and climate. 
Culture versus climate 
Although definitions of culture and climate tend to be similar, the term culture is generally 
seen as more comprehensive than climate. Culture can be seen as the set of values, beliefs 
and expectations that a group of people come to share (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). 
Culture describes the shared corporate values within an organisation, which influence the 
attitudes and behaviours of its members. Safety culture is a part of the overall culture of the 
organisation and is seen as affecting the attitudes and beliefs of members in terms of health 
and safety performance (Cooper, 2000). Helmreich and Merritt (1998) describe culture as 
mixture of values and beliefs that guide the behaviours of members in an organisation. 
Pronovost and Sexton (2005:1) state that: 
"Culture commonly refers to values, attitudes, norms, beliefs, practices and 
behaviours of personnel. In essence, culture is the way we do things around here, 
whereby the word here refers not to hospital, but rather to a particular work unit". 
On the other hand, climate can be defined as the sum of workers' perceptions about 
organisation (J ames et aI., 1978). Climate refers to the shared perceptions of workers of an 
organisation at a discrete point in time (Cox and Cheyne, 1999). Denison (1996) debated the 
differences and similarities between culture and climate. He concluded that culture refers to 
deep structure based on the values, beliefs and assumptions of the members of an· 
organisation, whilst climate refers to a state that links to the thoughts, feelings and 
perceptions of the members of an organisation. Denison (1996) further claimed that culture 
must be measured using qualitative approaches, whereas climate can be measured using 
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quantitative methods such as questionnaires. Cooke and Rousseau (1998) reviewed a number 
of definitions of culture and climate and concluded that most of the culture definitions are 
concerned with values, beliefs and attitudes that members come to share. In contrast, climate 
definitions tend to take into consideration the perceptions of members regarding the 
organisation in which they work. According to Gonzales et al. (1999) culture contains values, 
beliefs and underlying assumptions, while climate refers to a descriptive measure reflecting 
the workforce's perceptions of the organisational atmosphere. Clarke (2003) argued that 
culture refers to the deeper values and norms that influence thinking and action, whereas 
climate is more superficial and concerned with perceptions of the work setting. 
It appears that culture and climate are not clearly distinct and the terms are used 
interchangeably by a number of studies (Glendon and Stanton, 2000). Culture refers to the 
deep values and beliefs (deep structure of organisations) while climate refers to the 
employees' perceptions and norms and a measurable aspect of the work environment of 
organisations (policies, procedures and practices). The culture and climate of an organisation 
influence the practice of members in that organisation (Denison, 1996; Zohar, 2003). The 
relationship between organisational culture and organisational climate has also been debated. 
This is addressed in the following section. 
Organisational culture and organisational climate 
A number of studies have discussed the relationship between organisational culture and 
organisational climate. For example, Moran and Volkwein (1992) examined the distinctions 
between the two concepts and they conclude that organisational climate links to 
organisational culture as an element of organisational culture that is present when the 
members of an organisation act together when dealing with situations that may arise. 
Guldenmund (2000) notes that ·organisational climate refers to member's attitudes, 
perceptions and behaviour of organisational features, whereas organisational culture has been 
defined as the values, beliefs, and assumptions shared by members of an organisation and 
which is more encompassing than organisational climate. Organisational culture is assessed 
through qualitative tools, such as observations and interviews, whereas organisational climate 
can be measured by using self-administered questionnaires. According to Glendon and 
Stanton (2000) organisational climate is usually regarded as being more superficial than 
organisational culture in that it addresses the current state of an organisation. 
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According to Neal et al. (2000:100): 
"Safety climate is a specific form of organisational climate. which describes 
individual perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment" 
It appears that organisational climate can influence perceptions of safety climate and these 
perceptions can influence safety performance. Arezes and Miguel (2003) argued that safety 
culture is deeply related to organisational culture. In general, organisational culture a~d 
organisational climate are considered to be closely related concepts and safety culture and 
safety climate are elements of these two integrated concepts. As mentioned earlier, there is 
considerable debate regarding the relationship between safety culture and safety climate in 
the relevant literature and the relationship between them is unclear. 
Several researchers have pointed out that safety culture is used together with safety climate. 
For example, Cox and Flin (1998) argued that safety climate is often used together with 
safety culture, without making a clear distinction between the two concepts. They argued 
that there is a need to create a clear understanding of the relationship between two terms. 
Meams and Flin (1999) argued that although the two terms are often interchangeable and 
related, they are not exactly the same and this should be considered therefore they should be 
used with caution. According to Fleming (2005) it is accepted that the two concepts are 
closely related and the safety climate consists of the surface elements of the safety culture 
and can be measured by using safety climate questionnaire. 
It seems that the relationship between safety culture and safety climate is unclear because the 
two terms are highly related. However, it would appear that it is possible to distinguish 
between the two terms through reviewing their definitions, dimensions and assessment. The 
following subsections outline how safety culture and safety climate have been defined and 
what the dimensions of each concept are in the safety literature. 
Safety culture definitions and dimensions 
As mentioned earlier several definitions of safety culture can be found within the literature. 
Most of the safety culture definitions indicate that safety culture is part of organisational 
culture and that it concerns the shared values, beliefs and attitudes of members of an 
organisation to safety issues (Cox and Cox, 1991). It is argued that a positive safety culture 
is one in which all staff, from top level management to individual workers, are committed to 
work safely and to contribute positively to their own safety and that of others within an 
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organisation (Dalling, 1997). The dimensions of safety culture are addressed in the following 
section. 
Safety culture dimensions 
The dimensions of safety culture have been described in a number of studies (e.g. Brown and 
Holmes, 1986; Cooper and Philips, 2004). The dimensions relate to the perceived 
significance of safety to job behaviour, perceived management commitment towards safety, 
perceived commitment of workers to safety', and importance of safety training. Sorensen 
(2002) appears to agree that the dimensions of safety culture include management's 
commitment to safety, good communications, organisational learning and effective leadership 
role. Singer and colleagues (2003) identified the following safety culture dimensions: 
1 A high level of organisation's commitment to safety, this commitment is translated 
into shared values and beliefs amongst all members of organisation. 
2 Availability of resources to support a commitment to safety. 
3 Safety as a top priority: priority of safety versus production. 
4 Communication between employees and across different levels and units of 
organisation. 
5 Openness about problems and errors: reporting errors. 
6 Frequency of unsafe practice is rare. 
7 Organisational learning: learning from errors. 
A number of studies indicates that safety culture is a multi dimensional concept for example, 
the importance of management commitment to safety, the actions to improve safety 
performance, the importance of communication between workers and management, good 
reporting system including reporting and analysing incidents, the policies and procedures of 
work and the importance of the participation of the workforce in safety (workers involvement 
in safety) (Parker et al., 2006; Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007). 
Safety climate definitions 
Several definitions of safety climate can be found within the relevant literature. Zohar 
(1980:96) defines safety climate as: 
"A summary o/perceptions that employees share about their work environments" 
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According to Cooper and Philips (1994) safety climate refers to the shared perceptions and 
beliefs of the workers regarding the state of safety in their work environment. According to 
Mearns and Flin (1999) safety climate refers to the perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of 
workers related to hazards and safety issues in organisation. Safety climate refers to 
employee perceptions regarding their organisation's commitment to safety issue in order to 
maintain safe work practices (Robyn et al., 2000). Safety climate is a snapshot of the state of 
safety that can be viewed as an accurate indicator of the organisation's safety culture as 
perceived by workers (Flin et al., 2000). 
It seems that there is a degree of overlap between the definitions of safety culture and safety 
climate (M earns and Flin, 1999) and the two terms are highly related. Most definitions of 
safety culture present a view of shared attitudes and behaviours of employees about safety 
issues in an organisation. Jointly, most definitions of safety climate present a view of shared 
attitUdes and perceptions of employees about safety issues in an organisation. 
Safety culture is a part of the overall culture of the organisation and is seen as attitudes and 
behaviours of workers in terms of safety performance (Cooper, 2000). Safety climate is a 
part of the overall climate of the organisation and is seen as attitudes and perceptions of 
workers in terms of safety performance (Neal et al., 2000). Safety climate is considered as a 
measurable aspect of safety culture. It is argued that safety climate is related to the current 
surface features of safety culture which are determined by the employees' attitudes and 
perceptions at given point of time (Flin et al., 2000; Cox and Cheyne, 2000). These 
perceptions are derived from interactions with staff and different levels of management such 
as supervisors and top management level, policies and procedures and work practices (Mary 
et al., 2005). 
In conclusion safety climate is a snapshot of the state of safety providing a clear picture of 
underlying safety culture of workplace (Mearns and Flin, 1999; Flin et al., 2000). Cox and 
Flin (1998) proposed that safety climate is the preferred term when using psychometric 
questionnaire studies as the measurement tool. Similarly Mearns et al. (1998) suggested that 
a safety climate questionnaire is appropriate for assessing workforces' perceptions regarding 
the surface features of safety culture at a given point in time as a snapshot of safety culture. 
Sexton et al. (2006) indicated that safety climate is a measurable aspect of safety culture and 
can be assessed by safety climate questionnaire to assess frontline workers perceptions 
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toward safety issues in organisations. Safety climate questionnaire can be used to assess 
workforce perceptions of procedures and behaviours in their work environment that indicate 
the priority given to safety relative to other organisational goals. Safety climate questionnaire 
can assesses a range of different dimensions (Zohar, 1980; Flin et al., 2006b). 
Safety climate dimensions 
The dimensions of safety climate have been examined in a number of studies. For example, 
Brown and Holmes (1986) found that management commitment to safety and safety activities 
are key dimensions of safety climate. Similarly, Dedobbeleer (1991) found management 
commitment to safety and workers involvement as a key dimension of safety climate across 
ten safety climate instruments. Flin et al. (2000) found that the most commonly assessed 
dimensions across 18 safety climate questionnaires concerned management commitment to 
safety, the safety system in relation to procedures and practices, probability of risk, work 
stress and professionalism of workers (workers' knowledge and skills). Robyn et al. (2000) 
identified a number of safety climate dimensions such as senior management support for 
safety, good communication among staff members, feedback and preventing barriers to safe 
work practices. Cheyne et al. (2002) identified that communication, safety rules and goals, 
workers involvement and physical work environment should be considered as safety climate 
dimensions. 
Flin et al. (2006b) reviewed 12 studies of safety climate in healthcare and found common 
safety climate dimensions such as management support and commitment to safety, 
communication and feedback, reporting incidents, teamwork, rules and procedures of work, 
risk perception and safety attitudes of workers, organisational factors and safety system. It is 
worth noting that the safety climate dimensions emphasise the dimensions at a system level 
rather than an individual level. These include the importance of management support to 
safety, communication among employees and different units in workplace, feedback about 
errors, organisational learning, communication openness and reporting errors. 
From the examples of safety climate definitions and dimensions above, safety climate refers 
to the shared perceptions of work members to improve safety and it may be regarded as a key 
indicator and measurable aspect of safety culture that arise from employees' perceptions of 
organisations. The concept of safety climate includes all levels of organisation: management, 
team and individual. 
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The most notable dimensions of safety climate are management commitment to safety, 
i 
workers involvement, reporting system, organisational learning; communication openness, 
and feedback about error, and teamwork across different units in work environment. In short, 
safety climate dimensions enhance the state of safety in the work environment when most of 
these dimensions work in effective way (Mearns et aI., 1998). Each dimension has a specific 
function and aim impacting on safety climate and safety performance. 
There is a large body of research describing safety climate dimensions. For example, 
management commitment to safety is described as the perceptions of management 
commitment to safety issues in organisations (Abdullah et aI., 2009). Management 
commitment to safety has been described as a management support and positive actions in 
order to enhance safety in organisation (Health and Safety Executive, 2007). Havold and 
Nesset (2008) described communication as interaction and an effective information exchange 
between management and workforce about safety and risk in the work environment. Open 
communication means exchanging information between units of organisation honestly and 
smoothly (Hsu et aI., 2007). Reporting system describes the willingness of workers to give 
details about safety issues and those workers must be given feedback about errors for learning 
purposes (Health and Safety Executive, 2005). 
Employee involvement refers to how employees in all levels participate in improving safety 
(Fernands-Muniz, 2007), while organisational learning is related to getting feedback and 
learning from errors that happened in organisation. Teamwork means workers look out for 
each other and trust each other and it consists of attitudes, knowledge and skills of workers 
towards safety and concerns (Kaissi et aI., 2003). Non punitive culture means whether are 
workers willing to report errors without fear of punishment for making mistakes (Weingart et 
aI., 2004). However, it is known that poor performance in relation to safety climate 
dimensions such as lack of communication, lack of attention to safety procedures, workload 
and breaks in continuity of care leads to increased errors in organisation (Yassi and Hancock, 
2005). 
In summary, safety climate may be regarded as a clear picture, a current surface picture and a 
measurable aspect of safety culture. It appears that using a safety climate questionnaire is a 
useful measurement of an organisation's safety climate to provide a clear picture of the 
current state of safety. The assessment of safety culture is addressed in the following section. 
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The assessment of safety culture 
As mentioned earlier, safety culture consists of three components: psychological, situationa1 
and behavioural. It is important to mention that methods such as peer reviews, performance 
indicators and audit can be used to assess safety culture in a comprehensive way (Lee and 
Harrison, 2000). The psychological aspects of safety culture are concerned with workers' 
perceptions and actions toward safety issues in organisations (Kirk et al., 2006). This aspect 
of safety culture is a measurable aspect which is related to safety climate. In reality safety 
culture assessment tools that assess the psychological aspect of safety culture are measuring 
safety climate. 
Zohar, (1980) suggested that safety climate questionnaires produce a clear picture of an 
individual's safety climate at a group or organisationa11evel. Safety climate questionnaires 
assess surface features of safety culture to produce a clear picture of safety culture in terms of 
what the workforce do regarding safety, while the deeper layer of safety culture requires 
qualitative methods such as observations' and in-depth interviewing to investigate deep 
features in relation to workforces' safety practices (Cooper, 2000). Cox and Cheyne 
(2000:114) proposed that: 
"Assessment of safety climate is used as an indicator of overall of safety culture". 
Flin et al. (2006b) argue that safety climate can be regarded as the surface (external) features 
of the underlying safety culture and it can be used to assess workforce perceptions of 
procedures and behaviours in their workplace that indicate the priority given to safety in 
relation to other organisational goals. Thus, an evaluation of safety culture can be based on 
measuring safety climate primarily through the use of questionnaire surveys. 
Evidence from numerous studies demonstrates that questionnaires are a useful tool for 
measuring safety climate to provide a clear picture of the state of safety in organisations 
through assessing the perceptions of the workforce at a particular time (Mearns et al., 2003; 
F1in et al., 2006b; Gu1denmund 2007). It is widely accepted that safety culture assessment is 
based on measuring safety climate by using safety climate questionnaire to assess workers' 
perceptions of safety climate in their organisations (Flin, 2007). 
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A number of studies identify benefits of using a safety climate questionnaire for assessing 
safety culture. For example, Baily and Peters en (1989) concluded that safety climate 
questionnaires are useful because measuring safety culture by traditional methods such as 
safety review and audits is not enough and not effective. Safety climate questionnaire is 
effective method to assess employee perceptions, to identify weakness and strengths areas of 
safety culture and by using the data of safety climate questionnaire can effectively identify 
improvements of safety culture. 
Similarly, Ostrom et al. (1993) agreed with the conclusion of Baily and Petersen that the 
safety climate questionnaire is a valuable tool to assess safety culture. According to Kho et al. 
(2005) the self-administered questionnaire can help in understanding institutional perceptions 
of safety culture as an efficient way to ask standardized questions of all respondents 
concurrently and anonymously. Guldenmund (2007) agreed that the use of safety climate 
questionnaires is an effective approach in safety culture assessment in terms of assessing 
workforce perceptions towards safety issues in organisation. Safety climate questionnaires 
are used to assess safety culture in different organisations such as aviation, nuclear power, 
. petrochemicals and Medicine (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). 
It is widely accepted that, the relationship between safety climate and safety culture is closely 
related and they are integrated concepts. After reviewing the relevant literature on safety 
culture and safety climate table 2-1 is presented to summarize some of the differences and 
similarities between safety culture and safety climate. 
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Table 2-1 Differences and similarities between safety culture and safety climate 
Differences Safety culture Safety climate 
and 
similarities 
Background Has been discussed since Chernobyl disaster in 1986 Introduced in 1980 (Zohar, 1980). 
(Cox and Flin, 1998). 
Definition Safety culture refers to the shared employees' 
attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values towards 
safety (Cox and Cox, 1991). 
Components Psychological (relates to people's norms, values, 
attitudes and perceptions), situational (relates to 
policies and procedures), and behavioural 
(qualification, knowledge and pattern of behaviour) 
components (Cooper, 2000). 
Dimensions 
(the most 
common 
dimensions) 
Assessment 
Other 
considered 
points 
Such as: 
1 Importance of safety 
2 Management commitment to safety 
3 Communication between workers and 
across organisationall~vels. 
4 Reporting system 
5 Organisational learning. 
It could be assessed by measure safety climate. 
Safety culture is usually measured in industry by 
workforce questionnaire survey to assess what is 
called safety climate (Flin et aI., 2006 b). 
Safety culture is a part of organisational culture. 
Attitudes are corner stone of culture (M earns and 
Flin, 1999). Safety culture is more stable than safety 
climate and resistant to change (M earns et aI., 1998). 
Psychological aspect of safety culture is related to 
safety climate. Organisational safety culture is a 
measure of common thoughts, behaviours, and 
beliefs. Safety culture highlights deep features (Cox 
and Flin, 1998). Positive safety culture 
characterised by communication founded on mutual 
trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive measures (HSC, 1993 :23). 
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Is a snapshot of the surface features of 
state of safety resulting from the 
workforce's perceptions attitudes and 
beliefs about risk and safety issues 
(M earns and Flin, 1999). 
Safety climate refers to workforces' 
perceptions of practices, policies and 
procedures relating to safety within 
organisation (Neal and Griffin, 2002). 
Such as: 
1 Management commitment to 
safety 
2 Workers involvement 
3 Communication and feedback 
about error 
4 Teamwork 
5 Organisational learning 
6 Reporting system 
Measured by workforce questionnaire to 
give a snapshot of the current state of 
safety (Mearns and Flin, 1999). 
Safety climate is a part of organisational 
climate. Perceptions are basis of climate 
(M earns and Flin, 1999). Safety climate 
is a measure of individual perceptions or 
feelings about organisation. Safety 
climate is a measurable aspect of safety 
culture (Wiegmann et aI., 2002). Safety 
climate measurement is based on 
workforce perceptions. Safety climate 
highlights surface features of safety 
culture (Cox and Flin, 1998). Positive 
safety climate characterised by a shared 
commitment of care and concern towards 
safety (Cooper and Philips, 2004). 
In summary, safety culture reflects the deep values, attitudes and beliefs of members of 
organisation regarding safety and risk issues. It widely agreed that sa.fety culture is nonnally 
assessed by workforce questionnaire to measure safety climate. Safety climate reflects 
members' perceptions of safety and risk issues in their organisation. Safety climate is usually 
measured by questionnaire and providing a picture of safety culture in tenns of assessing 
workforce perceptions towards risk and safety issues at that point in time in an organisation. 
Safety culture assessment is increasingly recognised as an important factor to improve patient 
safety in healthcare organisation (Pronovost et al., 2003; Pronovost and Sexton, 2005). 
Therefore, the current study focuses on patient safety culture assessment and its role in 
improving patient safety. The following section discusses patient safety culture in healthcare 
organisations. 
2.3.3 Patient safety culture 
In healthcare organisations safety culture assessment is increasingly a critical element for 
improving patient safety (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). The significance of safety culture in 
preventing medical errors and improving patient safety has led to an increasing number of 
studies that discuss and assess safety culture in complex organisations such as healthcare and, 
in particular, in hospitals (Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). Healthcare organisations are 
increasingly aware of the importance of patient safety culture in order to enhance patient 
safety through the measurement of patient safety climate. Measuring patient safety climate in 
healthcare helps to diagnose the underlying patient safety culture of an organisation or work 
unit (Flin et al., 2006b). It is widely agreed that probably one of commonest ways to assess 
patient safety culture is based on using patient safety climate questionnaire to assess workers' 
perceptions of patient safety climate in their healthcare organisations (Sexton et al., 2006b; 
Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). 
The importance of safety culture in healthcare is widely recognised. For example, Nieva and 
Sorra (2003) argue that the positive safety culture supports patient safety and a poor safety 
culture is considered as a significant risk factor that can affect patient safety negatively. 
Similarly, Parker et al. (2006) argue that safety culture is affected by organisational changes, 
such as the systems, processes and practices of the organisation. For example, an 
organisation with a poor safety culture often has limited safety systems, while an organisation 
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with a positive safety culture has many safety systems, processes and practices to promote 
patient safety. This argument suggests that it should be possible to assess the extent to which 
systems and processes promote a positive patient safety culture by evaluating organizational 
practices that influence the patient safety culture. Therefore, patient safety culture 
assessment tools were developed to assess a number of important organisational practices that 
may influence patient safety culture (Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). 
Flin (2007) has argued that organisational factors of a positive safety culture influence patient 
safety culture and patient safety outcomes. Pronovost et al. (2003) argued that positive 
patient safety culture is characterized by clear commitment of leadership to discuss issues· 
that threaten patient safety, learning from medical errors, continuous patient safety 
improvement, encouraging teamwork, using reporting systems to analyse adverse events and 
no blame culture. 
A positive safety culture in healthcare can be seen as an environment that supports reporting, 
ends blame culture, effective leadership and focuses on systems. A poor safety culture 
contributes to medical errors, unsafe therapies and unintended injuries (Institute of Medicine, 
2000). Poor safety culture includes barriers to organisational learning from previous 
incidents (Johnson, 2002). This argument is supported by Nieva and Sorra (2003) who 
agreed that a positive safety culture supports patient safety while a poor culture is a 
significant risk factor that can threaten patient safety. Similarly, Fleming and Wentzell (2008) 
suggested that a poor patient safety culture is a significant risk factor that can threaten patient 
safety. 
The Institute of Medicine (2000) suggest that changing the patient safety culture from 
blaming culture in which healthcare workers are blamed for errors to an organisational 
learning culture in which people learn from errors to improve healthcare and prevent harm is 
the biggest challenge for moving towards patient safety. Similarly, the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (2005) suggests that a patient safety culture is characterised by an 
environment of mutual trust between staff members to allow them to talk and discuss freely 
about patient safety problems and work to solve them without fear of blame and punishment. 
Patient safety culture concerns how healthcare workers' values, attitudes and perceptions 
regarding their organisation's commitment to patient safety in order to maintain safe work 
practices in healthcare organisation (Handler et al., 2006). 
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A patient safety culture involves shared attitudes, values and nonns of staff related to patient 
safety. It is characterized by a number of positive features such as open communication 
about safety problems, effective teamwork and management supports patient safety to make 
it a top priority (World Health Organisation, 2008). Sorra and Dyer (2010) argued that 
patient safety culture is an aspect of organisational culture. It refers to management and staff 
values, beliefs and nonns about important issues in healthcare organisation, behaviour of 
members, acceptable and unacceptable actions and attitudes, and what process and 
procedures are in place with regard to patient safety. 
All these definitions indicate that patient safety culture is characterised by number of 
dimensions. The healthcare literature mentioned a number of patient safety culture 
dimensions. Table 2-2 presents a number of patient safety culture dimensions. 
Table 2- 2 Patient safety culture dimensions 
Study Patient safety culture dimensions 
Kirk et al. 
(2007) 
Chapter two 
1 Overall commitment to quality: The policies and procedures of 
organisation should be aimed to provide safe and quality healthcare 
services. 
2 Priority given to patient safety: The issue of patient safety should be taken 
in consideration at all levels of staff and management. 
3 Communication about safety issues: Communication should be open to 
discuss patient safety issues. 
4 Staff education and training about safety issue: Availability and usefulness 
of education and training programs. 
5 Team working around safety issues: Managing and developing teamwork 
based on effective cooperation and communication between staff. 
6 Organisational learning following patient safety incidents: Learning from 
patient safety incidents to improve patient safety. 
7 Perceptions of the causes of patient safety incidents and their 
identification: The mechanisms of reporting incidents. 
8 Investigating patient safety incidents: How the incidents are investigated? 
9 Personnel management and safety issues: Managing safety issues in work 
environment. 
35 
Table 2-2 (continued) 
IOM (2004) 1 Healthcare workers share the view that healthcare is a high-risk 
Weingart et al. 
(2004) 
Handler et al. 
(2006) 
Amanda et al. 
(2007) 
Sammer et al. 
(2010) 
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environment. 
2 Management commitment to exposing and analysing mistakes (events) that 
might harm patients. 
3 A balance between the need for reporting of events and the need to take 
action to improve patient safety. 
1 Leadership (patient safety is high priority to senior leaders) 
2 Salience (responsibility to patient safety) 
3 A non punitive environment (afraid of punishment) 
4 Reporting and communication (reporting errors and getting feedback about 
errors for learning from mistakes). 
1 Non punitive response to error. 
2 Teamwork within units. 
3 Communication openness. 
4 Feedback and communication about error. 
S Organisational learning. 
1 Communication, 
2 leadership 
3 Tendency of staff to report errors and teamwork. 
1 Leadership role to assure patients are safe from medical errors III 
healthcare as a high-risk environment. 
2 Teamwork in terms of the relationships among staff should be based on 
cooperation and open communication. 
3 Evidence-based which means patient care practices should based on 
evidence and standardised to provide safe and high quality care to patients. 
4 Communication in terms of an environment that helps staff to speak up 
when something is harm patients. 
5 Organisational learning, staff learns from mistakes for performance 
improvement. 
6 Just: medical errors happen due to system failures rather than individual 
failures. 
7 Patient-centred: Patient care is at the centred of health care process. 
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It seems that it is not possible to include all these dimensions of patient safety culture at the 
same time in one patient safety climate questionnaire but some questionnaires such as the 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorraand Nieva, 2004) includes many of these common dimensions. 
In summary, it appears that patient safety culture is concerned with shared values, attitudes 
and perceptions that determine how staff perceive and act upon patient safety within their 
healthcare organisations. Review of the studies in this section (2.3.3) (see footnote3) shows 
there are some common patient safety culture dimensions: management commitment to 
improve patient safety, communication among staff, teamwork, feedback communication 
, about error, event reporting and organisational learning. 
A large number of quantitative tools (e.g. Safety Climate Survey) and qualitative tools (e.g. 
Manchester Patient Safety Assessment Framework) have been developed to assess patient 
safety culture in healthcare organisations (Kirk et al., 2006). It is widely accepted that 
assessing patient safety culture in healthcare can be conducted by measuring patient safety 
climate through using patient safety climate questionnaire (Pronovost et al., 2003; Nieva and 
Sorra, 2003; Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Colla et al., 2005; Flin, 2007; Singla et al., 2006; 
Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). Measurement of patient safety climate seeks to explore the 
shared perceptions of healthcare workers regarding to safe performance in relation to patient 
care. The perceptions include key issues such as open and honest communication among 
staff, teamwork, organisational learning, management commitment of safety, feedback about 
errors and event reporting and analysing (Mary et al., 2005). 
Summary 
In summary, it can be seen that safety culture is a comprehensive concept that reflects the 
interaction between workers and processes in terms of the state of safety of the organisation. 
Safety culture refers to employees' shared attitudes, beliefs and perceptions towards safety 
issues in the workplace. The importance of safety culture in preventing accidents and 
improving safety in workplace is widely perceived. The characteristics of a positive safety 
culture are considered as important factors contributing to improve safety of organisations. 
3 Kirk et aI, 2007; Institute of Medicine, 2004; Wingart et aI, 2005; Handler et al., 2006; Arnanda et aI, 2007' , 
Sammer et aI, 2010 
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Safety climate may be regarded as a clear picture, a current surface and measurable aspect of 
safety culture and it is most often assessed by workforce questionnaire to measure safety 
climate. Healthcare organisations are increasingly aware of the importance of patient safety 
culture in order to enhance patient safety, through measuring patient safety climate using 
patient safety climate questionnaires. There are a number of patient safety climate 
questionnaires available to assess patient safety culture. The next section discusses the 
measurement of patient safety climate and provides the details of patient safety climate 
questionnaires. 
2.4 Measurement of patient safety climate 
This section is concerned with the measurement of the patient safety climate in healthcare 
organisations. It examines the existing patient safety climate questionnaires and their 
characteristics. In addition, the development and validation of patient safety climate 
questionnaires and the selection of a suitable questionnaire for measuring patient safety 
climate are discussed in this section. 
Patient safety culture can be assessed based on patient safety climate measurement using a 
patient safety climate questionnaire. The evaluation of patient safety climate generally refers 
to a measurable component of patient safety culture that is assessed by measuring the 
perceptions of healthcare staff toward patient safety through the use of patient safety climate 
questionnaires (Colla et aI., 2005; Flin et aI., 2006b). It is widely accepted that measuring 
perceptions of healthcare staff regarding patient safety issues assesses patient safety climate 
(Sexton et aI., 2006b). Therefore, it is possible to measure healthcare professionals' 
perceptions of patient safety across a range of dimensions by using patient safety climate 
questionnaires (Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). 
The current study aims to identify and validate a patient safety climate questionnaire for use 
in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. Initially, it is important to review the various patient safety 
. climate questionnaires and their characteristics to select the most appropriate one. Section 
2.4.1 identifies existing patient safety climate questionnaires. General characteristics, 
dimensions and psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires are also 
discussed in this section. 
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Section 2.4.2 discusses the development and validation of patient safety climate 
questionnaires and their psychometric analysis and properties. Section 2.4.3 discusses 
selecting a suitable questionnaire for measuring patient safety climate. Psychometric testing 
entails the use of established psychometric assessment techniques to assess psychometric 
properties of questionnaires, such as exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis 
and reliability analysis. These terms are provided and explained in a glossary (page number 
XN). 
2.4.1 Existing patient safety climate questionnaires 
There are a number of patient safety climate questionnaires available that are used to assess 
patient safety climate in healthcare. A search strategy was developed to identify existing 
patient safety climate questionnaires. A literature search was conducted utilising manual 
searching and electronic databases such as the Medline, Science direct and Pub med Central. 
The key words included patient safety climate, questionnaires, patient safety culture 
questionnaires/survey, safety climate questionnaires, measuring patient safety climate and 
healthcare. A combination of the key words, such as patient safety climate questionnaire in 
healthcare, and patient safety culture questionnaire in healthcare were used. No restriction on 
date or study type was used. However, the search was restricted to the English language 
publications. Websites relevant to patient safety were also used, and these included the 
website of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) , the National Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA) and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). A review of 
references from relevant studies was also conducted. The searches were originally conducted 
in December 2007. 
The criteria used for identifying existing patient safety climate questionnaires were: 
1 Use of questionnaire for measuring patient safety climate. 
2 Use in healthcare settings. 
3 Use for assessing the perceptions of health care staff. 
4 Questionnaires are published in English. 
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The above strategy produced 18 patient safety climate questionnaires as follows: 
1. Strategies for Leadership: An Organizational Approach to Patient Safety (SLOAPS) 
(Voluntary Hospital of America, 2000). 
2. Veterans Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire (VHA PSCQ) (Burr et 
aI., 2002). 
3. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
4. Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
5. Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2000, 2003). 
6. Hospital Transfusion Service Safety Culture Survey (Sorra and Nieva, 2002). 
7. Medication Safety Self-Assessment (MS SA) (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 
2000). 
8. Culture of Safety Survey (CSS) (Weingart et aI., 2004). 
9. Teamwork and Patient Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Kaissi et aI., 2003). 
10. Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ) (Helmriech et aI., 
1997). 
11. Modified Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (MORMAQ) (Flin et 
aI., 2003). 
12. Safety Climate Scale (SCS) (Pronovost et aI., 2003; Kho., 2005). 
13. Stanford University Patient Safety Climate in Health Care Organisation Questionnaire 
(Singer et aI., 2003). 
14. Patient Safety Culture in Health Care Organisation (Modified Stanford instrument) 
(Singer et aI., 2007). 
15. An employee questionnaire for assessing patient safety (Carayon et aI., 2005). 
16. Team Work and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
17. Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety Scale (Beuzekom, 2007). 
18. Patient Safety Culture Improvement Tool (Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). 
A number of review papers concluded that the patient safety climate questionnaires varied 
according to the general characteristics, dimensions covered and psychometrics properties 
(e.g. Colla et aI., 2005; Fleming, 2005; Flin et aI., 2006b; Singla et aI., 2006). Further details 
and examples of these characteristics are presented below in order to clarify this variation 
among patient safety climate questionnaires. 
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General characteristics of patient safety climate questionnaires 
This section focuses on the general characteristics of patient safety climate questionnaires 
such as source, aim, settings suitable for use, respondents (who are supposed to complete a 
questionnaire), length of questionnaires and response scale. 
A number of questionnaires have been adapted for healthcare from other industries such as 
aviation and nuclear because most of safety climate questionnaire were first developed in 
these industries (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). For example, the SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004) 
was adapted from the Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire. The Modified Operating 
Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (MORMAQ) was adapted from the Cockpit 
Management Attitudes questionnaire (Flin et aI., 2003). Recently, a number of patient safety 
climate questionnaires have been developed specifically for healthcare such as the Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The majority of 
patient safety climate questionnaires originate from the USA (Colla et aI., 2005). For 
example, the Agency for Hea1thcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in USA developed the 
HSOPSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004) was developed at the 
University of Texas, Centre of Excellence for Patient Research and Practice. 
In terms of the aims of patient safety climate questionnaires, each questionnaire has a 
specified aim. Most questionnaires are designed to measure attitudes and perceptions of staff 
about various aspects of patient safety. For example, the SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004) claims to 
measure attitudes of healthcare staff towards safety. The HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) was developed to assess staff perspectives on patient safety culture (Handler et 
aI., 2006). The SCS (Pronovost et aI., 2003) was developed to assess perceptions of 
healthcare staff regarding the commitment to patient safety as a positive culture (Pronovost et 
aI., 2003). In contrast, some questionnaires, such as the SLOAPS (Voluntary Hospital of 
America, 2000) and the MS SA (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2000) were 
developed to measure the extent to which patient safety improvement activities and concerns 
have been implemented (Colla, 2005). The SLOAPS (Voluntary Hospitals of America, 2000) 
aims to assess the extent to which safety is a strategic priority for a healthcare organisation. 
In other words, it is designed to assess attitudes of leadership towards patient safety 
(Pronovost et aI., 2003). 
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Nieva and Sorra (2003) state that some questionnaires assess staff perspectives that focus on 
daily activities within organisation and their impact on patient safety. An example of a 
questionnaire that focuses on staff perceptions is the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004). Some questionnaires assess managerial perspectives that focus on 
management assessment of patient safety policies and practices in healthcare organisations. 
An example of a self-assessment questionnaire designed for use by managers is the SLOAPS 
(Voluntary Hospital of America, 2000). However, the majority of patient safety climate 
questionnaires focus on the perceptions of healthcare staff while a minority of questionnaires 
are used at management level. Some questionnaires are designed to be completed as a team 
together such as the MSSA (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2000). 
In short, patient safety climate questionnaires measure either staff or managerial perspectives, 
or combine perspectives of both. The questionnaires' respondents are healthcare staff 
including, senior managers, clinicians (front line staff such as physicians and nurses) and non 
clinicians (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). According to Singla et al. (2006) most patient safety 
climate questionnaires were designed to be completed by hospital staff including physicians, 
nurses, pharmacists and other care givers. 
The majority of patient safety climate questionnaires are appropriate for general use (general 
evaluation of patient safety climate in healthcare settings) such as the HSOPSC (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004). In contrast, 
others are designed for specific departments, for example the MS SA (Institute for Safe 
Medication Practices, 2000) for use in pharmacy. The Hospital Transfusion Service Safety 
Culture Survey (Sorra and Nieva, 2002) is used for transfusion services. Colla et al. (2005) 
reviewed ni~e patient safety climate questionnaires designed to measure patient safety 
climate. They found five of these questionnaires were used for general evaluation of patient 
safety climate across healthcare settings. 
Flin et al. (2006b) reviewed 12 patient safety climate questionnaires designed to measure 
safety climate and diagnose the underlying safety culture of healthcare organisations. They 
found five of these questionnaires for general evaluation of patient safety climate in 
healthcare settings. Singla et al. (2006) reviewed 13 patient safety climate questionnaires. 
They found 9 questionnaires were designed for general use, for example the SAQ (Sexton et 
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al., 2004) and the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Four questionnaires were 
designed for specific use, for example the Modified Operating Room Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (MORMAQ) (Flin et al., 2003). It seems that the majority ofthe patient safety 
climate questionnaires are designed for general use. 
The majority of patient safety climate questionnaires are designed to be self-administered 
(Singla et al., 2006). The majority of questionnaires use the 5 point Likert scale such as the 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Some questionnaires use the 6 point Likert 
scale, for example the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et al., 2004). The 
majority of patient safety climate questionnaires use the five-point scale reflecting the level 
of agreement with statement about patient safety: from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly 
agree' (5), with a neutral category 'neither' (3). Other items can be answered using a five-
point frequency scale from 'never' (1) to 'always'(5) (Colla et al., 2005). 
The number of items to be completed ranges from 10 items in the Safety Climate Scale 
(Sexton et al., 2000, 2003) to 194 items in the MSSA (Institute for Safe Medication Practices , 
2000) (Colla et al., 2005). The demographic information in most patient safety climate 
questionnaires includes data on gender, years of experience and job title. 
Dimensions of patient safety climate questionnaires 
Patient safety climate questionnaires differ from one another in the dimensions covered. 
These dimensions range from four dimensions, such as the Safety Climate Scale (Kho et al., 
2005), while others include 12 dimensions, for example, the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004). A number of studies reviewed patient safety climate questionnaires. Table 
2-3 presents dimensions of patient safety climate questionnaires in these studies .. 
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Table 2- 3 Dimensions of patient safety climate questionnaires 
Study Dimensions of Patient safety climate questionnaires 
Colla et al. 
(2005) 2 
3 
4 
5 
Fleming (2005) 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Flin et al. 1 
(2006b) 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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Leadership 
Policies and procedures 
Staffing, 
Communication 
Reporting incidents. 
Management commitment to support patient safety. 
Importance of safety. 
Non punitive culture (no blame and shame response). 
Handoffs and transitions. 
Stress recognition. 
Staffing. 
Working condition relevant to patient safety. 
Reporting system. 
Teamwork (teamwork within units, teamwork across units). 
Communication openness. 
Organisational learning. 
Feedback and communication. 
Job satisfaction. 
Overall perception of safety. 
Supervisors' expectations and actions. 
Organisation! department. 
Management support and commitment to safety. 
Supervisors' role. 
Communication and feedback. 
Reporting incidents. 
Teamwork. 
Rules and procedures of work. 
Personal resources. 
Job demands. 
Risk perception and safety attitudes of workers. 
Organisational factors. 
Safety systems. 
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Table 2-3 (continued) 
Singla et al. 1 Management commitment to safety. 
(2006) 2 Non punitive culture (no blame and shame response). 
3 Handoffs and transitions. 
4 Working condition relevant to patient safety. 
5 Stress recognition. 
6 Risk taking (hazard detection). 
7 Frequency of event reporting. 
8 Teamwork. 
9 Staffing. 
10 Communication openness. 
11 Organisational learning. 
12 Feedback and communication about error. 
13 Beliefs about causes of errors such as human factors (e.g. fatigue and stress 
on patient safety). 
14 Job satisfaction. 
15 Overall perception of safety. 
In general, it seems that patient safety climate questionnaires vary in the dimensions 
addressed. However, it appears that most of patient safety climate questionnaires cover a 
number of common dimensions of patien.t safety climate. A comparison of dimensions was 
conducted across number of review papers (e.g. Fleming, 2005; Colla et at, 2005; Flin et at, 
2006b; Singla et at, 2006). These review papers include dimensions that related to patient 
safety climate in most of patient safety climate questionnaires that widely used and available 
in the literature. These dimensions are mentioned as common dimensions in most of these 
key review papers. Table 2-2 compares the 12 common patient safety climate dimensions 
that are mentioned in the four review papers. 
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Table 2-4 A comparison of the common patient safety climate dimensions that are 
mentioned in four review papers 
Patient safety climate Colla et al., Fleming, Flin et al., Singla et al., 
dimensions 
Overall perceptions of patient 
safety (Priority given to patient 
safety (patient safety is coming 
first and/safety system) 
Feedback and communication 
Incident reporting 
Staffing 
Leadership/supervisors role 
Policies and procedures of 
work/working condition relevant 
to patient safety 
Organisationalleaming (Learning 
from patient safety incidents) 
Management commitment to 
support patient safety 
Teamwork 
Communication openness 
Perception and understanding of 
the causes of patient safety 
incidents . 
Non punitive responses to error 
Chapter two 
(2005) (2005) (2006) (2006) 
Nine four 12 13 
questionnaires questionnaires questionnaires questionnaires 
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These questionnaires in table 2-4 are included in the list of existing patient safety climate 
questionnaires in section 2.3.1 as the most widely used questionnaires that are representative 
of the patient safety climate questionnaires currently available in the literature. 
From table 2-2 it seems that management commitment to support patient safety, feedback and 
communication, incident reporting, leadership/supervisors role, teamwork, and policies and 
procedures of work/working condition relevant to patient safety are common dimensions 
across three of the review papers. The dimensions for priority given to patient safety, staffing, 
organisational learning, and communication openness are common across two of the review 
papers. The dimensions for perception and understanding of the causes of patient safety 
incidents and non punitive responses to error are mentioned in one of the review papers. 
These dimensions were discussed in the section of safety culture and safety climate (2.3.2) in 
the current chapter. 
It is important that a patient safety climate questionnaire should be a valid and reliable tool 
and it should measure the common dimensio~s of patient safety culture (Nieva and Sorra, 
2003). Although the reviewed literature revealed that in recent years there has been 
increasing attention towards measuring patient safety climate, it has been reported that there 
is a lack of information reporting related psychometric properties of patient safety climate 
questionnaires (Flin et aI., 2006b). The psychometric properties of patient safety climate 
questionnaires are discussed below. 
Psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires 
The term psychometric can be described as the science of the measurement of mental 
functions, theoretically, when a concept does not lend itself to being measured directly, a set 
of questions which explore various aspects of the same concept can be asked and then tested 
for their reliability and validity (Bowling, 2005). Psychometric analysis is concerned with 
statistical techniques that help to assess the validity and reliability of the items of patient 
safety climate questionnaires (Singlaet aI., 2006). The validity and reliability of instruments 
are very important aspects of psychometric measurement. Instrument validity refers to what 
extent a measurement instrument measures what it is intended to measure, while reliability is 
based on the measuring tool which yields the same results on repeated occasions (Carrnines 
and Zeller, 1979). 
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Reliability is also referred to as consistency. The more common way of estimating reliability 
is by assessing internal reliability which means to what extent a group of items relates to a 
specific dimension of instrument (Pett et aI., 2003). It can be assessed by using a statistical 
test called Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951). 
A number of statistical analyses are used to assess the psychometric properties of 
questionnaires. For example, item analysis is used to provide descriptive item responses. 
Factor analysis is the most frequently used statistical technique and is employed to assess the 
psychometric properties of survey instruments (Colla et aI., 2005; Flin et aI., 2006b). It can 
be used to define a number of basic dimensions, each of which contains items which can be 
grouped together in a consistent and structured way (Bowling, 2005). The more popular 
choice for estimating reliability is internal consistency (Etchegaray and Fischer, 2006). 
Although there is agreement about the importance of assessing psychometric properties 
(validity and reliability) of patient safety climate questionnaires, there is a lack of reporting 
the data of the psychometric properties of questionnaires. The psychometric properties of 
patient safety climate questionnaires are not always provided in published studies, for 
instance, the Stanford University Patient Safety Climate in Health Care Organisation 
(Pronovost et aI., 2003; Fleming, 2005). Colla et al. (2005) examined the psychometric 
properties of nine patient safety climate questionnaires using a number of psychometric tests 
as review criteria, including item analysis, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EF A), Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA), Cronbach's alpha, correlation across dimensions, test/retest reliability 
and analysis of variance to test for variance between groups of a sample. They found the 
psychometric testing varied considerably across nine patient safety climate questionnaires 
and there was a limitation on reporting psychometric data from most patient safety climate 
questionnaires. For example, while psychometric properties were reported for three 
questionnaires: the HSOPSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), Hospital Transfusion Service Safety 
Culture Survey (HTSCS) (Sorra and Nieva, 2002) and the SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004), other 
questionnaires had a lack of reporting of their psychometric properties. 
Flin et al. (2006b) reviewed the psychometric properties of 12 patient safety climate 
questionnaires including: construct validity which refers to the factor (dimension) structure of 
a questionnaire and content validity which refers to the degree to which elements of a 
measure are relevant to a construct. Content validity of patient safety climate questionnaire 
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refers to the degree to which items of a patient safety climate questionnaire are relevant to 
patient safety culture (items related to dimensions). Internal consistency is assessed by 
Cronbach's alpha. Finally, factor structure is assessed by factor analysis (Pall ant, 2007). In 
this review (Flin et aI., 2006b) only six studies were found to report the results of factor 
analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Furthermore, only one study provided a comprehensive 
report of scale development and psychometric properties, relating to the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
Flin et al. (2006b) found there was a lack of clear theoretical reinforcement for most 
questionnaires and psychometric properties of some questionnaires were not reported where 
this information was available. Also, they concluded that there was a lack of standard 
psychometric analysis in several studies. It seems that the main limitation of Flin et als' 
review was the lack of reporting psychometric data of patient safety questionnaires. 
Similarly, Singla et al. (2006) examined the psychometric properties of 13 patient safety 
climate questionnaires. Psychometric testing was reported for two questionnaires, the SAQ 
(Sexton et aI., 2004) and the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Some 
psychometric testing was reported for three questionnaires. No psychometric was reported 
for eight of the questionnaires. 
In general, the authors of these review papers agreed that there is a lack of information 
reporting psychometric properties of a number of patient safety climate questionnaires. 
Moreover, it was noted that most of the above studies used general words such as adequate 
psychometric properties and good psychometric properties in relation to the psychometric 
evaluation of patient safety climate questionnaires. Unfortunately, this could increase the 
ambiguity of psychometric literature. Therefore, it is recommended that more consideration 
should be given to psychometric properties in the design of healthcare safety climate 
instruments and health services researchers need to assess the validity and reliability of their 
measures correctly (Flin et aI., 2006; Etchegaray and Fischer, 2006). 
Psychometric data should be reported in a clear way by using standardised psychometric tests. 
For example, as a minimum psychometric analysis should include EFA, CFA and reliability 
analysis and the correlations between questionnaire dimensions (factors) to ensure a rigorous 
scientific approach (Flin et aI., 2006b). Factor analysis is commonly used as a measure of the 
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construct validity of a questionnaire by using EF A to test factor structure (grouping a number 
of items together into one extracted factor) and CF A to test the proposed factor structure of 
the questionnaire (Hutchinson et aI., 2006). In terms of reliability, internal consistency is 
used to ,assess questionnaire reliability by calculating the Cronbach's alpha (a) coefficient 
alpha value for each factor of a questionnaire. It is generally agreed that questionnaire 
validity is good when items load strongly to one factor (item loading >0.4) and reliability 
being good when coefficient alpha value >0.7 under these conditions, all items of a 
questionnaire are assumed to be correlated (Wet et aI., 2010). 
To conclude, it is seen that patient safety climate questionnaires vary in a number of ways, 
such as general characteristics, content (dimensions) and psychometric properties (validity 
and reliability). Although there are differences between the questionnaires most of them have 
important similarities. For instance, they are designed to be used in particular settings such 
as hospitals and they are mainly intended for front line respondents (e.g. physicians, nurses). 
Furthermore, there are common dimensions across a number of patient safety climate 
questionnaires and psychometric analysis includes factor analysis and reliability analysis. 
In general, a patient safety climate questionnaire should be a valid and reliable questionnaire 
and it should measure the common dimensions of patient safety culture (Nieva and Sorra, 
2003). The following section aims to discuss the development and validation of patient 
safety climate questionnaires including their psychometric analysis and properties. 
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2.4.2 Development and validation of patient safety climate 
questionnaires 
The development of patient safety climate questionnaires is increasingly recognised as an 
important tool for assessing and improving patient safety culture in healthcare organisations 
(Nieva and Sorra, 2003; Colla et al., 2005; Prononvost and Sexton, 2005). Recent studies 
have focused on developing patient safety climate questionnaires either by adapting a 
questionnaire from other industries or by developing new questionnaires for health care 
organisations to measure patient safety climate in order to assess and improve patient safety 
culture. A number of questionnaires that were either adapted or developed have been 
validated in a number of countries (either original country of questionnaire or outside its 
country) (e.g. Sexton et al., 2000, 2003, 2004; Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Singer et al., 2003, 
2007). 
The first development approach has been to adapt patient safety climate questionnaires from 
other industries (adapting approach). A number of questionnaires were adapted for 
healthcare from other industries such as aviation as early stage of developing patient safety 
climate questionnaires. For example, the Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 
2004) was adapted from the Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire (FMAQ). The Safety 
Climate Scale (SCS) (Kho et al., 2005) was adapted from a widely used questionnaire in 
aviation called the Flight Management Attitudes and Safety Survey which is designed to 
measure attitudes toward stress, status hierarchies, leadership and interpersonal interaction. 
The SCS questionnaire is used to assess safety culture among staff (Pronovost et al., 2003). 
Helmreich et al. (1997) extended their work with the aviation industry to examine the 
attitudes of hospital operating rooms staff to teamwork and safety. They adapted the Cockpit 
and Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaires (CMAQ) to produce the Operating Room 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ) (Helmreich et al., 1997). The Teamwork 
and Safety Climate Survey was adapted for use in healthcare settings (Sexton et al., 2004). 
A number of patient safety climate questionnaires originated from the USA (Colla et al., 
2005). Therefore, most of them were validated in the USA healthcare settings. For example, 
the SAQ was developed at the University of Texas, Centre of Excellence for Patient Research 
and Practice by Sexton et al. in 2004 with new items generated by a focus group of health care 
providers, review of the literature and consultations with safety experts. The items were then 
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evaluated through pilot testing. The SAQ contains 60 items and covers six dimensions, 
which were identified in psychometric testing: teamwork, safety climate, perceptions of 
management, job satisfaction, stress recognition and work condition. Internal consistency by 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient ranged from 0.74 to 0.93. It demonstrated good psychometric 
properties. There are several different versions with slight modifications of its items based 
on different departments (e.g. emergency, pharmacy, intensive care unit, operating rooms and 
laboratory) (Sexton et al., 2006). 
In addition, some adapted questionnaires have been applied and empirically evaluated in 
different countries. For example, the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2004) was translated into 
Norwegian and validated in Norway (Norwegian university hospital) (Deilkas and Hofoss, 
2008), 1306 staff members completed and return the questionnaire (68% response rate). 
Reliability analysis and confirmatory factor analysis were performed. The factor structure 
was tested by confirmatory factor analysis and this identified 36 items representing seven 
dimensions: teamwork, safety climate, perceptions of hospital management, perception of 
unit management, job satisfaction, stress recognition and work condition. They used 
goodness of fit indices: the Adjusted Goodness of-Fit Index (AGFI), and the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). CF A showed acceptable goodness of fit values. 
The reliability analysis was acceptable for the seven dimensions (Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient ranged from 0.68 to 0.85). The SAQ Norwegian version showed satisfactory 
psychometric properties (Deilkas and Hofoss, 2008). 
Norden-Hagg et al. (2010) conducted a validation study of the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2004) for 
use in Swedish pharmacies. The SAQ data from 828 community pharmacies in Sweden, 
including 6,683 eligible pharmacists were received. The psychometric properties of the 
translated questionnaire of the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2004) were analysed using Cronbach 
alpha and inter correlations among the scales. CF A was conducted. The coefficient alpha 
value for each of the SAQ scales ranged from 0.72 to 0.89. The confirmatory factor analysis 
results, demonstrate that the Swedish translation of the SAQ has acceptable, to good, 
psychometric properties. Perceptions of the pharmacy (teamwork climate, job satisfaction, 
perceptions of management, safety climate, and working conditions) were moderately to 
highly correlated with one another whereas attitudes about stress (stress recognition) had only 
low correlations with other factors. Norden-Hagg et at. (2010) conclude that the Swedish 
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translation of the SAQ demonstrates acceptable construct validity, for assessing the frontline 
perspective of safety culture in community pharmacy staff. 
The three examples above of using the SAQ showed that the psychometric results are 
consistent. In other words, using the SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004) in different healthcare 
settings and other languages showed that the SAQ was valid and reliable. The development 
and characteristics of SAQ is provided in section 4.2 of chapter four. 
A number of patient safety climate questionnaires have been validated in different countries. 
For example, the Modified Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
(MORMAQ) was adapted by Flin et al. (2003) to use in hospitals in the United Kingdom. 
The MORMAQ was adapted from the Cockpit Management Attitudes questionnaire. It 
contains 60 items and covers seven dimensions. The proposed factor structure measures 
attitudes of staff to leadership, communication, teamwork, stress and fatigue, work values, 
human error and organisational climate. The questionnaire was completed by 222 
anaesthetists. A reliability analysis of the proposed structure based on Cronbach's alpha 
scores for each of the proposed factors showed low values (a = 0.18-0.54) for internal 
consistency (Flin et aI., 2003). 
Hutchinson et al. (2006) examined the factor structure, reliability and potential usefulness of 
the 27 item Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004) for use in the UK 
healthcare, based on a sample of n=897. Factor analysis and reliability analysis were carried 
out. EF A was carried out on a random 50% sample of respondents (the "construction" half of 
the data) using principal components extraction. Table 2-3 shows the psychometric 
information of Hutchinson et aI's study (2006). 
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Table 2- 5 Psychometric properties of Hutchinson et aI's study (2006) 
Psychometric analysis performed Psychometric properties 
Exploratory factor analysis to identify optimal model 
Confirmatory factor analysis on 11 factors 
Reliability analysis on five factors 
Optimal model 
Five factors were identified 
CF A indicated adequate fit. The CFI 
and RMSEA took values of 0.93 and 
0.08 for teamwork, and 0.94 and 0.07 
for safety climate 
Internal consistency reliabilities were 
satisfactory to good, with Cronbach's 
alpha 0.69 or above in all five factors 
five factors and 22 items 
Table 2-3 shows that five factors and 22 items were identified. CF A on the remaining 50% 
(the "validation half') of the dataset indicated an almost adequate fit of the model to the data 
under the widely applied fit indices criteria. The CFI and RMSEA values were: 0.93 and 
0.08 for teamwork, and 0.94 and 0.07 for safety climate. Internal consistency reliabilities 
were satisfactory to good, with Cronbach's alpha (a) 0.69 or above in all five factors. 
To summarise, it appears that the early stage of the measurement of patient safety climate in 
healthcare was an immature stage of development as compared to other industries such as 
aviation. Therefore, adapting commonly used questionnaires from other industries was the 
common approach as healthcare organisations started to work with patient safety culture and 
with the measurement patient safety climate. Therefore, learning from other industries 
experiences such as aviation was helpful in understanding the concepts and how they were 
measured (Helmreich, 2000; Sexton et al., 2000). Although, validation studies in healthcare 
(e.g. Hutchinson et al., 2006; Norden-Hagg et al. 2010) showed that some questionnaires 
such as the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2004) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton 
et al., 2004) had acceptable psychometric properties across different countries, there was a 
lack of psychometric data for early questionnaires, for example, psychometric properties and 
analysis of the SCS had not been reported (Pronovost et al., 2003). 
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The reason for not reporting psychometric data in some studies might be because they were 
concerned with developing new item questionnaires to use in healthcare rather than 
evaluating psychometric properties. In addition, there was a little experience in healthcare of 
safety culture assessment but currently there are now a number of questionnaires for 
assessing safety culture in healthcare (Fleming, 2005). 
The situation of measuring patient safety climate has changed to an approach in which a 
number of questionnaires have been developed specifically for healthcare organisations 
(Nieva and Sorra, 2003). For example, the SLOAPS was developed by the Volunteer 
Hospital Association (2000) to assess the extent to which safety is a strategic priority for 
healthcare leaders (Pronovost et aI., 2003), 23 clinical and administrative leaders completed 
the SLOAPS. No psychometric testing has been reported. The Teamwork and Patient Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire consists of 24 items across 4 dimensions. The questionnaire was 
completed by 261 staff members. Psychometric analysis was performed and revealed four 
dimensions: perceived of teamwork, support for team communication and decision making, 
teamwork in department and leadership role. Internal consistency results were reported for 
each dimension (Kaissi et aI., 2003). 
Singer et al. (2003) developed a patient safety climate questionnaire based on a review of 
existing patient safety climate questionnaires. They identified a list of key dimensions. A 
draft questionnaire consisting of 122 items was tested in pilot study to get feedback and to 
modify the questionnaire. The questionnaire was completed by 21,496 (response rate 51 %). 
The principle factor analysis was conducted on the responses of 82 questions and this 
identified five factors: organisation, department, production, reporting/seeking help and 
shame/self-awareness. The initial psychometric properties and analysis were not reported 
(Fleming, 2005). After that the revised version consisting of 38 items was used to collect 
data. Analysis of the psychometric properties ofthe questionnaire was performed by splitting 
the sample into derivation sample and validation sample, and then assessed by using 
exploratory factor analysis to responses in derivation sample. They identified nine factors 
(dimensions) and 38 items, Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranged from 0.50 to 0.89 (Singer et 
al.,2007). 
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Fleming and Wentzell (2008) developed the Patient Safety Culture Improvement Tool 
(PSCIT) to assess patient safety culture in healthcare organisations. The early development 
stage of the PSCIT involved reviewing the literature on patient safety culture assessment and 
patient safety culture instruments. Five interviews with patient safety experts across Canada 
were conducted to assess the content and face validity of the original version of the PSCIT 
questionnaire. This questionnaire covers five patient safety culture dimensions such as 
leadership, risk analysis, workload management, sharing and learning and resource 
management. However, Fleming and Wentzell (2008) conclude that this questionnaire 
should be used with caution because the psychometric properties (validity and reliability) 
have not been determined. 
It seems that although some patient safety climate questionnaires were developed to assess 
patient safety culture in healthcare organisations, there is limited reporting of psychometric 
data for some questionnaires (e.g. SLOAPS (Volunatry Hospital of America, 2000); 
Teamwork and Patient Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Kaissi et al., 2003); Patient Safety 
Culture Improvement Tool (Fleming and Wentzell, 2008). More recently, patient safety 
climate questionnaires have been developed specifically for healthcare such as the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) (Flin et al., 2006b). 
For example, the Agency for Health Care Quality and Research (AHQR) developed the 
HSOPSC questionnaire. The original items were validated by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) for the USA hospital settings (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The 
HSOPC questionnaire is based on a set of pilot studies carried out in 21 different hospitals 
involving 1461 hospital staff across the USA. The HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) is considered valid, reliable, and the most efficient questionnaire for assessing patient 
safety culture (Colla et al., 2005; Flin et al., 2006b). The HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) was also modified to assess patient safety culture in the nursing home setting. 
The internal consistency of the individual dimensions was generally similar to that of the 
original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Cronbach's alpha values ranged 
from 0.50 for staffing to 0.84 for teamwork across units (Handler et al., 2006). Table 2-6 
shows the original analysis of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
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Table 2- 6 The original analysis of the IIS0PSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
Sorra and Nieva's original analysis 
1 Cognitive interviews were conducted to assess the face validity of the questionnaire 
2 Pilot study is conducted. 
3 4983 questionnaires were administered across 21 hospitals in USA, with 1437 responses 
received (29%response rate) 
4 The psychometric analysis consisted of analytical techniques: 
• Reliability analysis: Cronbach's alpha values ranged from 0.63 to 0.84. 
• Item analysis 
• Content analysis 
• Exploratory factor analysis. 
• Confirmatory factor analysis. 
• Correlation analysis. 
• Analysis of variance. 
The HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) is used increasingly. in different 
countries such as the UK, Netherland, Turkey and Germany. This might indicate that this 
questionnaire reflects stable psychometric properties when used in different contexts. A 
number of studies have validated the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to 
measure patient safety culture in different health care settings across different countries. 
Some illustrative examples of recent validation studies in healthcare in different countries are 
provided below. 
Waterson et al. (2009) report on the assessment of the psychometric properties and suitability 
of the American HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) for use within the VK. The 
questionnaire was completed by 1437 staff members. EFA, CFA and reliability analyses 
were carried out to assess the psychometric performance of this questionnaire. The results of 
reliability analysis of the items within each original scale showed that more than half the 
scales failed to achieve satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha <0.7). 
Furthermore, a CF A carried out on the UK data set achieved a poor fit when compared with 
the original American model. An optimal measurement model was then constructed via 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses with split half sample validation and consisted 
of nine dimensions. The sample was split randomly into two halves; on one "construction" 
half, EF A was used to construct a measurement model for the items; the other "validation" 
half of the data was then used to test this model via CF A. 
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The results of a reliability analysis on the original dimensions (12 groupings of items) 
showed that seven dimensions (overall perceptions of safety, supervisor/manager 
expectations, organisational learning-continuous improvement, communication openness, 
non-punitive responses to error, staffing, hospital management support) fell short of an 
adequate level of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha <0.70), with staffing exhibiting an 
extremely poor level of reliability (a=0.58). Only two of the dimensions achieved alpha 
values >0.80 (frequency of error reporting, and feedback and communication about error). A 
CFA of the original model was then run (X2 =1907, df =674)~ the full range of fit indices 
suggested a level of fit with minor adequacy; specifically Comparative Fit Index (CFI) =0.91, 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) =0.89, RMSEA=0.04, Standardised Root Mean Square 
Residual (SRMSR) =0.05. 
Waterson et al. (2009) performed an EF A, using principal axis factoring as the extraction 
method and assessing the number of factors to be extracted by a combination of Kaiser's 
criterion and Cattell's screen plot method. An oblique rotation was carried out to aid 
interpretation of the resulting factors. Having examined a series of possible models, and 
gradually removing 13 items that were either severely cross-loaded or had very low loadings 
and communalities, the evidence pointed most strongly towards a nine-factor model for the 
remaining 27 items. Then, they tested the fit of this model to the other "validation" half of 
the data set using CF A (X2 =588, df =288). The fit indices suggested an adequate fit to the 
data, with CFI =0.95, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) =0.93, RMSEA=0.04, SRMSR=0.04. 
Finally, using the whole sample, reliability analys'es were performed for each of the groups of 
items defined by this factor structure. This indicated suitable internal consistency, with 
Cronbach's alpha >0.7 for seven of the nine dimensions. Only two dimensions fell below this 
level. Table 2-4 summarises the Psychometric analysis performed and psychometric 
properties provided of this validation study (Waterson et aI., 2009). 
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Table 2- 7 Psychometric properties of Waterson et aI's study (2009) 
Psychometric analysis performed Psychometric properties 
Reliability analysis on the original HSOPSC model More than half failed to achieve 
satisfactory internal consistency 
(Cronbach's a<0.7) 
Confinnatory factor analysis on the original HSOPSC model A poor fit (CFI=0.91, NNFI=0.89, 
RMSEA=0.04, SRMSR=0.05) 
Exploratory factor analysis to identify optimal model Nine factors were identified 
Confinnatory factor analysis on nine factors An adequate fit CFI=0.95, TU =0.93, 
RMSEA=0.04, SRMSR =0.04 
Reliability analysis on nine factors Suitable internal consistency, with 
Cronbach's a> 0.7 for seven of the nine 
dimensions. Two dimensions < 0.7 
optimal model Nine factors and 27 items 
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Another example of validation studies is provided by Bodur and Filiz (2010). They 
translated the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to assess patient safety culture 
in Turkish hospitals. The aim of the study was to assess the validity and reliability of the 
translated form of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was completed by 309 staff 
members. The data analysis strategy was summarized as percentages, means, and standard 
deviation values. 
Factor analysis, correlation coefficient, Cronbach's alpha (a), analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
and't-tests were employed in statistical analyses. Items on patient safety were categorized 
into 10 factors. Factor loadings and internal consistencies of dimension items were high. 
They (Bodur and Filiz, 20 I 0) concluded that the Turkish version of HSOPSC questionnaire 
was sufficiently valid and reliable to assess patient safety culture. The internal consistency of 
the Turkish items was lower for each factor than the original items in the AHRQ study except 
for frequency of events reported (a =0.86) and teamwork within units (a =0.83). The internal 
consistency of two factors was poor: staffing (a =0.19) and non-punitive response to error (a 
=0.31). The CFA results for the original showed a poor fit (fit indices not provided). 
The EFA identified 10 factors. Factor loadings were between 0.36 and 0.87. The factors 
jointly explained 62.1 % of the variance in the responses. The internal consistency of the 10 
factors was calculated with Cronbach's alpha coefficient was between 0.57and 0.86, except 
in two dimensions. Internal consistency reliability for all items was high (a =0.88). 
Construct validity for each of the 10 factors, were calculated by obtaining the mean of the 
item scores within one factor for every respondent and correlations between the scale scores 
were calculated. The scale scores showed there was correlation between factors. Table 2-5 
summarises the psychometric properties of Bodur and Filiz's study (2010). 
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Table 2- 8 Psychometric properties of Bodur and Filiz's study (2010) 
Psychometric analysis performed Psychometric properties (details) 
Reliability analysis on the original HSOPSC model Internal consistency: 8 factors lower 
than original model. One factor a 
=0.86. Two factors were poor (a =0.19-
0.31). 
Conflrmatory factor analysis on the original HSOPSC model A poor flt (fIt indices not provided). 
Exploratory factor analysis to identify optimal model Ten factors were identifled 
Conflrmatory factor analysis on ten factors Not performed 
Reliability analysis on nine factors Internal consistency: Cronbach's alpha 
coeffIcient was between 0.57and 0.86 , 
except in two dimensions. 
Construct validity There was correlation between 10 
factors 
Optimal model 10 factors and 42 items 
Smits et a1. (2008) examined the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in Dutch hospitals. The aim of this study was to examine the 
underlying dimensions and psychometric properties of the questionnaire in Dutch hospital 
settings, and to compare these results with the original questionnaire used in American 
hospital settings. The questionnaire was completed by 583 staff members. CFA was 
performed to examine the applicability of the factor structure of the American questionnaire 
to the Dutch data. EF A was performed to examine whether another composition of items and 
factors would fit the data better. Supplementary psychometric analyses were performed, 
including internal consistency and construct validity. 
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The result of the CF A (principal component analysis with Varimax rotation) showed that the 
factor structure of the original American questionnaire was a poor fit to Dutch data. 
Exploratory factor analysis identified 11 factors (factor loadings >0.40). Two items were 
removed from the questionnaire. Smits et a1. (2008) concluded that the Dutch translation of 
the HSOPSC consists of 11 factors with acceptable reliability and good construct validity. It 
is similar to the original HSOPSC factor structure (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The construct 
validity was studied by calculating scale scores for every factor and subsequently calculating 
Pearson correlation coefficients between the scale scores. The construct validity of each 
factor is reflected in scale scores that are moderately related. The construct validity was 
satisfactory for all factors; the moderate correlations of the factors show that there are no two 
factors measuring the same construct. For each factor, the internal consistency of the Dutch 
items was lower than the original HSOPSC items in the AHRQ study, except for 
communication openness, which was the same. The internal consistency of three factors was 
poor or even unacceptable: organisational learning and continuous improvement (a = 0.57), 
staffing (a = 0.49) and teamwork across hospital units (a = 0.59). The internal consistency of 
11 factors was acceptable (0.64 < a < 0.79), except for factor 10, adequate staffing was 
doubtful (0.58). Table 2-6 shows the psychometric properties of Smits et aI's study (2008). 
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Table 2- 9 Psychometric properties of Smits et aI's (2008) study 
Psych.ometric analysis performed Psychometric properties 
Reliability analysis on the original HSOPSC model Internal consistency was lower than the 
original HSOPSC items in the AHRQ 
study. One factor was the same. Three 
factors was poor or even unacceptable 
(0.57-0.49-0.59) 
Confirmatory factor analysis on the original HSOPSC model A poor fit (fit indices not provided). 
Exploratory factor analysis to identify optimal model 11 factors were identified 
Confirmatory factor analysis on 11 factors Not performed 
Reliability analysis on 11 factors The internal consistency of 11 factors 
was acceptable (0.64 < a < 0.79), but 
factor 10, Adequate staffing was 
doubtful (0.58) 
Construct validity There was correlation between 11 
factors. The construct validity was 
satisfactory for all factors 
Optimal model 11 factors and 40 items . 
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A more recent example is provided in the literature of the development and validation of a 
new version of patient safety climate questionnaire. Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) developed 
the German version the HSOPSC. The original HSOPSC version (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
was translated into Gennan. They assessed the dimensionality and psychometric properties 
of the questionnaire. Two new dimensions (unit management support and unit handoffs and 
transitions) were added to the questionnaire (six items more and the total items of the 
HSOPSC became 50 items). The questionnaire was completed by 568 staff members. 
Confinnatory and exploratory factor analyses (CFA, EFA) and Reliability analysis were 
applied. This strategy of analysis revealed eight factors instead of twelve factors for the 
original HSOPSC model. The CF A results indicated that the fit is not sufficiently good to 
confinn the original factor structure proposed by Sorra and Nieva (2004). The EFA results 
indicated eight underlying factors explained 59.8% of the variance of the items. Overall, the 
scales (eight factors) showed satisfactory to good internal consistency. Table 2-7 shows the 
psychometric properties ofPfeiffer and Manser's study (2010). 
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Table 2-10 Psychometric properties ofPfeiffer and Masner's study (2010) 
Psychometric analysis performed Psychometric properties (details) 
Reliability analysis on the original HSOPSC model Internal consistency was lower than the 
original HSOPSC items in the AHRQ 
study 
Confmnatory factor analysis on the original HSOPSC model The overall fit was not consistently 
satisfactory: three criteria indicate an 
adequate fit (RMSEA = .047, PCLOSE 
= .91,CMIN/df= 2.271). While 
GFI = .878, NFI = .859, and TU = .901 
Exploratory factor analysis to identify optimal model 8factors were identified 
Confmnatory factor analysis on 8 factors Not performed 
Reliability analysis on 11 factors The internal consistency of 8 factors was 
satisfactory to good internal consistency 
(alpha was ranged from 0.61 to 0.88) 
Seven out of twelve scales showed a 
lower internal consistency than was 
reported for the HSOPSC 
Construct validity There was correlation between 8 factors. 
The construct validity was satisfactory 
for all factors (correlation coefficient) 
Optimal model Eight factors 
On the whole, the results of validation studies (e.g. Hutchinson et aI., 2006; Smits et aI., 2008 
Waterson et al., 2009; Bodur and Filiz, 2010; Pfeiffer and Manser's study, 2010) are similar 
in using agreed fit indices and identifying optimal models and they are different in the values 
for internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha coefficient) and the number of factors in each 
optimal model. 
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In summary, it seems that the early stage of development of patient safety climate 
questionnaires which had been adapted provided little data about their psychometric 
properties. After that a number of questionnaires were specifically developed for healthcare 
but they provided limited data about the psychometric properties of the questionnaires. More 
recent validation studies provide comprehensive data about the psychometric properties of 
questionnaires. However, it seems that there is still a need for studies to assess the 
psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires when used in new contexts. 
Therefore, the current study aims to provide detailed information on psychometric analysis 
and properties of the questionnaire used in this investigation. 
Although, the development and validation of patient safety climate questionnaires has been 
carried out in a wide range of countries, there was no validated questionnaire for use in Saudi 
Arabia. There are very few studies of patient safety culture in Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
there are no validation studies and consequently no valid and reliable questionnaire for 
measuring patient safety climate. For example, Al ahrnadi, Talal (2009) assessed patient 
safety culture in Saudi hospitals by using the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004) without examining the reliability and validity of the questionnaire in the 
Saudi context. Similarly, a study by another author (Alahrnadi, Hanan, 2010) used the 
original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to assess patient safety culture 
in a number of Saudi hospitals without performing a detailed assessment of the validity and 
reliability of the questionnaire before its application in the Saudi context. 
These two examples of Saudi studies (e.g. Alahmadi, Talal 2009; Alahmadi, Hanan 2010) 
used the HSOPSC questionnaire to assess patient safety culture without validation of the 
questionnaire. They did not assess the validity and reliability of the questionnaire before 
applying it in a new context as recommended by Smits et al. (2008). These recent studies 
(Alahrnadi, Talal, 2009; Alahrnadi, Hanan, 2010) in Saudi hospitals were published after the 
current study began. However, both studies adopted a different approach to assessing patient 
safety culture than the current study. They aimed to assess patient safety culture in Saudi 
hospitals by using the original HSOPSC questionnaire without prior validation of the 
questionnaire. Whereas the current study using Saudi data performed extensive validation in 
order to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. 
Therefore, the current study aims to address an important gap in the literature. 
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In general, more recent validation studies since 2004 have reported psychometric properties 
of validated patient safety climate questionnaires (e.g. Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Hutchinson et 
aI., 2006; Smits et aI., 2008, Waterson et aI., 2009). This may be because these studies 
followed similar recommended practice in terms of assessing psychometric properties of 
patient safety climate questionnaires and publishing information regarding psychometric 
analysis including factor analysis and reliability analysis. 
2.4.3 Selecting a suitable questionnaire for measuring patient safety 
climate 
A large and growing body of literature addresses ways of measuring patient safety climate 
either by developing or selecting an established a suitable tool. It is recommended that using 
a valid and reliable questionnaire may be better than developing a new questionnaire (Pett et 
al. (2003). Indeed, Nieva and Sorra (2003:6) recommended that: 
"Healthcare organisations should first examine the suitability of existing tools to their 
needs before embarking on an effort to develop a new tool". 
The selection of a suitable patient safety climate questionnaire depends on the purpose and 
the needs of the study. In addition, the choice of questionnaire depends on the intended use , 
the target population, reliability and validity of the tool and dimensions. Colla et al. (2005) 
mentioned that selecting a suitable patient safety climate questionnaire depends on its 
purpose. Singla et al. (2006) argued that choice of patient safety climate questionnaire 
depends on a number of issues such as the intended use, the target population, psychometric 
properties including validity and reliability. 
A number of studies used selection criteria to find a suitable patient safety culture assessment 
tool. For example, Hutchinson et al. (2006) used criteria for the selection of an instrument 
that included: the instrument measured safety climate and was short enough for busy 
healthcare professionals. Nieva and Sorra (2003) proposed the following criteria: (1) the 
dimensions of patient safety culture that are evaluated; (2) the staff members Who will 
complete the tool; (3) the settings for which the tool was developed; and (4) the availability 
of reliability and validity evidence about the tool. Flin et al. (2006b) used criteria such as: 
use of questionnaire to measure safety climate in healthcare setting, availability of details of 
the questionnaire, questionnaires tested on sample of over 50 respondents and finally, English 
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language questionnaire. A valid and reliable patient safety climate questionnaire is the most 
important criteria beside the patient safety culture dimensions that are covered in a 
questionnaire (Fleming, 2005; Pronovost and Sexton, 2006). 
However, it is important to note that the selection of an appropriate patient safety climate 
questionnaire does not mean that one survey questionnaire is better than others but it depends 
on the purpose of study, taking into account some very important issues related to 
psychometric properties and dimensions of the questionnaire. 
In conclusion, this study needs a patient safety climate questionnaire that covers a 
comprehensive range of patient safety culture dimensions, and is a valid and reliable tool to 
assess patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. Therefore, there are many questionnaires for 
specific aims and use that are not suitable for this study such as the Modified Operating 
Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (Flin et aI., 2003) and the Teamwork and Patient 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Kaissi et aI., 2003). Further details of the selection of an 
appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for use in the current study are provided in 
section 4.2 of chapter four. 
Summary 
There are a number of patient safety climate questionnaires available to assess patient safety 
culture in healthcare. They are varied in terms of the general characteristics; the dimensions 
of patient safety culture covered in the questionnaires and psychometric properties. The 
development of patient safety climate questionnaires is increasingly recognised as an 
important tool for assessing and improving patient safety culture in healthcare organisations. 
The selection of the patient safety climate questionnaire depends on the purpose and the 
needs of the study, reliability and validity of the questionnaire and dimensions that are 
addressed in a questionnaire. 
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2.5 Overall summary of chapter two 
The literature review for this study focuses on the key elements of safety in organisations, 
patient safety, and the assessment of patient safety culture in healthcare. Safety is a concept 
that has attracted much attention across a wide range of industries, particularly high risk 
settings such as nuclear energy field, chemical processing, aviation, and healthcare. 
Organisations with good safety may reflect specific characteristics such as good 
communication, management commitment to safety and organisational learning from errors. 
Safety is a particularly important issue in high-risk organisations such as healthcare, where 
significant hazards are present. 
Safety in healthcare involves the safety of both healthcare workers and patients. The Institute 
of Medicine (2000) defines patient safety as freedom from accidental injury due to medical 
care or medical errors. It is widely accepted that safety culture is an important element in 
patient safety improvement. Safety culture refers to the shared attitudes, beliefs, and values 
of employees of an organisation in relation to safety issues. It is normally assessed by means 
of workforce questionnaire surveys to measure safety climate. Safety climate can be seen as 
clear picture, a current surface and measurable aspect of safety culture, which is recognized, 
from the employee's perceptions (Flin et aI., 2000). 
It is widely agreed that safety climate questionnaires are used to assess safety culture. The 
common approach for identifying safety culture dimensions is through analysing the 
psychometric properties of highly structured questionnaires (Cox and Flin, 1998). For that 
reason, patient safety climate measurement studies should focus on the psychometric 
properties of patient safety culture questionnaires that measure patient safety climate. The 
real test of the safety climate questionnaire is validation, in terms of its power to expose 
safety climate dimensions (Flin et aI., 2000). 
Assessing patient safety culture in healthcare is based on measuring patient safety climate 
through the use of a patient safety climate questionnaire. A number of patient safety climate 
questionnaires with differing characteristics have been developed to assess patient safety 
culture in healthcare organisations. These questionnaires are varied in terms of the general 
characteristics, psychometric properties and the dimensions of patient safety culture that are 
addressed by the questionnaires. 
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It is also very important to take into account that a patient safety climate questionnaire should 
be a valid and reliable tool and it should measure the common dimensions of patient safety 
culture (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). 
It seems that few studies have provided a full report of the development of measurement 
scales and their psychometric properties at an early stage of development of the patient safety 
climate questionnaires. In addition, there was no agreement about how to assess the validity 
and reliability of patient safety climate questionnaires. Most studies at that early stage 
adapted questionnaires from other industries or reviewed a number of questionnaires to 
develop new questionnaires. However, the development and validation studies are varied in 
terms of how they develop and validate the patient safety climate questionnaires and how 
they assess psychometric properties. The validation of the patient safety culture 
questionnaire construct has been performed by using factor analysis to uncover the latent 
structures of the safety culture dimensions and Cronbach's alpha for internal consistency as 
an accepted method for assessing reliability. Importantly, that more recent validation studies 
have provided a clearer view of psychometric analysis and psychometric properties of patient 
safety climate questionnaires (e.g. Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Hutchinson et aI., 2006; Waterson 
et aI., 2009). 
Selecting a suitable patient safety climate questionnaire depends on its intended use, the 
target population, length of questionnaire, dimensions of patient safety culture, and reliability 
and validity of questionnaire. However, it is important to review the various questionnaires 
to select the most appropriate one. The process of selecting an appropriate questionnaire 
involves establishing methodological criteria which can be employed as guidelines in this 
process. 
The reviewed literature revealed a number of gaps. Firstly, is in relation to a lack of 
reporting the psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires provided in 
relevant literature. Although the reviewed literature revealed that in recent years there has 
been increasing attention to measuring patient safety climate, there remains a lack of reported 
information on the psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires (Hin et 
aI., 2006b). 
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Most importantly for this current study is the lack of a suitable tool for assessing patient 
safety culture in Saudi hospitals. This topic is still at an early stage of development in Saudi 
Arabia. Although much patient safety research has been published, in particular in patient 
safety culture assessment, the patient safety climate measurement in non-Western countries 
such as Saudi Arabia is less advanced. There is no paper that provides a unique measurement 
of patient safety climate in healthcare organisations in Saudi Arabia (Walston et aI., 2010). 
This means there is a little known about patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals (Alahmadi, 
2010). However, it is clear that research on patient safety culture in the Saudi healthcare 
setting is needed. This in turn, increased the need for appropriate tools to measure patient 
safety climate in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the current study aims to identify a suitable' 
measure for assessing patient safety culture in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. In the next chapter, 
the research methodology used to address the aim of the current study is presented. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological procedures that were followed in addressing the aim 
of the present study. This study employed qualitative and quantitative approaches to identify 
a suitable patient safety climate questionnaire for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. Details of 
the research ethics process are presented in this chapter. 
3.2 Research aim and objectives 
This study aims to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient safety culture for use in 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The current study investigates whether there is an existing patient 
safety climate questionnaire that would be suitable for assessing patient safety culture in 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia. In this investigation four main objectives need to be met in order 
to achieve the aim of the study. 
The main objectives of the study are: 
1. To select an appropriate questionnaire to assess hospital patient safety culture. 
2. To evaluate the face validity of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire. 
3. To assess the psychometric properties of the selected questionnaire in hospitals in 
Saudi Arabia. 
4. To develop the most appropriate measure for assessing patient safety culture for use 
in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
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3.3 Study design 
The present study is focused on the validation and development of an appropriate patient 
safety climate questionnaire for use in Saudi hospitals. The selected patient safety climate 
questionnaire was identified to use in this investigation. Then the face validity of the selected 
questionnaire was established. The selected questionnaire was used to collect data to assess 
its psychometric properties (validity and reliability) and to develop an optimal model for 
assessing patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. The settings for the study were three 
hospitals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
The study comprised four main methods to address the study objectives: 
1. Literature review process to select appropriate quantitative tools for assessing 
patient safety culture. 
This stage of research aimed to select appropriate patient safety culture tools for assessing the 
perceptions of the workforce towards patient safety culture in hospitals for use in the 
investigation. A comprehensive literature search was conducted in this stage. This stage 
consisted of four steps and a number of selection criteria at each step. This stage identified 
two questionnaires, the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and the Teamwork 
and Safety Climate questionnaire (Sexton et aI., 2004). Further details of the approach taken 
can be found in chapter four, section 4.2. 
2. Qualitative interviews to assess face validity of the selected patient safety 
climate questionnaires. 
This stage aimed to establish the face validity of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva 
2004) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire (Sexton et aI., 2004) and 
compared them in order to select the more appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for 
the study. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 medical and nursing staff to 
explore the face validity of each questionnaire. At the end of this stage the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was identified as the most appropriate questionnaire to 
use in this investigation. The wording of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire 
(HSOPSC questionnaire) was modified to suit the Saudi settings. This method and its results 
are provided in detail in chapter four, section 4.3. 
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3. Data collection using the HSOPSC questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
In this stage of the study the HSOPSC questionnaire was applied in order to provide the data 
for psychometric assessment. This stage was concerned with the distribution and collection 
of the HSOPSC questionnaires. This method is described in detail in chapter five. The data 
management process is also provided in chapter five. 
4. Data analysis to assess the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
The main aim of the analytical strategy is to assess the psychometric properties (validity and 
reliability) of the HSOPSC questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. Validity is defined as 
the extent to which any instrument measures what it is intended to measure. Reliability 
concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same 
results in repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). To achieve this aim a number of 
analytical techniques were used such as factor analysis, correlation and reliability analysis. 
Factor analysis is a technique for examining the interrelationships among the items of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire in order to determine the structure (important underlying patient 
safety culture dimensions) in the Saudi data. Factor analysis aims to assess construct validity 
of an established instrument when administered to a specific population (Pett et al., 2003). 
Correlation refers to the association between two factors (dimensions) using a correlation 
coefficient ranging from -1 to + 1. A positive correlation means both factors increase, while a 
negative correlation means one factor increases as the other decreases (Campbell et al., 2007). 
Reliability refers to the ability of the measure to produce similar results across different 
situations, Cronbach's alpha (a) is the most common measure of internal consistency (Field, 
2009). Internal consistency of instrument is the most popular way for estimating how well 
the items of a particular dimension are related to each other (Pett et al., 2003). 
In the current study, the analytical strategy of assessing the psychometric properties of the 
original HSOPSC questionnaire is as follows: 
1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CF A) to test the fit of the original model (original 
HSOPSC questionnaire) to the whole data. If the original model fits satisfactorily this 
means the HSOPSC questionnaire is valid. 
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2. Reliability analysis is carried out to assess internal consistency of each dimension of 
the original HSOPSC questionnaire. 
The second probable result is if the original HSOPSC questionnaire data does not fit 
satisfactorily, in this situation: 
1. The data was split randomly into two halves. 
2. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EF A) was used on one half to derive optimal model. 
3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used on the other half of the data to test 
the fit of the optimal model. 
4. .Correlation of factors of the optimal model was performed to assess construct 
validity (to ensure the factors of the optimal model are related to each other). 
5. Reliability analysis was used on the whole data to assess the internal consistency 
of the optimal model in hospitals in Saudi Arabia by calculating the Cronbach 
alpha coefficients for the items in each dimension emerging from the factor 
analysis (EFA and CFA). 
There are a number of issues that should be considered in performing CF A and EF A: 
Firstly, CFA was used to test the original model fit to the data. Amos software was used to 
do CF A (Arbuckle, 2005). The guidelines for adequacy of fit in CF A suggests a comparative 
fit index (CFI) value at least 0.95. The adequacy of the model fit was determined by mUltiple 
fit indices. This includes the chi-square test statistic, which is the most commonly used fit 
statistic. Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and incremental fit index (IFI) 
are also considered. The Normed fit index (NFI) is a rescaled chi-square value (0 = no fit, 
1.0 = perfect fit) that is based on a comparison of the proposed model with a model that 
contains no relations, or a null model (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2000). Several authors (e.g. 
Bone, et aI., 1989; Hair et aI., 1998; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993; Schumacker and Lomax , 
2004; Nusair and Hua, 2010) agreed that the overall model fit is evaluated using goodness-of-
fit indices including xldf ratio, CFI, NFI, PNFI, RFI, IFI and RMSEA. Table 6-15 in page 
174 provides the general agreed fit indices (parameters). 
Secondly, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EF A) is an important and useful tool for refining 
measures and evaluating construct validity. In other words, EF A is used for creating and 
refining the instrument's scales (Conway and Allen, 2003). In EFA the aim is to discover the 
main constructs or dimensions (Kline, 1994). 
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A number of studies (e.g. Ford et aI., 1986; Floyd and Widaman, 1995; Gorsuch, 1997; 
Fabrigar et aI., 1999) suggested that there are three important decisions should be taken in 
consideration before using EF A as follows: 
(a) The factor extraction model used. 
(b) The number of factors retained. 
(c) The method used to rotate factors (assuming more than one factor is retained). 
Selection of the factor extraction model: 
A variety of factor extraction models are available, most can be categorized as either a 
common factor model or a components model (Gorsuch, 1983). The most popular 
components model is Principle Component Analysis (PCA). Among common factor models, 
maximum likelihood and principal axis factoring with estimated communalities are popular. 
The main difference between the two models is in their purposes. The purpose of common 
factor models is to understand unobserved (latent) factors that account for relationships 
among measured variables (items). The goal of PCA is simply to reduce the number of 
variables by creating linear combinations that retain as much of the original measures' 
variance as possible (without interpretation in terms of constructs). The results of two 
models may very closely resemble common factor results in some cases (Conway and Allen, 
2003). 
In other words, if a study's purpose is to understand the latent structure of a set of variables 
and interpret results then the use of a common factor model such as principal axis factoring 
represents the best decision. If a study's purpose is to be purely reduction of variables 
without interpreting the resulting variables in terms of latent constructs, then use of PCA 
represents the best decision (Conway and Allen, 2003). Snook and Gorsuch (1989) pointed 
out that common factor analysis tends to produce more sensible and accurate results than 
PCA. 
Generally, the selection of the factor extraction model is based on the purpose of the study. 
The current study aims to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient safety culture for 
use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. That means exploring and understanding the patient safety 
culture dimensions (factors) that could be used in Saudi hospitals for assessing patient safety 
culture. Therefore, the aim here is not just purely reducing the variables but the aim is to 
understand and interpret the resulting factors in terms of the structure of the patient safety 
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culture tool. Generally, the purpose of the current study involves latent constructs (important 
underlying patient safety culture dimensions) in order to determine the structure of patient 
safety culture tool in the Saudi data. Therefore, Principle Axis Factoring was selected to use 
as the extraction method of EF A. 
The number of factors retained: 
The second important decision is the criterion for the number of factors to retain. A number 
of studies (e.g. Zwick and Velicer, 1986; Fabrigar et aI., 1999; Conway and AlIen, 2003) 
clearly show that different criteria often lead to different numbers of factors being retained 
such as "Eigenvalues greater than one" rule, the Scree test and parallel analysis. Research 
shows that the Eigenvalues greater than 1 rule is commonly used but tends to produce too 
many factors. Therefore, in general there is wide agreement that using mUltiple techniques 
such as Eigenvalues and Scree plot have become more common that gives the most 
interpretable solution (Zwick and Velicer, 1986; Gorsuch, 1997; Fabrigar et aI., 1999). 
Eigenvalue is the sum of the squared of all items of each factor of extracted factors. Eigen 
value represents the amount of variation contributed by the factor. The Scree plot is used to 
identify a number of extracted factors (Pall ent, 2007). Therefore, in order to achieve the most 
interpretable solution in terms of a number of factors retained the combination of techniques 
of Eigenvalues greater than 1 rule and Scree plot were used in the current study. 
The method used to rotate factors (assuming more than one factor is retained): 
Rotation of factors usually aims to find a more interpretable solution, given a number of 
factors greater than one, (Conway and AlIen, 2003). Fabrigar et al. (1999) described simple 
structure of rotation factors in that each factor has a subset of variables (items) with high 
loadings, and the rest with low loadings, and that each variable has high loadings on only 
some of the factors and low loadings on the rest. Factor loadings are the correlations of items 
with factors. The factors deduced by their loadings (Kline, 1994). 
There are two type of analytical rotations can be used to get a more interpretable solution. 
The first type is called orthogonal rotation, such as varimax. The second type is called 
oblique rotation, such as direct oblimin. Orthogonal rotation decreases the number of factors 
and uses uncorrelated factors that mean this rotation gives some high loadings and some low 
loadings for each factor. Oblique rotation is allowing correlated factors and gives one high 
loading and other loadings near zero for each factor (Conway and AlIen, 2003). 
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In this type of rotation the covariance between elements on factors is minimized (Kim and 
Mueller, 1978). Oblique rotation provides a more interpretable solution than orthogonal 
rotations therefore; an oblique rotation is preferred (Ford et aI., 1986; Gorsuch, 1997; 
Fabrigar et aI., 1999). In this study varimax was used at the initial solution (first step of EF A) 
to produce the initial idea of factor loadings and to examine the clarity of the initial solution. 
After that, the oblique rotation was used to force factors of patient safety culture to be . 
correlated. In summary the following criteria are used in EF A: 
I. Principle Axis Factoring was selected to use as the extraction method of EF A. 
2. The combination technique of eigenvaluesgreater-than-I rule and scree plot were used. 
3. Varimax then oblique rotation (direct oblimin) were used. 
The data in this study was analysed according to the above strategy to assess the 
psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire in Saudi hospitals. More details of the 
method and the results are presented in chapter six. 
3.4 Study setting and sample 
The location of the study was in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The HSOPSC questionnaire was 
administered at three hospitals in Riyadh from June to mid of September 2009. The study 
sample was selected from all doctors and nurses in the three selected hospitals. Details of 
study settings and sample are provided in chapter five. 
3.5 Research Ethics Review 
Research ethics review was required from the School of Health and Related Research at the 
University of Sheffield. Thereafter, ethics review and agreements were sought from the three 
hospitals in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. The first stage involved ethical approval from the 
University of Sheffield. The current study received approval from the ethics committee in 
the School of Heath and Related Research at the University of Sheffield (see copies of ethics 
approval in appendix 5 and 6). 
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The second stage of ethics reVIew was the hospitals' approval to conduct the study. 
Communication was established with the research centres in the three hospitals in Riyadh for 
ethics application forms and regulati~:ms (instructions) for research requirements to obtain 
their agreement to undertake the study. 
1. Institutional Review Board Committee of the Research Centre, King Fahad Hospital 
(submitted in April 2009). 
2. Office of research affairs in King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre 
(submitted in April 2009). 
3. Institutional Review Board of the King Fahad Medical City (submitted in June 2009). 
The proposal of the current study and relevant forms were submitted to the three research 
centres above in hospitals in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. The proposal was approved by the 
Chairman of the Research Committee in the King Fahad Hospital (see appendix 8 for the 
copy of the approval letter from Institutional Review Board of King Abdullah International 
Medical & Health Sciences Research Centre in King Fahad Hospital). The proposal of the 
study was reviewed and approved by two committees, Research Ethics Committee (REC) and 
Clinical Research Committee (CRC) in the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research 
Centre. After that the proposal was approved by the Research Advisory Council (see 
appendices 13 and 14 for the copies of the approval letter from the Research Advisory 
Council, King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre). The proposal was reviewed 
by the External Research Review Committee after that the proposal was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board in the third hospital (see appendix 11 for the copy of the approval 
letter from Institutional Review Board of the King Fahad Medical City). This research ethics 
review process is described in detail in appendix 7. 
3.6 The fieldwork and plan 
The fieldwork commenced in early 2009 for a period of six months in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. 
Firstly, there were interviews with ~ number of participants. The approximate duration of the 
interview process including obtaining agreements of the hospitals was two and a half months. 
Secondly, the questionnaires were distributed in the three hospitals. The approximate 
duration of data collection process including distributing and collecting the questionnaires in 
the three hospitals was three months. 
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This period of time was particularly convenient because there were no holidays within this 
period of time that might have interrupted the field work. Table 3-1 shows the timetable of 
the fieldwork in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 3- 1 Fieldwork timetable 
Stage 
Interviews 
Questionnaires 
3.7 Summary 
Start 
10-4-2009 
28-6-2009 
End 
25-6-2009 
1-10-2009 
In summary, the methodology used for undertaking the research was based on the aim and 
objectives of the research. In the current study, both quantitative and qualitative methods 
were used to identify patient safety climate questionnaire that would be a suitable for 
assessing patient safety culture in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The next chapter provides the 
details of choosing an appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for use in Saudi 
hospitals. The details of the data collection process can be found in chapter five. The results 
of the psychometric analysis of the HSOPSC questionnaire properties (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
in Saudi hospitals using Saudi data can be found in chapter six of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Choosing an appropriate patient 
safety climate questionnaire for use in Saudi 
hospitals 
4.1 Introduction 
The current chapter aims to describe the process of choosing an appropriate patient safety 
climate questionnaire for use in the study. This chapter is divided into four sections. 
Following this introduction, section 4.2 describes the selection of appropriate questionnaires 
for assessing the perceptions of the workforce towards patient safety culture in hospitals. 
Sectio~ 4.3 describes the face validity testing of the two patient safety climate questionnaires 
and reports the findings. Section 4.4 provides the overall summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Selection of appropriate patient safety climate 
questionnaires 
This stage seeks to select appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires for assessing the 
perceptions of the workforce towards patient safety culture in hospitals for use in the 
investigation. This stage consists of four steps. Table 4-1 describes the criteria used in each 
step of the selection of appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires for assessing patient 
safety culture. 
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Table 4- 1 Steps of selecting appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires 
Step Criteria 
Step 1: Identifying existing patient 
safety climate questionnaires 
Step 2: Assessment of psychometric 
properties and dimensionality of 
questionnaires 
Step 3: Assessment of general 
characteristics of questionnaires 
Step 4: Selection of appropriate 
patient safety climate questionnaires 
1. Quantitative instruments 
2. Use for healthcare organisations 
3. Patient safety culture Iclimate questionnaire 
1. A valid and reliable questionnaire 
2. A questionnaire that encompasses the important 
patient safety culture dimensions 
1. For assessing perceptions of hospital staff 
2. Self- reported questionnaires 
3. A questionnaire is short enough for use by health 
professionals who are busy 
4. Availability of versions of questionnaires 
The selected questionnaires should be fitted with all 
criteria above 
4.2.1 Stepl: Identifying existing patient safety culture questionnaires 
This step was based on the following criteria: 
1. Patient safety culture Iclimate measures. 
2. Use for healthcare organisations. 
3. Quantitative instruments. 
Search strategy 
An extensive and comprehensive literature search was conducted utilising hand (library) 
searching and electronic databases such as the Medline, Science direct, Pubmed Central and 
the Psycho review of the published literature from 1966 to July 2008, Psycho from 1985 to 
July 2008. Using the search terms "healthcare organisation", "safety culture", "safety 
climate", "patient safety culture"," patient safety climate", "survey", "questionnaire" and 
"measuring". A combination of the key words, such as patient safety climate questionnaire in 
health care, and patient safety culture questionnaire in healthcare were used. No restriction on 
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date or study type was used. However, the search was restricted to the English language. 
Websites relevant to patient safety were also used, and these included the website of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA) and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (nU). Moreover, bibliographic 
references were also searched. The searches were conducted in 2007. 
The above strategy and criteria yielded 14 questionnaires that are used to measure patient 
safety culture Iclimate in healthcare organisations as follows: 
1. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
2. Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2000, 2003). 
3. Team Work and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
4. Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
5. Safety Climate Scale (Pronovost et aI., 2003; Kho et aI., 2005). 
6. Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety scale (Beuzekom, 2007). 
7. Veterans Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire. (Burr et aI., 2002). 
8. Strategies for Leadership: An Organisational Approach to Patient Safety 
(Voluntary Hospital of America, 2000). 
9. Hospital Transfusion Service Safety Culture Survey (Sorra and Nieva, 2003). 
10. Patient Safety Culture in Health Care Organisation (Singer et aI., 2007). 
11. Medication Safety Self-Assessment (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2000). 
12. Culture of Safety Survey (CSS) (Weingart et aI., 2004). 
13. Stanford University Patient Safety Climate in Health Care Organisation 
Questionnaire (Singer et aI., 2003). 
14. An employee questionnaire for assessing patient safety (Carayon et aI., 2005). 
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4.2.2 Step 2: Assessment of psychometric properties (validity and 
reliability) and dimensionality of patient safety climate questionnaires 
This step was related to reviewing the validity and reliability of questionnaires, an important 
step in selection process (Pronovost and Sexton, 2005). The dimensionality of the 
questionnaires was also considered. This step addressed the foHowing criteria: 
1. A valid and reliable patient safety climate questionnaire. 
2. A questionnaire that encompasses the important patient safety culture dimensions. 
These criteria were applied to the list of 14 questionnaires; four questionnaires were excluded. 
Table 4-2 shows the excluded patient safety climate questionnaires in this step. 
Table 4- 2 Excluded patient safety climate questionnaires in step2 
Patient safety climate questionnaire Reason for exclusion 
Stanford University Patient Safety Climate in Health Reliability not mentioned (Fleming, 
Care Organisation (Singer et aI., 2003) 2005) 
Strategies for Leadership: An Organisational 
Approach to Patient Safety(Voluntary Hospital of 
America, 2000) 
Safety Climate Scale (Pronovost et aI., 2003; Kho et 
aI., 2005) 
Culture of Safety Survey (CSS) (Weingart et aI., 
2004) 
Cronbach's alpha not mentioned 
(Colla et aI., 2005) 
Small number of dimensions 
Cronbach's alpha (internal 
consistency scores) were poor 
The remaining ten patient safety climate questionnaires as follows: 
l. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
2. Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2000, 2003). 
3. Team Work and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
4. Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
5. Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety scale (Beuzekom, 2007). 
6. Veterans Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire (Burr et aI., 2000). 
7. Hospital Transfusion Service Safety Culture Survey (Sorra and Nieva, 2003). 
8. Patient Safety Culture in Health Care Organisation (Singer et aI., 2007) 
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9. Medication Safety Self-Assessment (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2000) 
10. An employee questionnaire for assessing patient safety (Carayon et aI., 2005) 
4.2.3 Step 3: Assessment of general characteristics of patient safety climate 
questionnaires 
The third step in the process of selecting appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires for 
assessing patient safety culture was based on the following criteria: 
1. An instrument that can be utilised to assess the perceptions of patient safety culture of 
doctors and nurses in hospitals. 
2. Self-reporting questionnaires that staff could complete themselves without any 
assistance. 
3. Instrument short enough for use health workers who are busy such as doctors and 
nurses (Hutchinson et aI., 2006) as time to complete questionnaire is an important 
consideration. 
4. The availability of the questionnaires. Full copIes of questionnaires g1VIng 
descriptions, such as number of questions (items), type of questions, scale used the 
intended sample population and the setting where it has been used. 
These criteria above were applied to the list of 10 questionnaires, five questionnaires were 
excluded. Table 4-3 shows the excluded patient safety climate questionnaires in this step. 
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Table 4- 3 Excluded patient safety climate questionnaires in step 3 
Patient safety climate questionnaire Reason for exclusion 
Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care It contains 99 items. It is used for assessing system 
Safety scale (Beuzekom, 2007) failure in operating room and intensive care 
Medication Safety Self-Assessment (Institute Too long questionnaire contains 194 items 
for Safe Medication Practices, 2000) 
Hospital Transfusion Service Safety Culture Use for transfusion service. In addition the version 
Survey(Sorra and Nieva, 2003) of questionnaire is not available 
Veterans Administration Patient Safety Relatively long, it contains 71 items. In addition the 
Culture Questionnaire (Burr et al., 2000) version of questionnaire is not available 
An employee questionnaire for assessing The version questionnaire is not available 
patient safety (Carayon et al., 2005 
The remaining five patient safety climate questionnaires were: 
1 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Neiva, 2004). 
2 Safety Climate Survey (SCS) (Sexton et al., 2000, 2003). 
3 Team Work and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et al., 2004). 
4 Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2004). 
5 Patient Safety Culture Survey in Health Care (PSCSHC) (Singer et al., 2007). 
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4.2.4 Step 4: Select appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires 
The five patient safety climate questionnaires mentioned above were further reviewed in 
detail for their general characteristics, dimensions covered and psychometric properties of 
each questionnaire (Colla et aI., 2004; Singla., 2006). 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) 
Sorra and Neiva developed this tool in 2004 funded by the Agency for Health Care Quality 
and Research (AHRQ). This survey aims to enable hospitals to assess their patient safety 
culture. It was developed by reviewing the literature and existing safety culture surveys 
followed by interviews with hospital staff. The resulting questionnaire was piloted and the 
data analysed using factor analysis to identify which scales and items to retain. It contains 44 
items on a 5-point Likert Scale, and it is appropriate for general use by healthcare staff. The 
HSOPSC questionnaire is considered as a valid and reliable tool when tested in the USA to 
assess the perceptions of the· workforce towards the patient safety culture in hospitals. It 
covers 12 dimensions of safety culture, which are: 
1 Good channels of communication openness. 
2 Supervisor/manager actions promoting patient safety. 
3 No punitive response to error. 
4 Staffing. 
5 Hospital management support for patient safety. 
6 Teamwork within units. 
7 Teamwork across hospital units. 
8 Effective processing of organisational learning. 
9 Regular feedback and communication about errors. 
10 Hospital handover and transitions (information handover, exchange of information). 
11 Overall perceptions of safety. 
12 Frequency of event reporting. 
There are four outcomes, which include overall perceptions of safety, frequency of events 
reported, number of events reported and overall patient safety grade. This patient safety 
climate questionnaire shows good psychometric properties (Sorra and Neiva, 2004). Table 4-
4 shows the characteristics of the original HSOPSC questionnaire. 
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Table 4- 4 Characteristics of the originalllospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
Characteristics Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
Authors and 
development date 
Country 
Aim 
Number of items 
Scale 
Setting 
Staff 
Dimensions 
Psychometric 
assessment 
Sorra and Nieva 
(2004) 
U.S.A 
To enable hospitals to assess their patient safety culture. 
44 
On a 5-point Likert Scale 
Hospital 
Health care staff 
1. Communication openness 
2. Supervisor/manager actions promoting patient safety 
3. No punitive response to error 
4. Staffing 
5. Hospital management support for patient safety 
6. Teamwork within units 
7. Teamwork across hospital units 
8. Organisational learning processing 
9. Feedback and communication about error 
10. Hospital handover and transitions (information handover, exchange of 
information) 
11. Overall perceptions of safety 
12. Frequency of event reporting 
1 Good psychometric properties 
2 Cronbach's alpha range from 0.63-0.84 
3 Tested on large sample 
Statistical analysis such as item analysis, exploratory factor analysis, 
confirmatory factor analysis and correlated composite scores across dimensions 
performed to assess psychometric properties. It has a strong content validity and 
has been validated at all levels (Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Colla et aI., 2004). 
The version of the questionnaire can be found on www.ahrq.gov/quallhospculture 
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As mentioned in section (2.4) in chapter two, the HSOPSC questionnaire is very widely used 
in different countries, for example, the study in Belgium by Hellings and colleagues (2007) 
selected the HSOPSC questionnaire for their survey because they found it met more of their 
psychometric criteria than the other instruments they reviewed (Hellings et at, 2007). 
Overall, the questionnaire examines patient safety culture from a hospital staff perspective. 
The HSOPSC questionnaire measures a number of important dimensions and includes a 
number of outcomes of patient safety culture. It is a reliable and a valid questionnaire in 
measuring patient safety climate. 
Safety Climate Survey (SCS) 
Sexton and colleagues (2000, 2003) developed the Safety Climate Survey (SCS). It aims to 
allow an organisation to be able to assess staff perceptions of safety culture and to monitor 
the success of the patient safety initiatives. It is derived from the Flight Management and 
Attitudes Safety Survey (FMASS). The Safety Climate Survey contains 19 items covering 
seven safety culture dimensions, which are: 
1. Communication. 
2. Priority given to patient safety. 
3. Perception and understanding of the cause of patient safety incidents. 
4. Learning from patient safety incidents. 
5. Incident reporting. 
6. Leadership. 
7. Error management. 
It has been reported that this tool has a good test-retest reliability and internal consistency 
and that it is predictive of performance and accident rates (Sexton et at, 2000; Pronovost et 
aI., 2003). Table 4-5 shows the characteristics of the SCS. 
89 
Chapter four 
Table 4- 5 Characteristics of Safety Climate Survey 
Characteristics Safety Climate Survey 
Authors and 
development date 
Country 
Aim 
Number of items 
Scale 
Setting 
Staff 
Dimensions 
Psychometric 
assessment 
Chapter four 
Sexton et al. 
(2000,2003) 
U.S.A 
To allow organisations to be able to assess staff perceptions of safety culture and 
to monitor the success of the patient safety initiatives 
19 
On as-point Likert Scale 
Acute hospital settings 
Health care staff 
1. Communication 
2. Priority given to patient safety 
3. Perception of the cause of patient safety incidents 
4. Learning from patient safety incidents 
5. Incident reporting 
6. Leadership 
7. Error management 
Cronbach's alpha is good. 
Partial item analysis, partial confirmatory factor analysis, partial test Iretest 
reliability and analysis of variance across services performed (Colla et aI., 2005) 
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Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
Sexton et a1. (2004) developed this questionnaire. It contains 27 items covered in two 
sections teamwork and safety climate. Table 4-6 shows the characteristics of the Teamwork 
and Safety Climate Survey. 
Table 4- 6 Characteristics of Teamwork and safety climate survey 
Characteristics Teamwork and safety climate survey 
Authors and 
development date 
Country 
Aim 
Number of items 
Scale 
Setting 
Staff 
Dimensions 
Psychometric 
assessment 
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Sexton et al 
(2004) 
U.S.A 
To measure teamwork and safety climate in healthcare organisations 
27 
6-point Likert scale 
General primary and secondary health care settings 
Hospital and primary care staff 
1. Safety climate domain 
Attitudes to safety within own team, capacity to learn from errors, overall 
confidence in safety organisation and perception of management attitudes 
2.Team work domain 
Communication and collaboration with other staff, information handover (exchange 
of information) 
Psychometric analysis: 
1 Cronbach's alpha range from 0.69-0.84 
2 Face validity is good 
Factor analysis and reliability analysis performed 
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The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) is a refinement of the Intensive Care Unit 
Management Attitude Questionnaire (ICUMAQ), which has been taken from a questionnaire 
widely used in commercial aviation, the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (Sexton 
et aI., 2004). This questionnaire was developed by Sexton et at. (2004) to measure caregiver 
attitudes about the following dimensions: teamwork, safety climate, job satisfaction, stress 
recognition, perception of management and working condition. It contains 60 items and 
demographic information such as sex, age, nationality and experience. It uses a Likert scale 
and some items are negatively worded. It is used for multiple units in an organisation. The 
SAQ was designed to take a snapshot of culture in clinical areas. The SAQ is used for 
assessing the attitudes of front-line healthcare providers across a number of dimensions of 
patient safety. This questionnaire has shown adequate psychometric properties and was 
tested on a large sample. Cronbach's alpha ranged from 0.65-0.83 (Sexton et aI., 2006). 
Table 4-7 shows the characteristics of the SAQ. 
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Table 4- 7 Characteristics of Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
Characteristics 
Authors and 
development date 
Country 
Aim 
Number of items 
Scale 
Setting 
Staff 
Dimensions 
Psychometric 
assessment 
Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
Sexton et al. 
(2004) 
U.S.A 
To measure the attitudes of front-line healthcare providers about six patient 
safety-related domains 
60 
On a 5-point Likert scale 
Multiple units 
Health care staff 
1. Teamwork 
2. Safety climate 
3. Job satisfaction 
4. Stress recognition. 
5. Perception of management 
6. Working conditions 
Adequate psychometric properties. Tested on large sample 
Cronbach's alpha range from 0.65 - 0.83. Exploratory factor analysis, 
confirmatory factor analysis, correlated composite scores across dimensions and 
test Iretest reliability (Colla et aI., 2005) 
Note: Questionnaires (Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, Safety Climate Survey and Team Work and Safety 
Climate) are available at the University Of Texas Centre Of Excellence for Patient Safety Research and Practice 
web si te: http://www.uth.tmc.edulschooIs/medlimedlpatientsafety/survey&tools.htm. 
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Patient Safety Culture Survey in HealthCare (PSCSHC) 
Singer and colleagues developed the Patient Safety Culture Survey (Stanford instrument) in 
2003. It was adapted from five questionnaires in aviation and health care to assess safety 
culture. It contains 82 items and covers 16 topics but reliability statistics have not been 
published and it is relatively long. It was modified into 38 items, which is now the Patient 
Safety Culture Survey (modified Stanford instrument) and it is used to measure workforce 
perception of hospital safety culture. Cronbach's alpha ranged from 0.50-0.89 (Singer et aI., 
2007). Table 4-8 shows the characteristics of the PSCSHC. 
Table 4- 8 Characteristics of Patient Safety Culture Survey on Health Care 
Organisations 
Characteristics Patient Safety Culture Survey on Health Care Organisations 
Authors and 
Development date 
Country 
Aim 
Number of items 
Scale 
Setting 
Staff 
Dimensions 
Psychometric 
assessment 
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Singer et al. 
(2007) 
U.S.A 
To assess workforce perception of hospital safety culture 
38 
Likert scale 
General 
Healthcare staff 
1. Senior manager's engagement 
2. Organisational resources for safety 
3. Overall emphasis on safety 
4. Unit safety norms 
5. Unit recognition and support for safety effort 
6. Fear of shame. 
7. Provision of safety care 
8. Learning 
9. Fear of blame 
I. Pilot tested 
2. Alpha's range from 0.50 - 0.89 
3. It is a valid and reliable tool that is used to measure features of 
hospital safety climate 
4. Exploratory factor analysis performed 
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To sum up the process of selecting appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires, the 
decision was made to include the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) as an 
appropriate questionnaire to be used in the present study because of the following reasons: 
1. The tool is developed for hospitals. 
2. It is used internationally such as in the USA and Europe. 
3. It is a valid and reliable instrument when it was tested in USA hospitals. 
4. It examines patient safety culture from a hospital staff perspective. 
5. It is new tool,.based on the review of many instruments. 
6. It is a comprehensive tool; that encompasses 12 dimensions of patient safety culture. 
7. The HSOPSC questionnaire freely available. It has no copyright restriction, this is 
considered as a good point especially as time is limited in the present study. 
The second appropriate questionnaire selected was the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
because of the following reasons: 
1. It is a valid and reliable instrument when it was tested in USA hospitals. 
2. It examines patient safety culture from a hospital staff perspective. 
3. It is relatively short questionnaire (27 items). 
4. It is used internationally such as in the USA and Europe. 
5. The copy of the questionnaire freely available. It has no copyright restriction, this 
is considered as a good point especially as time is limited in the present study. 
Table 4-9 shows the steps of selecting appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires for 
assessing patient safety culture that were used in this study. 
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Table 4- 9 Steps of selection of an appropriate questionnaire for assessing patient safety 
culture 
Step Description Outcomes 
1. Identifying an existing 
patient safety climate 
questionnaire 
2. Assessment of 
psychometric properties 
(validity and reliability) 
and dimensionality of the 
questionnaires 
3. Assessment of general 
characteristics of the 
questionnaires 
4. Select appropriate patient 
safety climate 
questionnaires 
An extensive and comprehensive 
literature search 
Review the psychometric properties 
and dimensions of the tools 
Review the general characteristics 
A more detailed review and compares 
general characteristics, dimensions 
covered and the psychometric 
assessment of each questionnaire 
The next section discusses the comparison of the two questionnaires. 
4.2.5 Comparison of the two questionnaires 
14 questionnaires 
10 questionnaires 
Five qu~stionnaires 
Two questionnaires 
The aim of the comparison of the two questionnaires is to select the most appropriate one of 
them to use in the study. The first suitable patient safety climate questionnaire for this study 
was the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and the second suitable 
questionnaire was the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004). Therefore, 
in order to confirm that the final selected questionnaire was an appropriate instrument for the 
study, it was useful to make a comparison between the two questionnaires. In addition this 
comparison might provide important data for the study based on the answers of the 
participants. 
96 
Chapter four 
Theoretically it is important to consider the characteristics of patient safety climate 
questionnaires to compare and select an appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire. 
Therefore, the methodology of the current study started with comparing the patient safety 
climate questionnaires based on their characteristics as an important step to select appropriate 
patient safety climate questionnaires to use in this study. In terms of practicality the 
comparison of all questionnaires does not work because it is not feasible to the participants to 
ask them to compare between more than two questionnaires, this would take a long time and 
consume their time especially they are not experts in the measurement of patient safety 
climate to make a decision for which questionnaire is suitable for this study. Moreover, most 
of the other questionnaires are too long or too short or for specific settings such as pharmacy 
or operation rooms and not for the whole hospital. The section on selecting an appropriate 
questionnaire in this chapter has provided more details related to the comparison of the 
patient safety climate questionnaires therefore there was no point in comparison of the 
questionnaires in the interviews unless to confirm that the patient safety climate questionnaire 
that has been selected is the most appropriate questionnaire for the current study. 
A number of doctors and nurses from one hospital were selected to ask them to read the two 
tools and compare them to select the most clearly and understandable patient safety culture 
questionnaire. The comparison was between the following patient safety culture 
questionnaires: 
1. The HSOPSC questionnaire [44 items] (Sorra and Neiva, 2004). 
2. Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey [27 items] (Sexton et aI., 2004). 
The next section provides more details of the face validity interviews. 
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4.3 Face validity testing of two patient safety climate 
questionnaires 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This step was concerned with establishing and comparing the face validity of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire and the Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire in order to select the more 
appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for the study. The main aim was to ensure 
that the selected questionnaire was understandable and easy to complete by the respondents 
without any difficulties in the language and wording of questionnaire. Fink (1995: 51) points 
out that" Face validity is concerned with how a measure appears". To achieve this aim a 
maximum of 12 semi-structured interviews on a one-to-one basis were conducted to 
investigate perceptions of doctors and nurses towards the HSOPSC questionnaire and the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire. 
The cognitive interviewing technique was used in the face validity testing of the survey 
instrument to learn how the respondents understand the questionnaires and to identify the 
problems that might have arisen regarding the language and wording of the questionnaire. 
The cognitive interview is an interviewing technique based on memory retrieval for testing 
and improving the wording of questions in questionnaires. Therefore, the goal of cognitive 
interviewing is to make questionnaire items clear and understandable for respondents (Collins, 
2003). There are two types of cognitive interview: concurrent and retrospective. Concurrent 
encourages the respondents to give a verbal account of their thinking. Retrospective involves 
a respondent answering a draft questionnaire (Drennan, 2003). Therefore the participants in 
the interviews were asked to give their verbal and written responses of their thinking in 
answering the HSOPSC questionnaire and the Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire. 
The interviews aimed to investigate the perceptions of the interviewee, both doctors and 
nurses, towards both questionnaires. The process lasted from 1114/2009 to 2516/2009. It was 
concerned with conducting the interviews in one selected hospital because the data from one 
hospital would be sufficient to identify the potential changes related to the wording of the 
questionnaire, making it unnecessary to conduct the interviews in a second hospital. The 
interviews were conducted in hospital where the first ethics approval was obtained. 
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Twelve physician and nurse volunteers (Saudi and non Saudi) were recruited from one 
targeted hospital to participate in the interviews. The language of the questionnaires used in 
the interviews was English, for both Saudi and non Saudi physicians and nurses. 
4.3.2 Objectives of interviews 
The interviews aimed to: 
1. To establish the face validity of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
2. To establish the face validity of the Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire. 
3. To compare the two questionnaires. 
4. To select the most appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for the study. 
4.3.3 Setting of interviews 
The interviews were conducted in the hospital that gave ethical approval and agreement first, 
because there is no big difference in tenns of bed capacity and workforce. Also, the three 
hospitals are considered as tertiary hospitals and they are accredited by the Joint Commission 
of American Hospital Organisation (JCAHO), and thus the views of staff in one hospital were 
expected to be represented of the views of staff in other two hospitals in tenns of the clarity 
and ease of understanding the language of the questionnaires. The first hospital providing an 
approval letter and agreeing to conduct the study was King Fahad National Guard Hospital in 
Riyadh Saudi Arabia on 115/2009. 
4.3.4 Sample of interviews 
The participants in the interviews were selected based on convenience sampling technique. 
12 doctors and nurses volunteers (Saudi and non-Saudi) were recruited from one targeted 
hospital to participate in the interviews. 
4.3.5 Recruitment (interview process) 
The workforce of the three hospitals consists of Saudi and non-Saudi staff. Therefore, the 
interviews were conducted with Saudi and non-Saudi doctors and nurses. 
1 Identification: six physicians and six nurses to be interviewed were approached from 
the different categories of physicians and nurses (resident, specialist, consultant 
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physicians, head nurse and nurse), Saudi and non Saudi, in King Fahad National 
Guard hospital. In addition letters from medical and nursing directors were sent to the 
physicians and nurses in medical and nursing departments in the hospital indicating 
that the research was being undertaken and that staff who would like to participate 
may do so (see appendices 9 and 10 for the copies of letters from Associate Executive 
Director of Nursing Services and from Chairman of Surgery department in King 
Fahad National Guard Hospital). These letters were very helpful and motivated the 
staff to participate in the study. 
2 Approach: the researcher sent an invitation letter with participant information sheet to 
12 doctors and 12 nurses to invite them to participate in the interviews. The 
participant information sheet explains important points such as the purpose of this 
study and the confidentiality of data (see appendix 2). A period of 5-7 days was given 
to read the information sheet and to decide whether or he/she wishes to participate. 
Invitees who expressed their willingness to participate in the study were recruited 
until the target number of participants was reached, which was six physicians and six 
nurses. Each doctor/nurse who decided to participate was asked to sign a consent 
form and choose a suitable time for conducting the interview. If the invitees refused 
to take part in the study other participants were identified for recruitment. Any 
invitee was free to decline to participate at any point. 
3 Recruitment: the doctors and nurses that agreed to participate; were asked by the 
researcher to sign a consent form (see appendix 1). Then the researcher organised an 
interviews schedule. Those who took part in the interviews were not asked to take 
part in completing the questionnaires. 
In brief, the participants received the invitation letter to participate in the interviews and 
information sheet about the study. Approximately one week later, the researcher contacted 
the invited doctors and nurses to ensure their willingness to participate and to arrange a 
convenient time and place for the interviews. Participation in the study involved no harm or 
discomfort to participants. The participants received no direct benefit from participating in 
this study, but they were informed that the data they provided would contribute to the 
knowledge base by investigating the suitability of an appropriate patient safety climate 
questionnaire for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
100 
Chapter four 
4.3.6 The structure of the interview 
The purpose of the interviews was to make sure that the respondents had no difficulties in the 
language and wording of the selected patient safety culture questionnaire when administered 
in the selected hospitals. The language of the interviews was English because the common 
language of work in Saudi hospitals is English. The content of the interviews helped to 
identify the difficulties in understanding the language and wording of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (see appendix 3) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire (see 
appendix 4). Therefore, it was important to create a structure for the interview, which helped 
to achieve this. The structure of the interview, from the opening words to the final thanking 
of the respondents is as follows: 
1- The first contact between the researcher and the participants involved greetings, 
welcoming, and thanking the participant in advance, for hislher participation. Then, the 
researcher told the participant about the purpose of interview, the content of the 
interview and how the confidentiality of the information will be protected. The interview 
lasted 50 to 60 minutes. The content of the interview was recorded on the interview 
record sheet. 
2- The HSOPSC questionnaire and Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire with a 
cover sheet including the title and the aim of the study were provided to the participant. 
3- The researcher asked the participant to read and complete the two questionnaires 
carefully regarding to the clarity of the language, understanding the meaning of the 
words and understanding of the instructions and items in each section of the 
questionnaires. 
4- The following three questions were asked for each item of the two questionnaires: 
QI: Is the wording of the item number (At) clear for you? 
Answer: 1 -YES 2 -NO 
This question aims to ensure the item is clear to the participants. 
Q2: What does item number (AI) mean to you? 
This question aims to ensure that the participants understand the meaning of the items 
straight away without getting confused by different possible meanings coming in their 
minds. In other words direct to the point. 
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Q3: Do you find the item number (At), easy or difficult to understand? 
Comments: 
.......................................................................................................................... 
This question aims to make sure that the participants understand and answer the items 
easily, without any difficulty. 
5- The researcher discussed the comments of the participant regarding the clarity of the 
language and understanding the meaning of the words, terminology used for each item in 
the questionnaires. 
6- An interview record sheet was completed for each interview to save the content of each 
interview and for analysing the data of the interviews. 
7- The interview record sheet consists of four parts, firstly participant information such as 
name, job, nationality, department and hospital. Secondly, Part A: HSOPSC 
questionnaire. Thirdly, Part B: Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire. Finally, 
General comments. 
8- In closing the interview, the researcher checked that the questions and comments in the 
interview record sheet are completed and thanked the respondent for hislher interest and 
effort. 
In summary, 12 semi-structured interviews on a one-to-one basis were employed to 
investigate perceptions of doctors and nurses towards the HSOPSC questionnaire and the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate. The interviews started at different times during the hospital 
working hours and in different places of the hospital according to the participants' 
convenience. The participants were asked to carefully read and complete the two 
questionnaires, with focus on the clarity of the language and understanding of the items of the 
questionnaires. Therefore the participants in the interviews were asked to give verbal and 
written responses of their thinking in answering the two questionnaires. 
Generally, the same procedure was followed for both questionnaires, however, to avoid 
potential bias associated with the order of presenting the questionnaires, six interviews started 
with the HSOPSC questionnaire and the other six interviews started with the Teamwork and 
Safety Climate Survey. As mentioned earlier the answers of these three questions were 
recorded in the interview record sheet for each interview. These sheets were analysed. The 
next section provides the interview data analysis. 
102 
Chapter four 
4.3.7 Analysis of interviews data 
The main aim of the interviews was to establish the face validity of the selected 
questionnaires (HSOPSC and Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey) in order to ensure that 
the final selected questionnaire was understandable and easy for the respondents to complete, 
with no language and wording difficulties. The language of the two questionnaires was 
English. The interviews focused on investigating the wording and language of the 
questionnaires to ascertain which one of them was the most appropriate tool to use in the 
study in terms of the clarity and ease of understanding. The 12 interviewees provided a 
number of comments related to the meaning of the words, the clarity of the language, the 
structure of the sentence and the scale used in the questionnaire and the overall understanding 
of the language of each questionnaire. Generally, the interviews focused on the respondents' 
perceptions toward the cl~ty of the language and understanding the items in the two 
questionnaires. A number of points and issues were observed during the interviews in 
relation to the respondents' perceptions of the HSOPSC and Teamwork and Safety Climate 
Survey. This section reports the interview findings of the 12 semi-structured interviews. It 
begins with demographic information then the results of the HSOPSC questionnaire, 
followed by the results of the Teamwork and Safety Climate, after that, comparison of the 
tools, followed by the decision and changes for a choice of questionnaire. Finally, the 
summary of the interviews is provided. 
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4.3.8 Characteristics of participants 
Table 4-10 shows the characteristics of the participants of the interviews. 
Table 4- 10 Demographic information of participants (n=12) 
Interview Job title Department Gender Nationality Duration of 
No interview 
(hours/minutes) 
Doctor Paediatrics Male Saudi 1:20 
2 Nurse Outpatient clinics Male Philippine 1 :25 
3 Nurse Cardiology Female British 1:13: 
4 Nurse Nursing Male Dutch 1: 15 
5 Nurse Surgery Female Saudi 1:05 
6 Nurse inpatient wards Female South Africa 1:00 
7 Doctor Rehabilitation Male Saudi 1:00 
8 Nurse Inpatient wards Male Philippine 1:00 
9 Doctor Medicine Male Saudi 00:55 
10 Doctor Surgery Male Saudi 00:53 
11 Doctor Paediatrics Female Saudi 00:50 
12 Doctor Medicine Female Saudi 00:50 
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Table 4-10 shows that the interviews included nurses and doctors of both genders across a 
variety of departments and nationalities. The duration of the interviews ranged from 50 
minutes to 80 minutes. The next section reports the interview findings of the face validity 
testing of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
4.3.9 Results of the face validity testing of the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (IIS0PSC) 
Instructions and definitions: 
The instructions, definitions and the structure of the questionnaire were regarded as 
considered to be clear and organised, as the following participants commented: 
"I think it is fine and well organised and structured" (Interview 1) 
"The instructions and definitions are very clear to me" (Interview 5) 
"The first page is organised with clear instructions and definitions are provided" 
(Interview 10). 
The majority of the participants suggested using square brackets instead of circles in all the 
instructions in order to be consistent. (Mark one answer by filling in the brackets). Under 
section F only one respondent suggested adding "SECTION F": Your hospital (continued) 
and using the same scale of answering to avoid confusion on page six. However, the 
instruction under each section of the questionnaire was very clear and easy to understand. 
The definitions used in the questionnaire were clear and the respondents were familiar with 
them. Thus it was concluded that, the instructions and definitions used in the questionnaire 
were clear and there was no need to change them. 
First question: 
The respondents to the study were doctors and nurses working in medical and nursing 
departments only. Therefore, pharmacy, laboratory and radiology were removed as there was 
no staff from those departments in the hospital. The first question in the questionnaire was 
changed (see a copy of the HSOPSC questionnaire in appendix 3). 
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The wording of the questionnaire and the clarity of the items: 
The total number of items in the HSOPSC questionnaire is 54 including background items. 
Table 4-11 shows how clear and easily understood items of the HSOPSC were, based on the 
participants' answers. 
Table 4- 11 Clari!I and understanding of the IIS0PSC 
Interview Clarity of terms Understanding of items Unclear items 
No 
Number of Number of No Number Number of 
Yes answers (%) of easy difficult items 
answers items (%) 
1 52 2 (3.7%) 52 2 (3.7%) A5-A7 
2 54 0 54 0 
3 52 2 (3.7%) 52 2 (3.7%) A5-B4 
4 53 1 (1.9%) 53 1 (1.9%) AS 
5 50 4 (7.4%) 50 4 (7.4%) A5-A7-AI4-F3 
6 52 2 (3.7%) 52 2 (3.7%) A15-F3 
7 47 7 (13.0%) 47 7 (13.0%) A5-A7-B4-F3-
FII-BI-B8 
8 54 0 54 0 
9 52 2 (3.7%) 52 2 (3.7%) A5-A7 
10 50 4 (7.4%) 50 4 (7.4%) A5-A7-B4-HI 
11 54 0 54 0 
12 51 3 (5.6%) 51 3 (5.6%) AS-A7 
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Three respondents perceived that the HSOPSC was very clear. Nine respondents agreed that 
nine items of the HSOPSC were not clear and were difficult to understand. The words 
identified as difficult to understand are underlined. Table 4-12 shows these items and the 
number of participants who found them unclear and difficult. 
Table 4- 12 Number of participants identifying unclear items 
Items Number of 
participants 
AS: Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care 8 
A7: We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care 6 
A14: We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly I 
AI5: Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done I 
B4: My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 3 
over and over 
F3: : Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one 2 
unit to another 
FII: Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. 1 
HI: What is your staff position in this hospital? Mark ONE answer that 3 
best describes your staff position. 
H8: In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or 2 
contact with patients? 
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Table 4-12 shows that the participants agreed that items A5-A7-AI4-AI5-B4-F3-FII-HI-H8 
were unclear and difficult to understand. In particular A5 and A 7 appear most problematic. 
It was observed that the majority of the items of the HSOPSC were clear and easy to 
understand except a few items, as the following participants indicated: 
"In general it is clear, the language is simple and clear just two phrases (crisis mode 
and fall between the cracks) so it is important to check those with other staff. The 
meaning of the items is clear, so it is easy to understand the key word of each item 
quickly and easily. Most terms used related to patient safety, medical errors and 
incident reports. Reading one time enough to understand and get the meaning of the 
items. I think time of completion this is fair and reasonable (around 10 minutes)." 
(Interview 6) 
"Terms of the questionnaire are more related to patient care. AS and A 7 are not clear 
in good way because of (than is best)." (Interview I) 
"The majority of the items of the HSOPSC are simple and short. Generally, it is clear 
and all the items are understandable." (Interview 2) 
"Generally the HSPOPSC was very clear although, the item number A5 was simple 
but complex in same time." (Interview 3) 
"The language of the questionnaire is clear and easy to understand except AS is very 
ambiguous question." (Interview 4) 
"Most of items were clear and self explanatory. There are few confusing items that 
might carry more than one meaning such as AS-A7-B4-F3-FIl. Open question at the 
end is good and it is considered as advantage." (Interview 7) 
"It is very clear questionnaire and easy to understand so I do not have comments 
about all the items." (Interview 8) 
"It is written in clear and excellent language except AS and A7." (Interview 9) 
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"It is very clear and easy to complete. The language of items is simple except A5 and 
A7." (Interview 10) 
"The language of the questionnaire is excellent and clear item." (Interview 11) 
Although, the above examples showed that the majority of the items were clear it was 
observed that a number of items were not clear enough such as A5-A7-AI4-A15-B4-F3-Fll, 
as the following comments indicated: 
Item A5: Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care. The participant 
commented: 
"It seems difficult to understand because (than is best) confuses me, do you mean 
good or it is not good for patient care." (Interview 5) 
"Generally the questionnaire was very clear and the items were easy to understand 
except item A5 sort of complexity." (Interview 3) 
"It is not clear because of (than is)." (Interview 7) 
Similarly, other participants stated: 
"I do not know the meaning exactly because of (than is) so it is difficult I read it 3 
times." (Interview 9) 
"It is not clear item because of (than is)." (Interview 10) 
Item A7: We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. Similarly, the 
participants commented: 
"Also this item was not clear enough because of (agency and than is best), these 
words make the question difficult to understand, here we just use temporary staff I do 
not know what do you mean by agency."(Interview 5) 
"It is not clear and difficult to understand because of (than is) and we do not use 
agency here" (Interview 7). 
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"Also than is not clear it is difficult." (Interview 9) 
"It is not clear because of ( than is)." (Interview 1 0) 
Item A14: We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly. The respondent 
stated: 
"Do you mean doing many things quickly, to be onset it is difficult to understand 
because of (crisis mode)." (Interview five) 
Item A15: Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. The participants stated: 
"I think this item is clear in general but 1 would wonder about the word sacrificed? So 
maybe it needs change." (Interview 6) 
"It is difficult to understand the item because of (sacrificed)" (Interview 12). 
Item B4: My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and 
over. The participants commented: 
"I do not know the meaning of (overlook) here exactly, do you' mean ignore." 
(Interview 10) 
"No comments. But it is better to change overlook (ignore)." (Interview 3) 
"Overlook carry two meaning, it should be changed." (Interview 7) 
Item F3: Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one unit to another. 
The participants stated: 
"It is easy but the (fall between the cracks) I do not know, ifis it easy to understand to 
the staff or not so it should be checked." (Interview 6) 
"I do not understand the meaning of fall between the cracks so it was no meaning." 
(Interview 5) 
Item Fll: Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. The participant stated: 
110 
Chapter four 
"It needs more clarification because of problematic." (Interview 7) . 
Item HI: What is your staff position? The participants commented: 
"If you mean my current position so it should be changed to what is your current 
position? This is easy and direct question because your staff position could be meant 
my colleague position." (Interview 7) 
"Your staff position means the staff work with you, it is difficult to· understand so I 
think it should be your current position." (Interview 9) 
"Use current position instead of staff position." (Interview 10) 
Similarly, item H8: In your staff position, do you typically have direct contact with patients? 
The participant stated: 
"What do you mean by staff position? Is it my position or my colleague position?" 
(Interview 7) 
Thus it was decided that, items number A5-A7-A14-A15-B4-F3-FII-HI-H8 should be 
reworded to make them clearer and easier to understand. 
Some inconsistencies in the wording of the questionnaire were highlighted, for example, item 
Al and A4 use the term people while other items use such as A8, A16 and C6 the term staff. 
Participants agreed that it would be better to use one term instead of two terms, as the 
following participants stated: 
"Use staff instead of people." (Interview 1) 
"Staff instead of people in terms of consistency." (Interview 4) 
"Use one term for consistency staff instead of people." (Interview 7) 
As a result of this, it was decided to change the word people to staff in items Al and A4. 
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Scale: 
An important issue highlighted by the participants was the scale used in the questionnaire. 
The 5-point Likert scale that reads: (Strongly disagree -Disagree -Neither- Agree- Strongly 
agree-). The perception of most participants was that the scale of the questionnaire was good, 
as the following examples indicated: 
"It is clear and I can select my answer." (Interview 4) 
"The scale used in this questionnaire was good." (Interview 10) 
In general, it was observed that the most of the respondents had no difficulty linking their 
answer with this scale. Furthermore, it was observed that most of the respondents read the 
items of the HSOPSC questionnaire only one time before linking their answers with the scale. 
This indicates the clarity of the items and the scale was easy to use. 
Positive and negative items: 
It is worth noting that several respondents understood the negative items and could 
differentiate between the positive and negative items, as the following examples indicated: 
Item B 1: My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures. 
"I think the meaning of this item is positive and good attitude of the supervisors, 
really it is good to feel satisfy and somebody has recognised good job." (Interview 3) 
Item B2: My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient 
safety. 
"This item means take suggestion of staff in positive way." (Interview 3) 
On the other hand, in the case of the negative items, for example: 
Item B3: Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even 
if it means taking shortcuts 
"This indicate to negative things because they do not care, just ask me to shortcut to 
do ajob." (Interview three) 
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Item B4: My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and 
over 
"We aware there is a problem but they do not mange it in satisfactory way to avoid 
happening a problem. It is clear that means they pay no attention to problems that 
happen. This affects patient safety negatively." (Interview 3) 
Item AS: Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care. The participant 
commented: 
"It is not good for patient safety because it means we work more than regular hours 
which affect patient safety negatively." (Interview 8) 
It was clear that the negative items were recognised by the respondents without any difficulty. 
Therefore, it was decided that there was no need to direct participants' attention towards 
negative items by using a mark such as underlining. In general, the participants distinguished 
between positive and negative items. 
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General comments on the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: 
Table 4-13 shows the general comments of the respondents about the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
Table 4- 13 General comments of the respondents about nsopsc 
Interview General comments 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
The questionnaire is clear and easy to understand except items AS and A7. Use 'staff 
instead of 'people'. Use same tenn either 'mistakes' or 'errors'. 
The majority of the items are simple and short. Generally it is clear and all the items are 
understandable. 
The questionnaire is very clear. Item number AS is complex in tenns of clarity and 
understanding. Generally, all items are easy to understand. 
The questionnaire is clear but a few items are ambiguous should be changed. Use what is 
your position instead of what is your staff position? The scale of the questionnaire is 
good. 
Some items were not clear. The majority of the items were easy to understand. 
It is clear. Most of the tenns used were related to patient safety, medical errors and 
reporting. Time for completion is fair. It is easy to understand the key word of each item 
therefore; you can get the idea of each item quickly. 
7 Most of the items were clear and self explanatory. There were few confusing items that 
might carry more than one meaning such as AS, A7, Fll, and B4. Use one tenn for 
consistency such as staff or people. Use that instead of like in item number A8. Use 
current position instead of staff position. 
8 It is very clear and easy to understand. 
9 It is clear and excellent language except A5-A 7. 
10 It is very clear and easy to complete. The language of items is simple except two (A-A 7). 
Use current position instead of staff position. The scale of the questionnaire is good. 
11 The language of the questionnaire is excellent. Easy fonnat. Clear items. 
12 In general it is clear. Use one style of instruction in all sections. Clarity oflanguage is 
good. 
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In summary, the language of the HSOPSC questionnaire was found to be simple and 
understandable. The meaning of the words was found to be clear and direct and the structure 
of the sentences simple. The items were easy to understand. However, A5-A7-AI4-AI5-B4-
F3-FII-HI-H8 needed rewording and more clarification. The participants found the scale in 
the questionnaire easy to use. The positive and negative items were clear and the participants 
were able to distinguish between them. Generally, the HSOPSC is clear and easy to 
understand and complete. The next section reports the interview findings of the Teamwork 
and Safety Climate Survey. 
4.3.10 Results of the face validity testing of the Teamwork and Safety 
Climate Survey 
Instructions: 
It was observed that the participants found the instructions in the questionnaire were not clear 
enough, as the following participants commented: 
"Instructions were not clear on the first page because using (with respect to 
your specific unit or clinical units), I am working in many different units not 
in specific unit. This cause confused." (Interview 11) 
"I think the instructions of the questionnaire were very short and it needs more 
clarification but still acceptable." (Interview 12) 
The wording of the questionnaire and the clarity of the items: 
The total number of items in the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey is 35 including 
background items. Table 4-14 shows how clear and easily understood the items in the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey were. 
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Table 4- 14 Clarity and understanding of Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
Interview Clarity of items Understanding of items Items 
No. Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Yes No answers. easy items difficult 
answers. items. 
30 5 (14.3%) 30 5 (14.3%) 5-11-12-24-25 
2 31 4 (11.4%) 31 4 (11.4%) 11-18-24-25 
. 3 32 3 (8.6%) 32 3 (8.6%) 1-15-25 
4 32 3 (8.6%) 32 3 (8.6%) 1-5-25 
5 29 6(17.1%) 29 6(17.1%) 5-11-12-18-24-25 
6 34 1 (2.9%) 34 1 (2.9%) 11 
7 33 2 (5.7%) 33 2 (5.7%) 11-15 
8 35 0 35 0 
9 32 3 (8.6%) 32 3 (8.6%) 11-15-24 
10 34 1 (2.9%) 34 1 (2.9%) 24 
11 35 0 35 0 
12 33 2 (5.7%) 33 2 (5.7%) 1-11-15 
The participants agreed that eight items were not clear and were difficult to understand. 
There was a wide range of views from the respondents as to which items were ambiguous and 
difficult to understand, which makes the decision to make changes extremely difficult. 
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The number of items that were not clear was eight of 27 items which means large number of 
the items of Teamwork and Safety Climate were somewhat ambiguous as far as the 
participants were concerned. Table 4-15 shows these items and how many respondents found 
them unclear and difficult. 
Table 4- 15 Number of participants identifying unclear items 
Item No Number of 
participants 
1: Nurse input is well received in this clinical area 3 
5: Disagreement in this clinical area resolved appropriately (i.e. not who is right, 3 
but what is best for the patient) 
11: Briefings personnel before the start of a shift (i.e. to plan for possible 
contingencies) is important for patient safety 
7 
12: Briefings are common in this clinical area 2 
15: The levels of staffing in this clinical area are sufficient to handle the number 4 
of patients 
18: Personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines (e.g. hand wash, treatment 2 
protocols/clinical pathways, sterile field, etc) that are established for this clinical 
area 
24: Hospital management does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients 5 
25: This situation is doing more for patient safety now, than it did one year ago 5 
There was agreement that items number 1, 5, 11, 12, 15, 18,24, and 25 are ambiguous and 
difficult to understand. It was observed that the participants found some of the items of the 
questionnaire clear and easy to understand while they found others ambiguous and difficult to 
understand, as the following participants indicated: 
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"Generally it is ok but there is some editing will assist future respondents to 
answer the questions more accurately such as using words with specified 
meaning rather than using comprehensive words such as input in item 1, levels 
of staffing in item 15 and institution in item 25, also there are'number of long 
sentences so I read most of items more than once because of these 
comprehensive words." (Interview 3) 
"It is clear and easy to understand but some items need to read more than one 
time to understand." (Interview 8) 
"Some items were not to clear to me and also there are too long items so it is 
not clear such as item 11-18-24-25." (Interview 2) 
"Items 24 it is difficult to understand because (knowingly compromise). The 
word (institution) in item 25, this word more general should be used 
healthcare organisation or hospital. The word briefings in items 11 and 12, it 
was not specified because we use endorsement instead of briefings. Using i.e. 
in items 11-5 makes these items unclear such as the word (contingencies) in 
item 11 it was not clear to me." (Interview 1) 
Similarly, some items used abbreviation such as (i.e.) were not easy to understand, as the 
participants stated: 
"Items with i.e.in brackets are not easy to understand such as item 5. It is 
difficult to understand item 11 because (i.e.to plan for possible contingences)" 
(Interview 5) 
"I.e. makes some items not clear, I get confused because of i.e." (Interview 7) 
Some participants found words that have wider more general meaning which confusing and 
other words are ambiguous, as the following examples indicated: 
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"I think you have to write organisation or hospital instead of institution in item 
25. Endorsement instead of briefings because briefings could be carried for 
many meanings, in general, some words were too comprehensive in meaning 
such as nurses input in iteml, levels of staff in item 15, institution in item 25." 
(Interview S) 
"What do you mean by levels of staffing in item 1 S? I think this could be 
mean number of staff." (Interview 5) 
"Knowingly compromise makes item 24 not clear and difficult to understand 
the meaning of this item so I am unable to answer it." (Interview 5) 
"I do not understand item 24 and what the purpose of this item is." (Interview 
10) 
"It is difficult to understand item 24, I think this item need reworded because 
of (Knowingly compromise)." (Interview 9) 
"Some items were too long such as 5-11-18 this make understanding too 
difficult. Some items included ambiguous words such as input, contingences, 
briefings and knowingly compromise." (Interview 5) 
"The word contingences were not clear in item 11." (Interview 7) 
"The item 11 is clear but the word contingences was not clear and it is difficult 
to understand its meaning exactly." (Interview 9) 
"I have to read most of the questions twice to be clear." (Interview 4) 
"Some items are little long, the content of the most items is more 
comprehensive, most of items need reading twice to understand and to connect 
with suitable answer in the scale. Several items are not clear without i.e. and 
examples." (Interview 6) 
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As mentioned earlier the scale used in the questionnaire was an important issue. The 
questionnaire used a 6-point Likert scale (Disagree Strongly-Disagree Slightly-Neutral-Agree 
Slightly-Agree Strongly-Not Applicable). The participants experienced significant difficulty 
linking their answers to this scale, as the following comments indicated: 
"I am not comfortable with that scale, because more chances (six answers), 
need more concentration and focus, do I have disagreement or do I have 
agreement, so this scale put you off balance in answering the questions, so I 
need go back to read the question again which takes long time to read and 
understand the questions. What is the difference between disagree and slightly 
disagree, if I am just disagree what can I select, this scale confused me so the 
chance of just disagree is lost." (Interview 6) 
"The scale used is not easy to use and not comfortable and not clear to express 
your agreement." (Interview 10) 
"It is clear and appropriate length but the scale is not good." (Interview 11) 
Similarly, another participant noted that the scale was not appropriate: 
"The scale is not appropriate use the previous one because I want just agree, 
which one should I select, in this questionnaire it is difficult to answer many 
questions because many ambiguous questions in this questionnaire and 
because of the scale." (Interview 4) 
A major concern was related to understanding their preferences between 5-point and 6-point 
Likert scales. It was very clear that the respondents did not express a preference for the 6-
point Likert scale. A reason for this because strongly and slightly to agree prevented the 
participants from expressing their feeling correctly, hence they spent more reading the items 
of the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey and debating over their responses. Also there 
was no option to simply agree or disagree. Furthermore, because of the addition of a sixth 
possibility the participant may not have understood under what circumstances not applicable 
should be used. 
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It was noted that many items carrying different meanings and could be interpreted in different 
ways for example: 
( :hapter four 
"What do you mean by institution in items 25." (Interview 4) 
"It was quite difficult to understand some items because of the wording of the 
questionnaire such as the words contingencies in itemll and levels in item 15. 
It is short questionnaire." (Interview 7) 
"It is clear and short questionnaire. Ambiguous words such as contingencies 
in item 11."(lnterview 9) 
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Table 4-16 shows the general comments of the respondents about the Teamwork and Safety 
Climate Survey. 
Table 4- 16 General comments of the respondents about Teamwork and Safety Climate 
Survey 
Interview General comments 
No 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
The questionnaire is clear except some items. Some items needed further explanation, 
hence the use of i.e.in brackets. Some items were not direct to the point. 
Generally the questionnaire is clear. 
Generally, the questionnaire is ok but some editing would assist future respondents to 
answer the questions more accurately. Some words were too comprehensive in meaning 
such as situation (item 25), levels of staffing (item 15), nurses input (item 1). 
The scale used is not appropriate so the questions were difficult to answer. Ambiguous 
items because of difficult word used such as contingencies, knowingly compromise. 
Some items were too long, this makes understanding too difficult. Some items included 
ambiguous words such as levels of staff, contingences and briefing. Items with i.e. in 
brackets are not easy to understand. 
You need to think more before answering the questions. The items themselves were 
more comprehensive. The two items use Le.in bracket that means is not easy to 
understand then need more concentration and focus and therefore, reading many times. 
The scale used is less user friendly as it is likely to make respondent confused. 
Generally, it was clear except some items. It is short questionnaire. 
It is clear questionnaire but some items need to be read many times to be understood. 
It is clear and short questionnaire. 
It is clear to some extent. Scale used is not comfortable and not clear to express your 
agreement. Current position instead of staff position. 
It is very clear and easy to understanding. Appropriate length. Instructions were not 
clear on the first page. Scale was different (duration) in item 31 and 32. 
12 It is clear. Duration was different in items 31 and 32 need for consistency. 
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In summary, it was clear that the participants found the language in the Teamwork and Safety 
Climate Survey more complex at times than the HSOPSC, such as in items 1-5-11-12-15-18-
24-25, in which non-specific words, for example "institution''', ambiguous words, for 
example "contingencies"; and words with different meanings, for example, "input" were used. 
Therefore, the wording of the questionnaire needs clarification to be clear and easy for 
participants to understand. Participants found the scale used in the questionnaire difficult to 
apply. All these points are considered as disadvantage of this questionnaire especially in 
multi-cultural settings such as Saudi hospitals that. contains staff from Saudi and other 
different nationalities. Therefore, simplifying the language of a questionnaire is an important 
consideration. 
4.3.11 Results of the comparison of the two patient safety climate 
questionnaires 
In this comparison, it is not just the number of clear and easy to understand answers that will 
be taken into consideration but also the degree of clarity and difficulty of items based on the 
participants' comments above. Table 4-17 show the comparison of the questionnaires. 
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Table 4- 17 Com[!arison of the 9,uestionnaires ~12 interviews) 
Patient safety climate Clarity of items 
questionnaires Number of clear Number of not Total of the items 
and easy to clear and difficult 
understand items. to understand items 
The first interview 
HSOPSC 52 2 [A5-A7] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 30 5 [5-11-12-24-25] 35 
Survey 
The second interview 
HSOPSC 54 0 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 31 4 [11-18-24-25] 35 
Survey 
The third interview 
HSOPSC 52 2 [A5-B4] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 32 3 [1-15-25] 35 
Survey 
The fourth interview 
HSOPSC 53 1.[AS] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 32 3 [1-5-25] 35' 
Survey 
The fifth interview 
HSOPSC SO 4 [AS-A7-AI4-F3] S4 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 29 6 [5-11-12-18-24- 35 
Survey 25] 
The sixth interview 
HSOPSC 52 2 [AI5-F3] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 34 1 [11] 35 
Survey 
The seventh interview 
HSOPSC 48 6 [A5-A7-B4-Fl1- 54 
HI-HS] 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 33 2 [11-15] 35 
Survey 
124 
Chapter four 
The eighth interview 
HSOPSC 54 0 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 35 0 35 
Survey 
The ninth interview 
HSOPSC 52 2 [A5-A7] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 32 3 [11-15-24] 35 
Survey 
The tenth interview 
HSOPSC 50 4 [A5-A7-B4-Hl] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 34 1 [24] 35 
Survey 
The eleventh interview 
HSOPSC 54 0 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 35 0 35 
Survey 
The twelfth interview 
HSOPSC 52 2 [A5-A7-] 54 
Teamwork and Safety Climate 32 3 [1-11-15] 35 
Survey 
Table 4-18 shows the comparison of the questionnaires in terms of clarity of items based on 
number of no answers (unclear and difficult to understand). 
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Table 4- 18 Comparison of the questionnaires in terms of clarity (n=12) 
Interview Number of NO answers(unclear and difficult to Result (based on 
No understand) 
IISOPSC 
2 
2 o 
3 2 
4 1 
5 4 
6 2 
7 6 
8 0 
9 2 
10 4 
11 o 
12 2 
Chapter four 
Teamwork and Safety 
Climate 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
1 
2 
0 
3 
1 
o 
3 
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questionnaire with 
lowest number of NO 
answers), 
HSOPSC 
HSOPSC 
HSOPSC 
HSOPSC 
HSOPSC 
Teamwork and Safety 
Climate 
Teamwork and Safety 
Climate 
Both 
HSOPSC 
Teamwork and Safety 
Climate 
Both. 
HSOPSC 
Seven out of twelve respondents agreed that the HSOPSC questionnaire was clearer than the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire, while only three respondents agreed that the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate was clearer. Two respondents agreed that the both tools were 
clear. It was observed that the majority of the respondents read and completed the HSOPSC 
questionnaire easily and smoothly whilst the majority of the participants had to read 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire many times before completing the items. Table 
4-19 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the HSOPSC questionnaire and the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire in terms of the clarity of language. 
Table 4- 19 Advantages and disadvantages of questionnaires 
Questionnaire Advantages Disadvantages 
HSOPSC 1. Clear instructions 
2. Good scale of answer 
3. Clear language 
4. Short items 
5. Straight forward items 
6. Easy to understand 
7. Items consistency 
8. It has open question 
9. Easy format. 
Teamwork and 1. Language clear to some 
Safety Climate extent 
2. Short questionnaire 
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1. Language of some items was 
difficult to understand such as items 
number A5, A7. 
2. It used different terms such as 
people, staff, mistakes and errors. 
3. Use short forms like don't. 
All these could be solved without changing 
the meaning. 
1. Less friendly user scale. 
2. Use of comprehensive words. 
3. Use of ambiguous words. 
4. Long sentences 
5. Need more focus and concentration. 
6. Has to be read many times to be 
clear and understood 
7. Complex structure of sentences (not 
direct) 
4.3.12 Decision and changes (making a choice of questionnaire and 
changes to questionnaire's language and structure) 
Two main decisions needed to be made regarding which questionnaire should be selected to 
use in the study and which items should be changed in the selected questionnaire. The 
decision was made to use the HSOPSC questionnaire as the most appropriate questionnaire 
for the study because its language is clear and easy to understand, straightforward items and 
the scale is easy to use. 
In terms of changes to be made, it became apparent that were three possibilities in relation to 
the items of the HSOPSC questionnaire, could remain unchanged, be revised or be omitted. 
It is important to mention that the proposed changes were based on the comments and' 
suggestions of participants. These changes were checked with supervisors of the research. 
Moreover, the changes were checked with one of the authors of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire to confirm that the changes would not alter the meaning of the items. The 
decision was based on the clarity of the items to all participants. Table 4-20 shows the 
changes made to the number of items of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
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Table 4- 20 Changes made on the IIS0PSC questionnaire 
Item Before change After change 
number 
Al 
A4 
People support one another in this unit 
In this unit, people treat each other with 
respect 
Staff support one another in this unit 
In this unit, staff treat each other with respect 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than is Staff in this unit work longer hours than they 
best for patient care should which is not good for patient care. 
A7 We use more agency/temporary staff than We use more temporary staff than we should 
Al4 
A15 
F3 
B4 
~ best for patient care 
We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too 
much, too quickly 
Patient safety is never sacrificed to get 
more work done 
Things fall between cracks when 
transferring patient from one unit to 
another 
My supervisor/manger overlooks patient 
which is not good for patient care 
We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, 
too quickly 
Patient safety never takes second place to get 
more work done 
Some things do not happen or get missed 
when transferring patients from one unit to 
another 
My supervisor/manger ignores patient safety 
safety problems that happen over and over problems that happen over and over 
Fll 
HI 
H8 
Shift changes are problematic for patients 
in this hospital. 
What is your staff position in this 
hospital? Mark ONE answer that best 
describes your staff position 
In your staff position, do you typically 
have direct interaction or contact with 
patients? 
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Shift changes cause problems for patients in 
this hospital 
What is your current position in this 
hospital? Mark ONE answer that best 
describes your staff position 
In your current position, do you typically 
have direct interaction or contact with 
patients? 
In conclusion, the HSOPSC questionnaire has been selected for use in the study. This 
questionnaire includes 12 dimensions of patient safety culture divided into nine sections and 
including a background information section. The questionnaire consists of five pages in 
addition to the covering letter. There were many changes in section H (background 
information) which included as follows: three questions (question number two, three and four) 
about gender (Male or Female), nationality (Saudi or non Saudi) and educational levels of 
respondents were added to this section. These questions are important to describe the 
characteristics of respondents in the study. In question number one, the other staff positions 
were omitted, except doctor and nurse positions, because the target population of the study 
was doctors and nurses. The changes were made to the HSOPSC items that were mentioned 
in table 4-20 (see appendix 22 for a copy of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
questionnaire). The workforce of the three hospitals consists of Saudi and non-Saudi staff. 
The common language in the three hospitals is English. Therefore, the language of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire is English. Table 4-21 provides the patient safety culture dimensions 
of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
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Table 4- 21 Patient safety culture dimensions of the IISOPSC questionnaire 
Patient safety culture Definition 
dimension [items] 
Communication 
openness [C2-C4-C6] 
Feedback and 
communication about 
error[Cl-C3-C5] 
Frequency of events 
reported [DI-D2-D3] 
Handoffs & transitions 
[F3-F5-F7-Fl1] 
Management support 
for patient safety [Fl-
F8-F9] 
No punitive response to 
error [A8-Al2-Al6] 
Organizationalleaming-
Continuous 
improvement [A6-A9-
A13] 
Overall perceptions of 
patient safety [A15-
A18-AIO-A17] 
Staffing [A2-A5-A7-
A14] 
Supervisor/manager 
expectations and 
actions promoting 
safety [BI-B2-B3-B4] 
Teamwork across units· 
[F2-F4-F6-FlO] 
Teamwork within units 
[Al-A3-A4-Al1] 
Chapter four 
Staffwill freely speak up if they see something that may 
negatively affect patient care, and feel free to question those 
with more authority 
Staff are informed about errors that happen, given feedback 
about changes put into place based on event reports, and 
discuss ways to prevent errors 
Mistakes ofthe following types are reported: 
1) mistakes caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, 
2) mistakes with no potential to harm the patient, 
3) and 3) mistakes that could harm the patient, but do not 
Important patient care information is transferred across 
hospital units and during shift changes 
Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes 
patient safety and shows that patient safety is a top priority 
Staff feel that their mistakes are not held against them, and 
mistakes are not kept in their personnel file 
Mistakes have led to positive changes and changes are 
evaluated for their effectiveness 
Procedures and systems are good at preventing errors and there 
is a lack of patient safety problems 
There are enough staff to handle the workload and work hours 
are appropriate to provide the best care for patients 
Supervisors/managers consider staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety, praise staff for following patient safety 
procedures, and do not overlook patient safety problems 
Hospital units cooperate and coordinate with one another to 
provide the b.est care for patients 
Staff support one another, treat each other with respect, and 
work together as a team 
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of items 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Summary 
The participants understanding of the patient safety climate questionnaires were varied 
because of the way that they were written. Some participants understood the items in a 
certain way while others did not understand them at all. Therefore, an initial assessment is 
very important before full application of any patient safety culture tool is used in different 
contexts because of language and cultural variations. 
The interviews revealed variation of English language skills amongst participants. Therefore, 
it is very important to ensure using clear language, simple and clear words, simple structure 
of the sentences and simple and clear scale. The simple and clear items could be answered by 
all participants regardless of their level of English. Therefore, changes should be made to 
make all the items easy for all participants to understand. 
In terms of the language of the two questionnaires, the participants perceived that the 
language and wording of the HSOPSC questionnaire was clearer than the Teamwork and 
Safety Climate questionnaire. The respondents indicated that they understood the HSOPSC 
questionnaire better than the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey because the language of 
the HSOPSC is simpler and the sentences are shorter and more straightforward than those of 
the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey. The HSOPSC questionnaire is the most 
appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire to use for the study. 
4.4 Overall summary 
The first stage of the process of choosing an appropriate patient safety culture questionnaire 
for use in the study identified two questionnaires (the HSOPSC and the Safety Climate 
Survey). The next stage entailed an assessment of the face validity of the two questionnaires. 
The results of the comparison between these two questionnaires showed that the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was the most suitable patient safety climate 
questionnaire for the current study. In the next chapter, the process of data collection by 
using the HSOPSC questionnaire will be described. 
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Chapter Five: Data collection: Using the 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
questionnaire 
5.1 Introduction 
In this part of study the amended HSOPSC questionnaire was used to obtain the data for 
further validity assessment. The current chapter aims to describe the process of data 
collection using the HSOPSC to collect the questionnaire data from three hospitals in Saudi 
Arabia. This chapter is divided into seven sections. In section 5.2 describes the study 
settings. Section 5.3 concerns the study population. Section 5.4 addresses the sample size of 
the study. Section 5.5 describes the distribution and collection of the HSOPSC 
questionnaires. Section 5.6 describes the data management process and section 5.7 provides 
the summary of the chapter. 
5.2 Study setting 
The location of the study was in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia. The HSOPSC questionnaire was 
administered at three hospitals in Riyadh from June to October 2009. Three separate 
hospitals in Riyadh city. which has the largest number of hospitals in Saudi Arabia. have 
been selected for the purpose of this study: 
1. King Fahad National Guard Hospital (KFNGH) at King Abdul-Aziz Medical City 
2. King Fahad Medical City (KFMC) 
3. King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (KFSH&RC) 
These hospitals represent different types of the government providers in the Saudi health care 
system. These hospitals have been chosen for this study because they are the largest and 
most modem hospitals. Bed capacity is large with a large number of staff especially 
physicians and nurses. therefore. the three hospitals would provide sufficient potential 
respondents for the present study. 
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,In addition, those hospitals have expertise and experiences In communicating with 
international healthcare organisations. Moreover, the three hospitals are accredited by the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO). 
5.3 Population of study 
The popUlation of the study consists of physicians and nurses from the three hospitals. The 
staff in these hospitals are Saudi and non Saudi from a wide range of different nationalities. 
The common language is English. The study sample was selected. from all doctors and nurses 
in the three selected hospitals. 
5.4 Sample size 
The HSOPSC questionnaires were distributed to a sample of the doctors and nurses (Saudi 
and non Saudi) in the three hospitals. The ideal sample would be derived from random 
sampling, as this technique is relatively simple to apply and to represent the target population 
of the study but this technique takes a long time to obtain the required number of 
questionnaires. Therefore, the alternative sample entailed convenience sampling of 
physicians and nurses at all levels within the three hospitals to achieve the target number of 
completed questionnaires. This technique is a practical way to increase the return rate in a 
short time because it depends on readily available physicians and nurses in the three selected 
hospitals (Fink, 2003). There are several factors to take into consideration to estimate sample 
size of the study in order to determine the number of questionnaires should be distributed. 
The first factor is the minimum number of completed questionnaires required to obtain 
enough participants to perform the strategic plan of data analysis. 
In general a major concern was to obtain enough participants to perform factor analysis. 
Therefore, the required number of questionnaires is a minimum of 300 completed 
questionnaires to satisfactorily undertake factor analysis. It has been argued that a minimum 
sample size is at least 300 for factor analysis (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988). Secondly, 
anticipated return rate, the expected return rate of this study was 20%. Thirdly, the cost 
(printing cost of questionnaires) and available resources were taken into account. 
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The workforce of doctors and nurses in the three selected hospitals is approximately 4630 
(Statistics Directorate, 2009) with a target response rate is a minimum 300 completed 
questionnaires and the expected return rate was 20%. Also, according to Sorra and Nieva 
(2004) the sample size should be at least double the number of responses that are required. 
The number of questionnaires distributed was 1700 in the three hospitals. 
5.5 Data collection 
The data collection process was concerned with the distribution and collection of the 
HSOPSC questionnaires from three hospitals in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. The data collection 
process aimed to collect at least 300 completed questionnaires (target data) for analysis. The' 
study utilized primary data that was collected from doctors and nurses in the three hospitals 
in order to provide the data for assessment. The data collection was done during daily 
working hours in the three hospitals to avoid any physical or emotional harm to the patients 
and the staff. 
After getting the final approval and permission from the University of Sheffield (see the copy 
in appendices 5 and 6), 1700 HSOPSC questionnaires and cover letter as one document were 
printed in Saudi Arabia. The appearance of the questionnaires contributes to stimulating the 
respondents to complete them. Therefore, the questionnaires were printed on good quality 
paper with quality envelopes to motivate the staff to reply. Envelopes were used for 
maintaining respondents' confidentiality as an important factor for increasing response rate 
(Bourque and Fielder, 1995). 
The printing process took approximately one week. The principal aim of the distribution 
process was to ensure getting the target number of questionnaires returned. The data 
collection process was based on distributing as many questionnaires as possible to maximize 
the return rate in the limited time available in this very important stage of the study. The 
process was supervised and followed up carefully from the beginning to ensure the flow of 
distribution and collection of questionnaires was smooth and flexible without any difficulties. 
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The proposed strategy was based on posters and signs posted in the nurses' stations and 
doctors' meeting rooms throughout the hospitals to infonn them of the survey. The 
questionnaires were distributed by the researcher in wards and other specialist areas such as 
out-patient departments during staff breaks. The questionnaires were returned to the boxes 
located within the hospital or to a designated hospital contact person (primary contact person 
through the internal mail system in each hospital). 
In fact, this method was not effective because it did not work in tenns of practicality and 
nobody had time to track the questionnaires. Moreover, with this strategy it was taking too 
long to get the data because during the first two weeks just 10 doctors and 25 nurses returned 
completed questionnaires. Consequently, at that point in time it was considered that there 
was a need to find a more effective method. Therefore, the questionnaires were distributed in 
the three hospitals by establishing a data collection plan for each hospital to capture the target 
data by using different range of methods based on the current situation of each hospital such 
as the response of hospital management towards the study, the number of staff available, 
workload, awareness of patient safety and time limitations such as holidays. All these issues 
were taken into consideration in devising the best data collection plan for each hospital. 
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5.5.1 King Fahad National Guard hospital at King Abdul-Aziz 
Medical City 
The first hospital to give the ethics approval letter was King Fahad National Guard Hospital 
(see copy in appendix 8). Once the approval letter was obtained from the hospital's research 
committee, the planning of distributing the questionnaires was started immediately in order to 
save time. The new proposed strategy commenced with an introductory week in the hospital 
in order to gain good support for the data collection and to inform the staff about the research. 
The introductory week included the meeting with the chairman of research centre of King 
Abdullah International Medical Research Centre (KARC). The advice was given to submit 
the proposal and the ethical approval and discuss it with hospital management and medical 
and nursing directors to seek their help and support for the study by encouraging the staff to 
complete the questionnaires. 
A number of appointments with several medical directors in the hospital such as the director 
of surgery, medicine and paediatric department were made. In these meetings they read the 
proposal and ethical approval. The protocol of the study was presented and the outlines of 
the study were discussed. All of them were interested and very keen to help and support this 
research because they believe the research was important and useful for the patients and staff 
and for healthcare as well. Generally, they were interested in this project because they are 
concerned about patient safety in their departments and wish to improve it. In fact, these 
meetings were very helpful and they provided generous offers to distribute and collect the 
questionnaires through sending memos and they asked their secretaries to distribute the 
questionnaires in the doctors' mail boxes and the head nurses were requested to distribute and 
collect the questionnaires from their nursing staff during daily shift. 
This strong support demonstrates the interest of the hospital management, the medical 
directors and the nursing directors in looking after patient safety as a very important issue in 
healthcare. Patient safety is clearly considered to be top priority. Further, this support is 
recognised as the most important factor for maximizing the return rate of doctors' and nurses' 
contributions (see appendices 9 and 10 for the copies of their support letters). Consequently, 
all of them sent internal memos to the staff to ask them to contribute to the study as much as 
they can. A number of anonymous questionnaires were distributed through medical 
secretaries in each medical department based on the number of doctors available at that time. 
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Two weeks were given for doctors to get their responses. The first reminder was issued after 
two weeks and the final reminder was issued after another two weeks because they are very 
busy staff and also owing to holidays. It is important to mention that three important 
strategies were used to improve data collection process. 
There was a meeting with the Associate Executive Director of the nursing department related 
to approaching the nursing staff in the hospital. In this meeting the proposal and ethical 
approval were provided and the protocol of the study was presented and discussed. The 
researcher accepted the generous suggestion of the Executive Director of the nursing 
department of the hospital to distribute the questionnaires to the rest of the departments in the 
hospital through the head nurses. This support from the director of nursing was helpful in 
increasing the return rate in this period of time (summer holidays) because during the summer 
there is a shortage of staff because of holidays. In addition the nurses are very busy in their 
clinical areas which hinder the communication between the researcher and the nursing staff. 
The follow up process of distributing and collecting the questionnaires through administrative 
assistant of nursing services started, approximately one week after the first meeting with 
director to get the responses of nursing staff in patient areas and clinical areas such as wards 
and clinics of the hospital (see appendix 9 for the copy of the letter of the Associate 
Executive Director of the nursing department). Ten days was given for nurses to get their 
responses. The first reminder was issued after the ten days and the final reminder was issued 
after two weeks because they are very busy staff. 
To ensure the smooth flow of the data collection regular visits were made to doctors' meeting 
rooms; head nurses offices and medical secretaries in order to remind them about the survey. 
The main purpose of the follow up process was to emphasise the importance of their response 
and purpose of the study. A tracking record was used for distributing the questionnaires and 
handling the returned questionnaires from the medical secretaries and head nurse. The follow 
up process was continued every day and this tracking also is recognised as an important 
factor for maximizing the return rate of nurses' contribution. This process lasted more than 
one month (45 days) to complete. Table 5-1 shows the number of these questionnaires 
distributed to the medical and nursing staff of the hospital. 
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Table 5- 1 data collection of KFNGH 
Staff Questionnaires distributed Questionnaires returned Return rate 
Medical 250 107 42.8% 
Nursing 650 440 67% 
First reminder Two weeks for doctors Ten days for nurses 
Final reminder Two weeks for doctors Two weeks 
Duration of time 45 days 
Total 900 547 60% 
King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (KFSH&RC) was intended to be the 
second hospital. However, there was a delay in getting the ethical approval because of the 
establishment of a new research committee there. Therefore, the second hospital was King 
Fahad Medical City (KFMC) instead ofKFHRC. 
5.5.2 King Fahad Medical City 
The proposal and relevant forms were submitted to the External Research Review Committee, 
a subcommittee of Institutional Review Board for consideration and approval. The proposal 
was reviewed by the External Research Review Committee after that the principal 
investigator (the researcher) was informed that the proposal has approved by the Institutional 
Review Board of King Fahad Medical City (see the copy in appendix 11). Once the 
hospital's permission was obtained the introductory week was started immediately. The 
introductory week included meetings at management level of the hospital in order to gain 
support in the data collection. First meeting was done with Executive Director of Medical 
Affairs and Medical Consultant Council of the hospital. The protocol of the study and the 
ethical approval were presented and the main outlines of the study were discussed. As a 
result of this meeting internal memo was sent to all medical directors to encourage the 
doctors to participate in completing the attached questionnaire (see the copy of this letter in 
appendix 12), which reflects the keenness of the hospital administration to support patient 
safety and their conviction in this research. 
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In addition, meetings were conducted with medical directors such as paediatrics and medicine 
department to seek their support and make this study successful. The overall outcome of 
these meetings was positive and effective in terms of cooperation and participation in the 
study. 
A further meeting was conducted with the nursing director of the hospital. The protocol of 
the study and the ethical approval were presented and the main outlines of the study were 
discussed. There was agreement for help and support to encourage nursing staff to 
participate in this study. The advice was given that to present the study would be useful for 
seeking nursing cooperation for conducting this study. Therefore, the main outlines of the 
study were presented for the target audiences head nurses in the King Fahad Medical City. 
At workforce level a number of meetings were done with a number of doctors and nurses in 
the hospital in order to inform the medical and nursing staff of the survey. In each meeting 
the proposal and ethical approval were provided. 
After that, 400 questionnaires were distributed for both doctors and nurses in the hospital 
based on the discussion with the medical directors and head nurses that this number was 
reasonable as first distributing to their available staff at that time because of holidays. Two 
weeks were given for doctors to get their responses. The first reminder was issued after two 
weeks and the final reminder was issued after another two weeks because they are very busy 
staff and also owing to holidays. Ten days was given for nurses to get their responses. The 
first reminder was done through h~ad nurses after ten days and the final reminder after two 
weeks because they are very busy staff. Table 5-2 shows the number of these questionnaires 
distributed to the medical and nursing staff of the hospital. 
Table 5- 2 Data collection of KFMC 
Staff Questionnaires distributed Questionnaires returned Return rate 
Medical 150 46 30% 
Nursing 250 164 65.6% 
First reminder Two weeks for doctors Ten days for nurses 
Final reminder Two weeks for doctors Two weeks 
Total 400 210 52.5% 
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At this point in time (three weeks before the start of the holiday there), the proposal of the 
study had been approved by the new research committee of KFHRC. There were two options 
either to stay in the second hospital or work in parallel and start the data collection in the 
third hospital. The decision was made to include the third hospital in the study. Therefore, 
the data collection was started in the third hospital before the holiday. In this strategy 
(decision) time was saved to start in the third hospital before the holiday. Moreover, it was 
aiming to increase the probability of getting large number of respondents from the two 
hospitals rather than one hospital especially to increase the return rate of doctors responses 
because they are usually very difficult to recruit them to this type of questionnaire survey. 
Lastly, that it was worthwhile going to the third hospital (KFSH&RC) because three hospitals 
improve and enhance the value of the results of the study. According to this strategy 800 
questionnaires were distributed in the second (KFMC) and the third hospital, 400 
questionnaires for each hospital. 
5.5.3 King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre 
The King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (KFSH&RC) was the third hospital 
of this study. According to the KFSH&RC guidelines and instructions for submission of 
research proposals, the researcher must have successfully completed the National Institute of 
Health (Nlli) Web based training course "Protecting Human Research Participants" which 
was done on 22/3/2009. Then the principal investigator was identified. Subsequently, the 
research proposal format and the application form were completed. The principal 
investigator submitted the proposal with all relevant forms to the Office of Research Affairs 
(ORA). This office screened the proposal for compliance with submission guidelines, then 
forwarded it for peer review and sent it to the appropriate research committee for evaluation. 
The final decision was the study has approved by Research Advisory Council (RAC) (see the 
copy of ethical approval in appendices 13 and 14). 
The introductory week was started by making appointments with the principle investigator in 
the hospital and the Deputy Executive Director of Nursing Affairs of the hospital. In that 
week the proposal and ethical approval were provided to the directors of medical departments 
such as surgery, medicine and paediatric to give them chance to read it before the meetings. 
All of them were interested and very keen to help and support the research because they 
believe the research was important and useful for patients. The principal investigator 
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coordinated the process of data collection in Family Medicine and Polyclinic, Surgery, 
Medicine and Paediatrics. A number of questionnaires were distributed in each department 
based on available number of doctors working in each department. 
There was a meeting with the Deputy Executive Director of Nursing Affairs of the hospital. 
In this meeting the proposal and ethical approval were provided and the protocol of the study 
was presented and discussed. As a result of this meeting internal memo was send to all head 
nurses to encourage the nurses to contribute in completing the questionnaire as important 
study for patient safety as much as they can( see the copy of this letter in appendix 15). Also 
there was a meeting with the Senior Clinical Research Coordinator of King Faisal Heart 
Institute. There was support for data collection by sending covering letter with the 
questionnaires to encourage doctors to participate in the study. In this way 400 
questionnaires were distributed in different medical departments and clinical areas and 
patient areas such as wards and clinics. To ensure the smooth flow of the data collection 
regular visits were made with the principal investigator; head nurses and Senior Clinical 
Research Coordinator in order to remind them about the survey. 
Two weeks were given for doctors to get their responses. The first reminder was issued after 
two weeks and the final reminder was issued after another two weeks through the 
communication between principal investigator and medical secretaries. Ten days was 
allowed for nurses to get their responses. The first reminder was done through head nurses 
after ten days and the final reminder after another two weeks because they are very busy staff. 
All returned data collected from the medical secretaries, head nurse and the Senior Clinical 
Research Coordinator. The time required to complete data collection was approximately (six 
months). Therefore, at that point of time in the beginning of October 2009 this process was 
completed. Table 5-3 shows the number of these questionnaires was distributed to medical 
and nursing staff of the hospital. 
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Table 5- 3 Data collection of the KFSH&RC 
KFSH&RC 
Staff Distributed questionnaires Returned questionnaires Return rate 
Medical 150 40 26% 
Nursing 250 116 46% 
First reminder Two weeks for doctors Ten days for nurses 
Final reminder Two weeks for doctors Two weeks 
Total· 400 156 39% 
In summary, 1700 questionnaires and cover letter were distributed as one document. 
Different methods were used in each hospital to approach potential respondents and these 
methods produced 913 returned questionnaires from the three hospitals in Riyadh in Saudi 
Arabia which was very successful data collection as a good number of the questionnaires for 
data analysis. The data collection process was based on the following main principles: 
1. The data collection started by submitting the study proposal and hospital's 
requirements for getting the ethical approval. 
2. Making a data collection plan for each hospital in order to save time. 
3. Using different methods of gathering the data to achieve the minimum target data for 
each hospital. 
4. Approximately two weeks were given for doctors and nurses to return questionnaires 
because staff differ in terms of time they need to complete the questionnaires which 
might be completed at one sittings or over two sittings or may they completed at 
home because they are busy staff with patients (Bourque and Fielder, 1995). 
5. Follow up and assessment of the progress of the data collection. 
6. There was no need to redistribute the questionnaires because a large number of 
questionnaires were returned. 
7. At the end of the data collection process all the people who provided support to get 
this data were thanked for their helps and support, such as medical and nursing 
directors, principal investigator, head nurses and medical secretaries in all three 
hospitals. 
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The data collection included the following activities to maximize return rate: 
1. An introductory week was done in each hospital before distributing the questionnaires 
included a number of meetings at both management level and work force level, this 
week was very helpful and supportive in terms of informing the medical and nursing 
staff of survey and to make plan for data collection. 
2. The meetings were held with medical director and nursing directors in each hospital 
to seek support and facilitate the data collection process. 
3. A number of presentations were given in order to inform staff of the outlines of the 
study. 
4. A number of meetings with doctors and nurses in nurses' stations and doctors meeting 
rooms at each hospital were held to inform them of the survey. 
5. The questionnaires were returned to the head nurses and medical secretaries in wards, 
clinics and other specialist areas such as medical centres in the hospitals. The 
questionnaire and cover letter were handed to the participants to be completed. The 
cover letter explained the purpose of this study. The cover letter also assured the 
participants that the questionnaires were totally anonymous. In addition how to return 
the questionnaires was also stated in the cover letter clearly. 
6. Working every day in the hospital and following up the progress by regularly visiting 
the doctors and head nurses in order to motivate them to reply is considered very 
important factor in increasing the response rate (Bourque and Fielder, 1995). 
7. The strategy of data collection was changed many times and depends on the situation 
in each hospital. 
8. Doctors and nurses were motivated to complete the questionnaires because patient 
safety is an important issue and one of the main responsibilities of their job and 
because they believe that they are responsible for the safety of patients in their 
hospitals therefore they were very keen to contribute and complete the questionnaire. 
9. Handling the return questionnaires was based on collecting the returned 
questionnaires from the head nurses and the medical secretaries in all three hospitals 
as a reception point for the returned questionnaires. 
In short, all these activities helped to approach potential participants for the study. There 
were number of factors that increased the response rate. Firstly, there were factors related to 
the subject of the study, because assessment of patient safety culture is a very important 
element for improving patient safety in hospitals. 
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Furthermore, the study protocol. was carried out carefully to achieve this good data return. 
Secondly, factors related to the questionnaire, included the simple and clear language of the 
questionnaire and easy questionnaire formats and structures to make it easy for respondents 
to complete. Finally, factors related to the practicality of the gathering the data such as using 
different effective methods of data collection. All returned questionnaires (913) were kept in 
a secure location for confidentiality during all stages of the data collection in Saudi Arabia as 
well as in the university. The returned questionnaires were brought to the UK. to start data 
management and cleaning before performing data analysis. 
5.6 Data management 
5.6.1 Introduction 
Reviewing and cleaning of the data was conducted to make it ready for entry into SPSS for 
analysis. In this stage of the research each questionnaire was examined for completeness, to 
make sure that the respondents had completed the questionnaires properly prior to coding and 
entering the data into an electronic data file using statistical software (SPSS). 
The data management process is concerned with preparing, entering and editing the 
questionnaire responses from the returned questionnaires. The data management aims to 
prepare a clean data file for analysis. The process started with revision, checking and 
cleaning of the returned questionnaires to make them ready for entry into the data file in order 
to perform the analysis. The statistical packages SPSS version 16.0 and STATA V.8 were 
used for data processing and analysis. At this stage identifying complete and incomplete 
questionnaires is very important in calculating the return rate of the study. 
5.6.2 Data Preparation 
Data management was started with sorting the returned questionnaires in terms of completed 
and incomplete questionnaires. Thus each questionnaire was thoroughly reviewed to check 
whether it was completed or not. Among 1700 questionnaires that were administered at three 
hospitals, there were 862 completed questionnaires with a return rate of 50.7% and 51 
incomplete questionnaires. At this level the completed questionnaires (862) were sufficient 
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to perfonn the analysis according to the statistical requirements (GuadagnoIi and Velicer, 
19S5) and therefore the incomplete questionnaires were excluded from the data entry in this 
stage. The incomplete questionnaires were examined later in order to know which items 
were not completed and the reasons for incompleteness. The completed questionnaires were 
provided with serial numbers, started from number 1 to number 862. This numbering helped 
in data entry and also facilitated tracking and queries during different stages of data 
management; it was also useful for the questionnaires' archiving and sorting. Each 
questionnaire was addressed by the name of the hospital where it was completed, work area 
and the current position of the respondent in order to enable the researcher to identify 
participants by this infonnation during data entry. 
5.6.3 Data entry 
The variables of the HSOPSC questionnaire were clearly numbered and defined in the SPSS 
data file before entering the data. This stage consisted of two steps. The first step was 
coding and defining the variables' numeric values in the "Variable view" in SPSS. The 
second step was entering data into SPSS. The data entry step was started with variables 
definition by identifying the variables of the HSOPSC questionnaire which includes the 
number of the variable, variable label, type and measurement. The variables were classified 
into background variables (11 variables) and patient safety culture variables (44 variables). 
The first set of variables provides infonnation about the respondents' identity and 
background characteristics (Demographic items include: A-HI-H2-H3-H4-H5-H6-H7-HS-
H9-HIO). The second set of variables includes the variables of patient safety culture (44 
variables) (Non demographic items include AI-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7-AS-A9-AIO-All-
AI2-A13-A14-AI5-A16-AI7-AlS-B I-B2-B3-B4-CI-C2-C3-C4-C5-C6-D I-D2-D3-E-Fl-
F2-F3-F4-F5-F6-F7-FS-F9-FI0-FII-G). The total coding of the variables is 55 data variables 
plus the ID of questionnaire (see appendices 17 and IS). 
The second step in this stage was entering data into SPSS (through data view). With the 
variables defined, data entry started according to the serial number sequence of the 
questionnaires from number one to number 862. During the data entry each questionnaire 
was subject to double check and matching with its value label in order to ensure the precision 
of the data entry and to minimize the probability of data entry errors. This process was 
continued up to the end of the data entry. The data entry record was used to write comments 
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during data entry e.g. record of latest entry every day, poor handwriting, etc. It is worth to 
mentioning that the data was entered in reasonable blocks of time (approximately 20 
questionnaires each time) to minimize data entry mistakes due to fatigue and tiredness rather 
than entering it in one large period of time. 
5.6.4 Data editing (validation and checking) 
This stage was intended to check and validate the data by carefully reviewing and screening 
the entered data in order to identify duplicate cases, to check missing values, and to identify 
implausible (unlikely) values outside the range. In this stage the following strategy was used: 
1. Identify duplicate cases 
The option of identifying duplicate cases (questionnaires) in SPSS was used to check if there 
was any duplicate case (sorting cases by serial number). This step identified five duplicate 
cases. These cases were 166, 334, 600, 674 and 675. Each case was reviewed carefully. 
Initial data entry error with code for 196 was being wrongly input as 166. Number 334 was 
entered wrongly with number 344 as 334. Number 600 was entered twice. Number 674 was 
entered in place of574. Number 675 was entered instead of number 575. All duplicate cases 
were sorted out or deleted. Table 5-4 shows the duplicate cases and the action taken to these 
cases. 
Table 5- 4 Duplicate cases 
ID Reason 
166 196 wrongly input as 166 
334 344 wrongly input as 334 
Same questionnaire input twice 600 
674 
675 
Number 674 was entered in place of 574 
Number 675 was entered instead of number 575 
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Action taken 
ID changed to 196 
ID changed to 344 
The second entry was removed 
ID (674) changed to 574 
ID (675) changed to 575 
2. Identify Missing values 
The option of identifying missing values in SPSS was used to check if there was any missing 
value. The frequencies tables show blank records in 34 questionnaires. All these 
questionnaires were reviewed carefully to double check the data entry of these questionnaires. 
All were found to be due to errors in the data entry. Therefore all these blank records were 
completed using the responses from the questionnaires. All the items of each questionnaire 
above were reviewed and not only specific items. After that the data was checked again and 
the frequencies tables showed no missing values. 
3. Identify implausible values outside the range: 
The frequencies tables show number of implausible values outside the range as follows: 
Table 5- 5 OutIiers 
Number of questionnaire Number of item Action taken 
601 H4 H4 was changed from 6 to 4 
606 G-H2-H3 Corrected G=4, H2=2, H3=2 
608 H2 H2 was changed from 5to 1 
686 A5 A5 was changed from 45to 4 
710 AI7 A17 was Changed from 15to 4 
All the above questionnaires were checked and all the outliers were corrected. Generally, in 
this stage 39 questionnaires were reviewed carefully in order to clean the data continuously. 
Errors could happen at any stage of entering the data from the HSOSPC questionnaires into 
SPSS, therefore ensuring the accuracy of data entry is very important to achieve the best 
quality of data to obtain a realistic analysis. Double entry of data is recommended as a 
method for validating the accuracy of the data entry and an effective method for reducing 
data entry errors (Day, 1998). 
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5.6.5 Double entry 
In order to have complete confidence in the final data set, 15% double random check entry 
was done as follows: 
1. 15% of the cases were randomly selected (130 cases) entitled DFIAl (original file) 
2. The new file was created including 130 cases entitled DFIA2 (re entering data) 
3. Re entering the same 130 cases into DFIA2 
4. STATA V.S was used to compare the two files to check entry data errors (see the 
result of the comparison 
5. The values of the two files were compared with the values in the questionnaires to 
detect the place of error (see the comparison table in appendix 19). 
In summary, the comparisons showed that there were 55 data items (ignoring the ID) and 130 
cases (55 x I30), which make 7150 records. There were 51 errors (the number of errors found 
in the re-entering file (DFIA2) was 33 errors; while in the original file (DFIA2) was 18 
errors) in 23 questionnaires in total which is an error proportion of 0.7%. Therefore, double 
entry was made for the rest (732 questionnaires). 
Double entry was done as follows: 
1. First data entry file was created containing 732 cases 
2. The new file was created including 732 cases entitled double entry data file (DFIA2) 
3. Re entering the same 732 cases into DFIA2 
4. STATA V.8 was used to compare the two files to check entry data errors. 
5. The values of the two files were compared with the values in the questionnaires to 
detect the place of error (see appendix 20). 
In summary, the comparisons showed that there were 55 data variables (ignoring the ID) and 
732 cases (questionnaires) (55 x732), which make 40260 records. There were 320 
mismatches (errors) in lIS questionnaires in total which is an error proportion of O.S%. The 
comparison was performed between these errors which showed that the number of errors 
found in double data entry file was 183 errors; while in the first data entry (original file) was 
137 errors in 66 questionnaires. This means, an error proportion of the first data entry 
original file is 0.34%, less than one per variable. In fact the output of the double data 
checking from ST AT A that shows for each variable there is a mismatch is a good example of 
the value of double entry that was made in the study. This is a good return in terms of 
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accuracy of data entering. All entry data errors that found in first data file entry were 
corrected in the original file. All the questionnaires were reviewed and checked carefully as a 
final stage of cleaning data to detect any errors of the data in order to resolve them before 
starting data analysis. 
5.6.6 Incomplete questionnaires 
The incomplete questionnaires were checked to clarify whether the respondents faced 
difficulty with completion in common items or sections or whether it was due to other 
reasons. Also, the incomplete questionnaires were examined to know whether the 
demographic information or non demographic information was incomplete. The number of 
incomplete questionnaires were returned from the three hospitals was 51 (25 from KFNGH, 
14 from KFMC and 12 from KFSH&RC). The questionnaires were provided with serial 
numbers, started from number 1 to number 51 and entered into SPSS. Frequencies tables 
were used to examine these incomplete questionnaires. These tables showed incomplete 
item or section in each questionnaire (see appendix 16). Table 5-6 summarises these 
incomplete questionnaires in five groups. 
Table 5- 6 Incomplete questionnaire (n=51) 
In complete section or items Number of returned 0/0 
questionnaires 
1. Demographic items 16 31.4 
2. More than half of demographic items 9 17.6 
3. Section B 5 9.8 
4. Different sections (D-C-E-F-G) 14 27.5 
5. Different items (A3-A4-A 7-A17-D2-D3- 7 13.7 
F6 F7-H4-H5-H8) 
Total 51 100% 
From the above table the demographic items were incomplete in 16 questionnaires and more 
than half of demographic items were incomplete in nine questionnaires. Section B was 
incomplete in five questionnaires. Different sections such as D, C, E, F and G were 
incomplete in 14 questionnaires. Different items such as A3, A4, A7, A17, D2, D3, F6, F7, 
H4, H5, and H8 were incomplete in seven different questionnaires. As mentioned earlier 
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incomplete questionnaires were examined to clarify whether the respondents faced difficulty 
with completion in common items or sections and to identify if there is any trend or interest 
issues in these questionnaires. 
There are several interpretation of these findings: for example as a few respondents may have 
felt that the questionnaire was too long so they left many sections blank, or they did not have 
time to complete it. For section B it could be that respondents do not like to use the word 
supervisor or manager in section B or were unsure which was more appropriate word, thus 
section B was left incomplete in five questionnaires. 
Generally, the aim of analysing incomplete questionnaires was to examine whether the 
incomplete questionnaires were valid to be included in data analysis or not. Due to 
incomplete demographic information and the fact that considerable numbers of sections in 
these questionnaires were missing and moreover, given the availability of the large number of 
completed questionnaires (862). Hence, it was felt that it was better to use just the completed 
data set rather than including missing data as well as, because of the uncertainty of the 
seriousness of the respondents of incomplete questionnaires. Therefore the decision was 
made that the incomplete questionnaires were excluded from data analyses. At the end of the 
data management process the clean data file was ready for the next stage, data analysis. 
5.7 Summary 
The HSOPSC questionnaire was used to collect data, and 1700 questionnaires were 
administered at three hospitals in Saudi Arabia to collect the questionnaire data. In terms of 
return rate 913 questionnaires was returned. The data was cleaned and prepared for data 
analysis, 862 fully completed questionnaires were returned from three hospitals with a return 
rate of 50.7%. In the next chapter the data analysis will be presented. 
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Chapter 6: Assessing the psychometric 
properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the results of the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in Saudi hospitals in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia using Saudi data (862 
completed questionnaires). The chapter is composed of seven sections. Section 6.2 presents 
descriptive analysis including the sample characteristics and the item responses (item 
analysis). Section 6.3 concerns assessing the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This section presents the results of the assessment of 
the suitability of the Saudi data for factor analysis. Section 6.4 provides the results of testing 
the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) using Saudi data including CFA 
and reliability analysis (internal consistency). Section 6.5 reports the results of identifying 
the optimal model, 'including EF A, CF A and reliability analysis. Section 6.6 provides the 
proposed optimal model of the study. Finally, section 6.7 presents a brief summary of the 
chapter. 
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6.2 Descriptive Analysis 
This section provides the demographic characteristics of the study respondents. It also 
presents an analysis of the responses to individual items of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
Frequency tables are used to show the responses and the percentages of the respondents to 
safety climate items of the questionnaire. 
6.2.1 Demographic information 
This section reports the characteristics of the sample. Table 6-1 shows work area of 
respondents (doctors and nurses). 
Table 6- 1 Work area of respondents (n=862) 
Work area unit Number(%) 
Surgery 164 (19.0) 
Other 164 (19.0) 
Intensive care unit (any type) 148 (17.2) 
Medicine 117 (13.6) 
Paediatrics 106 (12.3) 
Obstetrics 69 (8.0) 
Emergency 43 (5.0) 
Rehabilitation 26 (3.0) 
Many different areas 16 (1.9) 
Anaesthesiology 6 (0.7) 
Psychiatric/mental health 3 (0.3) 
Table 6-1 shows that the variety of work areas of the respondents. Among the total 
respondents (862) the highest proportion of respondents worked in surgery (19.0%) and other 
departments (19.0%) followed by intensive care units (17.2%), medicine (13.6%), and 
paediatrics (12.3%). The detail of other departments is provided in table 6-2. The lowest 
percentage of respondents worked in obstetrics (8%), followed by emergency (5%), 
rehabilitation (3%), many different hospital units (1.9%), anaesthesiology (0.7%) and 
psychiatry Imental health (0.3%). It was important to identify other work areas because it 
was the highest percentage. Table 6-2 shows the other departments. 
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Table 6- 2 Other work areas of respondents (n=164) 
Work area unit Number(%) 
Cardiac 30 (18.3) 
In patient wards 28 (17.0) 
Endoscopy 23 (14.0) 
Operation room 20 (12.2) 
Oncology 15 (9.0) 
Ophthalmology 13 (8.0) 
Neonate 10 (6.0) 
Quality and safety 9 (5.5) 
Orthopaedic 6 (4.0) 
Nephrology 5 (3.0) 
Endocrinology 5 (3.0) 
The demographic variables of the sample included: current position; gender; nationality; 
highest educational level; training outside Saudi Arabia; years of work in this hospital; years 
of work in current hospital work area/unit; years of work in current speciality or profession; 
hours of work per week; and direct contact with patients. Table 6-3 provides the sample 
characteristics of the study. 
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Table 6- 3 Sample characteristics of the study (0=862) 
N Variable Number in each unit (%) 
Current position Nurse 661 (76.7) 
Doctor 201 (23.3) 
2 Gender Female 632 (73.3) 
Male 230 (26.7) 
3 Nationality Non Saudi 700 (81.2) 
Saudi 162 (18.8) 
4 Highest qualification PhD 129 (15.0) 
Master 34 (3.9) 
Bachelor 525 (60.9) 
Diploma 160 (18.6) 
Other 14 (1.6) 
5 Training outside S.A Yes 668 (77.5) 
No 194 (22.5) 
6 Years of working in this hospital Less than I year 123 (14.3) 
I to 5 years 464 (53.8) 
6 to 10 years 181 (21) 
11 to 15 years 48 (5.6) 
16 to 20 years 26 (3.0) 
21 years or more 20 (2.3) 
7 Years of working in current hospital Less than 1 year 119 (13.8) 
work area/unit 1 to 5 years 499 (57.9) 
6 to 10 years 161 (18.7) 
11 to 15 year 45 (5.2) 
16 to 20 years 23 (2.7) 
21 years or more 15 (1.7) 
8 Years of working in your current Less than 1 year 42 (4.9) 
speciality or profession 1 to 5 years 235 (27.3) 
6 to 10 years 220 (25.5) 
11 to 15 yea 162 (18.8) 
16 to 20 years 99 ( 11.5) 
1 years or more 104 (12.0) 
9 Working hours per week Less than 20 hours per week 9 (1.0) 
20 to 39 hours per week 46 (5.3) 
40 to 59 hours per week 661 (76.7) 
60 to 79 hours per week 105 (12.2) 
80 to 99 hours per week 37 (4.3) 
100 hours per week or more 4 (0.5) 
10 Direct interaction or contact with Yes 850 (98.6) 
patients No 12 (1.4) 
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The sample of the study consisted of201 doctors (23%) and 661 nurses (77%). The majority 
of respondents were female (73.3%). Most of respondents were non Saudi staff (81.2%) 
from 24 different nationalities. These nationalities were: British, Australian, Canadian, 
American, South African, Philippine, Pakistani, Indian, French, Egyptian, Netherlands, 
Jordanian, Norwegian, Finland, Yemeni, Kuwaiti, Chinese, Scottish, New Zealand, 
Malaysian, Sudan, Syria, Ireland, and Bahraini. 
The majority of staff (60.9%) have a bachelor's degree and 18.9% of staff have postgraduate 
qualifications (PhD, master's degree). Over 18.6% have a diploma degree. The majority of 
staff had training outside Saudi Arabia (77.5%) in many countries such as UK, USA, 
Australia, and Canada. The majority of the respondents (53.8%) worked from one to five 
years in their hospital and 57.9% worked from one to five years in their specific hospital unit 
or work area. The majority of the respondents (52.8%) have experience from one to ten years 
in their current speciality or profession. The most common category of work hours per week 
(76.7%) was 40 to 59 hours. Almost all respondents (98.6%) had direct contact with patients. 
6.2.2 Items analysis 
The HSOPSC questionnaire consists of 42 items (24 positively worded items and 18 
negatively worded items) plus two items on an overall patient safety grade (E) and number of 
events reported (G). These 42 items measure 12 dimensions of patient safety culture. Table 
6-4 shows the responses of the positively worded safety climate items. 
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Table 6- 4 Responses of the 24 positively worded safety climate items (n=862) 
Item Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Agree 
% % 0/0 0/0 % 
At 1.3 6.7 8.4 62.9 20.8 
A2 8.4 25.4 14.4 42.3 9.5 
A3 0.7 7.5 11.0 58.7 22.0 
A4 2.0 8.2 15.2 55.7 18.9 
A6 0.5 1.4 4.6 57.0 36.5 
A9 2.9 10.3 21.7 54.4 10.7 
All 4.1 18.3 13.0 51.4 13.2 
A13 1.2 5.2 9.5 65.5 18.6 
At5 4.9 15.7 13.0 46.8 19.7 
At8 2.0 9.5 16.1 60.2 12.2 
Bt 4.1 7.0 12.9 56.4 19.7 
B2 3.4 8.4 13.6 57.1 17.6 
Cl 2.0 9.3 34.5 36.0 18.3 
C2 1.2 8.8 31.0 38.5 20.5 
C3 1.6 7.7 23.3 37.4 30.0 
C4 9.6 23.1 32.9 25.3 9.0 
C5 1.3 5.8 16.5 43.3 33.2 
Dt 3.5 18.1 24.7 31.8 21.9 
D2 4.1 16.0 25.4 33.8 20.8 
D3 3.1 10.0 20.3 36.5 30.0 
Ft 1.3 6.7 11.3 64.2 16.6 
F4 1.4 12.9 22.6 55.9 7.2 
F8 2.2 4.2 9.0 49.1 35.5 
Fto 0.9 7.2 13.9 55.3 22.6 
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Table 6-4 shows that the highest percentage of all positive safety climate items is between the 
responses agree and strongly agree. The response of neither ranges from 4.6% to 34.5%. 
The lowest percentage is between disagree and strongly disagree. This means the majority of 
the respondents tended to agree and strongly agree with these positive items. Table 6-5 
shows the respons~s of the negative safety climate items. 
Table 6- 5 Resl:!ooses of the 18 oegativel~ worded safe!l: climate items (0=862) 
Item Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree 
0/0 % % % % 
A5® 6.1 35.2 18.3 26.6 13.8 
A7® 21.0 48.1 14.8 11.1 4.9 
A8® 4.8 26.2 22.3 35.7 11.0 
AIO® 9.3 35.8 18.7 31.6 4.6 
A12® 4.3 26.7 20.5 37.4 11.1 
A14® 5.9 34.2 18.6 30.3 11.0 
A16® 1.9 10.0 17.3 50.9 20.0 
A17® 8.4 37.1 19.4 29.7 5.5 
B3® 12.9 57.0 19.6 8.6 2.0 
B4® 33.4 56.4 6.0 2.91 1.3 
C6® 15.9 26.0 40.5 13.2 4.4 
F2® 7.2 46.5 21.2 21.3 3.7 
F3® 2.6 30.9 24.9 39.0 2.7 
F5® 11.4 53.9 18.9 14.3 1.5 
F6® 6.4 45.9 26.7 17.4 3.6 
F7® 2.9 34.2 30.4 29.4 3.1 
F9® 10.9 47.7 15.2 20.6 5.6 
Fll ® 11.3 52.3 22.7 11.9 1.7 
R indicates negatively worded items 
The above table shows the responses for the 18 negatively worded safety climate items. The 
highest percentage of all items is between disagree and strongly disagree except items A16 
and F3. The response of neither ranges from 6% to 40.5%. The smallest percent is between 
agree and strongly agree. The responses of disagree and strongly disagree of negatively 
worded items count as positive response because negative response of negative items means 
positive response. This means the majority of the respondents disagreed and strongly 
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disagreed with these negative items. Table 6-6 provides the responses to the question of an 
overall grade on patient safety of 862 respondents. 
Table 6- 6 Responses to the question of an overall grade on patient safety (n=862) 
Item Excellent Very good Acceptable Poor Failing 
% % 
E 14.0 48.1 35.7 1.9 0.3 
Among the 862 respondents 48.1 % perceived that the grade of patient safety was very good 
and 14% perceived that the grade of patient safety was excellent. A sizable proportion of the 
respondents 35.7% indicated that patient safety was acceptable. Few respondents (1.93%) 
perceived that patient safety was poor and failing. 
Table 6-7 provides the responses to the question on the number of events reported in the past 
12 months for all respondents. 
Table 6- 7 Responses to the question on the number of events reported in the past 12 
months (n=862) 
Item No event 1 to 2 event 3 to 5 event 6 to 10 11 to 20 21 event 
reports reports % reports % event event reports or 
% reports % reports % more % 
G 40.8 38.9 12.1 5.5 1.6 1.2 
The highest percentage of respondents (40.8%) did not report events followed by one to two 
event reports. Over 12 % reported three to five event reports. Five and half percent (5.5%) 
reported six to ten event reports. Around 1.6% reported 11 to 20 event reports. The lowest 
percent was 1.2% reported more than 21 event reports. 
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It was useful to determine if those reporting poor/failing were the same individuals who 
reported lots of events. Table 6-8 shows the comparison between an overall grade of patient 
safety and number of event reports in the past 12 months. 
Table 6- 8 Comparison between an overall grade on patient safety and number of event 
reeorts in the east 12 months !n=862) 
Item G: Number of event report in the past 12 months 
No event reports 3 to 5 event 11 to 20 event Total 
and 1 to 2 event reports and 6 to reports and 21 
reports 10 event reports event reports 
or more 
E: An overall Very good 433 (80.7%) 88 (16.4%) 15 (2.7%) 536 
grade of and 
patient safety Excellent 
Acceptable 242 (78.6%) 58 (18.8%) 8 (2.5%) 308 
Poor and 12 (66.7%) 5 (27.8%) 1 (5.5%) 18 
Failing 
Total 687 151 24 862 
Table 6-8 shows for those reporting poor/failing the higher proportion (66.7%) reported no 
event reports, while the lowest proportion (5.5%) reported 11 to 20 event reports. This means 
those reporting poor/failing were not the same individuals who reported lots of events. Table 
6-9 shows the descriptive analysis of the positively worded safety climate items. 
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Table 6- 9 Descriptive analysis of the 24 positively worded safety climate items (n=862) 
Item Mean (Sd) Median (IQR) 
AI: Staff support one another in this unit 3.9 (0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
A2: We have enough staff to handle the workload 3.1 (1.2) 4.0 (1-5) 
A3: When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we 3.9 (0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
work together as a team to get the work done 
A4: In this unit, people treat each other with respect 3.8 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
A6: We are actively doing things to improve patient care 4.2 (0.6) 4.0 (1-5) 
A9: Mistakes have led to positive changes here 3.6 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
All: When one area in this unit gets really busy, others 3.5 (1.1) 4.0 (1-5) 
help out 
A13: After we make changes to improve patient safety, 3.9 (0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
we evaluate their effectiveness 
A15: Patient safety never takes second place to get more 3.6 (1.1) 4.0 (1-5) 
work done 
A18: Our procedures and systems are good at preventing 
errors from happening 
3.7 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
BI: My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
3.8 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
safety procedures 
B2: My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 3.7 (0.9) 4.00-5) 
suggestions for improving patient safety 
Cl: We are given feedback about changes put into place 3.5 (0.9) 4.00-5) 
based on event reports 
C2: Staff will freely speak up if they see something that 3.6 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
may negatively affect patient care 
C3: We are informed about errors that happen in this 3.8 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
unit 
C4: Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of 
those with more authority 
3.0 (1.1) 3.0 (1-5) 
C5: In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from 
happening again 
4.0 (0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
DI: When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected 3.5 (1.1) 4.0 (1-5) 
before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
D2: When a mistake is made, but has no potential to 3.5(1.1) 4.0 (1-5) 
harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
D3: When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, 3.8(1.1) 4.0 (1-5) 
but does not, how often is this reported? 
FI: Hospital management provides a work climate that 3.8(0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
promotes patient safety 
F4: There is good cooperation among hospital units that 3.5(0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
need to work together 
F8: The actions of hospital management show that 4.1(0.9) 4.0 (1-5) 
patient safety is a top priority 
FIO: Hospital units work well together to provide the 3.9 (0.8) 4.0 (1-5) 
best care for patients 
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Table 6-9 shows that the mean scores of positive items were divided into three groups, the 
first group was between 3.0 and 3.5. The second group was between 3.6 and 3.9. The third 
group was between 4.0 and 4.2. The median score of all items was 4.0 except item number 
C4 was 3.0. Table 6-10 shows the descriptive analysis of the negative safety climate items. 
Table 6- 10 Descriptive analysis of the 18 negatively worded safety climate items (n=862) 
Item Mean (S d) Median (IQR) 
A5: Staff in this unit work longer hours than they 
should, which is not good for patient care 
A7: We use more temporary staff than we should, 
which is not good for patient care 
A8: Staff feel like their mistakes are held against 
them 
AIO: It is just by chance that more serious mistakes 
are held against them 
A12: When an event is reported, it feels like the 
person is being written up, not the problem 
A14: We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too 
quickly 
A16: Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in 
their personnel file 
A17: We have patient safety problems in this unit 
B3: Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts 
B4: My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety 
problems that happen over and over 
C6: Staff are afraid to ask questions when something 
does not seem right 
F2: Hospital units do not coordinate well with each 
other 
F3: Some things do not happen or get missed when 
transferring patients from one unit to another 
F5: Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes 
F6: It is often unpleasant to work with staff from 
other hospital units 
F7: Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units 
F9: Hospital management seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse event happens 
FII: Shift changes cause problems for patients in this 
hospital 
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3.0 (1.2) 
2.3(1.1) 
3.2 (1.1) 
2.8 (1.1) 
3.2 (1.1) 
3.0(1.1) 
3.7 (0.9) 
2.8 (1.1) 
2.3 (0.9) 
1.8 (0.8) 
2.6 (1.0) 
2.6 (1.0) 
3.0 (0.9) 
2.4 (0.9) 
2.6 (0.9) 
2.9 (0.9) 
2.6 (1.1) 
2.4 (0.9) 
3.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
3.0(1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
4.0 (1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
3.0(1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
3.0 (1-5) 
2.0 (1-5) 
2.0(1-5) 
Table 6-10 shows that the mean scores of negative items were divided into three groups. The 
first group was between 1.8 and 2.6. The second group was between 2.8 and 3.2. The third 
group was 3.7. The median scores of all items were also divided into three groups. The first 
group scored 2. The second group scored 3. The third group scored 4. Table 6-11 shows the 
descriptive analysis of an overall grade on patient safety and number of event reports in the 
past 12 months. 
Table 6- 11 Descriptive analysis of an overall grade on patient safety item and number 
of event reports in the past 12 months (n=862) 
Item Mean (S d) Median (IQR) 
E: An overall grade on patient safety 3.7 (0.7) 4.0 (1-5) 
G: Number of event reports in the past 12 months 1.9 (1.0) 2.0 (1-5) 
Table 6-11 shows that the mean score of item (E) was 3.7 and its median score was 4. The 
mean score of item (G) was 1.9 and its median score was 2. The HSOPSC questionnaire 
consists of 42 items grouped by 12 dimensions. Table 6-12 shows the responses of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire items grouped by dimensions. 
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Table 6- 12 Responses of the HSOPSC items grouped by dimensions (n=862) 
Item Dimensions Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
N disagree 
0/0 
Al 
1. Teamwork within units (4 items) 
Staff support one another in this unit 1.3 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect 
All When one area in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out 
0.7 
2.0 
4.1 
% 
6.7 8.4 62.9 
7.5 11.0 58.7 
8.2 15.2 55.7 
18.3 13.0 51.4 
2. Supervisor/Manager expectation and action promoting patient safety (4 items) 
BI My supervisor/manager says a good 
word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety 
procedures 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
B3 ® Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts 
B4 ® My supervisor/manager ignores patient 
safety problems that happen over and 
over 
4.1 7.0 
3.4 8.4 
12.9 57.0 
33.4 56.4 
3. Management support for patient safety (3 items) 
FI 
F8 
Hospital management provides a work 
climate that promotes patient safety 
The actions of hospital management 
show that patient safety is a top priority 
F9 ® Hospital management seems interested 
in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens 
1.3 6.7 
2.2 4.2 
10.9 47.7 
4. Organizational learning-continuous improvement (3 items) 
A6 
A9 
We are actively doing things to 
improve patient care 
Mistakes have led to positive changes 
here 
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12.9 56.4 
13.6 57.1 
19.6 8.6 
6.0 2.91 
11.3 64.2 
9.0 49.1 
15.2 20.6 
4.6 57 
21.7 54.4 
Strongly 
agree 
0/0 
20.8 
22.0 
18.9 
13.2 
19.7 
17.6 
2.0 
1.3 
16.6 
35.5 
5.6 
36.5 
10.7 
At3 After we make changes to improve 
patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness 
1.2 
S. Overall perceptions of patient safety (4 items) 
AtS Patient safety never takes second place 
to get more work done 
AtS Our procedures and systems are good 
at preventing errors from happening 
AtO It is just by chance that more serious 
® mistakes do not happen around here 
At7 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, 
® too quickly 
4.9 
2.0 
9.3 
8.4 
5.2 
15.7 
9.5 
35.8 
37.1 
6. Feedback and communication about error (3 items) 
Ct 
C3 
CS 
We are given feedback about changes 
put into place based on event reports 
We are informed about errors that 
happen in this unit 
In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent 
errors from happening again 
2.0 
1.6 
1.3 
C2 
7. Communication openness (3 items) 
Staff will freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect 
patient care 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions 
or actions of those with more authority 
C6® Staff are afraid to ask questions when 
something does not seem right 
1.2 
9.6 
15.9 
S. Frequency of event reported (3 items) 
Dt 
D2 
When a mistake is made, but is caught 
and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? 
When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often 
is this reported? 
D3 When a mistake is made that could 
harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? 
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9.3 
7.7 
5.8 
8.8 
23.1 
26.0 
18.1 
16.0 
10.0 
9.5 65.5 18.6 
13.0 46.8 19.7 
16.1 60.2 12.2 
18.7 31.6 4.6 
19.4 29.7 5.5 
34.5 36 18.3 
23.3 37.4 30.0 
16.5 43.3 33.2 
31.0 38.5 20.5 
32.9 25.3 9.0 
40.5 13.2 4.4 
24.7 31.8 21.9 
25.4 33.8 20.8 
20.3 36.5 30.0 
9. Teamwork across units (4 items) 
F4 There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work 
together 
F10 Hospital units work well together to 
provide the best care for patients 
F2 ® Hospital units do not coordinate well 
with each other 
F6 ® It is often unpleasant to work with staff 
from other hospital units 
A2 
10. Staffing (4 items) 
We have enough staff to handle the 
workload 
AS ® Staff in this unit work longer hours 
than they should, which is not good for 
patient care 
A 7® We use more temporary staff than we 
should, which is not good for patient 
care 
A14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too 
® much, too quickly 
11. Handoffs and transitions (4 items) 
F3 ® Some things do not happen or get 
missed when transferring patients from 
one unit to another 
FS ® Important patient care information is 
often lost during shift changes 
F7 ® Problems often occur in the exchange 
of information across hospital units 
F11 Shift changes cause problems for 
® patients in this hospital 
1.4 
0.9 
7.2 
6.4 
8.4 
6.1 
21.0 
5.9 
2.6 
11.4 
2.9 
11.3 
12. No punitive response to error (3 items) 
A8 ® Staff feel like their mistakes are held 
against them 
A12 When an event is reported, it feels like 
® the person is being written up, not the 
problem 
A16 Staff worry that mistakes they make 
® are kept in their personnel file 
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12.9 
7.2 
46.5 
45.9 
25.4 
35.2 
48.1 
34.2 
30.9 
53.9 
34.2 
52.3 
26.2 
26.7 
10.0 
22.6 55.9 7.2 
13.9 55.3 22.6 
21.2 21.3 3.7 
26.7 17.4 3.6 
14.4 42.3 9.5 
18.3 26.6 13.8 
14.8 Il.l 4.9 
18.6 30.3 11.0 
24.9 39.0 2.7 
18.9 14.3 1.5 
30.4 29.4 3.1 
22.7 11.9 1.7 
22.3 35.7 11.0 
20.5 37.4 11.1 
17.3 50.9 20.0 
Table 6-12 shows the responses tending to positive response (strongly agree and agree) 
toward positively worded safety climate items and dimensions, while they tend towards 
negative response (strongly disagree and disagree) toward negatively worded items and 
dimensions. The next section will report the results of the psychometric analysis of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire in Saudi hospitals. 
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6.3 Psychometric Analysis of the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This study aims to examine the underlying dimensions and the psychometric properties of the 
selected patient safety climate questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. This stage was 
concerned with assessing the psychometric properties (validity and reliability) of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire using the Saudi data and comparing this with the original HSOPSC 
model (Sorra and Neiva, 2004). Factor analysis is a method for examining the 
interrelationships amongst the items of the HSOPSC questionnaire in order to determine the 
structure (important underlying patient safety culture dimensions) in the questionnaire data. 
Furthermore, factor analysis can be used to assess the construct validity of an established 
instrument when administered to a specific population (Pett et aI., 2003). 
Therefore, it is important to examine the suitability of the data for factor analysis and to 
check the inter-item correlations of the HSOPSC questionnaire before performing factor 
analysis in order to ensure that the data is sufficient to be used for factor analysis (Smits et aI., 
2008). The following section presents the assessment of the suitability of the data for factor 
analysis. 
6.3.2 Assessment of the suitability of the data for factor 
analysis 
This step aimed to assess the suitability of the Saudi data for factor analysis. There are two 
main issues when considering whether a particular data set is suitable for factor analysis. The 
first issue is sample size (adequacy of sample). The second issue is the strength of the inter-
correlation amongst the items (correlation between the items) (Pall ant, 2007). 
Sample size is considered as an important requirement for factor analysis (Field, 2009). 
Therefore, before measuring the adequacy of the sample for factor analysis, it is important to 
report sample requirements such as the sample size of the study, the ratio of the sample size 
to the number of variables, the ratio of the number of variables to the number of factors in 
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order to assess whether the sample size is sufficient to satisfactorily undertake factor analysis 
(Ford et aI., 1986; Tinsley and Tinsley, 1987). Table 6-13 shows the sample size 
requirements. 
Table 6- 13 Sample size requirements of factor analysis 
Sample size of the study 
Number of variables 
Ratio of sample size to number of variables: 
Ratio of number of variables to number of factors: 
Number 
862 
42 
Greater than 20: 1 
3:1 
4:1 
The sample size of the data (862) is large and more than enough to conduct factor analysis 
with greater than 20 observations to each variable according to Coakes and Steed (2003). 
Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that 300 cases are good, 500 cases are very good and 1000 
cases or more are excellent because the large sample is useful and support the high 
confidence in the results. Also they report that normality is not necessary, because although 
normally distributed variables make the solution stronger, this is not necessary with a large 
data set. It is recognised that the assumption of normality may not be fully met (Helen, 2010). 
It is important to mention that the factor analysis assumed that the 5-point response scale for 
the HSOPSC items was a continuous response scale (Pett et aI., (2003). 
The ratio of sample size to number of variables is greater than 20: 1, which is sufficient! y 
large according to Everitt (1975). Costello and Osbome (2005) empirically tested the effect 
of sample size on the results of factor analysis and reported that larger samples tend to 
produce more accurate solutions. Moreover, 70% of the samples with the largest ratio (20: 1) 
produced correct solutions. They also report that the number of misclassified items was also 
significantly affected by the size of a sample. MacCallum et al. (1999) suggest that 
increasing the sample size is one means of overcoming these problems. They argue that, as 
the sample size increases, sampling error is reduced, factor analysis solutions become more 
stable and more reliably produce the factorial structure of the population (MacCallum et al. 
1999). It is clear that a large data set is very useful in factor analysis in terms of producing a 
robust factor solution. From these results we can conclude that the sample of the study is 
sufficient for undertaking the factor analysis. 
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In tenns of correlation between the items, looking at the inter-correlation between items is 
also an important requirement when conducting factor analysis. There are two potential 
problems, firstly, correlations that are not high enough (below 0.3) and secondly, correlations 
that are too high (greater than 0.8) (Field, 2009). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend 
an inspection of the correlation matrix for evidence of coefficients greater than 0.3. 
Two statistical measures help to assess the suitability of the data for factor analysis: Bartlett's 
test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy. Bartlett's test of sphericity should be significant (P<.05) for the factor analysis to 
be considered appropriate and the KMO should be greater than 0.6 as the minimum value for 
a good factor analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Therefore KMO and Bartlett's test 
were used to assess factorability of anti image to correlate (items to correlate as factors). 
Table 6-14 shows the results ofKMO and Bartlett's test. 
Table 6- 14 KMO and Bartlett's test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
0.905 
6606.872 
861 
.000 
If KMO >0.6 that means the correlation matrix is valid (acceptable) for factor analysis. Pett 
et al. (2003) report that a KMO above 0.90 is very good. In this data set KMO=0.905, which 
means that the degree of homogeneity of the sample that was obtained was sufficient and the 
sample is adequate for factor analysis. 
The Bartlett's test was applied to detennine the presence of the relationship with variables 
(items) of the HSOPSC questionnaire. The Bartlett's test was highly significant (P<O.OOl) 
for the data set which is considered appropriate and factor analysis is applicable according to 
Coakes and Steed (2003) and Field (2009). 
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It is important to mention that if Bartlett's test is significant (P<0.05) that means the 
correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (Coakes and Steed, 2003; Pett et aI., 2003). 
"Identity matrix is a matrix which Is appear on the diagonal and Os on the off-
diagonal. An example of such an identity matrix would be a correlation matrix in 
which all items on the off-diagonal are completely un correlated. A correlation matrix 
that is an identity matrix is not a welcome sight in factor analysis because its 
presence would imply that there are no interrelationships among the items" ( Pett et 
aI., 2003:63). 
Moreover, according to Field (2009), the Bartlett's test examines whether the correlation 
matrix resembles an identity matrix (i.e. off-diagonal components are zero). Therefore, if 
Bartlett's test is significant that means the correlations between items are significantly 
different from zero. This means good news for conducting factor analysis because there are 
correlations between the items. If Bartlett's test is not significant that means the correlation 
matrix resembles an identity matrix. This means items correlate very badly with all other 
items (i.e. all correlation coefficients are close to zero) (Field, 2009). If the correlation is 
greater than 0.3 this means factor loading is greater than 0.3, which is good for the data. 
In summary both the KMO test statistic and Bartlett's. test of Sphericity indicate that the 
Saudi data is suitable to be subjected to factor analysis. 
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6.3.3 Psychometric Data Analysis Strategy 
The psychometric data analysis strategy used in this stage was based on three main steps: 
Step 1: 
The first step aimed to investigate whether the factor structure of the original USA HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) can be used with the Saudi data, in which both 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CF A 4) and reliability analysis used. This step is described in 
section 6.4. 
Step 2: 
The second step aimed to examine whether an alternative structure of factors and items would 
fit the Saudi data better. In the other words, the objective is to check whether the items of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire formed different factors in the Saudi data, using exploratory factor 
analysis in order to develop the optimal model that can be used for assessing patient safety 
culture in Saudi hospitals. This step is described in section 6.5.1. 
Step 3: 
This step of psychometric analysis was concerned with undertaking the CF A and reliability 
analysis (internal consistency). It was concerned with testing the fit of the model that 
emerged from the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFAs) using CFA and reliability analysis 
(section 6.5.2). In this step, the c~mparison between the CFA output of resulting models and 
the CFA output of USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and OK (Waterson et aI., 2009) studies was 
presented. Factor correlations of the optimal mode were performed (section 6.5.3). Finally, 
the reliability analysis (internal consistency) was performed to assess how well the items 
within each dimension relate to each other of the optimal model of the study (section 6.5.4). 
Each step is presented below: 
4 For full definition of CF A, see glossary 
S For full definition ofEFA, see glossary 
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6.4 Testing the original USA HSOPSC model 
This step aimed to test the fit of the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to 
the Saudi data. This step of analysis is concerned· with undertaking the CF A and Reliability 
Analysis. 
6.4.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
This step aimed to test the fit of the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to 
the Saudi data using CF A which is the best procedure for investigating the factor structures of 
questionnaire (Hoyle, 1995). CF A 6 was performed in order to examine the applicability of 
the factor structure of the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire to the Saudi data. AMOS 
software was used to undertake CF A (Arbuckle, 2005). Various measures of fit (fit indices') 
examine whether the model provides a satisfactory fit to the data. This analysis includes the 
chi-square test statistic (X2), which is the most commonly used fit statistic, and the degree of 
freedom (df) ratio. Comparative Fit Index (CFI) value, Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), Incremental Fit Index (IF!), Root mean square residuals (RMR), 
Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TU) are also 
considered (Hu and Bentler, 1999). There is wide agreement that the overall model fit is 
evaluated using goodness of fit indices such as CFI-RMSEA-RMR-SRMR-TU (March and 
Balla, 1994; Sanislow et al., 2002; Lievens and Anseel, 2004; Kline, 2005). 
Hu and Bentler (1999) examine a range of cut-offs for many of these measures under 
different conditions (different sample size and model structure) and suggest using a 
combination of fit indices such as CFI and SRMR and RMSEA. They also suggest the CFI is 
used, with a value >0.90 indicating a good model. SRMR is used, with a value <0.08 
indicating a good model. RMSEA is used, with a value ~0.06 indicating a good model. Use 
of more fit indices been worthwhile such as X2/df, RMR, and TU. Therefore, X2/df, CFI, 
RMSEA, RMR, SRMR and TU were also used to evaluate the adequacy of the model fit. 
Table 6-15 shows the general agreed fit indices (parameters). 
6 For full definition ofCFA, see glossary 
7 For more detail of fit indices and cut offs for fit indices, see glossary 
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Table 6- 15 Generally agreed fit indices (parameters) 
Fit index(parameter) Cut off level (value) 
Chi square (X2) 
AMOS lists chi-square as CMINIDF 
Degree of freedom (dt) 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Root mean square residuals (RMR) 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 
CMINIDF should be 2 or less reflects good 
fit. In the case of the chi -square statistic, 
smaller rather than larger values indicate a 
good fit. 
Should be small 
CFI should be equal to or greater than 0.90 
to accept the model. 
RMSEA ~.06 as the cut-off for a good 
model fit 
RMR should be < .10, or .08, or .06, 
or .05, or even .04, for a well-fitting model 
A value less than 0.05 is widely considered 
good fit and below 0.08 adequate fit. 
It should be greater than 0.9 for a good fit 
Note: The usual words that are used in assessing model fit are: good model tit (for good 
model), adequate model fit (when the values of fit indices are at borderline), not satisfactory 
(when the values of fit indices are outside the generally agreed parameters). 
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Practical steps in the CFA process: 
The following steps describe the process of CF A: 
1 AMOS Graphics was used to open up a blank diagram window. 
2 Opening the data (the whole data was used, 862 questionnaires). 
3 Building the model (drawing the 12 factors by using model drawing area in step one). 
4 Adding the variable names to the model. 
5 Running the model and using the output window. 
Table 6-16 shows the fit indices ofCFA when applying the original USA model to the Saudi 
data compared with USA data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
Table 6- 16 Fit indices of CFA of USA 12 factors model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
Model Chi- df CMIN/DF CFI RMSEA RMR SRMR TLI 
USA data 
Saudi 
data 
square 
2064 
4995 
746 
805 
0.94 0.040 
6.2 0.64 0.067 0.178 0.193 0.617 
The fit indices from CFA indicated a weak fit to the Saudi data, while the values of fit indices 
in USA indicated a good fit to the USA data. For example the CFI in the Saudi data was less 
than 0.9 while in the USA data it was 0.94 (good model> 0.90). RMSEA in the Saudi data 
was 0.067 while in the USA data it was 0.040 (good model < 0.06). CMINIDF in Saudi data 
was greater than 2 (good model <2). Overall, the values of the fit indices of the Saudi data 
(12 factors) are outside the general agreed parameters in table 6-15. Therefore, this model fit 
was not satisfactory. 
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6.4.2 Reliability Analysis of the original USA IISOPSC model 
The internal consistency of the dimensions of the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) to the Saudi data was calculated with Cronbach's alpha (a). When different 
items are supposed to measure the same dimension (concept), it is recommended that internal 
consistency should be greater than or equal to 0.6 (Field, 2000). Since the HSOPSC 
questionnaire contains both positively worded items (n=24) and negatively worded items 
(n=18), the negatively formulated items were first recoded to make sure that a higher score 
always means a more positive response (Pallant, 2007). The internal consistency was 
calculated for every factor according to the original dimensions and items were then 
compared with the internal consistency found in the American study (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
The results of the reliability analysis for USA and Saudi data are presented in table 6-17. 
Table 6- 17 Results of reliability analysis for USA data and Saudi data 
IIS0PSC dimension Cronbach's alpha (a) 
American data Saudi data 
Overall perceptions of safety 0.74 0.31 
Frequency of error reporting 0.84 0.83 
Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety 0.75 0.75 
Organisational learning-continues improvement 0.76 0.63 
Teamwork within units 0.83 0.75 
Communication openness 0.72 0.67 
Feedback and communication about error 0.78 0.74 
Non punitive response to error 0.79 0.72 
Staffing 0.63 0.57 
Hospital management support for patient safety 0.83 0.65 
Teamwork across hospital units 0.80 0.69 
Hospital handoffs and transitions 0.80 0.59 
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The internal consistency of the Saudi data (n=862) for each dimension was greater than 0.6 
except for three dimensions that were poor or unacceptable with values less than 0.6: overall 
perceptions of safety (a = 0.31), staffing (a = 0.57) and hospital handoffs and transitions (a = 
0.59). The internal consistency of the Saudi data was lower for each dimension than the 
American data except dimension of supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting 
patient safety. 
Thus the results of the confirmatory factor analysis and reliability analysis showed that when 
applying the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to the Saudi data, the fit 
indices from CF A and internal consistency result indicated that this model fit was not 
satisfactory. This prompted an exploratory factor analysis in order to investigate if there is a 
factor structure that better fits the Saudi data. 
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6.5 Identifying an optimal model 
This step aimed to construct an optimal model for assessing patient safety culture in Saudi 
hospitals. Exploratory factor analysis (EF A) is an important and useful tool for refining 
measures and evaluating construct validity. It is used for creating and refining the 
instrument's scales (Conway and Allen, 2003) and to explore the field and to discover the 
main constructs or dimensions (Kline, 1994). The analysis strategy in this step was based on 
validating the HSOPSC questionnaire construct by using EF A to uncover the latent structures 
of the safety culture dimensions (factors) and Cronbach's alpha for internal consistency, using 
the Saudi data set. 
The Saudi data set was split randomly into two halves. Two files for each split half includes 
431 cases, the first one called the exploratory data file (EF A) and the second one called the 
Confirmatory data file (CF A). EF A was used on one half to produce optimal model followed 
by CFA of resulting measurement model on validation half of data to test the fit of the 
reSUlting optimal factor structure. In other words, the first random half of the Saudi data set 
was used for model construction by exploring a number of factors (patient safety climate 
dimensions). The second random half of the Saudi data set was used for model validation by 
confirming a number of factors resulting from model construction. 
The output of the first and final step EF A including tables of communalities, total variance 
explained and rotated Factor matrix and pattern matrix are presented in this section. The rest 
of the output of the other steps (from 2 to 10) of EF A are provided in the appendices as they 
are large tables and many that are difficult to present in this chapter because of space. 
Section 6.5.1 is concerned with a step by step strategy of EFA and reports its outputs. 
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6.5.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
Step by step strategy and output of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is as follows: 
EF A consists of two basic stages. The first stage, extraction, is concerned with how many 
factors should be extracted to represent the HSOPSC (safety climate items). The second 
stage is concerned with interpreting the meaning of the extracted factors and representing 
them in terms of theoretical structures of the patient safety climate dimensions. The strategy 
was based on running an initial EFA, using Principle Axis Factoring and Varimax rotation, as 
well as both Kaiser's criterion and the Scree plot, to assess how many factors should be 
extracted. This strategy produced a number of solutions. All these solutions were then 
examined by extracting the number of factors and changing the rotations to enable 
interpretation of the factors. 
Each possible solution was examined in order to determine the number of extracted factors. 
A number of points were taken into consideration for each of the possible solutions included 
identifying items with no loading, low loading, low communalities, items which cross-load 
and the theoretical structure of items. The theoretical structure refers to the extracted factors 
(related items grouped in one factor) that are expected to be theoretically related. This 
process was continued until a satisfactory solution was reached. 
Generally, each solution was examined and analysed carefully in relation to all these points 
before making a decision to either accept or reject it. Factor analysis is used as a data 
exploration technique and therefore, in order to achieve a satisfactory solution, the 
interpretation and the guidelines used are up to researcher judgement, rather than any hard 
and fast statistical rules (Pallant, 2007). 
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Step 1: EFA on all safety climate items ofllSOPSC (42 items) 
In order to run an initial EF A, Principal Axis Factoring was the chosen extraction method. 
Varimax was the chosen rotation method to provide an initial idea of items loading on each 
factor of the initial solution, thus providing a view about the underlying factors (latent 
structure). Eigenvalues greater than one (Eigenvalues > 1), and Scree plot were used to 
determine the number of factors to be extracted. 
Output of the initial solution (11 factor solution): 
As mentioned earlier, factor analysis depends on correlation between variables. Therefore, 
examining the correlations between the safety climate items (42 items) is considered to be a 
good idea in order to examine the correlations between the items before starting exploratory 
factor analysis. The correlation matrix shows the blocks of larger correlations running 
roughly diagonally down the matrix, indicating that the patient safety climate items are 
indeed closely related and that factor analysis is applicable. In order to examine the clarity of 
this solution the communalities, total variance explained, and rotated factors were 
investigated. Table 6-18 shows the communalities of the initial solution. 
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Table 6- 18 Communalities of the initial solution (n=431) 
Safety climate items Initial Extraction 
Al Staff support one another in this unit .52 .57 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .25 .26 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get .50 .59 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .50 .69 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient .25 .28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .41 .47 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .25 .31 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .46 .66 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .35 .39 
AlO It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .13 .09 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .38 .40 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the .44 .53 
A13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .47 .53 
A14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .36 .37 
A15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done 
.20 .19 
AI6 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file 
.31 .35 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in this unit 
.18 .20 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening 
.42 .42 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according 
.60 .77 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving .63 .71 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, .38 .46 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over .42 .60 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
.42 .44 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient .46 .52 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .44 .48 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority .41 .56 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .56 .57 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .28 .34 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, .54 .58 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this .66 .88 
reported? 
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Table 6-18 (continued) 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is .54 .55 
F 1 Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient .41 .41 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .45 .46 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one unit .15 .14 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .47 .56 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .39 .46 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .37 .39 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .42 .48 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .45 .47 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event .36 .36 
F 1 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .53 .61 
Ftt Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .34 .37 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
The extraction column of the communalities table (6-18) above shows the proportion of 
variance of each variable explained by the initial solution. Five items, specifically A2, AlO, 
A 15, A 17, and F3 are very poorly explained (very poor communalities, less than 0.3). AS 
(2.84) was close to 0.3. This item (AS) was retained initially, but it was a candidate for 
removal later. Table 6-19 shows the total variance explained by the initial solution. 
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Table 6- 19 Total variance explained by the initial solution (n=431) 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation Sums of Squared 
Total %of Cumulative Total %of Cumulative Total %of Cumulative 
Variance % Varianc % Varianc % 
1 9.78 23.9 23.9 9.3 22.7 22.7 2.20 5.4 5.4 
2 2.32 5.7 29.5 1.8 4.5 27.1 2.18 5.1 10.4 
3 2.19 5.3 34.9 1.7 4.2 31.4 2.10 5.0 15.5 
4 1.73 4.2 39.1 1.2 3.0 34.4 1.20 4.9 20.3 
5 1.62 3.9 43.1 1.2 2.9 37.3 1.20 4.7 25.0 
6 1.50 3.7 46.8 1.0 2.5 39.8 1.92 4.5 29.6 
7 1.26 3.1 49.8 .8 1.8 41.6 1.85 4.4 33.9 
8 1.18 2.8 52.7 .6 1.5 43.2 1.55 3.7 37.7 
9 1.08 2.6 55.4 .6 1.5 44.7 1.42 3.4 41.1 
10 1.07 2.6 58.0 .4 1.1 45.8 1.40 3.3 44.5 
11 1.00 2.5 60.5 .4 1.0 46.8 0.95 2.3 46.8 
12 .96 2.3 62.9 
13 .90 2.1 65.1 
14 .84 2.0 67.1 
15 .77 1.8 69.0 
16 .76 1.8 70.9 
17 .73 1.7 72.6 
18 .72 1.7 74.4 
19 .68 1.6 76.1 
20 .65 1.5 77.7 
21 .63 1.5 79.2 
22 . 61 1.5 . 80.7 
23 .60 1.4 82.2 
24 .58 1.4 83.6 
25 .56 1.3 85.0 
26 .53 1.2 86.3 
27 .51 1.2 87.6 
28 .47 1.1 88.7 
29 .46 1.1 89.8 
30 .43 1.0 90.9 
31 .43 1.0 92.0 
32 .41 1.0 93.0 
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Table 6-19 (continued) 
33 
.39 .9 93.9 
34 
.37 .9 94.9 
35 
.36 .9 95.8 
36 
.34 .8 96.6 
37 
.34 .8 97.4 
38 
.30 .7 98.2 
39 
.27 .6 98.9 
40 
.25 .6 99.5 
41 
.19 .4 100 
ExtractIOn Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
The three columns above show the Eigenvalues and respective cumulative percentages of 
variance accounted of all possible extracted factors. The next three columns indicate how 
many factors have been extracted determined by Kaiser's Eigenvalues > 1 criterion. The 
final three columns represent the percentages of variance explained by each factor after 
rotation. The total variance explained by this initial solution shows that 11 factors account 
for 46.8% of total variance. This number of factors was determined by Kaiser's 
Eigenvalues > 1 criterion. Table 6-20 shows the rotated factor matrix of the initial solution. 
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Table 6- 20 Rotated Factor Matrix of the initial solution (n=431) 
Safety climate items Factor 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
F7 Problems onen occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units .65 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is onen lost during shin changes .57 
F6 It is oncn unpleasant to work with starr from other hospital units .55 
FII Shin changes cau e problems for patients in this ho pital .50 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens .31 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transfening patients from one unit to another .30 
A 17 We have patient sa fety problems in this unit 
D2 When n mi take is made. but ha no potential to hann the patient . how often is this reponed? .91 
D3 When a mi lake is madc thnt could hann the patient . but does not. how oftcn is this 
.70 
rpnnt1 p,I') 
DI When a mistake is made. but i caught and corrected beforc arrecting the patient. how oftcn 
.69 
i thi reponed? 
A4 In this unit . people treat eHch other with re pect .75 
A I Starr SUppOl1 one an ther in this unit .68 
A3 When a lot of work need to be d ne quickly. we work together a a team to get the work .60 
A6 We nrc acti vely doing th ings to improve p, ti ent care .55 
A9 Mistake have led to positi ve changes here .52 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are g od Il t preventing errors from happening .38 .32 
FI Hospiull management provide a work climate that promote patient safety -.30 .36 .30 
A 15 Patient afcty never takes second place to get more work d ne 
IC3 We arc infonned about errors that happen in this unit .54 
C I Wc arc given feedback about change put into place based on event repons .52 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety. we eVllluate thei r effecti veness .44 .46 
C5 In thi unit. we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .46 .30 
A8 StafT feel like their mistakes are held against them .77 
A 12 When an event i reported. it feel like the person is being written uP. not the problem .64 
A 16 Starr worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .51 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .63 
F4 TI,cre is good coopemtion among hospital units that need to work together .58 
F8 The action of ho pital management show that patient safety is a top priority .36 .45 
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Table 6-20 (continued) 
F2 liospital units do not coordinate well wi th each other 
91 My upervi. or/manager ay a good word when he/she ees a job done according 10 
e tabli hed patient afety procedures 
9 2 My upervisor/manager eriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient afety 
AS taff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which i not good fo r patient care 
A 7 Wc use more temporary taffthan we hould, which i not good fo r patient care 
A 14 Wc work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly 
93 Whenever pre . urc build up, my upervi or/manager wants us to work Cl ter, even If il 
mean taking hon uts 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the worklo d 
A II When one area 111 this ul1ll gets rea lly bu y, othe help out 
C4 tnlT feel free to question the deci ion or action oftho e with more authority 
C2 StalTwill freely speak up if they see omething th, t may negatively affe t patient care 
C6 StalT are afraid to ask qu ti ns when omething does not eem nght 
9 4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problem llu1t happen over and over 
A I 0 It I ju t by chance that more seri us mistakes d n t happ n around here 
Extraction Method: Princi al Axi Factorin . p g 
Rotation Method : Varimax with Kai er Normalizati n 
a. Rotation converged in 17 iteration. 
I .4 1 -.42 
.77 
.66 
.48 
.44 
.38 .38 
-.30 .38 
-.36 
.32 -.36 
.34 
-.32 
The rotated factor matrix shows the loading f the initi al luti n (11 fact rs) with multiple 
items loading on each factor. Item lO A 15 A 17 did n t I ad up n any fact r. Item er 
loadings were: A ll , A13 A14, Al B3,84, 2, 5, F I F2, and 11 er I aded n 
factors three and nine. A 13 cros loaded n fact r fi ur and five. A 14 cr I aded n 
factors six and nine. A18 cross loaded on factor fi ur and even. 3 cr S I aded n fact r 
five and nine and eleven. B4 cross loaded on factor eight and I I . 2 cr s I aded n 
factors five and ten . C5 cross loaded on factors five and ten. FI cros loaded n fact rs one 
and four and seven. F2 cross loaded on factors one and even. cros I aded on factors 
four and seven. Table 6-21 show the summary of the 11 factor s lution and the fact r 
loadings. 
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.32 
.63 
50 
-.45 
56 
Tahle 6- 21 Structure of the initial solution (11 factors) and its loading 
Factor Items loading «.4) Strongly loading( >.4) 
number 
1 FI-F2-F3-F5-F6-F7-F9-Fll FI-F3-F9 FS-F2-F6-F7-Fll 
2 01-D2-03 01-02-03 
3 Al-A3-A4-All All Al-A3-A4 
4 A6-A9-A13-AlS-Fl-FS AlS-FI-FS A6-A9-A13 
S A 13-D3-CI-C2-C3-C5 A13-D3-C2 Cl-C3-CS-
6 AS-A12-A14-A16 A14 AS- A12 -A16 
7 AlS-Fl-F2-F4-FS-FI0 AlS-Fl F2-F4-F8-FlO 
S D1-D2-D4 B4 D1-D2 
9 A2-AS-A7-All-A14-D3 A2-All-A14-D3 AS-A7 
10 C2-C4-C5-C6 C5 C2-C4-C6 
11 D3-D4 D3 B4 
The II factor solution contained several items with loading less than 0.4. These items were 
FI-F3-F9-AII-AI8-AI4-A2-B3. Some items cross loaded (had loading < 0.4 on one factor 
but loadings > 0.4 on another factor such as AI3-C2-C5-F8-B4). Factor number II has only 
one item loading heavily (which might mean too many factors were extracted). In summary 
this solution provides ten clear factors with quite strong multiple items loading (> 0.4) on 
each factor (Pall ant, 2007). It is usual to regard factor loadings as high if they are greater 
than 0.6 (the positive or negative sign is irrelevant) and moderately high if they are above 0.3. 
Other loading can be ignored (Kline, 1994). 
In summary, the initial solution was unclear because of cross loadings of many items. In 
addition, several items had loading less than 0.4, factor number 11 has only one item loading 
heavily, two factors (factor one and seven) were not theoretically related and the 11 factors 
solution accounts for 46.8% of total variance. Because of these findings and the lack of 
clarity of this initial solution, EF A on 42 items with 11 factors and oblique rotation was 
undertaken to aid interpretation of the items in each factor of the solution. The following 
pattern matrix shows the structure and loadings of the 11 factor solution. 
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Table 6- 22 Pattern matrix of the initial solution (11 factors) (n=431) 
Safety climate items 
C3 We are infonned ab ut errors that happen in thi unit 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event repons 
A 13 Afler we make changes to impl'Ove patient afety, we evaluate thei r effecti veness 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them 
A 12 When an event i repolted, it feels like the person i being written up, 11 tthe problcm 
AI6 Staff worry that mi takes they make are kept in their personnel fil e 
A 14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, t quickly 
0 2 When a misl.1ke i made, but has n potential to hann the patient , how ofl cll L this reported? 
0 3 When a ml take i madc that could hann tl~c patient , but does n t, how oflcn i this 
01 When a mi take is made, but i eaught and orrected before affecting the patient, how ofl en 
i~ lhi. reported? 
F7 Problem oflcn occur in the exchangc of infonnation acro ho pital uni 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is oflen lost during hifl changes 
F6 It is oflen unpleasant to work with taff from other ho pital unit 
FII Shifl changes eau e prob lems Cl r patient in th i h pllal 
F3 ome thing do not happen or getmi ed when tran ferring patient fi m onc un it to another 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in thi un it 
A4 In thi unit , people treat each other with respect 
A I Stn ff suPPOtt one another in thi unit 
A3 When a lot of work need to be done quickly, wc work together a a team to get the wo rk 
C4 Staff feel free to que tion the dcci ions or action oftho e with more authori ty 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they ee something that may negatively affect patient care 
C6 Staff are afrnid to ask questions when something do not eem right 
CS In this unit, we discu ways to prevent errors from happening again 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he! he sees a job done according to 
lestablished patient sa fety procedures 
B2 My upervi or/manager eriously considers taff suggestions for improving patient safety 
AS Staff in thi unit work longer hours than they sh uld, which i not good for patient care 
A 7 We use more temporary stalTthan we hould, which i not good for patient care 
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.45 
.42 
.41 
.30 
2 
.79 
.65 
.49 
.34 
3 
-.97 
-.74 
-.73 
4 
.64 
.57 
.52 
.46 
5 
.77 
.67 
.57 
Factor 
6 
.69 
.55 
-.41 
.32 
7 
-.87 
-.73 
8 9 10 11 
-.3 1 
-.48 
-.46 
Table 6-22 ( continued) 
B3 Whenever pressure builds uP. my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster. even if it 
mean taking shortcuts 
A2 We have enough stafT to handle the workload 
A II When onc area inlhis unit gets rea lly busy, others help out 
B4 My supervi or/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over 
A 10 It is just by chance that more seriou mi takes do not happen around here 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patient 
F4 nlere is good cooperation am ng ho pital units that need to work together 
F8 The actions of hospital management how that patient safety is a top priority 
F2 Hospital unit do not coordinate well with each other 
A 18 Our procedures and sy tcm arc good at preventing errors from happening 
FI Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
F9 Hospital managcmnct scem intere ted in patient afcty only aner an adverse event happen 
A I S Patient safety nevcr takes second place to get morc work done 
ExtracllOn Method: Pnnclpal AxiS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kai er Normalization 
Rotation converged in 20 iteration 
-.33 
.32 
.30 
.33 .56 
The pattern matrix above indicated that items AlO-AlS-A1 7-F3-FI -F9 did not load upon any 
factor. Items AI I-A I4-A18-A2-B3-CS had low loadings. The next step excluded AlO-AlS-
A17-F3-F I-F9 because they did not load upon any factor. 
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I: li 
-.69 11 I' 
-.63 
-.49 
.43 
-.31 
-.48 
-.46 
Step 2: EFA was then run excluding items A10-A15-A17-F3-F1-F9, with 11 factors and 
oblique rotation to aid interpretation of the items in each factor of the solution (Waterson et 
aI., 2009). 
The extraction column of the communalities table (see appendix 24) shows that item A2 was 
very poorly explained (0.243), while item AS was now above 0.3. The table of the Total 
Variance Explained of the initial solution shows that the 11 factors account for SO.8% of total 
variance (see appendix 25). The pattern matrix of the initial solution in this step indicated 
that items A2-Al1 did not load upon any factor. Items number A14-AI8-CS had low 
10adings (see appendix 26). The next step excluded A2-AII-AI4-A1S-C5. 
Step 3: After excluding items AlO-AI5-AI7-F3-FI-F9-A2-AI1-AI4-AI8-C5 EFA was then 
run again with 11 factors and an oblique rotation was carried out to aid interpretation of the 
items in each factor of the solution. 
The communalities table shows that all the 31 safety climate items had high communalities 
(see appendix 27). Item A7 was close to 0.3 (0.285). The total variance explained by this 
step shows that the 11 factors account for S2.9 % of total variance (see appendix 28). The 
pattern matrix of the initial solution shows that this solution included 31 safety climate items 
in 11 factors while 11 items were excluded (A2-A10-A11-A14-A15-A17-A18-C5-F1-F3-F9). 
Item loadings were between 0.37 and 0.97. There were only small shifts among items across 
factors. For instance, A13 moved to 'Feedback and communication about error', F6 moved 
to 'Handoffs and transitions', and F8 moved to 'Teamwork across units'. All dimensions 
consisted of two to four safety climate items (see appendix 29). Table 6-23 shows the final 
structure of the initial solution. 
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Table 6- 23 Final structure of the initial solution (11 factors) 
Factor Factor Items loading(0.37- Number 
number 0.97) of items 
1 Feedback and communication about error CI-C3-A13 3 
2 Frequency of event reported 01-02-03 3 
3 No punitive response to error A8-AI2-AI6 3 
4 Ilandoffs and transitions FS-F6-F7-Fll 4 
S Teamwork within units AI-A3-A4 3 
6 Communication openness C2-C4-C6 3 
7 
Supervisor expectation and action promoting 
B1-B2 2 patient safety 
8 Staffing AS-A7 2 
9 Teamwork across units F2-F4-F10-F8 4 
10 Organisational learning- continuous improvement A6-A9- 2 
11 Supervisor expectation and action promoting B3-B4 2 patient safety negatively attitude 
The composition of the factors of the initial solution was very similar to that of the USA 
IIS0PSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) because the main part of the factor structure 
was unchanged. Although the initial solution was clear and appropriate, use of a combination 
of Kaiser's criterion and Cattell's screen plot (Scree plot) method was also required to assess 
the number of factors to be extracted (Conway et al., 2003). Thus, the Scree plot was 
examined in order to identify the optimal number of factors that should be extracted, to 
explore potential improvements by examining a series of possible solutions and to identify 
common factor structure across different solutions of the exploring approach. Figure 6-3 
shows the Scree plot of the initial solution. 
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Figure 6- 1 Scree plot of the initial solution 
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Factor Number 
Cattell (1966) recommended retaining all factors ab ve the elbow r break in the plot, as 
these factors contribute the most to the explanation of the variance in the data set. The breaks 
in the Scree plot suggest three break points. Only factors to the left of the point of the break 
should be retained (Field 2009). The first break point corresponds to factor nwnber 12. 
Counting back one factor means that the actual break point was 12, so the 11 factor solution 
should be tested. The second break point corresponds to factor number 11 . ounting back 
one factor means that the actual break point was 11 then a 10 factor solution should be tested. 
The third break point corresponds to factor number 9. Counting back one factor means that 
the actual break point was 9, and then a 8 factor solution should be also tested. 
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In fact, the Scree plot in figure 6-3 was not very clear because there was more than one 
obvious break and it seems just a gradual curve. Therefore it was very important to examine 
all possible realistic solutions such as, 12 factors because it is the original structure of the 
questionnaire, and also 9 factors for reasons of completeness and also because it was 
suggested by another validation study (Waterson et aI., 2009). All of the possible solutions 
should be investigated because EF A is an exploratory approach and experimentation with 
different number of factors should be continued until a satisfactory solution is found (Pallant, 
2007). 
The decision was made that all these possibilities; 12-11-10-9-8 factor solutions should be 
investigated in order to find how many factors should be extracted as the most appropriate 
solution and also to explore loading of each item and variance explained in each solution. 
The best solution is: 
1 One where it makes theoretical sense (items in one factor theoretically related), it 
explains the most total variance, each item is explained well by this number of factors, 
the rotated solution has no low loading items. 
2 All items loading upon factors. 
3 No cross- loading items or cross loading items are heavily in one factor and low on 
another. 
4 No free- standing items (one item in one factor). 
5 The most items loading should be quite strongly (close or above 0.4) in the final 
model. 
6 Three items and above load up on each factor is the best but two items are acceptable 
especially if they are very high loadings items (above 0.5) and theoretically related. 
All these possible (11-12-10-9-8) factor solutions were investigated. Each solution is 
presented below: Step 4 investigated the 11 factor solution, step 5 investigated the 12 factor 
solution, step 6 investigated the 10 factor solution, step 7 investigated the 9 factor solution 
and step 8 investigated the 8 factor solution. 
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Step 4: The 11 factor solution 
EFA was run on all safety climate items ofHSOPSC (42 items), Principal Axis Factoring was 
the chosen extraction method. Varimax was the chosen rotation method and 11 factors were 
used instead of eigenvalues > 1. 
Output of the 11 factor solution: 
The output of the 11 factors including the communalities, the total variance explained table 
and rotated factor matrix were the same output of the initial solution above in step 1 (pages: 
181-186). To avoid repetition it is not presented twice. 
Step 5: The 12 factor solution 
EF A was run on all safety climate items (42 items) with using varimax rotation and number 
of factors (12). 
Output of the 12 factor solution: 
The output of the 12 factor solution includes the communalitics, the total variance explained 
table and rotated factor matrix. The extraction column of the communalities table of the 12 
factor solution shows the proportion of variance of each variable explained by 12 factors 
solution. Six items, specifically A2, AS, AIO, AlS, A17, and F3 are very poorly explained 
(very poor communalities, < 0.3) (sce appendix 30). The total variance explained table 
shows that 12 factor solution accounts for 48% of total variance (sce appendix 31). 
The rotated factor matrix of the 12 factor solution shows the loadings of 12 factors with 
multiple items on each factor. Items AI7 and F3 did not load upon any factor. Items cross 
loadings were A2, All, A13, AI4, AI8, 84, C2, FI, F2, F8, and F9. A2 cross load on factor 
four and factor nine. A 11 cross load on factors four, nine and 11. A 13 cross loaded on 
factors three and seven. A 14 cross loaded on factors six and nine. A 18 cross loaded on 
factors five and seven. 84 cross loaded on factors eight, 11 and 12. C2 cross loaded on 
factors three and ten. Fl cross loaded on factors five and seven. F2 cross loaded on factors 
one and five. F8 cross loaded on factors five and seven. F9 cross loaded on factors one and 
seven (see appendix 32). Table 6-24 shows the structure of the 12 factor solution and item 
loadings. 
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Table 6- 24 Structure of the 12 factors solution and item loadings 
Factor Items loading «0.4) Heavily loading( >0.4) 
number 
1 F2-F5-F6-F7-F9-Fll F2-F9 F5-F6-F7-Fl1 
2 01-02-03 01-02-03 
3 Cl-c2-C3-C5-A13 C2 C1-C3-CS-A13 
4 A1-A2-A3-A4-A11 A2-Al1 A1-A3-A4 
5 F1- F2-F4-F8 -FIO-AI8 FI-AI8 F2-F4-F8-F1O 
6 A8- Al2 -A14-A16 A14 A8- Al2 -A16 
7 A6-A9-A 13-A lS-A 18-F I-F8-F9 A15-AI8-FI-F8-F9 A6-A9-A13 
8 B1-B2-B4 B4 BI-B2 
9 AS-A7-AI4-B3-AII-A2- A2-A11-A14 AS-A7-B3 
10 C2-C4-C6 C2-C4-C6 
11 AlO-A11-B4 A1O-All-B4 
12 B4 B4 
The 12 factor solution contained several items with loading less than 0.4. These items were 
FI-F9-A2-AlO-AII-A14-AlS-A18-B4. Factors number 11 and 12 had no items 
loading >0.4, which means there are too many factors in this solution. In summary, this 
solution provided ten clear factors with multiple items loading heavily on each factor. 
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Step 6: The 10 factor solution 
EFA was run on all safety climate items (42 items) using varimax rotation and number of 
factors (10). 
Output ofthe 10 factor solution: 
The output of the 10 factors including the communalities; the total variance explained table 
and rotated factor matrix are provided in appendix. The extraction column of the 
communalities table of the 10 factor solution shows the proportion of variance of each 
variable explained by the 10 factors solution. Seven items, specifically A2, AS, A 7, A 10, 
A15, A17, and F3 are very poorly explained (very poor communalities, <0.3) (see appendix 
33). 
The total variance explained table shows the 10 factors solution accounts for 45.5% of total 
variance (see appendix 34). The rotated factor matrix shows the loadings of the 10 factors 
with multiple items on each factor. Items Al 0, A 15, A 17 and F3 did not load upon any 
factor. Items cross loadings were A3, All, AI3, AI4, D3, C2, C3, CS, F2 and FlO. 
A3 cross loaded on factor one and factor four. A II cross loaded on factors four and seven. 
AI3 cross loaded on factors one and eight. AI4 cross loaded on factors five and seven. D3 
cross loaded on factors seven and ten. C2 cross loaded on factors eight and nine. C3 cross 
loaded on factors one and eight. CS cross loaded on factors one and eight. F2 cross loaded 
on factors one and factor two. F I 0 cross loaded on factors one and factor two (see appendix 
35). Table 6-25 shows the structure of the 10 factor solution and item loadings. 
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Table 6- 25 Structure of the 10 factor solution and its loading 
Factor Items loading «0.4) Heavily loading( >0.4) 
number 
1 A6-AI3-AI8-F8-FIO-FI-F4-A9- A3-C3-F2-F9 A6-AI3-AI8-F8-FlO-FI-
C5-A3-C3-F2-F9 F4-A9-C5 
2 F2-F5-F6-F7-FII-FIO FlO F2-F5-F6-F7-FII 
3 DI-D2-D3 DI-D2-D3 
4 AI-A3-A4-AII All AI-A3-A4 
5 A8- Al2 -AI4-AI6 Al4 A8- Al2 -A16 
6 BI-B2- BI-B2 
7 A5-A7-AI4-B3-AII-A2- A2-AII-AI4-B3 A5-A7 
8 C3-CI-C5-A13-C2 C2 C3-CI-C5-A13 
9 C2-C4-C6 C2-C4-C6 
10 B3-B4 B3 B4 
The 10 factor solution contained several items with loading less than 0.4. These items were 
F9-All-A14-A2-B3. Some items had loading <0.4 but loadings >0.4 on different factors 
such as A3-C3-F2-FlO-C2. Factor number lO had one item loading >0.4. In summary this 
solution provided nine clear factors with multiple items loading heavily on each factor. 
Factor number one included nine items that had loadings >0.4. This factor might be divided 
into two factors meaning this solution included 10 factors. 
EFA was re run on all safety climate items (42 items) with using oblique ~otation and number 
of factors (10). In this step the rotation was changed into oblique to make sure that factor 
number 10 was loading by one item. The result was given by oblique rotation indicated that 
the factor number 10 was loading heavily by one item. Therefore, this solution provides nine 
factors with multiple items loading heavily on each factor. 
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Step 7: The 9 factors solution 
EFA was run on all safety climate items (42 items) using varimax rotation and number of 
factors (9). 
Output of the 9 factor solution: 
The output of the 9 factors includes the communalities, the total variance explained table and 
rotated factor matrix. The extraction column of the communalities of the 9 factors solution 
table shows the proportion of variance of each variable explained by 9 factors solution. 
Seven items, specifically A2, AS, A7, AIO, AIS, A17, C6, and F3 are very poorly explained 
(very poor communalities, < 0.3) (see appendix 36). 
The Total variance explained table shows the 9 factor solution accounts for 44.2% of total 
variance (see appendix 37). The rotated factor matrix table of the 9 factor solution shows the 
loadings of 0 9 factors with multiple items on each factor. Items A 10, A IS, A 17 and F3 did 
not load upon any factor. Items cross loadings were A3, All, A 14, D 1, D2, D3, C2, CS, Fl, 
F4, F9 and FI0. A3 cross loaded on factors one and four. A 11 cross loaded on factors onc 
and six. AI4 cross loaded on factors five and six. Dl cross loaded on factors one and eight. 
B2 cross loaded on factors one and eight. D3 cross loaded on factors six and ninc. C2 cross 
loaded on factors one and seven. CS cross loaded on factors one and seven. Fl cross loaded 
on factors one and two. F4 cross loaded on factors two and nine. F9 cross loaded on factors 
one and two. FI0 cross loaded on factors one and two (scc appendix 38). Table 6-26 shows 
the structure of the 9 factor solution and item loadings. 
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Table 6- 26 Structure of the 9 factors solution and its loading 
Factor Items loading «0.4) Heavily loading(>0.4) 
number 
1 A3-A6-A9-AII-A13-A18-B1- A3-AI1-BI-B2-B4-C2- A6-A9-A 13-A 18-C 1-
B2-B4-CI-C2-C3-C5-FI-F8-F9- FI-F9 C3-C5-FS-FI0 
FlO 
2 F1-F2-F4-F5-F6-F7-F9-FlO-Fll FI-F4-F9 F2-F5-F6-F7-FlO-F11 
3 01-02-03 01-02-03 
4 AI-A3-A4 AI-A3-A4 
S A8-AI2-A14-AI6 A14 A8-AI2-A16 
6 A2-A5-A6-A7-AII-A14-B3 A2-All- A5-A7-AI4-B3 
7 C2-C4-C5-C6 C5 C2-C4-C6 
8 BI-B2 B1-B2 
9 B3-F4 B3 F4 
The 9 factor solution contained several items with loading less than 0.4. These items were 
A2-A5-AII-B3-C5-FI-F9. Some items had loading <0.4 but loadings >0.4 on different 
factors such as A3-A14-F4-C2. Factor number 9 have one item loading >0.4. In summary 
this solution provided nine factors with multiple items loading heavily on each factor. 
Factors number one consists of nine items loading >0.4. This factor might be divided into 
two factors. Factors number two consists of six items loading >0.4. This factor might be 
divided into two factors. 
EFA was re run on all safety climate items (42 items) using oblique rotation and number of 
factors (9) to check whether the number of extracted factors had changed or not. In this step 
the rotation was changed into oblique to make sure that factor number 9 was loading by one 
item. The result given by oblique rotation indicated that factor number 9 was still loading 
heavily by one item. However, this solution provided eight factors with multiple items 
loading heavily on each factor. 
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Step 8: The 8 factor solution 
EFA was run on all safety climate items (42 items) using varimax rotation and number of 
factors (8). 
Output of the 8 factor solution: 
The output of the 8 factors solution includes the communalities, the total variance explained 
table and rotated factor matrix. The extraction column of the communalities table of the 8 
factors solution shows the proportion of variance of each variable explained by 8 factors 
solution. Seven items, specifically A2, A5, A7, AIO, A15, A17, C6, and F3 are very poorly 
explained (very poor communalities, < 0.3) (see appendix 39). The Total variance explained 
table of the 8 factors solution shows 8 factors solution accounts for 42.4% of total variance 
(see appendix 40). 
The rotated factor matrix of the 8 factor solution shows the loadings of 8 factors with 
multiple items on each factor. Items Al 0, A 15, A 17 and F3 did not load upon any factor. 
Items cross loadings were: A3, All, A14, Dl, D2, D3, D4, C2, C5, FI, F2, F4, F9 and FIO. 
A3 cross loaded on factors one and four. A 11 cross loadcd on factors one and four and seven. 
Al4 cross loaded on factors five and seven. Dl cross loaded on factors one and eight. D2 
cross loaded on factors one and eight. D3 cross loaded on factors seven and eight. D4 cross 
loaded on factors one and eight. C2 cross loaded on factors one and six. C5 cross loaded on 
factors one and six. Ft cross loaded on factors one and two. F2 cross loaded on factors one 
and two. F4 cross loaded on factors one and two and four. F9 cross loaded on factors one 
and two. FI0 cross loaded on factors one and two (see appendix 41). Table 6-27 shows the 
structure of the 8 factor solution and its item loadings. 
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Table 6- 27 Structure of the 8 factor solution and its item loadin~s 
Factor Items loading «.4) Heavily loading( >.4) 
number 
1 A3-A6-A9-AII-A13-AlS-Bl- A3-AII-B2-B4-C2-Fl- A6-A9-A 13-AlS-B 1-
B2-B4-CI-C2-C3-C5-FI-F2-F4- F2-F4-F9 CI-C3-C5-FS-FlO 
FS-F9-FI0 
2 FI-F2-F4-F5-F6-F7-F9-FI0-Fll FI-F4-F9 F2-F5-F6-F7-FI0-Fll 
3 01-02-03 01-02-03 
4 AI-A3-A4-All-F4 All-AI4 AI-A3-A4 
5 AS-AI2-AI4-AI6 A14 AS-AI2-AI6 
6 C2-C4-C5-C6 C5-C6 C2-C4 
7 A2-A5-A7-AII-A14-B3 A2-Al1 A5-A7-AI4-B3 
8 81-82-83-84- 81-B2-B3-B4 
It is clear that the 8 factor solution contained several items with loading less than 004. These 
items were A2-All-C5-C6-FI-F9. Some items had loading <A but loadings >0.4 on 
different factors such as A3-A14-B2-B4-C2. In summary this solution provided eight clear 
factors with multiple items loading heavily on each factor. Factor number one consisted of 
ten items loading> 004. This factor might be divided into two factors. Factor number two 
consists of six items loading> 004. This factor might be divided into two factors. 
EFA was re run on all safety climate items (42 items) with using oblique rotation and number 
of factors (8) to check whether the number of extracted factors had changed or not. The 
result was given by oblique rotation indicated that the same number of extracted factors (8 
factors). Therefore, this solution provided eight clear factors with multiple items loading 
heavily on each factor. 
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Conclusion from the different factor solutions (11-12-10-9-8) 
The investigation of the five solutions in steps number 4-5-6-7-8 aimed to identify the 
number of factors that could be extracted. The 11 factors solution shows that the 11 factors 
seems the most logical fit to this set of items. The 12 factors solution shows that the 10 
factors seems the most logical fit to this set of items. The 10 factors solution shows that the 
nine factors seems the most logical fit to this set of items. The 9 and 8 factor solutions show 
that the 8 factors seems the most logical fit to this set of items. Items number Al O-A 15-A 17-
F3 had no loading upon any factor. Table 6-28 shows the summary of the five solutions. 
Table 6- 28 Summar~ of the five solutions 
Steps of Solution Number of Total variance explained % Items not loading 
E.F.A factors 
Step 4 11 11 46.8 AIO-AIS-A17 
Step 5 12 10 48 A17-F3 
Step 6 10 9 45.S AIO-A15-A17-F3 
Step 7 9 8 44.2 AIO-AlS-AI7-F3 
Step 8 8 8 42.4 AIO-AlS-A17-F3 
Table 6-29 shows the low communalities and loading items in each solution. 
Table 6- 29 Low communaIities and loading items in each solution 
Steps of Solution Items with low communalities Items with low loading « 0.4) 
E.F.A « 0.3) 
Step 4 11 A2-AS-AI0-AI5-A17-F3 F I-F3-F9-A ll-A 18-A 14-A2-133 
Step S 12 A2-AS-AIO-AlS-AI7-F3 FI-F9-AII-AIO-A14-AlS-A18-A2-
B4 
Step 6 10 A2-AS-A7-A10-AlS-A17-F3 F9-AII-A14-A2-B3 
Step 7 9 A2-AS-A10-AlS-A17-F3-C6 A2-AS-AII-B3-CS-FI-F9 
Step 8 8 A2-A5-A7-AIO-AlS-A17-C6-F3 A2-AII-CS-C6-FI-F9 
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The items that did not load upon any factor were AlO-AI5-AI7-F3 across most of the 
proposed solutions and items A2-A5-AI0-AI5-AI7-F3 had low communalities across most 
the proposed solutions. Items A2-Al1-FI-F9 had low loading « 0.4). It is important to 
notice that AIO-AI5-AI7 were all from one dimension (overall perceptions of patient safety) 
while A2-AS were from another dimension (staffing), FI-F9 were from another dimension 
(management support for patient safety) and F3 was from different dimension (handoffs and 
transitions). 
It is important to mention that extra investigation (EF A and CF A) was performed in order to 
explore potential improvements and because exploratory factor analysis is based on 
exploration approach. Therefore, this investigation was performed by exploring the 
comparison between the 11-12-10-9-8 factors solutions that produced the common factor 
structure across these solutions. Although the eight factors seems the most appropriate 
number in terms of how many factors that should be extracted, it seems that the common 
factor structure which consists of 10 factors should be examined. However, the result of this 
extra investigation also confirmed that the eight factor solution is the optimal model of the 
current study (see appendix 47). 
In conclusion the results of the comparison above between the five solutions suggested 10 or 
9 or 8 factor solution. However, the 8 factors seems the most appropriate number in terms of 
how many factors that should be extracted because it was indicated in the Scree plot and it 
was recommended by the 9 factors solution and the 8 factors solution. Each solution has a 
number of cross loadings items; hence orthogonal rotation was used to produces more easily 
interpretable results (Costello and Osbome, 2005). However, rotation cannot improve the 
basic aspects of the analysis, such as the amount of variance extracted from the items 
(Costello and Osbome, 2005). Therefore, the 8 factors were investigated by using oblique 
rotation to obtain the optimal solution. 
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Step 9: 
EFA was run on all safety climate items (42 items) with using an oblique rotation and number 
of factors (8). 
Output: 
As mentioned earlier the output of the 8 factors including the communalities, the total 
variance explained were the same output in step 8. The pattern matrix of the 8 factors 
solution shows the loadings of 8 factors with multiple items on each factor. Items A 10, A 15, 
AI7, F3 and F4 did not load upon any factor (see appendix 42). The 8 factor solution 
contained several items with loading less than 0.4. These items were A2-AII-AI4-AI8-B3-
B4-CI-C3-C6-FI-F9-FIO. Therefore, these 17 items were excluded on the next step. 
Step 10: 
EFA was run excluding Al 0-AI5-AI7-F3-F4-A2-AII-AI4-AI8-B3-B4-CI-C3-C6-FI-F9-
FIO by using oblique rotation and number of factors (8). 
Output: 
The output of the 8 factors included the communalities, the total variance explained table and 
pattern matrix. The extraction column of the communalitics table of the 8 factors solution 
shows the proportion of variance of each variable explained by 8 factors solution. Item A 7 
was very poorly explained (very poor communalities, < 003) (see appendix 43). The total 
variance explained table of the 8 factors solution shows 8 factor solution accounts for 51.2% 
of total variance (see appendix 44). 
The pattern matrix shows the loadings of the 8 factors with multiple items on each factor. 
Item number C5 cross loaded on factors one and six. Item number F2 had loading less than 
0.4 (see appendix 45). Therefore, these two items (C5-F2) were excluded on the next step. 
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Step 11: The finalS factor EFA solution 
EFA was run excluding 19 items (AlO-A15-A17-F3-F4-A2-A11-A14-A18-B3-B4-C1-C3-
C5-C6-F1-F9-FlO-F2) with using oblique rotation and number of factors (8). 
Output of the finalS factor EFA solution 
The output of the final 8 factor EF A solution included the communalities, the total variance 
explained table, Scree plot and pattern matrix. Table 6-30 shows the communalities of the 
final 8 factor EF A solution. 
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Table 6- 30 Communalities ofthe finalS factor EFA solution (n=431) 
Safety climate items [ nitial Extraction 
Al Staff support one another in this unit .48 .66 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a .41 .51 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .45 .60 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good .15 .28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .37 .47 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for .17 .24 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .41 .61 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .31 .34 
A12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, .40 .54 
A13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their .38 .49 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .26 .35 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done .57 .70 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for .60 .77 
C2 StaffwiIl freely speak up if they see something that may negatively .40 .51 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
.31 .60 
DJ When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the .52 .56 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how 
.64 .89 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how 
.50 .52 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes 
.34 .43 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units 
.30 .37 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital 
.36 .57 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top .29 .34 
Fll Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .31 .40 
ExtractIOn Method: Pnnclpal AXIS factonng 
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T hi 6 31 T I I' dfhfi 18f a e 
-
ota variance expl ame o t e ma actor so uhon n= EFA I . ( 431) 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation 
Factor Total %of Cumulative % Total %of Cumulative % Total 
1 5.65 24.6 24.6 5.21 22.6 22.6 3.0 
2 2.04 8.8 33.4 1.67 7.2 29.9 2.8 
3 1.91 8.3 41.8 1.41 6.1 36.1 1.9 
4 1.47 6.4 48.2 .98 4.2 40.4 2.3 
5 1.29 5.6 53.8 .89 3.9 44.3 2.5 
6 1.20 5.2 59.0 .65 2.8 47.1 2.3 
7 1.02 4.4 63.5 .56 2.4 49.6 2.9 
8 0.93 4.0 67.6 .44 1.9 51.5 1.3 
9 
.79 3.4 71.0 
10 .72 3.1 74.1 
11 .70 3.0 77.2 
12 .63 . 2.7 79.9 
13 .56 2.4 82.4 
14 .53 2.3 84.7 
15 .51 2.2 86.9 
16 .47 2.0 89.0 
17 .45 1.9 91.0 
18 .44 1.9 92.9 
19 .42 1.8 94.7 
20 
.38 1.7 96.5 
21 .33 1.6 97.1 
22 .25 1.2 99.4 
23 
.22 .5 100 
The total variance explained table shows the 8 factors solution accounts for 51.5% of total 
variance. Figure 6-4 shows the Scree plot of the final 8 factor EF A solution. 
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Figure 6- 2 Scree plot of the fmal 8 factor EF A olution 
Scree Plot 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 11 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 19 20 21 22 23 
FOlctor Number 
The break in thi s Scree pI t ugge ted the eight fact r oluti n. The fi 11 wing tabl e h w 
the pattern matri x f the fi nal fact r luti n . 
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Table 6- 32 Pattern matrix of the final 8 factor EFA solution (n=431) 
Safety climate items 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
FS TI,e action of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive change here 
D2 When a mislJlke is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
D3 When a l11i take is made that could hann the patient , but does not, how often is this reported? 
AS Staff feel like their mistakes are held again tthem 
A 12 When an event is reported , it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem 
A 16 Staff worry thatl11i takes they make are kept in their personnel file 
F7 Problem often occur in the exchange of information across hospilJll units 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units 
F5 Important pati ent care infonnation i oft en lost during shift changes 
FII Shin changes cau c problem for patient in thi h spital 
A I Staff support onc another in this unit 
A4 In thi unit , people treat each other with respect 
A3 When u lot of work need to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or action oftho e with 111 re authority 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriou Iy con iders taff suggestion for improving patient safety 
B I My upervi or/manager say a good word when helshe ees a job done according to established patient safety 
procedure 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care 
ExtractIOn Method: Pnnclpal AXIS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
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I 
.69 
.65 
.40 
.42 
Factor 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
.98 
.72 
.77 
.73 
.60 
.46 
.75 
.56 
.58 
.46 
-.71 
-.71 
-.50 
.75 
.55 
-.76 
-.71 
.59 
.49 
Table 6-33 shows the structure and factor loadings of the final EF A solution (8 factors). 
Table 6- 33 Structure of the final EF A solution 
Factor Factor 
number 
1 Organisationalleaming- continuous improvement 
2 Frequency of event reported 
3 No punitive response to error 
4 Handoffs and transitions 
5 Teamwork within units 
6 Communication openness 
7 Supervisor expectation and action promoting patient 
safety 
8 Staffing 
Items Number 
(loading> 0.4) of items 
A6-A9-AI3-F8 4 
01-02-03 3 
A8-A12-A16 3 
FS-F6-F7-Fll 4 
AI-A3-A4 3 
C2-C4 2 
Bl-B2 2 
AS-A7 2 
The final EF A solution (8 factors) accounted for 51.5% of total variance and consisted of 
eight factors representing 23 safety climate items. The solution included 23 safety climate 
items in 8 factors while 19 items were excluded (A2-AIO-AII-A14-A15-A17-A18-B3-B4-
CI-C3-C5-C6-FI-F2-F3-F4-F9-FlO). Factor loadings were between 0.43 and 0.97. There 
were only small shifts among items across factors for instance, F6 moved from "teamwork 
across units" to handoffs and transitions. F8 moved from "management support for patient 
safety" to organisational learning-continuous improvement. All dimensions consisted of two 
to four safety climate items. The structure of the 8 factor final EF A solution makes 
theoretical sense, as all 23 safety climate items that are theoretically related were grouped 
together as a factor. There was no cross-loading. There were no free - standing items (just 
one item in one factor). All the 23 safety climate items were loading quite strongly (loading> 
0.4). 
The best solution is one where it makes theoretical sense (items in one factor theoretically 
related), it explains the most total variance, each item is explained well by this number of 
factors, the rotated solution has no low-loading items and all items load upon factors. There 
is no cross-loading items (item is heavily in one factor and low on another). There is no free 
-standing item (one item in one factor). 
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The most items loading quite strongly (above 0.4) in the final model. Three items and above 
upon each factor is the best but two items are acceptable especially if they are very high 
loading items (above 0.5) and theoretically related. The next step investigated each factor of 
the final 8 factor EF A solution. 
EFA of each potential scale of the final solution (8 factors solution) 
This step aimed to check the final solution (8 factors) derived from these exploratory factor 
analyses. Therefore, conducting an exploratory factor analysis on each scale (factor) to check 
each set of items is satisfactorily explained by a single factor as structured in the final 
solution in table 6-33. In the other words this step aimed to make sure that these items for the 
scale only load onto one scale. In general, the reason for this extra EF A is to check the 
overall (final) EFA of the final solution. The output of this step showed that each set of items 
was loaded on one factor as they were structured in the final solution in table 6-33. Overall, 
all items (23 items) and 8 factors were satisfactorily explained by a single factor (the output 
of this step is provided in appendix 46). The next section concerns with testing the fit of the 
optimal model (8 factors). 
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6.5.2 Testing the fit of the optimal model: CFA 
This step aimed to test, using the validation half of the data, the fit of the optimal model 
(eight factors) that emerged from the EF A that was performed on the construction half of the 
data. 
The process of CF A analysis of the eight factors solution was followed: 
1 AMOS Graphics was used to open up a blank diagram window 
2 Opening the data (the validation half of the data, 431 questionnaires) 
3 Building the model (drawing the eight factors by using the model drawing area in step 
one) 
4 Adding the variable names to the model 
5 Running the model and using the output window 
Table 6-34 shows the output of CF A of 8 factors solution. 
Table 6- 34 Output of CFA of 8 factors solution (n=431) 
Model Chi- DF CMINIDF CFt H.MSEA RMR SH.MH. 'I'Ll 
square 
Eight 407 202 2 0.93 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.92 
Factors (good) (good) (good) (good) (good) (good) (good) (good) 
The output in table 6-34 above shows that this model achieved good fit, Chi-square (;(2) (202) 
= 407, P< 0.001; CMIN/DF = 2 (good model S2), CFI = 0.93 (CFI > 0.90); RMSEA = 0.049 
(RMSEA < 0.06); SRMR = 0.047 (SRMR < 0.08). Overall, the fit indices from CFA of eight 
factors indicated that this model fit was good. Furthermore, the fit of the optimal model 
(eight factors) was tested for whole data (862) to confirm it as optimal model of the current 
study. Table 6-35 shows the output of the CF A testing the fit of optimal models for whole 
data (862 questionnaires). 
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Testing the fit of optimal model for whole data 
Table 6- 35 Output of the CFA testing for whole data (n=862) 
Model Chi- DI- Cl\llN/DI<~ CFI RMSEA Rl\lR 
Eight 
factors 
square 
553 
(good) 
202 2 
(good) (good) 
0.94 0.04 
(good) (good) 
0.03 
(good) 
SRMR TLI 
0.04 
(good) 
0.93 
(good) 
The values of the fit indices of the Saudi data (8 factors) meet the general agreed parameters 
in table 6-15 page 174. Therefore, this model fit was a good fit. Consequently this model 
was acceptable as the optimal model of the current study. Moreover, the comparison of CF A 
of USA and UK models and the optimal model (8 factors) of the current study was performed 
in order to check the results of the CFA of the optimal model of the current study. Table 6-36 
presents the comparison of CF A of the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and the UK (Waterson 
et al., 2009) models and the optimal model (8 factors) of the current study. 
Table 6- 36 Comparison of CFA OF USA, UK and the current study 
Model Chi- DI<' Cl\UN/DF CH RMSEA RMR SRMR TLI 
USA 
UK 
The current 
study 
square 
2064 
587 
553 
746 
288 
202 2 
0.94 0.04 
0.94 0.04 0.04 0.93 
0.94 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.93 
The results of the CFA of the optimal model of the current study are in line with other results 
of CF A in USA and UK studies. It is clear that the optimal model that fits the Saudi data is 
the eight factor solution. 
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6.5.3 Construct validity (factor correlations of the optimal 
model) 
The factor correlations of the optimal model were examined to find out whether the eight 
factors related to each other or not. The construct validity was studied by calculating 
correlations between the scale scores for every factor and subsequently calculating Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the scale scores. Table 6-37 shows the inter-correlations of 
the 8 dimensions (correlation coefficient). 
Table 6- 37 Inter-correlation of the 8 dimensions 
N Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Organisationalleaming- continuous 
improvement 
2 Frequency of event reported .15 
3 No punitive response to error .25 .35 
4 Handoffs and transitions .31 .38 .29 
5 Teamwork within units .41 .38 .62 .45 
6 Communication openness .29 .50 .46 .39 .58 
7 Supervisor expectation and action .25 .52 .25 .51 .35 .33 
promoting patient safety 
8 Staffing .23 .36 .48 .31 .65 .56 .29 
Note: All correlations are significant, P<.OOI 
Table 6-37 shows that inter-correlation between the eight factors range between .154 up to 
.658 supporting that the factors are not independent from each other. The construct validity 
of each factor is reflected in scale scores that are moderately related. High correlations (r> 
0.7), however, would indicate that factors measure the same concept (Smits et aI., 2008). The 
highest correlation were those bctween teamwork within units and staffing(r = 0.658), but no 
correlation was exceptionally high. The construct validity was satisfactory for all factors; the 
moderate correlations of the factors show that there are no two factors measuring the same 
construct. The eight factors (dimensions of patient safety culture) of the optimal model are 
related to each other. The next section concerns reliability analysis of the optimal model. 
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6.5.4 Reliability analysis (internal consistency) 
This step was concerned with reliability analysis (internal consistency) of the optimal model. 
The negatively formulated items were first recoded on the whole sample (862) to ensure that 
all items are coded in the same conceptual direction. The internal consistency was calculated 
for every factor according to the optimal model dimensions and items structure (8 factor 
solutions). Table 6-38 shows the results of the reliabilities of each scale of the eight factor 
model. 
Table 6- 38 results of the reliability analysis of the 8 factor model (n=862) 
Factor Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Factor 1 A6-A9-AI3-F8 0.68 
Factor 2 01-02-03 0.84 
Factor 3 A8-AI2-A16 0.72 
Factor 4 FS-F6-F7-Fll 0.69 
Factor S AI-A3-A4 0.79 
Factor 6 C2-C4 0.69 
Factor 7 BI-B2 0.83 
Factor 8 AS-A7 0.41 
The reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach's alpha values of the factors are above 0.68, 
except for factor 8 which is low. This factor consists of two items. However, this factor is 
still acceptable because the various fit indices in confirmatory factor analysis of the model 
meet the agreed parameters. Furthermore, the theoretical structure of this factor is related to 
the staffing dimension. It is possible that a set of items will be below 0.7 on Cronbach's 
alpha, yet various fit indices in confirmatory factor analysis will be above the cut off levels. 
Alpha coefficient may be low because of lack of homogeneity of variances among items, for 
instance, and it is also lower when there are fewer items in the scale/factor (Kline, 2005). 
In summary, the 8 factor model (23 safety climate items) is the optimal model for the Saudi 
data. The next section provides the dimensions and items comprising the eight structure of 
the optimal model. 
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6.6 Proposed optimal model 
Table 6- 39 Proposed optimal model 
Factor 1: Organisational learning-continues improvement (4 items) 
A6: We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
A9: Mistakes have led to positive change here 
AI3: After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
F8: The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
Factor 2: Frequency of events reported (3 items) 
D 1: When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
D2: When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
D3: When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? 
Factor 3: No punitive response to error (3 items) 
A8: Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them® 
A12: When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem® 
A16: Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file® 
Factor 4: IIandoffs and transition (4 items) 
F5: Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes® 
F6: It is often unpleasant to work with stafffrom other hospital units® 
F7: Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units® 
FII: Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital® 
Factor 5: Teamwork within units (3 items) 
AI: Staff support one another in this unit 
A3: When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work 
A4: In this unit, people treat each other with respect 
Factor 6: Communication openness (2 items) 
C2: Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care 
C4: Stafffeel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
Factor 7: Supervisor expectation and action promoting patient safety (2 items) 
B I: My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety 
procedures 
B2: My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
Factor 8: Staffing (2 items) 
A5: Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient safety® 
A7: We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care® 
R indicates negatively worded items 
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Table 6-39 shows the structure of the optimal model consists of 23 items (14 positively 
worded items and nine negatively worded items). The optimal model (eight factors) includes 
five positively worded factors and three negatively worded factors. 
6.7 Summary of overall findings 
The validity and reliability of the HSOPSC questionnaire was rigorously tested using Saudi 
data (862 completed questionnaires). The results of descriptive analysis show that the 
majority of respondents agree and strongly agree with positively worded items. The majority 
of respondents disagree and strongly disagree with negative items. The pre-analysis showed 
that the Saudi data was suitable to be subjected to factor analysis. 
The initial results of the CF A and reliability analysis showed that when applying the original 
USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to the Saudi data, the fit indices from CFA 
and values of Cronbach's alpha (a) indicated that this model fit was not satisfactory. The 
results of EF A, CF A, correlation and reliability analysis showed that the optimal model to the 
Saudi data consists of eight factors (23 safety climate items). 
The findings of this study indicated that the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) was not valid and reliable in Saudi hospitals. The optimal model could be used in 
Saudi hospitals to assess patient safety culture. In the next chapter, the findings are discussed. 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research findings that emerged from this study. The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss the findings of this thesis with reference to the literature of patient 
safety culture measurement that was reviewed in chapter two. This chapter addresses the key 
findings in relation to three topics: face validity (section 7.2), testing the original English 
language HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) (section 7.3) and developing an optimal 
model in a Saudi context (section 7.4). The methodological issues as well as the strengths 
and limitations of the study are addressed. Section 7.5 discusses some methodological issues 
related to negatively worded items and reporting psychometric properties of patient safety 
climate questionnaires. Section 7.6 presents the strengths and limitations of the study. 
Finally, section 7.7 summarises the findings and impact of the study. 
7.2 Face validity findings 
This section aims to discuss the findings of the face validity testing of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate survey (Sexton 
et al., 2004) in the Saudi context. Face validity is a measure of whet~er a tool seems 
reasonable, and produces reasonable data from the viewpoint of its respondents (Carmines 
and Zeller, 1979). Face validity refers to whether the test seems to measure what it is 
intended to measure. In other words, face validity is an initial assessment of how a test looks 
(Streiner and Norman, 1995). 
In terms of the importance of face validity, a number of studies demonstrated that 
establishing the face validity of a patient safety climate questionnaire is an essential element 
before full application. For example, Hutchinson et al. (2006) asked a number of staff 
members to complete the Stanford University Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare 
Organisations questionnaire (Singer et al., 2003) and the Teamwork and Safety Climate 
Survey (Sexton et al., 2004) for comparison. A number of changes were made to the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et al., 2004) to make it clear and accessible for 
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frontline staff. Hutchinson et aI., (2006) demonstrated a more general need for thorough 
validation of safety climate questionnaires before widespread usage because environmental 
differences might exist at the national level. Waterson et a1. (2009) discussed the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) with NHS staff members before full 
application. As a result a number of changes were made to the wording of the questionnaires 
with respect to terminology used within the UK settings. Waterson et aI., (2009) emphasised 
that there is a need for caution in using patient safety climate questionnaires in different 
settings and they stress the importance of appropriate validation before widespread use in 
different contexts. 
It seems that assessing face validity is a critical issue whenever patient safety climate 
questionnaires are used. According to Pronovost and Sexton (2005) it is important to validate 
patient safety climate questionnaires before extensive use in a new context. Therefore, 
attention should be paid to establish face validity before extensive use, especially in a new 
context. 
The approach taken to test the face validity of a patient safety climate questionnaire varies 
between studies. The first approach is used where patient safety climate questionnaires have 
been translated and validated in other languages for use in different countries. For example, 
Deilkas and Hofoss (2008) translated the SAQ (Sexton et aI., 2004) to Norwegian and 
validated the translated version. The original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
was translated and validated into Dutch for application in the Netherlands (Smits et aI., 2008), 
into German (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) and into Turkish (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). These 
studies used their national language by using forward-backward translation (Sperber, 2004). 
They used a translation to their most commonly spoken language and validated the translated 
questionnaire: this might be because English was not used as the professional language in 
their hospital settings. 
However, a translation of a patient safety climate questionnaire is based on the common 
professional language used in each country while the validation of a patient safety climate 
questionnaire should be performed before full application in different contexts. The current 
study used the same language as the original questionnaires, which is English, because the 
common language in the Saudi hospitals is English as the professional language. 
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The face validity testing of the two patient safety climate questionnaires was conducted in 
order to select the most appropriate one of them to use in the current study. Moreover, 
testing two questionnaires provided new information in terms of how staff can understand the 
content of different questionnaire items. 
The second approach is testing the face validity of a patient safety climate questionnaire 
when using its original language without translation of the questionnaire to another language. 
For example, in the study conducted by Hutchinson et al. (2006) minor adaptations were 
made to the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004) before it was used in 
their study. Similarly, in Waterson et al. (2009) a number of changes were made to the 
wording of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) before full application with 
respect to terminology used within the UK settings. These studies keep the same language 
but they changed some words because of different terminology. 
The face validity stage (an initial assessment stage) of the current study highlighted a number 
of issues. For example, the current study indicated that there is a range of spoken language 
ability and understanding of the written language in the questionnaires, because of the ethnic 
cultural mix of staff in Saudi settings. The interviews revealed variation of English language 
skills amongst participants. This variation is expected because they use English as a 
professional language but it is not their first language since they are from different 
nationalities. Therefore, it seems plausible that the participants might vary in their 
understanding of the questionnaires due to variation in language ability among participants. 
However, it was observed that simple and clear items in the questionnaires could be 
understood by participants who speak English regardless of their nationalities. Overall, this 
suggests that in a multi cultural context the cultural differences should be taken into account 
whenever patient safety climate questionnaires are applied in different cultural settings, such 
as Saudi hospitals settings. Therefore, rigorous validation should be performed to reduce the 
impact of the complexities of cultural and language issues which might exist, and to enhance 
the quality and validity of the research (Sperber, 2004). 
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In the current study, face validity testing indicated that there were problems and difficulties 
of comprehension with some wordings of both questionnaires. For example, some words of 
the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) were difficult to understand such 
as ''than is", "crisis mode", and "fall between the cracks". Similarly, some words of the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire (Sexton et al., 2004) were difficult to understand 
such as "briefings", "contingencies" and "knowingly compromise". These problems might 
be because the variation of clarity of language and the wording of both questionnaires which 
led to some participants understanding the items in a certain way while others did not 
understand them at all. However, with regard to comprehension and competence of the 
language and wording of the patient safety climate questionnaires, it was observed in the 
interviews that simple, clear and straightforward wording of items in the questionnaires could 
be understood by participants. 
For the purpose of assessing the comprehensibility of items and identifying problems with the 
wording of questionnaires, face validity testing is an essential element of the application of 
patient safety climate questionnaires. For example, Bodur and Filiz (2010) tested the 
comprehensibility of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) by discussing the 
wording of the questionnaire with 5 doctors and 8 nurses and their opinions were used to 
make the final version of the questionnaire clear, simple and easy for respondents to complete. 
The face validity testing in the current study highlighted a very important issue regarding the 
scale that is used in the questionnaires. It was observed that the majority of the participants 
had no difficulty linking their ans~ers with the 5-point Likert responses scale, ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree with a midpoint called "neither", of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Furthermore, it was observed that most of the 
respondents read the items of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
only once before linking their answers with the scale. This indicates the clarity of the items 
and that the scale was easy to use with answers. On the other hand, the participants 
experienced significant difficulty linking their answers with the 6-point Likert responses 
scale of the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et al., 2004). The participants 
believed it was not easy to use because more chances prevented them from expressing their 
feeling correctly. Observation of how participants approached answering the questionnaires 
was valuable in identifying where they were encountering difficulties. 
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The current study highlighted another important issue which was observed regarding 
negatively worded items. It is worth noting that the positive and negative items were clear 
and the participants were able to distinguish between them. However, this issue will be 
discussed in detail in section (7.5) in the current chapter. 
The current study indicated that the face validity testing was a helpful tool for identifying the 
most appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire for use in the study. The first method of 
the research was concerned with selecting appropriate patient safety climate questionnaires 
for assessing the perceptions of the workforce towards patient safety culture in hospitals, for 
use in the investigation (see chapter four, section 4.2 for more details). This method 
identified two questionnaires, the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) as a first 
appropriate questionnaire and the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et al., 2004) 
as a second appropriate questionnaire. 
The HSOPSC and the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey were used in a number of 
studies because they are valid and reliable questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004; Hutchinson 
et al., 2006). However, the first method of the research was helpful to identify appropriate 
questionnaires but it did not tell us about how staff understand the meaning of the items of 
patient safety climate questionnaires. Therefore, there was a need to test and assess the 
wording of individual items to select the most appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire 
to use in the current study before the full application. 
The participants perceived that the language and wording of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was clearer and easier to understand than the 
Teamwork and Safety Climate questionnaire (Sexton et al., 2004) because the language and 
wording of the HSOPSC questionnaire is simple and clear and more straightforward than that 
of the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey. Moreover, the terminology of the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire is directly related to patient safety, medical errors and reporting 
incidents. This might be because of the simplicity of the wording of individual items of the 
original HSOPSC questionnaire and because it was developed specifically for healthcare 
settings (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The wording of the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
(Sexton et al., 2004) was perceived as more complicated and difficult for participants to 
understand easily. In addition, the participants found the scale used in the questionnaire 
difficult to apply. 
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However, these differences might be because of the two questionnaires were from different 
sources, the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004) was adapted from 
industry and the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was developed for 
specifically for healthcare settings. 
Selecting an appropriate patient safety climate questionnaire should be based on not only on 
reviewing available questionnaires but also an initial assessment of patient safety climate 
questionnaires (face validity testing) is very important and an essential element in validation 
studies. The current study has highlighted that face validity is a helpful tool in terms of 
identifying changes that should be made to questionnaires to be clear and easy to understand 
by respondents. However, while only minor changes needed to be made to the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), the Teamwork and Safety Climate Survey 
(Sexton et aI., 2004) needed many changes because a number of its items were ambiguous 
and difficult to understand, which makes the decision to make changes extremely difficult as 
it may alters the meaning of the items. 
A number of studies made changes to questionnaires as a result of face validity testing. For 
example, Hutchinson et al. (2006) made minor changes to the questionnaire wording based 
on face validity results. Waterson et al. (2009) made a number of changes to the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) based on feedback from group discussion 
with staff members with respect to terminology used within UK. Changes should be made to 
make items easier for the respondents to understand them. 
Summary 
The current study found that staff varied in terms of their understanding and interpretation of 
the wording of the items of the two patient safety climate questionnaires. Therefore, an 
initial assessment is a very important element before the full application of any patient safety 
climate questionnaire in a different context, such as Saudi hospitals, because of language and 
cultural variation due to different cultural and ethnic groups. The current study highlights 
that face validity is an essential element before the widespread application of a patient safety 
climate questionnaire in different settings environmentally and culturally. It seems that the 
face validity of the current study is more than just identifying ambiguous words in the 
questionnaires that should be changed to make them clear and easy to understand (minor 
adaptations ). 
223 
Chapter seven 
It also takes account of the range of language ability among participants, and 
comprehensibility and competence of the language of the patient safety climate questionnaire, 
the applicability of the scale, and the ability to recognise negatively worded items. When 
comparing two questionnaires it is also a helpful tool in terms of selecting the appropriate 
patient safety climate questionnaire. On the basis of the above issues and important benefits, 
it is worthwhile and valuable to undertake face validity as good practice and an essential 
element in validation studies, especially where environmental differences might exist. 
Therefore, attention should be paid to face validity before extensive use especially in a new 
context (Hutchinson et al., 2006; Waterson et al., 2009). 
The face validity in the current study was aimed at more than how the two patient safety 
climate questionnaires look. The additional value is to adapt an appropriate questionnaire in 
a culturally relevant and comprehensible form while maintaining the meaning of the original 
items of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire. The original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was identified as the most appropriate patient safety 
climate questionnaire to use for the study. Testing the validity of the factor structure of the 
original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) with Saudi data will be discussed in 
the next section. 
7.3 Testing the original model findings 
The pre-analysis (Bartlett's test and KMO) was performed to assess the suitability of the 
Saudi data for factor analysis. The results showed that the Saudi data was sufficient for 
performing factor analysis. Pallant (2007) highlights the importance of undertaking pre-
analysis in order to assess the suitability of data for factor analysis prior to assessing the 
psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires and more recent studies are 
adopting this as good practice (e.g. Smits et al., 2008; Waterson et al., 2009; Bodur and Filiz, 
2010). 
One of the main findings of the current study relates to the applicability of using the original 
English language HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) for assessing patient safety 
culture in Saudi hospitals. In the current study the first step of psychometric analysis aimed 
to investigate whether the factor structure of the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (12 
factors and 42 items) can be used with the Saudi data by using CF A and reliability analysis. 
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The current study demonstrated that the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) did not fit the Saudi data well (poor fit). Therefore, the factor structure of the 
original USA HSOPSC questionnaire cannot be effectively used in Saudi hospitals. The 
results of CF A and reliability analysis are discussed and compared with the results of the key 
studies below. 
Firstly with regard to CF A in the current study, the fit indices were used to evaluate the 
adequacy of the original model fit and their values were as follows: (Chi-square=4995, 
DF=805, CFI=0.642, RMSEA=0.678, RMR=O.l78, SRMR=O.l93 and TLI=0.617). These fit 
indices from CF A indicated that when applying the original USA HSOPSC model (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) to the Saudi data, this model fit was not satisfactory because overall, the values 
of the fit indices of the Saudi data were outside the general agreed parameters. In other 
words, the fit indices did not meet the goodness of fit criteria (see table 6-15, page 174). In 
contrast, the fit indices were used in the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) as follows: (Chi-square=2064, DF=746, CFI=0.94, RMSEA=0.040). Although 
they used just four fit indices, they achieved the general agreed parameters. However, the 
relatively high values of fit indices of CF A achieved in the original model (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) may be due to their use of the same sample for the EF A and CF A, in other words the 
split half validation was not undertaken and they tested the fit of their model by using the 
same data (Waterson et aI., 2009). In general, it is recommended that use of a wide range of 
fit indices is the best means of evaluating the degree of fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999), as has 
been done in the current study. 
The current study indicated that the fit indices of CF A of the original HSOPSC model (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004) using Saudi data were unsatisfactory. Other studies found similar results, 
for example, Smits et al. (2008) examined the applicability of the factor structure of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to the Dutch data (Dutch translated version 
of the HSOPSC questionnaire).' The fit indices from CFA indicated that this model fit was 
not satisfactory. Similarly, Waterson et al. (2009) tested the original HSOPSC model (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004) in the UK context and they found that the fit indices of CF A were a poor fit 
when they compared them with the original American model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
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Bodur and Filiz (2010) performed CF A to investigate whether the factor structure of the 
original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) could be used with Turkish 
data (Turkish translated version of the HSOPSC questionnaire). They (Bodur and Filiz, 2010) 
concluded that the original model was not a satisfactory fit with the Turkish settings. In a 
study by Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) they examined the applicability of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to assess patient safety climate in a German speaking 
hospital setting in Switzerland (German translated version of the HSOPSC questionnaire). 
They found the values of fit indices of CF A indicated that the fit is not sufficiently good to 
confirm the proposed factor structure of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
It appears that the overall fit was consistently unsatisfactory for the above studies when they 
compared with Sorra and Nieva's (2004) original USA HSOPSC questionnaire. 
It seems, based on the evidence from the results of CF A in different studies above, that the 
factor structure of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) might not 
work in a satisfactory way in these countries. It appears that the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire measures different dimensions of patient safety culture in different countries. 
Table 7-1 shows the comparative CFA data of these countries (six countries). 
Table 7- 1 Comparative CFA data from six countries 
Study I<'it indices criteria of C}'A 
Original HSOSPC (Sorra and Nieva, Chi-square=2064, DF=746, CFI=0.94, RMSEA=0.040 
2004) 
The current study 
The UK study (Waterson et aI., 2009) 
Chi-square=4995, DF=805, CFI=0.64, RMSEA=0.678, 
RMR=0.178, SRMR=0.193 and TLI=0.617 
Chi-square=1906, DF=674, CFI=0.91, RMSEA=0.045, 
SRMR=0.046 
German study (Pfeiffer and Manser, RMSEA=0.047, PCLOSE=0.91, CMIN/df=2.271, 
2010) GFI=O.878, NFI=0.859, and TLI=0.901 
Dutch study (Srnits et al., 2008) NA 
Turkish study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010) NA 
NA: not available. 
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Table 7-1 shows that three studies reported the values of the fit indices of CFA when they 
tested the fitting of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (e.g. Sorra and Nieva, 2004; 
Waters on et aI., 209; Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) while two studies did not report this (e.g. 
Smits et aI., 2008; Bodur and Filiz, 2010). This kind of incompleteness might be because of 
the difficulty of reporting fit indices. It might be also because some studies depend on 
reporting reliability analysis which is an important indicator but not enough to evaluate the 
fitting of the original model in terms of a comprehensive psychometric assessment of patient 
safety climate questionnaires in a different context. According to Hoyle (1995) CF A is the 
best procedure analysis for examining the factor structure of models. 
Secondly, with regard to reliability analysis in the current study, the internal consistency of 
the 12 factors of the original USA questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was calculated with 
Cronbach's alpha (0) (Field, 2000). The internal consistency of the Saudi data for each 
dimension was greater than 0.6 except for three dimensions that were poor or unacceptable: 
for overall perceptions of safety (0=0.31), staffing (0=0.57) and hospital handoffs and 
transitions (0=0.59). Overall, the internal consistency of the Saudi data was lower for each 
dimension than the American data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
The first dimension with low internal consistency was the overall perception of patient safety 
which consists of four items. This dimension relates to the extent to which procedures and 
systems in hospitals are good at preventing errors and there is a lack of patient safety problem 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004). There is a multi cultural environment in Saudi hospitals because the 
staff there are from different countries. Therefore, their perceptions may be affected by their 
cultural backgrounds and experiences in their countries. Accordingly, they might answer 
these items of overall perceptions of patient safety dimension based in comparison with the 
procedures and systems in their countries. Moreover, the majority of staff have experiences 
and communications training outside Saudi Arabia such as the UK, USA and Canada. All 
these cultural issues might affect the overall perceptions of the staff. 
On the other hand, this dimension works with the UK data that was gathered from similar 
cultural backgrounds in an English context (Waterson et aI., 2009). Similarly, the dimension 
works with the Dutch data (Dutch translated version of the HSOPSC questionnaire) that was 
gathered from the same culture (Smits et aI., 2008). It seems that this kind of dimension is 
affected by cultural background. 
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Therefore, it did not work in a multi cultural environment such as the Saudi context but it 
works in data that gathered from the same culture such the UK and Dutch contexts. However, 
it is seemed that there is a cultural variation between staff and also between contexts. 
Therefore, it may be the perceptions of staff toward patient safety culture dimensions in the 
questionnaire may be affected by their cultural backgrounds and experiences. 
The second dimension that had low internal consistency was the staffing dimension (a=0.57). 
It consists of four items and it is about the extent to which there is enough staff to handle the 
workload and whether work hours are appropriate to provide the best care for patients (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004). This dimension had low internal consistency in a number of studies. For 
example, Smits et al. (2008) found the staffing dimension had low internal consistency 
(a=0.49) when they tested the fit of the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) in Dutch data. Similarly, the staffing dimension had low internal consistency 
(a=0.S8) in Waterson et al. (2009) study when they tested the fit of the original USA 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in the UK data. 
The staffing dimension had very low internal consistency (a = 0.19) in a study by Bodur and 
Filiz (2010) when they tested the fit of the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) in the Turkish data. It seemed that this dimension did not work well in different 
contexts. It might be that the composition of this dimension was not simple and clear as it 
has conflicting items (a mixture of one positive and three negative items), therefore it is 
difficult to interpret this kind of composition (Schmitt and Stults, 1985). 
The third dimension was hospital handoffs and transitions. It consists of four items and it is 
about how important patient care information is transferred between hospital departments 
during shi~ changes (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The current study indicated that the internal 
consistency of hospital handoffs and transitions might be acceptable because it was close to 
0.6. This dimension might work with a different structure of items in the Saudi data. 
However, this point may be answered by EF A in the next section. 
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In summary, the current study indicated that the internal consistency was lower for each 
dimension than the American data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Three factors were poor or 
unacceptable: overall perceptions of safety, staffing and hospital handoffs and transitions. 
A similar finding was reported by it number of studies. For example, in the study by Smits et 
al. (2008) the internal consistency of the Dutch items was lower than that of the original 
items in the AHRQ study (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) except for communication openness, 
which was the same. The internal consistency of three factors was poor or even unacceptable: 
organisational learning-continuous improvement (a = 0.57), staffing (a = 0.49) and 
teamwork across hospital units (a = 0.59). The internal consistency of the UK items was 
lower for each dimension than that of the original items of the HSOPSC questionnaire. The 
internal consistency of one dimension was unacceptable, which was staffing (a=0.58) 
(Waterson et aI., 2009). 
Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) reported that the internal consistency of the German items was 
lower for seven dimensions than the original items of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004). Similarly, Bodur and Filiz (20 I 0) reported that the internal consistency of the 
Turkish items was lower for each dimension than the original items in the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), except for frequency of events reported (a =0.86) and 
teamwork within units (a=0.83). The internal consistency of two factors was poor: Staffing 
(a=0.19) and non-punitive response to error (a=0.31). Table 7-2 provides comparative data 
of internal consistency of a number of studies ( six countries). 
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Table 7- 2 Comparative internal consistency data from six countries 
I1S0PSC dimensions Internal consistency [Cronbach's alpha (a)] 
USA The UK Germany Netherlands Turkey 
Current 
study 
Overall perceptions of safety 0.74 0.31 0.67 0.75 0.74 NA 
Frequency of error reporting 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.79 0.86 
Supervisor/manger 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.70 NA 
expectations and actions 
promoting patient safety 
Organisationalleaming- 0.76 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.57 NA 
continuous improvement 
Teamwork within units 0.83 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.83 
Communication openness 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.72 NA 
Feedback and 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.75 NA 
communication about error 
No punitive response to error 0.79 0.72 0.65 0.71 0.69 0.31 
Staffing 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.49 0.19 
Hospital management 0.83 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.68 NA 
support for patient safety 
Teamwork across hospital 0.80 0.69 0.70 0.76 0.59 NA 
units 
Hospital handoffs and 0.80 0.59 0.77 0.71 0.68 NA 
transitions 
NA: not available but the internal consistency of each dimension was lower than USA dimensions in the Turkish 
study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). 
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In summary, it seemed that the internal consistency of the current study using Saudi data, UK, 
German, Dutch, Turkish data was lower for each dimension than the American data (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004). The lowest internal consistencies of dimensions across these different 
studies are overall perception of patient safety, organisational learning, non punitive response 
to error, staffing, teamwork across hospital units and hospital handoffs and transitions. The 
results of the reliability analysis of the studies provide evidence that the original model does 
not work well in different countries. 
On basis of the results of testing the original model in the current study (CF A and reliability 
analysis), the question of investigating the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in the Saudi hospital settings could be answered. It 
seems that the reliability and validity of the original factor structure of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) is not replicated in Saudi hospital settings. Thus the 
original model of the HSOPSC should not be used in Saudi hospitals. This finding is in 
contrast with other recent studies in Saudi hospitals that were produced after the current study 
began. For example, Alahmadi's (2009) study assessed patient safety culture in Saudi 
hospitals by using the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) before 
examining the reliability and validity of the questionnaire in a different context. Similarly, in 
a study by another author (Alahmadi. Hanan, 2010) used the original HSOPSC questionnaire 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to assess patient safety culture in a number of Saudi hospitals 
without performing a proper validation of the questionnaire before its application in the Saudi 
context. 
It seems that these two Saudi studies (Alahmadi. Talal, 2009; Alahmadi. Hanan, 2010) did 
not assess the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire whereas the current 
study performed rigorous validation to assess the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire. However, the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) needs to be 
used with caution in Saudi hospitals because of the variation of cultures and language in the 
Saudi context as discussed earlier in section (7.2) of this chapter. Therefore, it is important to 
check the validity and reliability of a patient safety climate questionnaire before applying it in 
a new context (Smits et al., 2008). 
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In terms of testing the original HSOPSC questionnaire at an international level (different 
countries), evidence from other studies supports the findings from testing the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire in the current study. For example, the factor structure of the original 
USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was tested in different countries. 
Smits et al. (2008) examined the applicability of the factor structure of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire to the Dutch data. They indicated that the Dutch version was not able to 
replicate the factor structure proposed by Sorra and Nieva (2004), but found some factors 
corresponding to those proposed for the original instrument. Similarly, in a UK study 
(Waterson et aI., 2009) investigated whether the factor structure of the original USA 
HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) could be used with the UK data study. 
Waterson et al. (2009) found that the UK version was not able to replicate the factor structure 
of the HSOPSC questionnaire. Similarly, Bodur and Filiz (2010) examined the applicability 
of the factor structure of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) to the 
Turkish data. Bodur and Filiz (2010) found that the factor structure of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) cannot be used with Turkish data. In a study by 
Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) they examined the applicability of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire to assess patient safety climate to a German speaking hospital setting in 
Switzerland. They also found the German version was not able to replicate the proposed 
factor structure of the HSOPSC by Sorra and Nieva (2004). 
Summary 
In summary, the findings from testing the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) highlight a number of important issues. For example, the testing of the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire might be useful when it is based on reporting the results of CF A and 
reliability analysis in terms of evaluating the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire. The results from CF A and the internal consistency of the current study using 
Saudi data indicated that the twelve dimensions of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004) did not match the findings in Saudi hospitals. As a result, the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire cannot be used with the English language Saudi data. Therefore, it 
appeared that the factor structure of the original HSOPSC questionnaire may be measuring 
different dimensions of patient safety culture in the Saudi context as compared to the USA 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This might be because of cultural and contextual differences 
between the United States and the Saudi hospital settings. 
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The original factor structure of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) has 
recently been applied and empirically evaluated in different countries (e.g. Netherlands: 
Smits et aI., 2008; the UK.: Waterson et aI., 2009; Turkey: Bodur and Filiz 2010; Germany: 
Pfeiffer and Manser, 20 to). None of these studies were able to replicate the factor structure 
proposed by Sorra and Nieva (2004). Based on this, it is important to investigate whether or 
not the dimensional structure of patient safety climate questionnaires can be replicated in 
different contexts to ensure that patient safety climate questionnaire is valid and reliable, 
therefore, a questionnaire developed in one context should ideally always be validated before 
wider use in a different context (Pronovost and Sexton, 2005). Patient safety climate 
questionnaires need to be used with caution because of cultural and language variations 
between different contexts (Nieva and Sorra, 2003; Hutchinson et aI., 2006; Waterson et aI., 
2009). These issues above show the importance of testing the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) carefully before full application in different healthcare 
environments. 
However, a number of recent studies in patient safety culture in Saudi Arabia (e.g. Alahmadi 
Talal, 2009; Alahmadi Hanan, 2010) did not investigate whether the factor structure of the 
original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (12 factors and 42 items) (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) can 
be used with the Saudi data by using psychometric analysis such as CF A and reliability 
analysis. The current study has addressed the need to identify an optimal model for using to 
assess patient safety culture in Saudi Arabia. The findings of EF A, CF A and reliability 
analysis in terms of developing the optimal model are discussed in the next section. 
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7.4 Developing the optimal model 
As mentioned earlier, the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) is not 
valid and reliable in the Saudi context using English language data. Therefore, there was a 
need to identify an optimal model for the Saudi data. An optimal measurement model was 
constructed via EF A and CF A with the Saudi data split into halves. In the current study the 
results of psychometric analysis (EFA, CF A and Reliability analysis) show that the optimal 
model for the Saudi data consists of eight factors (see table 6-39 in page 216). The optimal 
model could be used in Saudi hospitals to assess patient safety culture. The findings of EF A, 
CFA and Reliability analysis are discussed below. A comparison of optimal models across 
different countries is provided. 
With regard to EF A, it was performed in order to investigate if there is a factor structure that 
better fits the Saudi data. In the current study, the Saudi data set was split randomly into two 
halves. The first half of the Saudi data set was used for model construction by exploring a 
number of factors (patient safety culture dimensions). The second half of the Saudi data set 
was used for model validation to test the fit of the results of the optimal factor structure. A 
split half validation strategy (EF A followed by CF A) was recommended by a number of 
studies for providing realistic results of the psychometric properties of patient safety climate 
questionnaires. For example, Waterson et al. (2009) split their data when they identified an 
optimal model in the UK context. On the other hand, a number of recent studies did not split 
their data. For example, in Sorra and Nieva's (2004) study, the split half validation was not 
undertaken and they tested the fit of their model by using the same data (Waterson et aI., 
2009). Smits et al. (2008) did not split Dutch data into halves when they identified their 
optimal model in Netherlands hospitals. Similarly, Bodur and Filiz (2010) did not split the 
Turkish data into halves. However, the complexity of psychometric analysis (cross validation) 
might be the reason for not doing the split half validation in these studies. 
In terms of method of extraction, rotation and other criteria for EF A, in the current study EF A 
was performed to identify an optimal model, using Principle Axis Factoring and Varimax 
rotation, as well as both Kaiser's criterion and the Scree plot. Changing the rotations was 
performed (from Varimax to Oblique rotation) to enable interpretation of the factors. 
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According to Costello and Osbome (2005), Oblique (Orthogonal) rotation is used to produce 
more easily interpretable results especially in terms of cross loading items. All these criteria 
were taken into consideration for identifying the optimal model of the current study with no 
low loading, no low communalities, no cross-loaded items and including the theoretical 
related structure of the items of the optimal model. According to Flin (2007) identification of 
a patient safety climate questionnaire with a high standard of measurement means its results 
can be relied on. Therefore, using the criteria above was helpful in terms of ensuring a high 
standard measurement of the original HSOPSC questionnaire dimensions (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) in the Saudi context and identifying the optimal model. 
Studies vary in their use ofEFA for developing a measurement model. For example, Pfeiffer 
and Manser (20 10) applied EF A using principle component analysis, Varimax rotation to 
interpret the factor loadings independently and Kaiser's criterion (Eigenvalues>I). Although, 
this strategy seems comprehensive, there is a lack in terms of changing rotation to produce an 
easily interpretable measurement model. As a result of this, their optimal model contains a 
number of items which cross-loaded in two factors and also some items with low loading. It 
might also be due to not having examined a series of possible models and they did not 
gradually remove low loading and cross-loaded items (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). 
Smits et al. (2008) applied EF A using principle component analysis, Varimax rotation, 
Kaiser'S criterion (Eigenvalues>l) and the Scree plot. Their model (11 factors) consists of 
highly loading items (>0.36). On the other hand, Waterson et al. (2009) applied EFA using 
principle axis factoring, Varimax rotation, Kaiser's criterion (Eigenvalues>l) and the Scree 
plot. Their model also consists of highly loading items (>0.36). An oblique rotation was 
used to aid interpretation of their resulting factors (9 factors). However, it seems that the 
methods of extraction and rotation are different in these studies because selecting extraction 
and rotation methods is based on the purpose of study (Conway and AlIen, 2003). 
In the current study, a number of exploratory factor analyses were performed and a number of 
solutions were identified. Each possible solution was examined in order to identify an 
optimal model including 11, 10 and 8 factor solutions. At the end of this stage the eight 
factor solution was identified as an optimal model for the current study. The total variance 
explained by the optimal model (8 factors) accounts for 51.5 % of total variance. 
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The optimal model consists of 23 items while 19 items were removed gradually that were 
either cross-loaded or had low loading «0.3) or no loading across different solutions. Factor 
loadings were between 0.43 and 0.97. All dimensions of the optimal model in the current 
study consist of two to four safety climate items. 
The optimal model of the current study is in line with other studies. For example, Waterson 
et al. (2009) identified 9 factors as the optimal model of their data. Their model accounts for 
51.5% of total variance. The optimal model consists of 27 items and 13 items were removed 
gradually that were either cross-loaded or had low loading «0.3). Factor loadings were 
between 0.38 and 0.98. All dimensions consist of two to five items. Smits et al. (2008) 
identified 11 factors as the optimal model of their data. Their model accounts for 57.1 % of 
total variance and the optimal model consists of 40 items (two items were removed). No 
items cross-loaded or had loading less than 0.3. Factor loadings were between 0.36 and 0.88. 
All dimensions consist of two to five items. This means that the current study followed 
recommended practice. However, the studies vary in terms of the composition of dimensions. 
In terms of the composition of the items and factors of the optimal model of the current study, 
the optimal model consists of eight dimensions. Two dimensions were formed as before, 
these were frequency of events reported and non punitive response to error. Three 
dimensions lost one item (Teamwork within units, handoffs and transitions, and 
communication openness). Two dimensions lost two items (staffing, supervisor expectations 
and actions promoting patient safety). One dimension had a new item "organisational 
learning-continuous improvement". There were only small shifts among items across factors. 
For instance, F6 moved to "Handoffs and transitions", and F8 moved to "organisational 
learning-continuous improvement". 
, 
On the other hand, in the optimal model of the current study, four dimensions are absent: 
"overall perception of patient safety", "feedback and communication about error", "teamwork 
across hospital units" and "hospital management support for patient safety". The 
composition of the optimal model of the current study consists of 23 items which represent 8 
dimensions of patient safety culture, while 19 items were excluded because their loading 
either they did not load upon any factor or they had low loading. The composition of the 
optimal model is discussed below. 
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In the optimal model of the current study, four dimensions are absent. For example, "overall 
perception of patient safety", this might be absent because the respondents are from 23 
countries and therefore they have different perceptions of patient safety because they have 
different cultural backgrounds. This dimension combined with the staffing dimension in the 
optimal model derived from the UK data (Waterson et al., 2009) and German data (Pfeiffer 
and Manser, 2010). As mentioned earlier in section 7.3, the "overall perception of patient 
safety" works better in other countries such as the Dutch and the British (e.g. Smits et al., 
2008; Waterson et al., 2009) either because it seemed that they have shared similar 
perceptions of safety within their countries or because their understanding of English was 
similar. On the other hand, this dimension did not work in multi cultural environment such as 
the Saudi context. Moreover, it seems that the "overall perception of patient safety" and 
staffing could be formed as one dimension. This may be because of the "overall perception 
of patient safety" regarding the issues that could prevent problems of patient safety and 
staffing could be one of the issues that contribute to provide the best care for patients (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004). 
Another dimension that was lost in the optimal model of the current study is "feedback and 
communication about error". It might be because staff do not trust the incident report system 
because almost half (46.7%) of respondents agreed that their mistakes are held against them. 
This dimension works in a number of studies (Netherlands: Smits et al., 2008; UK: Waterson 
et al., 2009). Additionally, this dimension combined with the "communication openness" 
dimension in the optimal model derived from both the Turkish data and German data (Turkey: 
Bodur and Filiz, 2010; Germany: Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). This might indicate that there 
is no a blame culture and they support reporting mistakes that happen in hospitals to learn 
from their mistakes and to improve patient safety. Moreover, it seems that "feedback and 
communication about error" dimension and "communication openness" could be formed as 
one dimension because both of them are concerned with how the communication between 
staff should be about how errors happen (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
The teamwork across hospital units dimension was lost in the current study (except item F6). 
This dimension combined with the handoffs and transitions dimension in the optimal model 
derived from the German data (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). This dimension combined with 
hospital management support for patient safety dimension in the optimal model derived from 
the Turkish data (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). 
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It seems that the items of this dimension could be correlated with different items of 
dimensions. The hospital management support for patient safety dimension consists of three 
items. Two items were dropped whereas item number F8 moved to organisational leaming-
continuous improvement. This dimension also did not work in the optimal model derived 
from the UK data (Waters on et aI., 2009). However, the absence of this dimension might be 
considered as an indicator of a lack of hospital management support for patient safety or may 
not be aware. 
"Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety" dropped two 
negative items (83-84). These two items are about the negative role of managers towards 
patient safety (i.e. ignoring patient safety problem). Similarly, these two items were dropped 
in the optimal model derived from the UK data (Waterson et aI., 2009). It is expected 
because if the respondents agreed with 81 and 82 as positive items of this dimension they 
disagreed to 83 and 84, therefore, the negative items were discarded from this dimension 
(Spector, 1997). Therefore, the majority of respondents in the current study (89.8%) 
disagreed that supervisors ignore patient safety problems and they agreed (76.1 %) that 
supervisors promote patient safety. 
"Staffing" dropped two items (A2-AI4). These items are about having enough numbers of 
staff and how they handle the workload. It seems that almost half of respondents (51.8%) 
agreed that there is a shortage of staff and there is a high workload. These two items work in 
a number of optimal models as an indicator of having enough staff to handle the workload 
properly (e.g. Waterson et aI., 2009; 80dur and Filiz, 2010). 
A single item was dropped from "Hospital handoffs and transitions" (F3: things lost when 
transferring patients from one unit to another), from "teamwork within units" (A 11: when one 
area in this unit gets busy, others help out) and "communication openness" (C6: staff are 
afraid to ask question when something does not seem right). This means these items are not 
working in any dimension of the optimal model. This dropping of some items is expected. 
For example, in Waterson et aI's (2009) study, a single item dropped from both "teamwork 
within units" and "teamwork across units". Similarly, in Smits et aI's (2008) study, a single 
item dropped from "hospital handoffs and transitions". 
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In the optimal model of the current study, there were only small shifts among items across 
factors. For instance, F6 (it is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units) 
moved from "teamwork across units" to "handoffs and transitions", and F8 (the actions of 
hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority) moved from "management 
support for patient safety" to "organisational learning-continuous improvement". It seemed 
that this item movement (shifting) is acceptable because F6 is related to staff that work in 
same shift and shift changes. Also F8 is related because there is a link between patient safety 
as a top priority and learning from mistakes to improve patient safety. Similarly, shifting of 
items happened in different optimal models of studies. For example, F6 moved to handoffs 
and transitions dimension in optimal model derived from the Turkish data (Bodur and Filiz, 
2010). F6 moved to communication openness in optimal model derived from the Dutch data 
(Smits et al., 2008). It seems that shifting of items depends on how staff understand the 
content of the items and the relationships between items. 
In summary, the eight factor structures of the Saudi and the American HSOPSC versions are 
reasonably consistent. The overall structure of eight factors is the same and the composition 
of dimensions is approximately similar because the main part of the factor structures is the 
same. Table 7-3 shows the comparison between the structures of the American version and 
the Saudi version of eight factors of the HSOPSC questionnaire. 
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Table 7- 3 Comparison between the structures of the American version and the English 
language Saudi version of eight factors of the HSOPSC 
Eight factors (dimensions) American version Saudi version 
No punitive response to error A8®-A12®-A16® A8®-A12®-A16® 
Teamwork within units AI-A3-A4-Al1 AI-A3-A4 
Handoffs and transition F5®-F7®-Fll®-F3® F5®-F7®-Fll®-F6® 
Organisational learning-
continues improvement 
Communication openness 
Staffing 
Supervisor expectation and 
action promoting patient 
safety 
Total 
® indicates negative items. 
A6-A9-A13 A6-A9-A13-F8 
C2-C4-C6 C2-C4 
A5®-A7®-A2-A14® A5®-A7® 
B I-B2-B3®-B4® BI-B2 
28 23 
Note 
Same 
Lost one item 
(All) 
Lost one item 
(F3) and add one 
item (F6) 
Add one item 
(F8) 
Lost one item 
(C6) 
Lost two items 
(A2-AI4) 
Lost two items 
(B3-B4) 
7 items lost and 
2 items add 
Table 7-3 shows that seven items were lost (AII-F3-C6-A2-A14-B3-B4) and two items (F6-
P8) were added to the Saudi version across the eight factors. In total, the differences between 
two versions are five items. The items of each factor are theoretically structure related and 
the optimal model of the current study (Saudi version) demonstrates generally good 
psychometric properties. The construction of the optimal model of the current study was 
confirmed by using CF A. The following section discusses the CF A of the optimal model of 
~he current study. 
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Following EFA, CFA was performed, using the validation half of the data, to test the fit of 
the resulting models that emerged from the EF A that was performed on the construction half 
of the data. These models were 11, 10, and 8 factor solutions. However, the values of the fit 
indices from CF A of 11 and 10 factors were outside the general agreed parameters as shown 
on page 174 (see appendix 47). Therefore, the model fit of both 11 and 10 factors were not 
satisfactory. Consequently these models were rejected. The fit indices from CF A of eight 
factors indicated that this fit model was satisfactory because the values of the fit indices of 
the Saudi data (8 factors) meet the general agreed parameters (Chi-square=407, DF=202, 
CFI >0.90, SRMR <0.08, RMSEA <0.06 and TLI>0.90). Consequently this model (eight 
factors) was acceptable as the final optimal model. 
Finally, testing the fit of the optimal model for the whole data set was performed by using 
CF A. The result of this step also confirmed that the fit of the optimal model was appropriate 
to the whole Saudi data. Through this rigorous process the optimal model (eight factors) of 
the current study was tested carefully and confirmed via two confirmatory analyses. In terms 
of using CF A to confirm the optimal model, it seemed that an application of this procedure 
was not conducted in a number of studies (e.g. Smits et aI., 2008; Alahmadi, 2009; Alahmadi, 
2010; Bouder and Filiz, 2010; Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). This situation might be referring 
to the complexity of CF A because most of studies used reliability analysis and correlations 
instead ofCFA. However, some studies performed CFA to confirm their optimal model such 
as Waterson et al. (2009). According to Hoyle (1995) CFA is the best analysis procedure in 
terms of examining the factor structure of models. 
With regard to reliability analysis, in the current study, the optimal model's internal 
consistency (reliability) was assessed using Cronbach's alpha (a). When different items are 
supposed to measure the same dimension, it is recommended that internal consistency 
(reliability) should be greater than or equal to 0.6 (Field, 2000). Since the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) contains both positively worded items (n=24) and 
negatively worded items (n=18), the negatively formulated items were first recoded to make 
sure that a higher score always means a more positive response (Pallant, 2007). 
The internal consistency was calculated for every factor according to the optimal model 
dimensions and items structure (8 factors) by using Cronbach's alpha values (a). The 
reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach's alpha values (a) of the factors are equal or above 
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0.68 for all factors. Factor 7 is low «0.68). This factor consists of two items. Although 
three items and above upon each factor is the best, two items are acceptable especially if they 
are very high loadings items (above 0.5) and theoretically related. This factor is acceptable 
because the two items are high loading and the theoretical structure of this factor is related to 
staffing dimension. Furthermore, various fit indices in CF A of the optimal model met with 
the agreed parameters. It is important to mention that it is possible that a set of items will be 
below 0.7 on Cronbach's alpha (a), yet various fit indices in confirmatory factor analysis will 
be above the cut off (usually 0.9) levels. Alpha may be low when there are fewer items in the 
dimension (Kline, 2005). The value ofCronbach's alpha (a) depends on the number of items 
on the scale. If a number of items on the scale are increased thus Cronbach's alpha (a) will 
increase. Therefore, it is possible to get a large value ofCronbach's alpha (a) because a lot of 
items are present, and not because a scale is reliable (Field, 2009). 
A number of studies found two items with low Cronbach's alpha (a). For example, the 
staffing dimension was 0.50 in Handler et al. (2006). Singer et aI's (2007) study found 
Cronbach's alpha (a) ranged from 0.50 to 0.89 across the factors. However, it seemed that 
the application of reliability analysis was conducted in a number of studies (e.g. Smits et aI., 
2008; Waterson et al.; 2009; Bodur and Filiz, 2010; Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). According 
to Field (2009) it is useful to check the reliability of the scale in validation studies. Moreover, 
the application of reliability analysis may also refer to the simplicity of the reliability 
procedure compared with the CF A procedure. 
In summary, the results of the EF A, CF A and reliability analysis indicate that eight factors 
solution is the optimal model of the current study. The composition of the optimal model 
was considered appropriate. The composition of the eight factors of the optimal model was 
similar to that of the American HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) because the 
main part of the eight factors structure was unchanged. It seems that the psychometric 
analysis strategy of the current study contributes to the knowledge of patient safety climate 
measurement in terms of using rigorous assessment of psychometric properties of the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire in new settings. Moreover, it seems that there are common 
dimensions of patient safety culture across different countries (at international level). The 
next section examines a number of validation approaches and optimal models in different 
contexts in order to identify if there is a common patient safety culture dimensions. 
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Validation studies and optimal models in different contexts 
The original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) has recently been validated in a 
number of different countries (e.g. the UK., Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey). Table 7-4 
presents approaches of validation of the HSOPSC questionnaire of the current study 
compared with these countries. 
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Table 7- 4 Approaches of validation of the HSOPSC 
Study 
Language 
Face validity· 
testing 
Testing 
original 
model 
Split data 
Optimal 
model 
Con finned 
optimal 
model 
Reliability 
analysis for 
optimal 
model 
Current study 
English 
Perfonned 
CFAwas 
conducted (a 
weak fit). 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated 
(Cronbach's alpha 
(a) was not 
satisfactory). 
Perfonned 
Eight factors 
CFAwas 
conducted. It was 
satisfactory fit. 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated with 
Cronbach's alpha 
(a). 
Chapter seven 
UK (Waterson 
et al., 2009) 
English 
Perfonned 
CFAwas 
conducted (a 
weak fit). 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated 
(Cronbach's 
alpha (a) was 
not satisfactory 
Perfonned 
Nine factors 
CFAwas 
conducted. It 
was satisfactory 
fit. 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated with 
Cronbach's 
alpha (a). 
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Netherlands Germany 
(Smits et al., (Pfeiffer and 
2008) Manser, 2010) 
Dutch Gennan 
Translation into Translation into 
Dutch Gennan 
CFA was CFA was 
conducted (not conducted (a 
satisfactory fit). weak fit. 
The internal The internal 
consistency was consistency was 
calculated calculated 
(Cronbach's (Cronbach's 
alpha (a) was alpha (a) was 
not satisfactory). Satisfactory 
scores). 
Not perfonned Not perfonned 
10 factors Eight factors 
CFA was not CFA was not 
conducted. conducted. 
The internal The internal 
consistency was consistency was 
calculated with calculated with 
Cronbach's Cronbach's 
alpha (a). alpha (a). 
Turkey (Bodur 
and Filiz, 2010) 
Turkish 
Translation into 
Turkish 
CFAwas 
conducted (a 
weak fit. 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated 
(Cronbach's alpha 
(a) was not 
satisfactory). 
Not perfonned 
11 factors 
CFA was not 
conducted. 
The internal 
consistency was 
calculated with 
Cronbach's alpha 
(a). 
Table 7-4 shows that studies are varied in terms of the extent validation approaches 
(psychometric assessment) conducted when using the HSOPSC questionnaire at an 
international level and assessing patient safety culture in different countries. However, there 
is adherence to recommended practice across these studies in terms of validation patient 
safety climate questionnaire including face validity testing, testing original model, split data, 
EF A, CF A and reliability analysis. 
It seems that each country has developed a somewhat different optimal model. Table 7-5 
shows the factor structure of the optimal model of the current study compared with optimal 
models that developed in these countries in addition to the original USA HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This comparison is aimed to identify the common 
dimension of patient safety culture across different countries. 
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Table 7- 5 Common patient safety culture dimensions across different countries 
Dimension Original The UK study Germany study Dutch Turkey study 
study current (Waterson (Pfeiffer and study (Bodur and Filiz, 
(Sorra study et al., 2009) Manser, 2010) (Smits 2010) 
and et al., 
Nieva, 2008), 
2004) 
Organisational 
.J .J .J 11 (Teamwork .J 
learning - within unit) 
continuous 
improvement 
Frequency of event 
.J 
reported 
Non punitive 
.J 
response to error 
Handoffs and .J 11 (Teamwork 
transitions across units) 
Teamwork within 
.J 
units 
Communication 
openness 
Supervisor 
expectation and 
action promoting 
patient safety 
Staffing 
.J .J .J 
Feedback and 
.J .JII .J .JII 
communication (Communication (Communication 
about error openness) openness) 
Management 
.J .J 11 (Teamwork 
support for patient across units) 
safety 
Overall perception 
.J "11 " 11 (Staffing) 
of patient safety (Staffing) 
Teamwork across 
.J 
" units 
Total number of 12 8 9 8 11 10 
dimension 
.JIndicates dimension is included 
11 Indicates two dimensions combined in one dimension. 
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Two dimensions were combined into one dimension (factor) in three studies. For example, 
"staffing" and "overall perception of safety" combined as one factor in the UK study 
(Waterson et aI., 2009). In the German study (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) "communication 
openness" and "feedback and communication about error" combined as one factor. 
"Organisational learning-continuous improvement" and "teamwork within units" also 
combined as one factor. "Staffing" and "overall perceptions of safety" combined as one 
factor. "Teamwork across units" and "handoffs and transitions" combined as one factor 
(Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). In the Turkish study, "hospital management support for patient 
safety" and "teamwork across units" combined as one factor. "Communication openness" 
and "feedback and communication" combined as one factor, while the other 8 factors work as 
separate factors (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). The current study has 8 factors and each factor 
works separately. Similarly the Dutch study has 11 factors and each factor works separately 
(Smits et aI., 2008). 
In three studies of the six studies in table 7-5, two dimensions combined in one dimension 
(items from two dimensions grouped together to form one dimension), still each dimension 
counts separately. Therefore, it appears that, there are a number of common dimension 
across these studies. The common patient safety culture dimensions at an intemationallevel 
are: 
1 Frequency of event reported. 
2 Non punitive response to error. 
3 Communication openness. 
4 Supervisor expectation and action promoting patient safety. 
5 Handoffs and transitions. 
6 Teamwork within units. 
7 Staffing. 
These dimensions are present in different countries, maybe because they are related to patient 
safety elements at an organisational level and not to patient safety practices at the individual 
level. Therefore, staff are varied in terms of their safe practice for patient care but they 
agreed about understanding the common dimensions of patient safety as organisational 
factors because safety climate is constituted by organisational factors (Neal et aI., 2000). 
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The system approach that is based on investigation of organisational factors which lead to 
errors is widely used in organisations and is becoming increasingly used in healthcare to 
improve patient safety (Currie and Watt, 2007). Thus, errors in organisations usually happen 
because of poorly designed systems rather than weakly performing workers (IOM, 2000). 
It appears that "teamwork across units", "overall perceptions of safety", "feedback and 
communication about error" and "management support for patient safety" were absent in the 
current study only, while, "organisational learning" was absent in two countries at the 
European level (UK and Netherlands). "Hospital management support for patient safety" 
was absent in the UK study and the current study. However, the common patient safety 
culture dimensions at the European level are: 
I Frequency of event reported. 
2 Non punitive response to error. 
3 Handoffs and transitions. 
4 Communication openness. 
5 Supervisor expectation and action promoting patient safety. 
6 Teamwork within units. 
7 Staffing. 
8 Overall perceptions of safety. 
9 Feedback and communication about error. 
10 Teamwork across units. 
However, it was difficult to identify the structure of these common dimensions across these 
countries because there was a lack of reporting of the structures of dimensions of some 
studies. Therefore, it was not possible to report and compare the structure of items and 
dimensions between these models in different countries. However, a number of studies 
mentioned that the composition of the dimensions of their optimal model was similar to that 
of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Smits et aI., 2008; Bodur and Filiz, 2010). This 
means, maybe, that the original model of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) 
was not succeeding in a number of countries but found some dimensions corresponding to 
those proposed for the original HSOPSC questionnaire. It seems that the absence of number 
of patient safety climate dimensions such as organisationalleaming-continuous improvement 
and hospital management support for patient safety disagree with a number of studies that 
reviewed a number of patient safety climate questionnaires. For example, Fleming (2005) 
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mentioned that organisational learning-continuous improvement and hospital management 
support for patient safety are reported as common dimensions in a number of patient safety 
climate questionnaires. Flin et al. (2006b) stated that management commitment to safety is 
the most common dimension in nine patient safety climate questionnaires. Singla et al. (2006) 
mentioned that most of the questionnaires included four dimensions. These were: 
management commitment to safety, communication openness, beliefs about causes of errors 
and teamwork. However, this disagreement across reviews may be expected because in these 
review papers they compared patient safety culture dimensions across a number of different 
patient safety climate questionnaires. Meanwhile, in the current study the patient safety 
culture dimensions of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) were compared 
across different countries to identify the common dimensions in different contexts. The 
difference arises because there are two different approaches to compare dimensions; one is 
comparing dimensions across different tools while the second is comparing dimensions of 
one tool across different countries. However, it is argued that there is a great value of 
comparing dimensions of one tool in different countries. 
Summary of developing an optimal model 
The current study is the first extensively validated study of a patient safety climate 
questionnaire in Saudi hospitals and it identifies the optimal model (eight factors) for 
assessing patient safety culture in Saudi Arabia. The current study indicated that the 
psychometric properties of the optimal model are good. The composition of the eight factors 
of the optimal model of the study was similar to that of the USA HSOPSC questionnaire· 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) because the main part of the eight factor structure was unchanged. 
In general, the structure of the optimal model of the current study was considered appropriate. 
At the international level, it seemed that the approach to identifying an optimal model in 
different countries (e.g. the UK, Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey) is varied. However, 
these countries did in general follow recommended practice in terms of psychometric analysis 
strategy (EF A, CF A and reliability applications). The composition of the factors of the 
optimal models varies from country to country. There are some dimensions and items of the 
original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) that are absent in each country. In 
addition, some dimensions combined into one dimension and some items shifted to other 
dimensions. However, it does seem that there are common dimensions of patient safety 
culture at an international level. The next section will address some methodological issues 
from the current study. 
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7.5 Methodological issues 
Negatively worded items 
According to Marsh (1996) when a questionnaire includes both negative and positive items, 
then the proportion of negatively and positively worded items should be relatively constant 
for each factor. This creates balance in a scale and this balance helps to establish distinction 
between different factors. Most patient safety climate questionnaires include both negative 
and positive items (Hutchinson et al., 2006). For example, the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire consists of 12 factors (four positive factors, one negative factor, and seven 
factors are a mixture of both negative items and positive items). In total, it consists of 18 
negative items and 24 positive items. The Teamwork and Safety Climate survey consists of 4 
negative items and 23 positive items. 
However, there is a debate in the literature regarding negatively and positively worded items 
that construct the factor structure of questionnaire. A number of studies argued that negative 
items correlate with positive items to form a separate factor (e.g. Spector et al., 1997). On the 
other hand, other studies argued that usually a minority of the items in most questionnaires 
are negative items and they are grouped together as a separate factor (e.g. Schmitt and Coyle, 
1976; Schmitt and Stults, 1985). A large body of literature indicates that separate factors are 
associated with negatively and positively worded items. In other words, negative items are 
grouped together (correlated with each other) and positive items are grouped together to form 
a separate factor (Marsh, 1996). 
The optimal model of the current study consists of both negative and positive items (nine 
negative items and 14 positive items). The optimal model consists of eight factors (three 
negative factors and five positive factors). Moreover, the negative items were grouped 
together in a number of dimensions such as "no punitive response to error", and "handoffs 
and transitions". The positive items were grouped together in a number of dimensions such 
. as "organisational learning-continuous improvement", "frequency of event reported" and 
"supervisors" (see table 6-39 page 216). This result is consistent with the views of Schmitt 
and Stults (1985); Marsh (1996); and Spector et al. (1997). 
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The results of the current study differ from the UK study conducted by Waterson et al. (2009), 
who found four factors in their optimal model (consisting of both negative and positive items) 
out of nine factors overall. In some studies negative items were not used in data analysis 
based on responses of respondents. For example, Hutchinson et al. (2006) found that a 
number of respondents in their study failed to recognise the negative items of the Teamwork 
and Safety Climate survey. Therefore, four negatively worded items were removed from the 
final stage of factor analysis. 
However, in the current study, it seemed that the respondents were able to distinguish 
between positive and negative items as mentioned in the face validity stage and the 
respondents did not experience difficult in interpreting negatively worded items. Therefore, 
it was decided that there was no need to direct participants' attention towards negative items 
by using a mark such as underlining. This finding was also reflected later in the 
psychometric analysis of negative items because the optimal model of the current study 
contains both negatively and positively worded items as separate factors and they did not 
cause problems in terms of interpreting the results. In general, the respondents in the current 
study distinguished between positively worded and negatively worded items and they 
succeeded to notice negatively worded items without any difficulty. Therefore, the 
negatively worded items were included in the factor analysis of the study. 
Reporting psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires 
In terms of reporting psychometric data, it seemed that there is a lack of reporting the 
psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires in the published literature, 
even though the need for analysing and reporting psychometric properties of patient safety 
climate questionnaires has been stressed by several authors (Nieva and Sorra, 2003; Colla et 
aI., 2005; Hutchinson et aI., 2006; Flin et aI., 2006b). According to Nieva and Sorra (2003) 
more evidence is needed in relation to reporting the psychometric analysis and data of patient 
safety climate questionnaires. In Singla et aI's (2006) review no psychometric testing had 
been reported for eight questionnaires from their review of 13 questionnaires. 
Similarly, Flin, et al. (2006b) mentioned that the main limitation of their review was the lack 
of provision of psychometric data in publication of results of patient safety questionnaire use. 
A possible explanation of this limitation might be due to complexity of factor analysis, 
especially confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Alternatively, it might be due to a misconception about assessing the psychometric properties 
of patient safety climate questionnaires in some studies, in particular, what psychometric 
analysis should be performed and how to report the psychometric data of questionnaires. It 
appears there is a need for better practice regarding psychometric properties of patient safety 
climate questionnaires in terms of reporting them properly. According to Flin et al. (2006b) 
it is becoming increasingly important to obtain information about the psychometric properties 
of patient safety climate questionnaires. Therefore, the psychometric analysis strategy of the 
current study was performed according to a recommended standard, to ensure a rigorous. 
scientific approach. Moreover, the current study reports the details about the assessment of 
the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire with the Saudi data. The next 
section will discuss the strengths and limitations of the current study. 
7.6 Study Strengths and limitations 
This study has some strengths and limitations that are discussed in this section. A mixed 
method approach was used. Initial assessment of the questionnaires was conducted. Three 
hospitals were included in the study for data collection, and 862 completed questionnaires 
were returned so the data was tested in a large sample. An intensive advanced psychometric 
assessment including EF A and CF A was performed. The rigorous psychometric analysis 
strategy was performed according to recommended practice to validate the psychometric 
properties of the HSOPSC questionnaire for use in Saudi hospitals. 
This study had a number of challenges such as time available for data collection; especially 
as the data collection was divided in two stages. Firstly, hospital agreements were obtained 
and 12 interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia. Then, the researcher returned to the place 
of the study (University of Sheffield in the UK) to discuss and to confirm the decisions and 
the results of the face validity stage with the supervisors before going back to Saudi Arabia to 
collect the data from Saudi hospitals. Secondly, the HSOPSC questionnaires (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) were distributed and collected in three hospitals in Saudi Arabia. All these 
stages lasted around six months. However, the most practical challenge of this study was 
achieving a high HSOPSC questionnaires return rate among hospitals staff. 
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The study encountered some challenges during the data collection stage. For example, 
summer holidays of staff during the data collection of the current study, shortage of staff in 
certain departments and a delay in ethics review in the third hospital due to the establishment 
of new regulations there. 
A theoretical challenge encountered in the current study was a lack of reporting of explicit 
psychometric data in some relevant studies used in the comparative analyses. The 
measurement of patient safety climate is a dynamic growing field and includes some 
limitations such as not reporting currently patient safety climate questionnaires under 
development but not published (Colla et aI., 2005). Some aspects of the questionnaires such 
as psychometric properties may have been performed but not yet published. Some versions 
of questionnaires are not available (Flin et aI., 2006b). 
The current study may not have included all relevant existing patient safety climate 
questionnaires in the literature review; however, it included the most widely used 
questionnaires which are representative of the patient safety climate questionnaires currently 
available in the published literature. Moreover, the current study discussed key studies that 
report data about the psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires. 
This research was carried out as a PhD project; therefore, all these stages were undertaken by 
the researcher. However, all the stages of the current study was discussed and supervised by 
research supervisors to ensure the quality of the study including developing the research 
question, aim and objectives, the methodology, the data collection and data analysis. 
The researcher received statistical analysis training and support course to aid with their 
psychometric analysis of the HSOPSC questionnaire. Written materials provided information 
on correlation, validity, reliability, data splitting, EFA and CFA. Workshops were also 
conducted on factor analysis (EFA and CFA) and the use of AMOS software was conducted. 
The course instructor explained how to undertake both EF A and CF A. The research was 
undertaken independently. Follow up meetings were held to ensure that the psychometric 
analysis (CF A and EF A) were performed correctly and satisfactorily and to discuss the 
results. 
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7.7 Summary of the main findings and impact of the study 
The current chapter offers a general overview of the most significant findings of the study 
and provides an interpretation of these findings in the context of the patient safety culture 
measurement. The originality and the research contributions of the study findings are 
discussed in this chapter. 
In general, the current study followed recommended practice in terms of assessing the 
psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires from key studies (e.g. 
Hutchinson et aI., 2006; Smits et aI., 2008; Waterson et aI., 2009; Bouder and Filiz, 20 10; 
Pfeiffcr and Manser, 2010). For example, the current study established the face validity of 
the two patient safety climate questionnaires for comparison (Hutchinson et aI., 2006). It also 
used CF A and reliability analysis when testing the original HSOPSC questionnaire in Saudi 
hospitals. A split half validation strategy (EF A followed by CF A) was performed as it is 
recommended by a number of studies for providing realistic results of the psychometric 
properties of patient safety climate questionnaires (e.g. Waters on et aI., 2009). Finally, an 
extensive EF A, CF A and reliability analysis was performed in order to identify the optimal 
model for Saudi hospitals. 
The current study provides four main findings. Firstly, in terms of the importance of face 
validity, the current study demonstrated that establishing face validity of a patient safety 
climate questionnaire is very important and an essential element before wider application in a 
new context. Secondly, the current study demonstrated that the factor structure of the 
original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (12 factors and 42 items) is not valid and reliable when 
used with the English language Saudi data collected in this study because the psychometric 
properties of the original HSOPSC questionnaire are not a satisfactory fit with the Saudi data. 
The original HSOPSC questionnaire may be effectively measuring different dimensions of 
patient safety culture within Saudi Arabia, as compared to the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
Therefore, the factor structure of the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) cannot be used with the Saudi data and the original USA HSOPSC model was not 
suitable for use in Saudi hospitals. 
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Thirdly, the results of psychometric analysis (EFA, CFA and Reliability analysis) showed 
that eight factors was the optimal model for the Saudi data. The optimal model could be used 
in Saudi hospitals to assess patient safety culture. Finally, the current study compared 
number of optimal models in different countries. The comparison shows the seven common 
patient safety culture dimensions in different contexts. The next chapter will provide the 
conclusion of the current study and recommendation for the future use of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis by summarising the key findings in relation to the research 
question, aim and objectives of the study. In section 8.2 the implications of the study are 
presented, including theoretical implications, practical implications and recommendations for 
future research of patient safety culture measurement, in particular, patient safety culture 
measurement in Saudi Arabia. Finally, in section 8.3 the conclusion of this chapter is 
provided. 
The current study investigated whether there was an existing patient safety climate 
questionnaire that would be suitable for assessing patient safety culture in hospitals in Saudi 
Arabia. The main aim of the study was to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient 
safety culture for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. In this investigation four main objectives 
needed to be met in order to achieve the aim of the study. The main objectives of the study 
were: 
1 To select an appropriate questionnaire to assess hospital patient safety culture. 
2 To evaluate the face validity of the selected patient safety climate questionnaire. 
3 To assess the psychometric properties of the selected patient safety climate 
questionnaire in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
4 To develop the most appropriate measure for assessing patient safety culture for use 
in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
In terms of achievement of the objectives, a mixed methods study design has been employed 
to identify a suitable patient safety climate questionnaire for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
The original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and Teamwork and Safety 
Climate Survey (Sexton et aI., 2004) were identified as appropriate questionnaires in the first 
stage of the research. The second objective was testing the face validity of the two 
questionnaires above for comparison. 
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The original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was the most appropriate 
questionnaire for use in the current study although some changes were made to the wording. 
Thirdly, this questionnaire was used to collect the data from three Saudi Arabian hospitals 
using 862 completed questionnaires, and finally, the evaluation of the psychometric 
properties of the HSOPSC using Saudi data. 
In terms of findings, the current study provides three main findings. Firstly, the current study 
demonstrated that establishing face validity of a patient safety climate questionnaire is very 
important and an essential element before the full application of a questionnaire. Secondly, 
the current study demonstrated that the factor structure of the original USA HSOPSC 
questionnaire (12 factors and 42 items) (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was not valid and reliable in 
Saudi hospitals. Thirdly, the current study developed an English language version of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire, consisting of eight patient safety culture dimensions, as an optimal 
model which can be used in Saudi hospitals for assessing patient safety culture. 
8.2 Implications of the study 
This research contributes to the measurement of patient safety culture in three ways: 
contribution to the current knowledge (theoretical implications), implications for practice and 
implications for future research (empirical implications). 
Contribution to the current knowledge 
In terms of theoretical implications, measuring safety climate in healthcare is still a 
developing science. Therefore, there is a need to measure patient safety climate in different 
healthcare environments carefully to avoid the risk of inappropriately applying patient safety 
climate questionnaires in a different environment (Waterson et al., 2009). The current study 
highlights the necessity of assessing the face validity of patient safety climate questionnaire 
before full application in different settings. It indicates that there is a need for caution in 
using the original English language version of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) in Saudi Arabia and underlines the importance of appropriate validation of patient 
safety climate questionnaires before extending their usage in healthcare contexts different 
from those in which they were developed. 
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The current study shows that the HSOPSC questionnaire may be measunng different 
dimensions of patient safety culture within Saudi Arabia, as compared to the USA (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004). In addition, the HSOPSC questionnaire may also be measuring different 
dimensions of patient safety culture within different countries such as the UK, Netherlands, 
Germany and Turkey as compared to the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Moreover, the 
current study provides international comparative information regarding the use of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire in different countries. This comparison has identified the seven 
common patient safety culture dimensions of this questionnaire across these countries. 
Implications for practice 
In terms of practical implications, based on this study, the original English language version 
of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) is not appropriate for use in Saudi 
hospitals, while the validated Saudi English language version of the HSOPSC questionnaire 
can be used to assess patient safety culture in the Saudi hospitals. The optimal model of the 
current study (Saudi English language version of the HSOPSC) demonstrates generally good 
psychometric properties. The eight factor structures of the Saudi and the American HSOPSC 
versions are reasonably consistent because the overall structure of eight factors is the same 
and the composition of dimensions is approximately similar. This study demonstrates that 
the Saudi English language version of the HSOPSC questionnaire is an appropriate patient 
safety climate questionnaire to assess patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals. 
Implications for future research 
Several areas for further research have emerged from the findings of the current study. In 
terms of empirical implications, the current study highlights that there is a weakness in 
reporting psychometric properties and psychometric analysis in the relevant literature. More 
safety climate questionnaire validation studies are needed that include the reporting of all the 
assessment data regarding the psychometric p,roperties of patient safety climate 
questionnaires. Additional studies on patient safety culture assessment in Saudi healthcare 
using the validated Saudi English language version of the questionnaire developed in the 
current study will help to provide better understanding of patient safety in Saudi Arabia. 
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8.3 Conclusion 
The current study is one of few studies to provide an evaluation of an American patient safety 
climate questionnaire using data from Saudi Arabia and applying a rigorous psychometric 
analysis strategy. It also appears to be the first study to identify the Saudi English language 
version of the HSOPSC questionnaire as the optimal model for assessing patient safety 
culture in Saudi hospitals. In conclusion, the findings of the current study contribute to the 
measurement of patient safety climate in healthcare organisations. Moreover, the current 
study established a basis for measuring the patient safety culture in Saudi hospitals, thereby 
potentially contributing to creating a safer environment for hospital patients in Saudi Arabia. 
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Appendix 1 Consent form 
Title of Project: An evaluation of a patient safety culture tool in Saudi Arabia 
Name of Researcher: Mamdooh Shrier Alonazi 
Participant Identification Number for this project: 
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated .. .... . .... ..... for the above project and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason. 
3. I understand that my responses will not be anonymised before analysis. 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access 
to my responses. 
4. I agree to take part in the above research project. 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Lead Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence or the participant 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Copies: Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written information provided 
to the participants. A copy for the signed and dated consent form should be placed in the project 's 
main record (e.g. a site file) , which must be kept in a secure location. 
The University of Sheffield 
Western Bank 
Sheffield 
S102TN 
UK 
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Appendix 2 Participant Information Sheet 
Research project title: An evaluation of a patient safety culture tool in Saudi Arabia 
Invitation to participate: 
You are being invited to take part in this PhD research project. It is important for you to 
understand why this research is being done and what it will involve before you consider your 
participation. Please read the following information, which explains the purpose of this 
research and what participation will involve and you may discuss this with others if you wish. 
If you would like further information or you have questions, please contact the researcher. 
You will be given a period of 5-7 days to decide whether or not you wish to participate. 
Thank you for reading this information. If you decide to participate, you will be given a copy 
of this information sheet and your signed consent form. 
Purpose of the research: 
The purpose of this research is to identify a suitable measure for assessing patient safety 
culture for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The methods that will be used to collect the 
information include interviews and questionnaires related to the development of the patient 
safety culture tool. It is expected that data collection will be undertaken over a period of five 
months. 
Why have I been chosen? 
The participants in this study are frontline healthcare providers (doctors and nurses). 
Therefore, you have been selected because you are one of the doctors or the nurses in the 
hospital. You would be one of a total of twelve doctors and nurses helping with this part of 
the study. 
A-2 
Do I have to participate? 
No, it is up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part. If you decide to take part 
you will be given this infonnation sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent fonn. 
Even after deciding to take part in this research, you are still free to withdraw from the 
research at any point in time and without giving a reason. If you decide to participate in the 
interviews we will ask you not to take part in completing the questionnaires. 
What will happen to me if I participate? 
If you decide to participate then you will be interviewed in an informal conversational style. 
The researcher will ask you to sign a consent form. Then the researcher will organise an 
interview schedule. The interview will last about 50 to 60 minutes, you will fill in the 
questionnaire (Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire) and notes will be 
taken by the researcher during the interview. Three questions will be asked for each item of 
the questionnaire: 
Q 1: Is the wording of the item clear for you? 
Q2: What does the item mean to you? 
Q3: Do you find the item easy or difficult to understand? 
The interview will be conducted in a private office and everything said and written during the 
interview will remain in confidence. There is no potential for physical and/or psychological 
harm / distress to participants during the research. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge base by investigating the suitability of an 
appropriate patient safety culture measure for use in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. It is hoped 
that the knowledge generated will contribute to the literature on the measurement of the 
. patient safety culture, in particular in Saudi Arabia. There are no direct benefits to you. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be published in the PhD thesis. No named information about you will be 
mentioned in the thesis. 
A-3 
Will my taking part in this research be kept confidential? 
All of the data that will be collected will be securely stored by the researcher. The interviews 
notes will be disposed of 24 months after the researcher receives the PhD degree. The 
computer used for analysing the data will be password protected. Research notes will be 
stored in a locked filing cabinet in an office that is locked. Your anonymity and 
confidentiality will be preserved at all times. Access to the research data is limited to the 
research team, which include the supervisors of this research and the researcher (Professor 
AlIen Hutchinson, Dr. Jenny Freeman, Dr. Rachel O'Hara and Mr Mamdooh Shereir 
Alonazi). 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is part of the PhD studies and no organisation is involved in funding. 
Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
The research has been scientifically reviewed by the University of Sheffield, School of 
Health and Related Research in the United Kingdom. It has also been reviewed and approved 
by the School of Health and Related Research Ethics Committee. In addition, it has been 
reviewed by the Medical and Health Sciences Research Centre at King Abdul-Aziz Medical 
City and Research department at King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
Contact for further information: 
Should you need more information you can contact the supervisors of the research and the 
researcher: 
1. Professor Allen Hutchinson 
Professor in Public Health 
School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR) 
Section of Public Health 
Regent Court, 30 Regent Street 
Sheffield, SI 4DA, UK 
Tel: +44 1142220813 
Emai1: Allen.hutchinson@sheffield.ac.uk 
A-4 
2. Dr. Jenny Freeman 
School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR) 
Section of Health Services Research 
Telephone: (+44) (0) 1142220695 
Fax: (+44) (0) 1142220749 
Email: j.v.freeman@sheffield.ac.uk 
3. Dr. Rachel O'Hara 
School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR) 
Section of Public Health 
Regent Court, 30 Regent Street 
Sheffield, SI 4DA 
Tel: +44 1142220680 
Emai1: r.ohara@sheffieId.ac.uk 
4. Mamdooh Sherier Alonazi 
PhD student in 
Section of Public Health 
TeI: [in Saudi Arabia+966505386492] [in the U.K+447735627677] 
Email: M.Alonazi@sheffieId.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in the research. 
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Appendix 3 Original Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Survey 
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and event reporting in your 
hospital and will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. 
• An "event" is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or deviation, 
regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm. 
• "Patient safety" is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries · or 
adverse events resulting from the processes of healthcare delivery. 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
In this survey, think of your "unit" as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you 
spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services 
What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Mark ONE answer by filling in the circle. 
l11a. Many different hospital units/No specific unit 
[1] b. Medicine (non-surgical) 11I g. Intensive care unit (any type) 11I1. Radiology 
111 c. Surgery 11I h. Psychiatry/mental health 11I m. Anaesthesiology 
111 d. Obstetrics 11I i. Rehabilitation 11I n. Other, please specify 
111 e. Pediatrics 11I j . Pharmacy 
[1] f. Emergency department [1J k. Laboratory 
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Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your work area/unit. 
Mark your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Think about your hospital work area/unit Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1. People support one another in this unit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
2. We have enough staff to handle the workload [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
work together as a team to get the work done 
4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect. (1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
for patient care 
6. We are actively doing things to improve patient (1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
safety 
7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is best [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
for patient care 
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
them 
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
don't happen around here 
11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
others help out 
12. When an event is reported, it feels like the [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
person is being written up, not the problem 
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SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
Think about your hospital work area/unit 
Strongly 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 
13. After we make changes to improve patient [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
14. We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, [1] [2] (3) (4) [5] 
too quickly 
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more [1] [2] [3) [4] [5] 
work done 
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in [1] [2] (3) [4] [5] 
their personnel file 
17. We have patient safety problems in this unit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
18. Our procedures and systems are good at [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
preventing errors from happening 
SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager 
please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your immediate 
supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report. Mark your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Strongly 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 
1- My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] patient safety procedures 
2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
3. Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] even if it means taking shortcuts 
4 . My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
problems that happen over and over 
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SECTION C: Communications 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? Mark your answer by filling in the 
brackets. 
Think about your hospital work area/unit 
1. We are given feedback about changes put into 
place based on event reports 
2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something 
that may negatively affect patient care 
3. We are informed about errors that happen in 
this unit 
4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or 
actions of those with more authority 
5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors 
from happening again 
6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when something 
does not seem right 
SECTION 0: Frequency of Events Reported 
Never Rarely 
[1] (2) 
[1] (2) ' 
[1) (2) 
[1) (2) 
[1) (2) 
[1] (2) 
Most of Some 
the Always 
times 
time 
[3] [4] [5] 
[3] (4) (5) 
(3) (4) (5) 
[3] (4) [5] 
[3] [4] [5] 
[3] [4] [5] 
In your hospital work area/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they reported? Mark 
your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Most Some 
Never Rarely 
times 
of the Always 
time 
1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and 
Corrected before affecting the patient, how [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
often is this reported 
2. When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often is [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
this reported 
3. When a mistake is made that could harm 
the patient, but does not, how often is this [1) [2] [3] [4] [5] 
reported? 
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SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. Mark ONE answer. 
A B c D E 
Excellent Very Good Acceptable Poor Failing 
SECTION F: Your Hospital 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your hospital. Mark 
your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Think about your hospital 
1. Hospital management provides a work climate 
that promotes patient safety 
2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with each 
other 
3. Things "fall between the cracks" when 
transferring patients from one unit to another 
4. There is good cooperation among hospital units 
that need to work together 
5. Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes 
6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from 
other hospital units 
7. Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[1] 
[1] 
[1] 
[1] 
[1] 
[1] 
[1] 
A-IO 
Disagree 
[2] 
[2] 
[2] 
[2] 
[2] 
[2] 
[2] 
Neither Agree 
[3] [4] 
[3] [4] 
[3] [4] 
[3] [4] 
[3] [4] 
[3] [4] 
[3] 
Strongly 
Agree 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
8. The actions of hospital management show that 
patient safety is a top priority [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
9. Hospital management seems interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] happens 
10. Hospital units work well together to provide the 
best care for patients [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
11. Shift changes are problematic for patients in this 
hospital [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
SECTION G: Number of Events Reported 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? Mark ONE answer . 
[l] a. No event reports [l] d. 6 to 10 event reports 
[l] b. 1 to 2 event reports [l] e. 11 to 20 event reports 
[l] c. 3 to 5 event reports [l] f. 21 event reports or more 
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SECTION H: Background Information 
This information will help in the analysis of the survey results. Mark ONE answer by filling in the circle. 
1. What is your staff position in this hospital? Mark ONE answer that best describes your staff position. 
[1] a. Physician in training 
[1] b. Physician (general physician) 
[1] c. Resident physician 
[1] d. Specialist 
III e. Consultant 
[1] f. Professor 
2. What is your gender? 
[1] a. Male 
3. What is your nationality? 
III a. Saudi 
4. What is your educational level? 
III a. PhD 
III b. Master degree 
III c. Bachelor degree 
III d. Diploma 
[1] g. Head nurse 
[1] h. Registered nurse 
111 i. Other, please specify: ................... .... . 
III b. Female 
III b. Non-Saudi, please specify: ................ .. 
111 e. other, Please specify ...................................... . 
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5. How long have you worked in this hospital? 
111 a. Less than 1 year [l] d. 11 to 15 years 
111 b. 1 to 5 years [l] e. 16 to 20 years 
111 c. 6 to 10 years [l] f. 21 years or more 
6. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit? 
111 a. Less than 1 year [l] d. 11 to 15 years 
111 b. 1 to 5 years 111 e. 16 to 20 years 
111 c. 6 to 10 years 111 f . 21 years or more 
7. Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
111 a. Less than 20 hours per week [l] d. 60 to 79 hours per week 
III b. 20 to 39 hours per week [l] e. 80 to 99 hours per week 
III c. 40 to 59 hours per week 111 f. 100 hours per week or more 
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8. In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients? 
[l] a. YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients 
[l] b. NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients 
9. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession? 
[l] a. Less than 1 year [l] d. 11 to 15 years 
[l] b. 1 to 5 years [l] e. 16 to 20 years 
[l] c. 6 to 10 years [l] f. 21 years or more 
SECTION I: Your Comments 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or event reporting in your hospital. 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix 4 Teamwork and Safety Climate 
Please answer the following items with respect to your specific unit or clinical area. Choose your 
responses using the scale below: 
Teamwork climate 
No Item Disagree Disagree neutral Agree Agree Not 
slightly s lightly trongly Applicable 
trongly 
I Nurse input is well received in this 
clinical area. 
2 In this clinical area, it is difficult to 
speak up if I perceive a problem with 
patient care . 
3 Decision-making in this clinical area 
utilizes input from relevant personnel. 
4 The physicians and nurses here work 
together as a well-coordinated team. 
S Disagreements in this clinical area are 
resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is 
right, but what is best for the patient). 
6 I am frequently unable to express 
disagreement with the attending/staff 
physicians here. 
7 It is easy for personnel here to ask 
questions when there is something 
that they do not understand. 
8 I have the support I need from other 
personnel to care for patients. 
9 I know the first and last names of all 
the personnel I worked with during 
my last shift. 
10 Important issues are well 
communicated at shift changes. 
11 Briefing personnel before the start of 
a shift (i.e., to plan for possible 
contingencies) is important for patient 
safety. 
12 Briefings are common in this clinical 
area . 
13 I am satisfied with the quality of 
collaboration that I experience with 
staff physicians in this clinical area. 
14 I am satisfied with the quality of 
collaboration that I experience with 
nurses in this clinical area . 
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Safety climate 
15 The levels of staffing in this clinical 
area are sufficient to handle the 
number of patients. 
16 I would feel safe being treated here as 
a patient. 
17 I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any patient safety concern I 
may have . 
18 . Personnel frequently disregard rules 
or guidelines (e.g., hand-washing, 
treatment protocols/clinical pathways, 
sterile field, etc.) that are established 
for this clinical area. 
19 The culture in this clinical area makes 
it easy to learn from the errors. 
20 I receive appropriate feedback about 
my performance. 
21 Medical errors are handled 
appropriately here. 
22 I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety in 
this clinical area. 
23 In this clinical area, it is difficult to 
discuss errors. 
24 Hospital management does not 
knowingly compromise the safety of 
patients. 
25 This institution is doing more for 
patient safety now, than it did one 
year ago. 
26 Leadership is driving us to be a safety-
centred institution. 
27 My suggestion about safety would be 
acted upon if I expressed them to 
management. 
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Background information: 
1. What is your staff position in this hospital? Mark ONE answer that best describes 
your staff position. 
O. Physician in training O. Head nurse 
O. Physician (general physician) O. Registered nurse 
O. Resident physician O. other, please specify: 
O. Specialist 
o Consultant 
O. Professor 
2 What is your gender? 
O.Male 
O. Female 
3 What is your nationality? 
O. Saudi 
O. non-Saudi, please specify ........................................................... . 
4 Experience in organisation 
O. Less than 6 months 
0.6 to 11 months 
O. 1 to 2 years 
0.3 to 7 years 
O. 8 to 12 years 
O. 13 to 20 years 
0.21 or more 
5 How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit? 
O. a. Less than 1 year 
O. b. 1 to 5 years 
O. c. 6 to 10 years 
O. d. 11 to 15 years 
O. e. 16 to 20 years 
O. f. 21 years or more 
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6 Unit clinical area: please write in your unit 
title/location: .... . ....................................... .. 
7 What is your educationallevel? 
O. PhD degree 
O. Master degree 
O. Bachelor degree 
O. Diploma degree 
O. e other, please specify 
8 In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with 
patients? 
O. YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients 
O. NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients 
9 Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
O. Less than 20 hours per week O. 60 to 79 hours per week 
O. 20 to 39 hours per week O. 80 to 99 hours per week 
0.40 to 59 hours per week O. 100 hours per week or more 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix 5 University ethics approval 1 
Our ref: /CAO 
DATE 
Mamdooh Alonazi 
ScHARR 
Dear Mamdooh, 
The 
University 
Of 
Sheffield. 
CheryJ Oliver 
Ethics Committee Administrator 
Regent Court 
30 Regent Street 
Sheffialrl Sl 4DA 
Telephone: +44 (0) 114 2220871 
Fax: +44 (0) 114 272 4095 (non confidential) 
Email: c.a.oliver@sheffield.ac. uk 
An evaluation of a patient culture tool in Saudi Arabia 
Thank you for submitting the above research project for approval by the ScHARR Research 
Ethics Committee. On behalf of the University ethics reviewers who reviewed your project, I 
am pleased to inform you that the project was approved. 
If during the course of the project you need to deviate significantly from the documents you 
submitted for review, please inform me since written approval will be required. 
Yours sincerely 
c ·-·,·, 
\ ''--..!-
, .... \, ,~-
Cheryl Oliver 
Ethics Committee Administrator 
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Appendix 6 University ethics approval 2 
Our ref: leAo 
16 June 09 
Mamdooh Alonazi 
ScHARR 
Dear Mamdooh, 
The 
University 
Of 
Sheffield. 
Cheryl Oliver 
Ethics COlluuittee Administrator 
Regent Court 
30 Regent Street 
Sheffield Si 4DA 
Telephone: +44 (0) 114 2220871 
Fax: +44 (0) 114272 4095 (non confidential) 
Email: c.a.oliver@sheffield.ac.uk 
An evaluation of a patient culture tool in Saudi Arabia 
Thank you for the additional papers you have submitted to Jennifer Burr. 
ScHARR ethics has looked through the changes and is happy to approve the amendment. 
Please note this does not replace the ethical approval that you may require from the King Fahad 
Hospital in Saudi Arabia. 
Yours sincerely 
Cheryl Oliver 
Ethics Committee Administrator 
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Appendix 7 Research ethics review 
Research ethics review was required from the School of Health and Related Research at the 
University of Sheffield. Thereafter, ethics review and agreements were sought from the three 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
Ethics in School of Health and Related Research 
The first stage involved ethical approval from the University of Sheffield. The present study 
followed the university ethics review procedure ('UER Procedure') from the School of Health 
and Related Research at the University of Sheffield as follows: 
Scientific Review 
The study was reviewed not only in terms of ethical aspects, but also from scientific quality 
such as the methodology and strategy of data analysis. Therefore, this stage involved the 
scientific review and the ethics approval in March-April 2009. As a starting point, the 
scientific review document was sent to the two scientific reviewers in the School of Health 
and Related Research on 4th March 2009. Once the feedbacks received from the scientific 
peer review, the following suggestions have been taken into account and acted upon. 
Reviewer 1: 
The application should be approved with the suggested, optional amendments as follows: 
1. Clarifying as to whether the patient safety tool is to be used only in English with 
English speaking staff or whether it will be used in translation. 
2. Providing copies of consent forms and information sheets to demonstrate how the 
confidentiality of interviews will be assured. 
3. Clarifying the differences between the two hospitals particularly in terms of the 
justification of conducting the interviews in only one hospital. 
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Reviewer 2: 
The study is well thought out and scientifically sounds. The application should be approved 
with the suggested optional amendments as follows: 
1. Will the questionnaire be in English or will it need to be translated? Suggested that it 
will need to be clarified in the protocol. 
2. Suggestion that the cover letter is printed on the same document as the questionnaire, 
or that information is included directly on the questionnaire about how to return it. 
3. Will the student undertake the factor analysis and if so will he have access to a 
statistician to advise him on this? 
4. There are two potential scenarios described for the factor analysis. The suggestion is 
that there is a lack of clarity about the first stage and the second stage of the proposed 
analytical strategy (which stage comes first?), but it is also strongly recommended to 
check with a statistician with expertise in factor analysis. 
5. Re-time schedule between the interviews and questionnaires, ensuring that enough 
time is allowed for making and agreeing changes to the questionnaires and then 
getting them printed. 
6. Ensure identification in advance of somewhere In Saudi Arabia to get the 
questionnaires printed. 
Ethics Review 
After all the comments of the scientific reviewers were considered to account and acted upon. 
The protocol includes the University Research Ethics Application Form, the Interview 
Consent Form and Participant Information Sheet (see appendix 4). The protocol then was 
submitted to the ethics administrator at School of Health and Related Research on 1 i h March 
2009 to obtain ethics approval for the study. The ethics reviewer's comments indicated the 
need for some work before approval can be given, these comments were as follows: 
1. Application form [We have made the changes you resolved, please see the responses 
below and changes in documentation]. 
2. Start date of project is stated as in 2007 (presumably the start of the PhD). We cannot 
give retrospective ethical permission to proceed, so this should be changed [The date 
has been changed] 
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3. In stage 1 there should be a clear statement about the balance between nurses and 
doctors in the interview sample? (It may mean 12 doctors and 12 nurses or 6 of each, 
etc.). There should be a statement if more than 12 or 24 volunteer after reading the 
information how selection and rejection will be handled [It has been clarified] 
4. For stage 1 in the application form it needs to be clear what the doctor/nurse docs 
once they decide whether to participate. It is also not clear how the 12 participants 
are selected or what happens if they refuse [I have clarified] 
5. Needs to be clear that those who have taken part in Stage 1 will be asked not to take 
part in Stage 2 (Information sheet) [We have mentioned it in information sheet] 
6. In A9.1 it should state there is an opportunity for the participant to ask questions?! 
(see covering letter)[we have done this] 
7. In Ala it states data 'will be saved securely on the managed desktop at the university 
and be password protected during the study period' ; There must be a statement that 
explains what happens to the data after the study.[We have mentioned what will 
happen to the data and the period in application form] 
8. Not clear from the application whether the student would, in his normal capacity, 
have access to the hospital administration. If not then he should not expect to access 
the personal details for staff through this system and should request that this 
information be obtained, and letters circulated to staff, on his behalf. Please 
confirm.[The local research ethics and scientific committee approval in each hospital 
will enable the student to approach member of staft] 
9. Covering letter Change "I would be grateful if you would take a few minutes ....... " 
to "I would be grateful if you would volunteer to take a few minutes ....... " - there is 
nothing to clearly indicate participation is voluntary. There should be some indication 
that as many 300 participants are sought.(We have done this] 
10. Information sheet. Somewhere the potential participants should be told that they 
would be 1 of 12 or 24 people helping with this part of the study. Also should mention 
right to withdraw at any time.[ It has been done] 
11. Those who have taken part in Stage 1 should be asked not to take part in Stage 2 (see 
comment above)[ It has been done] 
12. In the information sheet specify what the doctor/nurse should do when they decide to 
participate in the interview. Some indication of the type of interview questions 
expected is necessary[ We mentioned it] 
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13. Under 'What will happen ifI take part', there is reference to a questionnaire. Is this a 
different questionnaire to the one being circulated later in the study? If so we would 
need a copy. If it's the same one please could this be clarified [The questionnaire 
mentioned is the same questionnaire] 
14. Questionnaire. Reformat questionnaire, as currently several questions go across 2 
pages and this means that they are difficult to compete e.g. section D, H6 etc.[We 
have made some formatting changes but further work required after the interview 
stage] 
15. Consent form. The following should be resolved and amendments made as necessary. 
Although item 3 evidently implies that at least the researcher will collect participant 
identifiable data they are not given permission to have access to it by the participant 
ticking the box! The questionnaire as it stands has no name on it so at the point of 
collection it could be anonymised. If the latter is the case and also in recording what 
happens during the interview the researcher does not record the name of the 
participant (other than on the consent form) then item 3 could stand as worded. 
However this does raise the issue that if the data is anonymous at the point of 
collection then it cannot subsequently be withdrawn from the study (if a participant 
decides to withdraw). It could be argued that participants should be told that once 
anonymised their data can no longer be removed from the study. [Item three has been 
changed on the interview consent form]. 
The above suggestions have been taken into account and acted upon and the documentation 
has resubmitted on 7/4/2009 to get the ethical approval from the ethics committee in the 
School of Heath and Related Research at the University of Sheffield. Finally, the study was 
approved (See copy of ethics approval in appendix 2). 
Ethics and agreements in Saudi hospitals 
The second stage was the hospitals' approval to conduct the study. Communication has been 
established with the research centres in the three hospitals in Riyadh for ethics application 
forms and regulations (instructions) for research requirements to obtain their agreement to 
undertake the survey as follows: 
1. Institutional Review Board Committee of the Research Centre, King Fahad Hospital 
(submitted on April 2009) 
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2. Research department in King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre 
(submitted on April 2009) 
3. Institutional Review Board of the King Fahad Medical City (submitted on June 2009) 
The proposal was submitted to the three research centres above in hospitals in Riyadh in 
Saudi Arabia. These hospitals are the largest tertiary hospitals in terms of bed capacity and 
workforce in Saudi Arabia. 
This task started on 11 April 2009 by preparing research proposal and the application form of 
King Fahad Hospital. The researcher completed the application form according to the 
general instructions of the research centre of the hospital. After that the proposal and all 
relevant forms were completed and submitted to the Medical & Health Sciences Research 
Centre (MHSRC) in King Fahad Hospital to obtain a reference number for the study. 
Thereafter it was forwarded to the Research Committee meeting and Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) for peer review and discussion. Finally, the decision approving the proposal 
was made by the Chairman of the Research Committee (See appendices for the copy of the 
approval letter from Institutional Review Board of King Abdullah International Medical & 
Health Sciences Research Centre). 
King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (KFSH&RC) was the second hospital on 
14/4/2009. According to the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre's 
guidelines and instructions for submission of research proposals, the researcher must have 
successfully completed the National Institute of Health (NIH) Web based training course 
"Protecting Human Research Participants" which was done on 22/3/2009 (see appendix for 
the copy of the certificate). Then the principal investigator was identified. Subsequently, the 
research proposal· format and the application form were completed. The principal 
investigator submitted the proposal with all relevant forms to the Office of Research Affairs 
(ORA). This office screened the proposal for compliance with submission guidelines, then 
forwarded it for peer review and sent it to the appropriate research committee for evaluation. 
There was a delay in obtaining the ethical approval because of the establishment of a new 
research committee there, once the new committee members were designated the proposal 
has submitted. However below is a time history of the research. "An Evaluation of Patient 
Safety Culture Tool in Saudi Arabia". 
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20 April 2009: Proposal submitted to the Research Advisory Council, King Faisal Specialist 
Hospital and Research Centre for evaluation. 02 May 2009: Proposal forwarded to the 
Research Ethics Committee (REC). 04 May 2009: approved by the REC through the review 
process. 18 May 2009: Scheduled for discussion by the Clinical Research Committee (CRC) 
on next meeting. 26 May 2009: Proposal discussed by CRC - some clarifications were 
requested from the investigator. The clarification was provided and the proposal was 
scheduled for discussion again by the CRC. However, this may take some time due to the 
change of the membership of the Research Advisory Council Supporting Committees. After 
that, the proposal of the study was reviewed and approved by two committees, Research 
Ethics Committee (RE C) and Clinical Research Committee (CRC). Finally, the decision 
approving the proposal was made by the Research Advisory Council (See appendices for the 
copy of the approval letter from the Research Advisory Council, King Faisal Specialist 
Hospital and Research Centre). 
The third hospital was King Fahad Medical City Riyadh, Saudi Arabia approached on 
6/6/2009. The proposal and relevant forms were submitted to the External Research Review 
Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional Review Board in King Fahad Medical City. 
The proposal was reviewed by the External Research Review Committee after that the 
principal investigator was informed the proposal has approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (See appendices for the copy of the approval letter from Institutional Review Board of 
the King Fahad Medical City). 
It is important to mention that time is an important factor in the fieldwork of the study. 
Therefore, the face validity interviews were held in the hospital which issued its agreement 
the first. King Fahad Hospital was the first one where the interviews were conducted. 
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Appendix 8 King Fahad National Guard Hospital agreement 
I ·H;'<1i·t4:~fllir." ~~tiv .. Office . 4~19!~JI~d~~~~~a.lc}i_.,.~~~j~09: , 
National Guard-Health Affair-s·-· · __ ·- _.-
King Abdulaziz :\<ledi cal City 
~.l~1 ~.ra.J1 UL..I.I 
~J u.,~1 - .,jW,joJ1 U"'~I 
~1.J.:!.,:..o.JI~..:W.J ~,l.O 
(~ f?:>p, r\~. ~l Institutional Review Board ~~ 16586/ 16669 tt:SI1515 ~V16567 ~CLNReseorChl @ngho .mAd .SO 
... ........... ........ ... .......... ..... ..... ... ... .. .. .......... ... ....... ..... 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: (G) 14 April 2009 
(H) 18 Rabi'1I1430 
Ref. #: IRBC/021/09 
To: Mr. Mamdooh Sherier Alonazi 
PhD Student 
University of Sheffield U.K. 
Subject: Protocol RC09/015 - "An Evaluation of a Patient Safety Culture Tool In Saudi 
Arabia 
This is in reference to your subject proposal, which has been expedited reviewed by the IRB 
on 14th of April 2009. Upon recommendation of the Research Committee, and following the 
review of the IRB on the ethical aspects of the proposal, you are granted permission to 
conduct your study. 
Your research proposal is approved for one year commencing from the above date with the 
following conditions: 
TERMS OF APPROVAL: 
1. Annual Reports: Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission 
of an Annual Report. Please provide KAIMRC with an Annual Report determined by 
the date of your letter of approval. 
2. Amendments to the approved project: Changes to any aspect of the project require 
the submission of a Request for Amendment to KAIMRC and must not begin without an 
approval from KAIMRC. Substantial variations may require a new application. 
3. Future correspondence: Please quote the project number and project title above in 
any further correspondence. 
4. Monitoring: Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by 
KAIMRC at any time. 
5. Retention and storage of data: The PI is responsible for the storage and retention of 
original data pertaining to a project for a minimum period of five years. 
Prof. Amin Kashmeery 
Head, Biomedical Ethics Section 
National Guard Health Affairs 
1'. O. BoxN!4<Jt1,iltiY'dh 11426 
TeJ. 2520088 
Telex : 41134~O '1GR"1 EO SJ 
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Appendix 9 Support letter from Associate Executive Director of Nursing department 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
National Guard-Health AmliJ-s 
King Abdulaziz Medical City 
NURSING SERVICES 
Reference: NSG.JM152.09 
DATE: 19 May 2009 
Memorandum 
TO : Mr. Mandooh Sherler Alonazl 
PHD Student. University of ~heffleld , UNK 
FROM: Rob Hemmelder 
(A) Associate E1<ee...tii4~~:tr 
----~ ..--
SUBJECT: Research Survey -
~.l~1 ~."aJ 1 ~I 
~I ~,j..!J\ - ~JlI ...,....r-J1 
~I .J:>jsJl~.:ill.1 a..:.:.l4 
"An Evaluation of a Patient Safety Culture Tool in Saudi Arabia" 
Ref: IPRCl021109 
----- ------------
Attached is the above referenced memorandum confirming the approval of the Research Committee for 
you to conduct the above research survey in KAMC-Rlyadh . 
We support your request to conduct this research survey; and in view thereof, you are authorized to 
coordinate with the nursing leadership and staff to "face validate" your tool and distribute your research 
questionnaire In the clinical units I wards. 
Best regards. 
J M/ml 
Cc: H.E. Or. Bandar AJ Knawy. Chief Executive Officer, NGHA 
Mr. Abdullah AJ Aamer, Executive DireC1or, Operal/on. 
Or. Mohammed AI Jumah, Execulive Director, KAIMRC 
Dlrector1 . Clinical Nursing 
Att: IPRCI021 /09 
File: Research 
Chrono 
1E11522 'I!i +9661·2520088 ext I1584/12818/ 11882 / 11780 
P. O. Bux 22490, Riyndh 11426 
Td. 25200118 
Tdts : 403450 NGRMIiD S-l 
I.:FH·t. tAJERIA1.S 14;?4 (1)51%) (ORACLE.297.95) 
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Appendix 10 Support letter from Chairman of Surgery department 
Department of Surgery 
Office of the Chairman 
REr 036-05 ·2009rvs 
DATE: 18 ~Iay 2009 
23 )umada I 1430 
TO 
FROM 
M;EMOR'A,N'DUM 
ALL DIVISION HEADS (as pe r d istri bution list) 
Department of Surgery 
National Guard Health Affairs 
Department of Surgery \\. _ _ /' 
National Guard Health Affairs\, \~ 
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
NATIONAL GUARD HEALTH AFFAIRS 
KING ABDULAZIZ MEDICAL crN 
KING FAHAD HOSPITAL 
SUBJECT 
DR. SALEH AL AZZAM d Chairman 
RESEARCH PROJECT, AN EVALUATION OF A PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE 
TOOL IN SAUDI ARABIA BY MR MANDOOH SHERIER LONAZI 
Please be advised that Mr. Mandooh Alonazi has the approval of the CEO to conduct research on the above 
mentioned subject, which consists of two parts : 
1) Interview 
2) Filling up questionnaire 
The first part which Is the Interview is conducted by Mr. Mandooh Alonazl over 50-60 minutes, th is Interview is 
confidential and if you are willing to partici pate It Will be carried out at your convenient time and location and 
the Information obtained Will help the principle 's investigation in his theSis for PhD please see attached form if 
you do agree to participate, please sign below as follows: 
Agree o No o Yes, if yes please complete at your conven ience. 
Date : . ___ ____ _ Location : ______ _ 
I look for\'vard to your support and) thank you for taking time to read and participate in either the Interview, the 
quest ionnaire or both, for any further Information please contact Mr. Mandooh Alonazl, please see attached 
form. 
Notice : Please drop your response in the box assigned for thiS proJect In the Department of Surgeries office. 
Kind regards, 
Distribution L ist : 
I. Dr. Khal id AI Mazrou, Head , DiviSion of ENT Surgery 
2. Dr. Khalld AI Bedah, Head, DIVision of General Surgery 
J. Dr. NevlIIe Russell, Head, DIVISion of Neurosurgery 
4. Dr. Khalld AI Jobalr, Head, DiviSion of Ophthalmology Surgery 
5. Dr. Othman AI Tuwairg l, Head, Division of Oral and M~xl llofacla l Surgery 
6. Dr. Ahmad AI Khela lfl, Head , DIVision of Orthopcd,c Surgery 
7. Dr. ~lohammed AI Namshan, Head, Divls on of Pedlalnc Surgery 
8. Dr. Abdullah AI Thunyan, Head, DIVis ion of PlastiC Surgery 
9. Dr:.Mohammed AI Abdulatief, Head, o.lv.!E~n ofT . ..chc::0:;.ra::.;c::.;lc:o..::S,::u"'rg""e:;.ry!..-. __________________ _ 
Admlnislratlv8 Assistant 1 Ronel ex\, 14118 
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Appendix 11 King Fahad Medical City agreement 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Health 
King Fahad Medical (it 
Dear Mr Mamdooh AlOnazi, 
~~,...Jt ~J&!' m.1. 
~1;;J!iJ 
~I ~1!L1.t1~oJ,..t 
June 16, 2009 
ERRC Number: 09-013 
It is my pleasure to inform you that the External Research Review Committee, a subcommittee of the 
Institutional Review Board , has approved your study titled : "Evaluation of a Patient Safety Culture Tool 
in Saudi Arabia". 
Please be informed that in conducting this study, you as the Principal Investigator is required to abide 
by the rules and regulations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and KFMC/ERRC. The approval of 
this proposal will automatically be suspended on June 15.2010 pending the reapplication to renew 
the approval. 
Please observe the following: 
l. PersonaL identifying data should only be collected when necessary for research ; 
2. The data collected should only be used for this proposal ; 
3. Secondary disclosure of personal identifiable data is not allowed. 
4. No medical tests for study purposes are permitted to be conducted on patients. 
Wc wish YOII every success in your research endeavor. 
---'::::':' SinCere IY'/~~
Mohamail AI Tannir, DMD, MPH 
Head of Extemal Research Review Committee 
Institutional Review Board 
King Fahad Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
Tel : 966 1 288999 Ext.839111299 
Email: !H.;iHa IJ!Jir@liliru;.m~d,~ 
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Appendix 12 Support letter from Executive director of Medical Affairs 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Health 
~.l~1 ~JLlI ~I 
~I ojlJJ 
~1~1!l.l.t.J1~.l.o King Fahad Medical City 
~I wj..!Jl tJ~1 .):!J.o.lI ~ Executive Director of Medical Affairs Office 
To: 
Executive Director of Medical Affairs Office 
30001 &!t2889000 / 8020 
Directors, Hospita]s/Ccnters 
Directors, McdicalAdministrations 
Department Heads 
Datc: 
Ref. No.: 
f.!j 7933/4336 
20 Sha'ban 1430 
11 August 2009 
30001/ /1430 
From: Dr. AbduJrahm.n~M.zrou Executive Director, Me ical Affairs 
Chairman, Medical Consultant Council 
Attachment: Questionnnirp. (8p) 
Subject: Completion of Research Questionnairc 
Assalamu alaykum \va rahmatullah. 
The External Research Review Committee under the Institutional Review Board at 
KFMC has approved the conduct of the research entitled "An Evaluation of a Patient 
Safety Culture Tool in Saudi Arabia" by Mr. Mamdooh AlOnazi (PhD candidate) of 
the University of Sheffield, UK. 
In order to make this study significant and successful, J am encouraging my 
colleagues to participate in completing the attached questionnaire prepared by the 
researcher. 
Your cooperation will bring more value to this research as this would be a step 
towards creating a safer environment for our patients. 
Thank you and best regards. 
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Appendix 13 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Centre agreement 
TO: 
• 
':'~'fl jS.rJ '-1 ,0,0> jJl ~ d.Ll1i,Si 7,j 16 •• 
King Fais:.tl Specialist Hospital at. Research Centre 
Ccn, Org, ~~ <.-,:;" 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AFFAIRS 
1132937 111.27894 I8IMBC 03 
INTERNAL MEMO 
Nahar Alannl, MD 
Associate Consultant Vascular Surgeon 
Department of Surgery 
~ A/~ 
DATE: 02 Rarnadan 1430 
23 August 2009 
FR~OM: Mohamed M. A1oTUrkJ., CCRP 
_--7 Co-Di~tor 
Office of Research Affairs 
REF: ORNI140/30 
SUBJECT: PROPOSAL fI. 2091 025 
An Evaluation of Patients Safety Culture Tool in Saudi Arabia 
Further to the Office of Research Affairs (ORA) memo, ORN0992130, your Emailed reply to the Clinical 
Research Committcc (CRC), (received at OS July 2009), was reviewed by the CRC at 19 August 2009, 
We are pleased to inform you that the CRC has accepted the reply and recommended the above-referenced 
proposal for approval. We take this opportunity to congratulate you on behalf of the Research Advisory 
Council (RAC), 
In conducting this study, the Investigators are required to abide by the rules and regulations of the 
Government of Saudi Arabia, KFSH&RC, and the RAC. Further, you are required to submit a Final report by 
19 July 2010, so it can be reviewed by the Committees without a lapse in approval. The approval of this 
proposal will automatically be suspended on 10 August 2010, pending the acceptance of the Final Report. 
You also need to notify the ORA as soon as possible in the case of: 
I Any amendments to the proposal 
2 Termination of the study 
J Any event or new information that may affect the benefit/risk ratio of the proposal 
Please observe the following: 
1 Personally identifying data should only be collected when necessary for research 
2 The data collected should only be used for this proposal 
3 Data should be stored securely so that only a few authorized users are permitted access to the 
database 
4 Secondary disclosures of personally identifiable data are not allowed 
5 Should there be a need to contact the research subjects for follow-up information, you will need 
to seek the authorization of the RAC prior to such contact. 
We wish you success in your research endeavors. 
ORA cc.; Chairm.&A. Clink , ! Rutucb Committee 
A Ch.imwI . CPI(. ) 
ForrrM1100.01 (Rav. 09-27\ I C. 202028 
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Appendix 14 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Centre agreement 
':'L..a,;{1 ',< .... ." ,0 o;'ill~.:llL1 9 ".;".4 
, ..r~ - ~ _ I.S 
!(jng fahal Specialist Hospit-u & Resean:h Cenrre 
(;l·n . Or);. ~LL <--.;.-
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AFFAIRS 
MBC: 03, TEL: 32937, FAX: 27894 
INTERNAL MEMO 
TO: Nahar Alanezl, MD DATE: 11 Rajab 1430 
04 July 2009 Associate Consultant Vascular Surgeon 
Department of Surgery 
~ .. --. .- ~ / -----, 
THROUGH: Mohamed AI Turld, CCRP REF: ORAJ0992/30 
Co- Director 
Office of Research Affairs 
FROM: Sasha M, Abu Rass, MPharm -----===:;;;-
Proposal Processing Section -~ 
Office of Research Affairs 
SUBJECT: Proposal # 2091 025 
An Evaluation of Patients Safety Culture Tool in Saudi Arabia - Research Study 
The above-referenced proposal was reviewed by the Clinical Research Committee (CRC) and the 
Research Ethics Conunittee (REC) on 26 May and 04 May 2009, respectively. 
The REC has recommended approving the proposal as submitted. 
The CRC was not able to accept the proposal in the current format and request the following: 
1. Abstract/Sununary of the proposal 
2. Copy of the Questionnaire and Data Collection Sheet 
3. Detailed work plan for each investigator. 
4. The investigators were planning to start the project early in year 2009, during the active 
period of the year for 5 months? What will be the situation if it will start now in summer'? 
Will the investigators be able to conclude the study in the specified period of time? 
S. There is no indication in the recruitment plan for which hospitals will be included in the 
study and who are the participants? 
6. How the participants will be selected (i.e. randomized or invited)? How the selection bias 
be minimized? 
Please forward your reply/ revised proposal to the Office of Research Affairs (ORA) at your 
convenience, but not later than two months from the date of this memo 
ORA 
m 1110<lf01 (Rev 09-27) I.C. 202028 E ·Mall: QraOktshre Wy SI 
C 
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Appendix 15 Support letter from Deputy Executive Director Nursing Affairs 
I Ext: 23442 
TO: 
fROM: 
SUBJECT: 
":"l.:l..~'1I:rrj ~~I ~.:.U.l.1 ~ 
King faisal Spedallsr Hospital & Rcsea.«,h Centre 
lic:n , t r(~, <\-.k "_,j.. 
NURS~G AFFAIRS - MBe 73 Fax: 23021 ] 
Nursing Leadership Team 
Nursing Affairs 
DATE: 11 Ramadan 1430 
01 September 2009 
Rita Anderson. RN. BSN. ~ };:/ ~ 
Deputy Execu tive Direct6~  -
Nursing Affairs 
OUR REF: DEDNA: 09030 
PROPOSAL # 2091 025 · An Evaluation of Patients Safety Culture Tools in Saudi Arabia 
Ref: ORA/1 140/30 
As per Ihe a ttached memo from RAC. Mr, Mamdooh Sherier Alonozi 's 'research proposal is 
approved for application in King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Cen ter. 
Please extend your support in this importan t study for Patien t Safety . 
Thank you. 
1.C.l0202B 
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Appendix 16 Incomplete questionnaires 
d uncomplete questionnaires 
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Appendix 17 Data management table (background items) 
Number Variable label Type Measurement 
of 
variable 
A Work area of respondent Numeric Nominal 
Ht Current position Numeric Nominal 
H2 Gender Numeric Nominal 
H3 Nationality Numeric Nominal 
H4 Highest educational qualification Numeric Ordinal 
H5 Training outside S.A Numeric Nominal 
H6 Years of working in this hospital Numeric Ordinal 
H7 Years of working in current hospital work area Numeric Ordinal 
H8 Working hours in the hospital Numeric Ordinal 
H9 Direct contact with patients Numeric Nominal 
HIO Years of experience in current specialty Numeric Ordinal 
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Appendix 18 Data management (safety climate items) 
Number of Variable Type Measurement 
variable 
Al Staff support one another in this unit Numeric Ordinal 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload Numeric Ordinal 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, Numeric Ordinal 
we work together as a team to get the work 
done 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with Numeric Ordinal 
respect 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they Numeric Ordinal 
should, which is not good for patient care 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve Numeric Ordinal 
patient care 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, Numeric Ordinal 
which is not good for patient care 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against Numeric Ordinal 
them 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here Numeric Ordinal 
AIO It is just by chance that more serious Numeric Ordinal 
mistakes do not happen around here 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, Numeric Ordinal 
others help out 
A12 When an event is reported, it feels like the Numeric Ordinal 
person is being written up, not the problem 
Al3 After we make changes to improve patient Numeric Ordinal 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
AI4 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, Numeric Ordinal 
too quickly 
AIS Patient safety never takes second place to get Numeric Ordinal 
more work done 
A16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept Numeric Ordinal 
in their personnel file 
AI7 We have patient safety problems in this unit Numeric Ordinal 
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A18 Our procedures and systems are good at Numeric Ordinal 
preventing errors from happening 
Bl My supervisor/manager says a good word Numeric Ordinal 
when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers Numeric Ordinal 
staff suggestions for . . patient Improvmg 
safety 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my Numeric Ordinal 
, supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking short cuts 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety Numeric Ordinal 
problems that happen over and over 
Cl We are gIven feedback about changes put Numeric Ordinal 
into place based on event reports 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see Numeric Ordinal 
something that may negatively affect patient 
care 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in Numeric Ordinal 
this unit 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or Numeric Ordinal 
actions of those with more authority 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors Numeric Ordinal 
from happening again 
C6 " Staff are afraid to ask questions when Numeric Ordinal 
something does not seem right 
01 When a mistake is made, but is caught and Numeric Ordinal 
cprrected before affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported? 
02 When a mistake is made, but has no potential Numeric Ordinal 
to harm the patient, how often IS this 
reported? 
03 When a mistake is made that could harm the Numeric Ordinal 
patient, but does not, how often is this 
reported? 
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E An overall grade on patient safety Numeric Ordinal 
Fl Hospital management provides a work Numeric Ordinal 
climate that promotes patient safety 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with Numeric Ordinal 
each other 
F3 Some things do not happen or get mi ssed Numeric Ordinal 
. when transferring patients from one unit to 
another 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital Numeric Ordinal 
units that need to work together 
FS Important patient care information is often Numeric Ordinal 
lost during shift changes 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from Numeric Ordinal 
other hospital units 
F7 Problems often occur In the exchange of Numeric Ordinal 
information across hospital units 
F8 The actions of hospital management show Numeric Ordinal 
that patient safety is a top priority 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in Numeric Ordinal 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide Numeric Ordinal 
the best care for patients 
Ftt Shift changes cause problems for patients in Numeric Ordinal 
tills hospital 
G Number of event reports in the past t2 Numeric Ordinal 
months 
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Appendix 19 Duple data entry (15%) 
NO Number of Number of Value in Value in Correct Site of 
questionnaire item DFIAl DFIA2 (re- Value in data entry 
(original entering) questionnaire errors 
file) 
1 728 A4 5 3 3 DFIAI 
2 728 A6 3 4 4 DFIAl 
3 728 A8 4 2 2 DFIAl 
4 728 A9 2 4 4 DFIAl 
5 520 A5 2 3 3 DFlAl 
6 687 A5 3 2 2 DFIAI 
7 687 HIO 6 3 6 DFIA2 
8 486 A9 4 2 4 DFIA2 
9 486 All 2 5 2 DFIA2 
10 486 A12 5 3 5 DFIA2 
11 486 A14 3 4 3 DFlA2 
12 486 A17 4 3 4 DFIA2 
13 486 Al8 3 2 3 DFlA2 
14 246 All 4 2 4 DFIA2 
15 232 A13 2 4 4 DFIAl 
16 339 A15 2 3 3 DFlAI 
17 720 B3 2 1 1 DFIAI 
18 720 B4 2 1 1 DFIAl 
19 577 Cl 3 2 3 DFIA2 
20 707 DI 3 2 2 DFIAI 
21 707 D2 3 2 2 DFlAl 
22 583 D2 3 2 3 DFlA2 
23 653 D2 5 3 3 DFIAl 
24 633 FI 4 2 4 DFIA2 
25 633 F2 2 3 2 DFIA2 
26 633 F3 3 4 3 DFlA2 
27 633 F4 4 1 4 DFlA2 
28 633 F6 1 2 1 
DFlA2 
29 633 F7 2 5 2 
DFlA2 
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30 653 F8 5 2 5 DFIA2 
31 633 F9 2 4 2 DFIA2 
32 633 Fll 4 2 4 DFIA2 
33 633 G 2 6 2 DFIA2 
34 633 HI 6 1 6 DFIA2 
35 633 H5 1 4 1 DFIA2 
36 633 H6 4 2 4 DFIA2 
37 633 H7 2 3 2 DFIA2 
38 633 H8 3 1 3 DFIA2 
39 633 H9 I 3 1 DFIA2 
40 390 G 2 1 2 DFIA2 
41 268 HI 9 11 9 DFIA2 
42 268 H4 5 3 5 DFIA2 
43 570 HI 12 11 12 DFIA2 
44 570 HIO I 2 1 DFIA2 
45 7 H3 2 1 2 DFIA2 
46 196 H4 4 5 5 DFIAI 
47 231 H4 4 3 3 DFIAl 
48 462 H4 5 4 5 DFIA2 
49 722 H5 1 2 2 DFIAl 
50 822 H5 1 2 2 DFIAl 
51 835 H5 1 2 2 DFIAl 
Total 23 51 51 51 51 51 
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Appendix 20 Duple data entry for the rest of the questionnaires 
NO Number of Number Value in First Value in Correct Value Site of 
questionnaire of item entry Double entry in data entry 
questionnaire errors 
1 10 A 3 4 3 Double 
2 10 A2 4 5 4 Double 
3 10 A3 5 4 5 Double 
4 10 A5 4 5 4 Double 
5 10 A6 5 1 5 Double 
6 10 A8 1 5 1 Double 
7 10 AlO 5 4 5 Double 
8 10 All 4 5 4 Double 
9 10 A12 5 4 5 Double 
10 10 AI4 4 5 4 Double 
11 10 A16 5 4 5 Double 
12 14 H5 1 2 1 Double 
13 14 H6 3 1 3 Double 
14 14 H10 3 1 3 Double 
15 38 H5 2 1 2 Double 
16 41 F9 2 4 2 Double 
17 41 F10 4 2 4 Double 
18 64 H10 3 2 2 First 
19 67 H4 5 4 5 Double 
20 74 H2 1 2 I Double 
21 74 H3 1 2 1 Double 
22 74 H8 3 5 5 First 
23 77 A12 3 4 4 First 
24 79 A15 4 5 4 Double 
25 79 A16 5 4 5 Double 
26 79 A17 2 4 2 Double 
27 79 A18 4 3 4 Double 
28 79 B2 3 2 3 Double 
29 79 C3 2 1 2 Double 
30 79 C4 1 3 1 Double 
31 79 C5 3 4 3 Double 
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32 79 C6 4 1 4 Double 
33 79 Dl 1 2 1 Double 
34 79 D2 2 3 2 Double 
35 134 H2 2 1 2 Double 
36 136 HI 12 11 12 Double 
37 136 H8 3 4 4 First 
38 137 Cl 2 4 4 First 
39 137 C2 2 4 4 First 
40 137 C3 2 4 4 First 
41 137 C5 2 4 4 First 
42 137 C4 2 4 4 First 
43 144 Al 4 3 3 First 
44 144 A2 5 4 4 First 
45 144 A3 3 5 5 First 
46 144 A4 1 3 3 First 
47 144 AS 5 1 1 First 
48 144 A6 1 5 5 First 
49 144 A7 5 1 1 First 
50 145 H8 4 6 6 First 
51 162 H5 1 2 I Double 
52 164 A 4 11 4 Double 
53 168 H5 1 2 1 Double 
54 170 H8 3 1 3 Double 
55 170 H7 2 3 2 Double 
56 171 H5 1 2 1 Double 
57 179 H5 1 2 1 Double 
58 252 FI0 2 3 3 First 
59 252 F9 2 3 3 First 
60 252 H5 1 2 2 First 
61 253 H4 5 4 5 Double 
62 255 C5 4 3 4 Double 
63 261 H5 2 1 1 First 
64 262 H8 4 3 3 First 
65 263 H5 2 I 1 First 
66 264 H5 2 1 1 First 
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67 266 H5 2 1 1 First 
68 276 H9 2 1 1 First 
69 284 F8 4 3 4 Double 
70 288 B4 2 4 2 Double 
71 288 C4 4 3 4 Double 
72 288 HI 12 11 11 First 
73 314 HIO 4 5 5 First 
74 318 HI 9 11 11 First 
75 319 HI0 1 6 1 Double 
76 322 A 11 2 11 Double 
77 324 C4 4 5 4 Double 
78 324 C5 5 4 5 Double 
79 324 C6 2 5 2 Double 
80 324 Dl 4 2 4 Double 
81 324 D2 3 4 3 Double 
82 324 D3 5 3 5 Double 
83 325 A5 5 2 2 First 
84 325 A4 2 4 4 First 
85 325 A6 4 5 5 First 
86 326 HI 9 11 9 Double 
87 335 A17 3 5 3 Double 
88 337 A17 2 4 2 Double 
89 339 Al3 4 3 Double 
90 341 A8 2 4 2 Double 
91 341 A9 4 2 4 Double 
92 341 AlO 2 4 2 Double 
93 341 All 4 2 4 Double 
94 341 A12 2 4 2 Double 
95 345 A9 5 2 5 Double 
-96 346 A 4 7 7 First 
97 367 C6 1 4 1 Double 
~ 367 Dl 4 5 4 Double 
I---
99 391 D3 3 4 4 First 
>-
100 ~93 A 5 7 5 Double 
i--
101 396 Al 4 2 4 Double 
'-----
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102 396 A2 2 4 2 Double 
103 396 AS 4 5 4 Double 
104 396 A6 5 2 5 Double 
105 396 A7 2 4 2 Double 
106 396 A9 4 2 4 Double 
107 396 AlO 2 4 2 Double 
108 396 A12 4 5 4 Double 
109 396 Al3 5 4 5 Double 
110 396 A14 4 5 4 Double 
111 396 A15 5 4 5 Double 
112 396 A16 4 3 4 Double 
113 396 A17 3 4 3 Double 
114 396 B2 4 2 4 Double 
115 396 B4 2 5 2 Double 
116 400 B4 4 2 4 Double 
117 400 B2 2 4 4 First 
118 407 Fl 4 5 5 First 
119 424 F7 4 3 4 Double 
120 430 H3 2 1 2 Double 
121 455 Fl 4 2 4 Double 
122 455 F2 2 4 2 Double 
123 455 F4 4 3 4 Double 
124 455 F6 3 4 3 Double 
125 457 E 3 4 3 Double 
126 463 Fl 5 4 5 Double 
127 471 A18 2 4 4 First 
128 476 B2 2 4 4 First 
129 476 B3 1 2 2 First 
130 476 B4 4 1 1 First 
131 478 F8 2 4 4 First 
132 478 F9 4 2 2 First 
l33 478 FIO 2 4 4 First 
134 478 Fll 4 2 2 First 
135 494 A8 4 2 2 First 
136 494 Fll 2 3 3 First 
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137 508 A14 5 2 2 First 
138 513 A8 4 5 5 First 
139 521 F10 4 3 4 Double 
140 522 F9 2 3 3 First 
141 522 F8 2 4 4 First 
142 526 H3 2 1 1 First 
143 531 H5 1 2 1 Double 
144 532 A12 3 2 2 First 
145 532 A13 5 3 5 Double 
146 532 A14 2 5 2 Double 
147 532 A15 3 2 3 Double 
148 532 A17 2 3 2 Double 
149 532 A18 4 2 4 Double 
150 534 A14 3 2 3 Double 
151 534 A15 3 2 3 Double 
152 536 H9 1 2 1 Double 
153 536 HIO 3 2 3 Double 
154 537 AS 2 3 2 Double 
155 537 A12 2 3 2 Double 
156 540 F9 4 5 4 Double 
157 543 C6 1 5 1 Double 
158 543 D1 2 1 2 Double 
159 543 E 5 2 5 I Double 
160 543 F2 2 5 2 Double 
161 543 F3 5 2 5 Double 
162 543 F4 4 5 4 Double 
163 543 F5 1 4 1 Double 
164 543 F6 2 1 2 Double 
165 543 F8 5 2 5 Double 
166 543 F9 1 5 1 Double 
167 543 F10 5 1 5 Double 
168 543 Fl1 3 5 3 Double 
169 543 G . 1 3 1 Double 
~ 
170 547 C5 2 3 3 First 
~ 
171 547 C6 2 3 3 First 
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172 548 H3 2 1 1 First 
173 550 HI 6 11 11 First 
174 554 A 2 5 5 First 
175 554 Al 3 4 4 First 
176 554 A2 3 4 4 First 
177 554 A3 3 4 4 First 
178 554 A4 3 4 4 First 
179 554 A5 3 2 2 Fi rst 
180 554 A6 4 2 2 First 
181 554 A7 3 4 4 First 
182 554 A9 4 2 2 First 
183 554 A8 3 4 4 First 
184 554 All 4 2 2 First 
185 554 Al3 3 2 2 First 
186 554 A18 4 2 2 First 
187 554 BI 4 1 1 First 
188 554 B2 4 1 1 First 
189 554 B3 4 2 2 First 
190 554 B4 4 2 2 First 
191 554 Cl 3 2 2 First 
192 554 C2 3 2 2 First 
193 554 C3 3 2 2 First 
194 554 C4 3 2 2 First 
195 554 CS 3 2 2 First 
196 554 Dl 3 2 2 First 
197 554 D2 3 4 4 First 
198 554 D3 3 5 5 First 
199 554 FI 4 2 2 First 
200 554 F3 4 5 5 First 
201 554 F4 4 2 2 First 
202 554 F6 4 5 5 First 
203 554 F7 4 5 5 First 
204 554 F8 3 2 2 First 
205 554 F9 3 4 4 First 
206 554 FIO 3 2 2 First 
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207 554 HI 1 6 6 First 
208 554 H2 1 2 2 First 
209 554 H4 3 1 1 First 
210 554 H5 2 1 1 First 
211 554 H6 2 6 6 First 
212 554 H7 2 6 6 First 
213 554 HIO 2 6 6 First 
214 556 A9 2 4 2 Double 
215 565 E 3 4 3 Double 
216 548 H2 2 I 2 Double 
217 567 A17 2 3 2 Double 
218 567 C5 5 4 5 Double 
219 567 Dl 2 3 2 Double 
220 578 Bl 3 5 3 Double 
221 578 B2 3 2 3 Double 
222 575 G 3 2 3 Double 
223 590 F7 2 3 3 First 
224 590 F9 3 4 4 First 
225 590 FlO 4 3 3 First 
226 590 FII 3 1 1 First 
227 602 Fll 2 4 2 Double 
228 602 G 1 2 1 Double 
229 615 A 11 3 3 First 
230 619 A 11 3 3 First 
231 641 A10 2 4 2 Double 
232 635 H9 2 1 1 First 
233 638 Dl 2 3 3 First 
234 641 Al3 4 2 2 First 
235 641 F8 5 4 4 First 
236 641 H6 4 5 5 First 
237 642 H9 2 1 1 First 
238 646 H9 2 1 1 First 
239 652 G 4 5 5 First 
240 689 C3 3 4 4 First 
241 692 A12 2 3 3 First 
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242 702 Fl 5 4 5 Double 
243 703 F3 2 3 3 First 
244 711 A5 3 2 2 First 
245 712 D1 3 2 2 First 
246 715 A7 4 5 4 Double 
247 715 D2 5 4 4 First 
248 719 A9 4 5 4 Double 
249 719 A10 3 2 3 Double 
250 719 All 4 3 4 Double 
251 719 A12 3 2 3 Double 
252 719 A13 5 4 5 Double 
253 719 A14 3 4 3 Double 
254 719 A15 2 3 2 Double 
255 719 A16 4 3 4 Double 
256 719 A18 4 3 4 Double 
257 719 B1 4 5 4 Double 
258 719 B2 4 5 4 Double 
259 719 B3 2 3 2 Double 
260 719 B4 2 3 2 Double 
261 719 Cl 4 3 4 Double 
262 719 C2 2 3 3 Double 
263 719 C3 5 3 5 Double 
264 719 C4 4 4 4 Double 
265 719 CS S 4 5 Double 
266 719 C6 1 2 L Double 
267 719 DI 5 4 5 Double 
268 719 D2 5 4 5 Double 
269 719 D3 1 2 L Double 
270 719 E 3 2 3 Double 
271 719 Fl 4 3 4 Double 
272 719 F2 2 3 2 Double 
273 719 F3 4 3 4 Double 
274 719 F4 4 3 4 Double 
275 719 F5 1 2 1 Double 
276 719 F6 2 1 2 Double 
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277 719 F7 2 1 2 Double 
278 719 F8 4 2 4 Double 
279 719 F9 2 1 2 Double 
280 719 FI0 4 3 4 Double 
281 719 F11 2 4 2 Double 
282 719 AI7 5 4 5 Double 
283 732 All 1 4 4 First 
284 732 AI2 5 1 1 First 
285 732 A13 1 5 5 First 
286 732 AI4 5 I 1 First 
287 732 A15 2 5 5 First 
288 732 A16 5 2 2 First 
289 732 AI7 4 5 5 First 
290 732 A18 5 4 4 First 
291 736 B2 4 2 2 First 
292 743 A3 3 2 3 Double 
293 743 A4 3 2 3 Double 
294 743 B1 3 4 3 Double 
295 743 B2 3 4 3 Double 
296 743 H5 1 2 1 Double 
297 754 A15 5 4 5 Double 
298 754 A16 I 5 1 Double 
299 756 B4 2 1 1 First 
300 763 B3 2 3 3 First 
301 766 C4 4 3 4 Double 
302 766 C5 3 4 4 First 
303 769 A5 2 3 3 First 
304 770 A2 3 2 2 First 
305 782 C6 2 5 2 Double 
306 792 A14 3 2 2 First 
, 
307 800 Cl 4 2 4 Double 
308 800 C2 2 2 4 Double 
309 803 F4 4 3 3 First 
310 818 Cl 4 5 5 First 
311 818 C2 4 5 5 First 
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312 818 C3 4 5 5 First 
313 826 A6 4 5 5 First 
314 829 C2 4 5 5 First 
315 832 AI0 4 2 2 First 
316 836 F9 3 2 2 First 
317 836 HI 9 8 8 First 
318 847 HI 11 8 8 First 
319 854 F9 2 3 3 First 
320 860 A 5 7 5 Double 
Total 118 320 320 320 320 
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University 
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Appendix 21 Cover letter 
Dear respondents, 
School of Health and Related 
Research 
I am a PhD student at the University of Sheffield in the D.K and I am currently in the process of 
collecting data for my study entitled "An evaluation of patient safety culture tool in Saudi Arabia". 
This study aims to identify a suitable measure for assessing the patient safety culture for use in 
hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The knowledge generated will contribute to the measurement of the patient 
safety culture in hospitals in Saudi Arabia, and ultimately the creation of a safer environment for 
patients in hospital. As a healthcare professional, your assistance is very important and useful to this 
study to get at least 300 completed questionnaires. Your Participation is voluntary in the study. 
I would be grateful if you would volunteer to take a few minutes of your valuable time to fill in this 
questionnaire. Your privacy and confidentiality will be fully respected as this questionnaire was 
designed in such a way as to be completely anonymous. If you have any question or queries or 
concern about the questionnaire you are welcome to contact me through my contact numbers or be 
sending an email to the address below. 
Please post the completed questionnaire to secretary of your department. Alternatively, the 
questionnaire can be returned to head nurse in your clinical area. I am very grateful for your 
participation in this study and your commitment and dedication to the healthcare services in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Thank you very much for your patience and cooperation, 
Yours sincerely, 
Mamdooh Sherier Alonazi 
The University of Sheffield Faculty of Medicine 
School of Health and Related Research 
Phone: [Saudi Arabia: 00966505386492]-[UK: 00447735627677] 
Email:M.Alonazi@sheffield.ac.uk 
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Appendix 22 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture with changes 
HOSPIT AL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and event 
reporting in your hospital and will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. 
• An "event" is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or 
deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm. 
• "Patient safety" is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries 
or adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery. 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
In this survey, think of your "unit" as the work area, department, or clinical area of the 
hospital where you spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical 
services 
What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Mark ONE answer by filling in the 
brackets [v1 
G Many different hospital unitslNo specific unit [ ] 
G Medicine (non-surgical) [ G Surgery [ ] 
G Obstetrics [ ] 
G Pediatrics [ ] 
o Emergency department [ 
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~ Intensive care unit (any type) [ G Psychiatry/mental health [ ] 
c=l Rehabilitation [ ] 
o Anaesthesiology [ ] 
G Other [ ] 
Please specify ...... . ............... . 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your 
work area/unit. Mark your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Think about your hospital work Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
area/unit Disagree Agree 
1. Staff support one another in this unit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
2. We have enough staff to handle the [1] [2] [3] [4] 
workload [5] 
3. When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
get the work done 
4. In this unit, staff treat each other with [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
respect 
5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than 
they should, which is not good for [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
patient care 
6. We are actively doing things to improve [1] [2] [3] [4] patient safety [5] 
7. We use more temporary staff than we 
should, which is not good for patient [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
care 
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
against them 
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] here 
lO.1t is just by chance that more serious [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
mistakes do not happen around here 
11. When one area in this unit gets really [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] busy, others help out 
12.When an event is reported, it feels like 
the person is being written up, not the [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
problem 
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SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
Think about your hospital work area/unit Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
13.After we make changes to improve patient [ 1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
14.We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
too quickly 
I5.Patient safety never takes second place to get [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
more work done 
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
in their personnel file 
17.We have patient safety problems in this unit [1 ] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
I8.0ur procedures and systems are good at [1 ] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
preventing errors from happening 
SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your 
immediate supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report. Mark your answer by 
filling in the brackets. 
1. My supervisor/manager says a good word 
when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures 
2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers 
staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
3. Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts 
4. My supervisor/manager ignores patient 
safety problems that happen over and over 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
Disagree 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
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Strongly 
Agree 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
SECTION C: Communications 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? Mark your answer by 
filling in the brackets. 
Think about your hospital work area/unit Never Rarely Some Most of Always 
times the 
time 
1. We are given feedback about changes put 
into place based on event reports [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
2. Staff will freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
patient care 
3. We are informed about errors that happen [1] [2] [3] 
in this unit [4] [5] 
4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or [1] [2] [3] [4] 
actions of those with more authority [5] 
5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent [1] [2] [3] 
errors from happening again [4] [5] 
6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when [1] 
something does not seem right [2] [3] [4] [5] 
SECTION D: Frequency of Events Reported 
In your hospital work area/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they 
reported? Mark your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Never Rarely Some Most Always 
times of the 
time 
When a mistake is made, but is caught 
and corrected befpre affecting the 12.atient, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
how often is this reported 
2 When a mistake is made, but has no 
12.otential to harm the 12.atient, how often is [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
this reported 
3 When a mistake is made that could harm 
the 12.atient, but does not, how often is this [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
reported? 
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SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. Mark ONE 
answer. 
[ ] 
A 
[ ] 
B 
Excellent Very Good 
SECTION F: Your Hospital 
[ ] 
C 
Acceptable 
[ ] 
D 
Poor 
[ ] 
E 
Failing 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about 
your hospital. Mark your answer by filling in the brackets. 
Think about your hospital 
Hospital management provides a 
work climate that promotes 
patient safety 
2 Hospital units do not coordinate 
well with each other 
3 Some things do not bappen or get 
missed when transferring patients 
from one unit to another 
4 There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work 
together 
5 Important patient care information 
is often lost during shift changes 
6 It is often unpleasant to work with 
staff from other hospital units 
7 Problems often occur 111 the 
exchange of information across 
hospital units 
8 The actions of hospital 
management show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
9 Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only 
after an adverse event happens 
10 Hospital units work well together 
to provide the best care for 
patients 
11 Shift changes cause problems for 
patients in tills hospital 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
Disagree 
Et] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Et] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1 ] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
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Strongly 
Agree 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
[5] 
SECTION G: Number of Events Reported 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? Mark 
ONE answer. 
G No event reports [ ] 
G 1 to 2 event reports [ ] G 3 to 5 event reports [ ] 
SECTION H: Background Information 
G 6 to 10 event reports [ ] G 11 to 20 event reports [ ] 
o 21 event reports or more [ ] 
This information will help in the analysis of the survey results. Mark ONE answer by filling 
in the brackets. 
1. What is your current position in this hospital? Mark ONE answer that best describes 
your current position. 
G Physician in training [ ] 
G Physician (general physician) [ D Resident physician [ ] 
G Assistant consultant [ ] 
G Associate consultant [ ] 
o Consultant [ ] 
2. What is your gender? 
G Male [ ] 
3. What is your nationality? 
G Saudi [ ] 
4. What is your highest educational qualification? 
G PhD Doctorate / Board Certified/Fellowship [ ] G Master degree [ ] 
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GJ Head nurselNurse manager [ G Nurse supervisor [ ] 
Q Registered nurse [ ] 
CD Clinical resource nurse [ 
G Staff nurse [ ] 
~ Other [ ] 
Please specify ...................... . 
G Female [ ] 
G Non-Saudi [ ] 
Please specify .... ........ .. ... . .. . .. 
D Bachelor degree [ ] 
G Diploma [ ] 
[J Other [ ] 
Please specify .................... '" 
5. Do you have any training outside Saudi Arabia? 
G Yes [ ] G No [ ] 
If yes, please specify .. .. ............... . .. .. .... . .. ........ . 
6. How long have you worked in this hospital? 
G Less than 1 years [ G 1 to 5 years [ ] 
G 6 to 10 years [ ] 
G 11 to 15 years [ ] 
[J 16 to 20 years [ ] 
~ 21 years or more [ 
7. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit? 
G Less than 1 years [ G 11 to 15 years [ 
G 1 to 5 years [ ] [J 16 to 20 years [ ] 
G 6 to 10 years [ ] ~ 21 years or more [ 
8. Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
G Less than 20 hours per week [ G 60 to 79 hours per week [ 
G 20 to 39 hours per week [ ] G 80 to 99 hours per week [ 
Q 40 to 59 hours per week [ ] 0 100 hours per week or more [ ] 
9. In your current position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients? 
·G YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients [ ] G NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients [ 
10. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession? 
G Less than 1 year [ G 11 to 1 5 years [ ] 
G 1 to 5 years [ ] G 16 to 20 years [ ] 
G 6 to 10 years [ ] ~ 21 years or more [ ] 
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SECTION I: Your Comments 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or event reporting in your 
hospital. 
THANK. YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix 23 Comparison between an overall grade of patient safety and number of event reports 
Item G: Number of event report in the past 12 months 
No event reports 3 to 5event 1 1 to 20 event Total 
and 1 to 2 event reports and 6 to reports and 21 
reports 10 event reports event reports or 
more 
E: An overall Very good 433 88 15 536 
grade of and 
patient safety Excellent 
Acceptable 242 58 8 308 
Poor and 12 5 1 18 
Failing 
Total 687 151 24 862 
The table above presents the comparison between an overall grade of patient safety and 
number of event reports in the past 12 months. It shows that only one respondent reported 
poor and failing whom reported lots of event while 12 respondents also reported poor and 
failing they reported no event reports and 1 to 2 event reports. This means those reporting 
poor/failing were not the same individuals who reported lots of events. 
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Appendix 24 Communalities of the initial solution (11 factors) 
Safety climate items Initial Extractio 
A 1 Staff support one another in this unit .51 .64 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .24 .24 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work .48 .56 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .48 .62 
, 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .24 .31 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .40 .50 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .23 .31 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .45 .64 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .33 .38 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .36 .40 
A12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .43 .55 
Al3 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .46 .55 
A 14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .35 .38 
Al6 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .30 .35 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .41 .42 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to .59 .81 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety .62 .69 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it .38 .46 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over .39 .60 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .41 .45 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care .45 .52 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .42 .48 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority .40 .57 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .54 .56 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .27 .33 
D 1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how .53 .58 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this .66 .88 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this .53 .55 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .44 .46 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .45 .56 
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Appendix 24 (continued) 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .38 .46 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .33 .36 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .42 .54 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .43 .44 
Ft 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .52 .63 
FIt Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .33 .39 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 25 Total Variance Explained of the initial solution (11 factors) 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
Factor 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 9.168 25.4 25.4 8.7 24.1 24.1 2.9 
2 2.223 6.1 31.6 1.7 4.9 29.1 3.7 
3 2.175 6.0 37.6 1.6 4.7 33.8 2.8 
4 1.764 4.8 42.5 1.2 3.5 37.4 3.3 
5 1.598 4.4 47.0 1.1 3.1 40.6 3.7 
6 1.452 4.0 51.0 .9 2.7 43.3 2.3 
7 1.214 3.3 54.4 .7 2.1 45.4 4.3 
8 1.149 3.1 57.6 .6 1.8 47.2 3.1 
9 1.008 2.8 60.4 .5 1.5 48.8 4.8 
10 .897 2.4 62.9 .4 1.1 49.9 .6 
11 .867 2.4 65.3 .3 .9 50.8 3.3 
12 .857 2.3 67.6 
13 .748 2.0 69.7 
14 .722 2.0 71.7 
15 .713 1.9 73.7 
16 .679 1.8 75.6 
17 .663 1.8 77.4 
18 .630 1.7 79.2 
19 .607 1.6 80.9 
20 .589 1.6 82.5 
21 .571 1.5 84.1 
22 .509 1.4 85.5 
23 .492 1.3 86.9 
24 .486 1.3 88 .2 
25 .451 1.2 89.5 
26 
.441 1.2 90.7 
27 
.422 1.1 91.9 
28 
.412 1.1 93.0 
29 
.379 1.0 94.1 
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Appendix 25 (continued) 
30 .375 1.0 95.1 
31 .353 .9 96. 1 
32 .331 .9 97.0 
33 .31 1 .8 97.9 
34 .292 .8 98.7 
35 .253 .7 99.4 
36 .198 .5 100 
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Appendix 26 Pattern Matrix of the initial solution (11 factors) 
Safety climate items 
Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 
C3 We are infonned about errors that happen in this unit .47 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .45 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .39 
-.33 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reported? .96 
D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .73 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .72 
A8 Staff fee l like their mistakes are held aga inst them .78 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .66 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in thei r personnel file .5 1 
AI4 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .33 
F7 Problems often occur in the e)(change of infonnation across hospital units -.70 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes -.55 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units -.5 1 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospi tal -.50 
A I StafT support one another in this unit .76 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .73 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done .56 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload 
A 7 We use more temporary stafT than we should, which is not good for patient care .52 
AS StafT in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .45 
83 'Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means .41 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established -.90 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers stafT suggestions for improving patient sa fety -.67 
C4 StafT fee l free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority -.67 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively afTect patient care -.5 1 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .41 
CS In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errOrs from happening again -.31 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .70 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .64 
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Appendix 26 (continued) 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other 
F8 The actions of hospita l management show that patient sa fety is a top priority 
84 My supervisor/manager ignore); patient safelY problems that happen over and over 
A II When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening 
ExtractIOn Method: Princlpl AxIS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Nonnalization 
a. Rotation converged in 21 iterations. 
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-.46 
.45 
.52 
-.56 
-.48 
-.30 
Appendix 27 Communalities of initial solution (11 factors) with safety climate items (n=31) 
Safety climate items Initial Extraction 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .49 .65 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the .43 .52 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .47 .61 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .19 .34 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .39 .61 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .21 .28 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .43 .62 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .31 .35 
AI2 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .42 .55 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .45 .56 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .28 .35 
8 I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to .59 .84 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient .62 .68 
83 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it .35 .64 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over .36 AD 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .41 .46 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care .44 .55 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .40 047 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority .36 .56 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .26 .34 
o I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how .53 .58 
02 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this .65 .89 
03 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this .52 .55 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .43 .47 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .43 .52 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .37 .445 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .328 .37 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .39 .56 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .39 042 
F I 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .51 .68 
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Appendix 27 (continued) 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospita l I .37 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 28 Total Variance Explained ofthe initial solution (11 factors) with safety climate (n=31) 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
Factor 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 7.897 25.4 25.4 7.4 24.0 24.0 2.1 
2 2.078 6.7 32.1 1.7 5.5 29.5 3.4 
3 2.053 6.6 38.7 1.5 5.0 34.6 3.0 
4 1.689 5.4 44.2 1.2 4.0 38.6 2.2 
5 1.441 4.6 48.8 1.0 3.3 41.9 3.3 
6 1.362 4.3 53.2 .8 2.8 44.7 2.5 
7 1.169 3.7 57.0 .7 2.3 47.1 3.2 
8 1.112 3.5 60.6 .6 2.0 49.1 1.4 
9 .983 3.1 63.8 .5 1.7 50.8 4.0 
10 .855 2.7 66.5 .3 1.1 51.9 3.1 
11 .800 2.5 69.1 .2 .9 52.9 2.5 
12 .763 2.4 71.6 
13 .707 2.2 73 .8 
14 .682 2.1 76.0 
15 .623 2.0 78.1 
16 .594 1.9 80.0 
17 .565 1.8 81.8 
18 .533 1.7 83.5 
19 .519 1.6 85 .2 
20 .498 1.6 86.8 
21 .487 1.5 88.4 
22 .460 1.4 89.8 
23 .437 1.4 91.3 
24 .430 1.3 92.6 
25 .393 1.2 93 .9 
26 .387 1.2 95.2 
27 .363 l.l 96.3 
28 
.335 1.0 97.4 
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Appendix 28 (continued) 
29 
.327 1.0 98.5 
30 .255 .8 99.3 
31 .204 .6 100 
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Appendix 29 Pattern Matrix of the initial solution (11 factors) with safety climate items 
Safety climate items (n=3 1) Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
C3 Wc are infonned about errors that happen in this unit .45 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .44 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .4 1 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reported? .97 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .73 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .72 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units .73 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work wi th sta ff from other hospital units .54 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .52 
F 11 Shi ft changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .46 
A8 Sta ff feel like their mistakes are held against them .74 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .66 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel fil e .50 
At Staff support one another in this unit .77 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .72 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done .57 
C4 Sta ff feel free to question the decisions or actions o f those with more authority .65 
C2 Sta ff wi ll freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect pati ent care .51 
C6 Sta ff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right -.4 1 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good wo rd when hclshe sees a job done according to 
-.9 1 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving pati ent safety 
-.64 
AS Sta ff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .55 
A 7 We use more temporary sta ff than we should, which is not good for patient care .37 
I ' 
I' 
Ft 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .74 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .59 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priori ty .44 I: 
I' 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other -.4 1 I ' I: 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
-.70 I ' 11 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
-.43 
-
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Appendix 29 (continued) 
83 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even ifit 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores pati ent sa fety problems that happen over and over 
Extractton Method: Pnnclpl AxIS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 21 iterations 
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.73 
.39 
Appendix 30 Communalities of the 12 factors solution 
Communalities 
Initial Extraction 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .52 .59 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .25 .29 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get .50 .58 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .50 .68 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for .25 .28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care Al 047 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .25 .36 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them 046 .66 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .35 .39 
A 10 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .13 .17 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .38 047 
A) 2 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the 044 .53 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 047 .53 
A14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .36 .37 
A 15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done .20 .25 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .31 .36 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in this unit .18 .19 
A18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening 042 043 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done .60 .76 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving .63 .72 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, .38 048 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and 042 .58 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 042 044 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 046 .54 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .44 .49 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority Al .56 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .56 .57 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .28 .35 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the .54 .59 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potentia) to harm the patient, how often is .66 .88 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is .54 .56 
FI Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety Al .41 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other 045 047 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one .15 .18 
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F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .47 .56 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .39 .46 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .37 .39 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .42 .48 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .45 .49 
F9 Hospital managemnet seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse .36 .40 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .53 .63 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .34 .42 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
A-7S 
Appendix 31 Total variance explained of the 12 factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings Loadings 
Factor 
%of %of Total 
%of 
Total Cumulative % Total Cumulative % Cumulative % 
Variance Variance Variance 
1 9.930 23.6 23.6 9.434 22.5 22.5 2.387 5.6 5.6 
2 2.413 5.7 29.3 1.867 4.4 26.9 2.205 5.2 10.9 
3 2.227 5.3 34.6 1.827 4.3 31.3 2.166 5.1 16.0 
4 1.869 4.4 39.1 1.380 3.2 34.5 2.152 5.1 21.2 
5 1.626 3.8 43.0 1.180 2.8 37.4 1.943 4.6 25.8 
6 1.516 3.6 46.6 1.033 2.4 39.8 1.928 4.5 30.4 
7 1.288 3.0 49.6 .809 1.9 41.7 1.786 4.2 34.6 
8 1.188 2.8 52.5 .669 1.5 43.3 1.649 3.9 38 .6 
9 1.095 2.6 55.1 .629 1.4 44.8 1.519 3.6 42.2 
10 1.086 2.5 57.7 .482 1.l 46.0 1.311 3.1 45.3 
11 1.057 2.5 60.2 .437 1.0 47.0 .623 1.4 46.8 
12 .961 2.2 62.5 .399 .9 48.0 .501 1.1 48.0 
13 .913 2.1 64.6 
14 .847 2.0 66.6 
15 .786 1.8 68.5 
16 .761 1.8 70.3 
17 .737 1.7 72.1 
18 .731 1.7 73.8 
19 .698 1.6 75.5 
20 .661 1.5 77.1 
21 .634 1.5 78.6 
22 .619 1.4 80.0 
23 .612 1.4 81.5 
24 .598 1.4 82.9 
25 .579 1.3 84.3 
26 .561 1.3 85.6 
27 .519 1.2 86.9 
28 .491 1.1 88.0 
29 .472 1.1 89.2 
30 .460 1.0 90.3 
31 .436 1.0 91.3 
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32 .431 1.0 92.3 
33 .412 .8 93.3 
34 .396 .4 94.2 
35 .370 .8 95 .1 
36 .351 .8 96.0 
37 .342 .8 96 .8 
38 .325 .7 97.6 
39 .284 .6 98.2 
40 .278 .6 98 .9 
41 .251 .5 99.5 
42 .194 .4 100 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factonng 
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Appendix 32 Rotated Matrix of the 12 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=42) Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units .64 
F5 Important patient care infonnation i often lost during shift changes .59 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .54 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .54 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens .34 -.34 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in this unit 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reported? .90 
D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient , but does not, how often is this reported? .70 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .69 
C3 Wc are infonned about errors that happen in this unit .57 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event repol1s .54 
CS In thi unit , we discus ways to prevent errors from happening again .48 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient sa fety, we evaluate their effectiveness .48 .4 1 
A4 In this unit , people treat each other with respect .72 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .76 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done .61 
F I 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .65 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .58 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .45 .36 li 
F2 liospital units do not coordinate well with each other .39 -.44 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .35 .33 
FI Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety .33 .32 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .77 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being wri tten up, not the problem .65 
AI6 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .52 
AI4 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .39 .37 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .51 
A9 Mi takes have led to positive changes here .50 
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A 15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done .30 
8 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to .76 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving pati ent safety .68 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores pati ent safety problems that happen over and over -.36 .34 .3 1 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for pati ent care .48 
A 7 We u e more temporary sta ff than we should, which is not good for patient care .48 
83 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means .44 
A 11 When one area in thi s unit gets really busy, others help out .33 -.35 .3 1 
A2 We have enough ta ffto handle the workload .3 1 -.3 1 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decision or actions of those with more authority .6 1 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect pati ent care .38 48 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right -.45 
A I 0 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .38 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when trans ferring patients from one unit to another 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 19 iterations. . a. 
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Safety climate items (N=42) Initial Extraction 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .52 .57 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .25 .26 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to .50 .58 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .50 .70 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for .25 .28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .41 .42 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient .25 .29 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .46 .61 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .35 .33 
A 10 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .13 .10 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .38 .38 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not .44 .55 
AI3 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their .47 .54 
A14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .36 .38 
A IS Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done .20 .19 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .31 .36 
AI7 We have patient safety problems in this unit .18 .17 
AI8 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .42 .42 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done .60 .71 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving .63 .74 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work .38 .44 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and .42 .48 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .42 .44 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect .46 .50 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .44 .48 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more .41 .57 
CS In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .56 .57 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .28 .34 
D 1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the .54 .56 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often .66 .88 
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D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often .54 .55 
Fl Hospita l management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety .41 .40 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .45 .45 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one .15 .12 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .47 .52 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .39 .46 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .37 .39 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .42 .49 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .45 .47 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse .36 .36 
FI0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .53 .53 
Fl1 Shift changes cause problems fo r patients in this hospital .34 .36 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
A-8i 
Appendix 34 Total variance explained of the 10 factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation Sums of Squared 
%of %of %of 
Factor Total Variance Cumulative % Total Variance Cumulative % Total Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.930 23 .6 23.6 9.432 22.4 22.4 3.626 8.6 8.6 
2 2.413 5.7 29.3 1.852 4.4 26.8 2.509 5.9 14.5 
3 2.227 5.3 34.6 1.816 4.3 31.1 2.183 5.1 19.7 
4 1.869 4.4 39.1 1.356 3.2 34.4 2.029 4.8 24.6 
5 1.626 3.8 43 .0 1.166 2.7 37.1 1.853 4.4 29.0 
6 1.516 3.6 46.6 1.009 2.4 39.5 1.649 3.9 32.9 
7 1.288 3.0 49.6 .791 1.8 41.4 1.482 3.5 36.4 
8 1.188 2.8 52.5 .651 1.5 43.0 1.467 3.4 39.9 
9 1.095 2.6 55.1 .602 1.4 44.4 1.395 3.3 43 .2 
10 1.086 2.5 57.7 .444 1.0 45.5 .934 2.2 45.5 
11 1.057 2.5 60.2 
12 .96 1 2.2 62.5 
13 .913 2.1 64.6 
14 .847 2.0 66.6 
15 .786 1.8 68.5 
16 .761 1.8 70.3 
17 .737 1.7 72.1 
18 .73 1 1.7 73.8 
19 .698 1.6 75.5 
20 .661 1.5 77.1 
21 .634 1.5 78.6 
22 .619 1.4 80.0 
23 .612 1.4 81.5 
24 .598 1.4 82.9 
25 .579 1.3 84.3 
26 .561 1.3 85.6 
27 .519 1.2 86.9 
28 .491 1.1 88.0 
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29 .472 1.1 
30 .460 1.0 
31 .436 1.0 
32 .431 1.0 
33 .412 .9 
34 .396 .9 
35 .370 .8 
36 .351 .8 
37 .342 .8 
38 .325 .7 
39 .284 .6 
40 .278 .6 
41 .251 .5 
42 .194 .4 
Extraction Method : Principal Axis 
Factoring. 
89.2 
90.3 
91.3 
92.3 
93 .3 
94.2 
95 .1 
96.0 
96.8 
97.6 
98.2 
98.9 
99.5 
100 
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Appendix 35 Rotated Factor Matrix of the 10 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=42) Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .61 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .55 -.35 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .54 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .52 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .51 .40 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital uni ts that need to work together .46 
FI Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety .46 
A9 Mistakes have led to pos iti ve changes here .42 
C5 In this unit, we discu s ways to prevent errors from happening again .41 
.41 
F9 Hospital managcmnet seem interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens -.35 
A 15 Patient sa fety never takes second place to get more work done 
F7 Problem often occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units .66 
F5 Imponant patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .59 
F6 11 i often unplea ant to work with staff from other hospital units .54 
F I I Shi ft changes cau e problems for patients in this hospital .49 
F2 Hospital unit do not coordinate well with each other -.36 .46 
F3 Some thing do not happen or get mi sed when tran ferring patients from one unit to another 
D2 When a mistake i made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reponed? .90 
D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient , but does not, how often is this reported? .70 
DI When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .68 
A4 In this un it, people treat each other with respect .75 
A I StafT support one another in thi unit .68 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done .33 .59 
A8 StafT feel like their mistakes are held against them .73 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .66 
A 16 Staff worry that mistake they make are kept in their personnel fil e .51 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established .73 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriou Iy considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety .71 
A5 StafT in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .48 
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A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good fo r patient eare 
AI 4 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much. too quickly 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, cven ifi t means 
A2 We have enough sta ff to handle the work load 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out 
C3 We are infonned about errors that happen in this unit 
C l We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
C4 Staff feel free to question the dec isions or actions o f those with more authority 
C2 Sta ff will freely speak up if they see something that may negati vely affect patient care 
C6 Staff arc afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores pati ent safety problems that happen over and over 
A I 0 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here 
AI 7 We have pati ent safety problems in thi s unit 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factormg. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 15 iterations 
A-8S 
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Appendix 36 Communalities of the 9 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=42) Initial Extraction 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .51 .57 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .24 .24 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to .50 .58 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .50 .71 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for .25 .28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .41 .41 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient .25 .25 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .46 .62 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .35 .33 
A 10 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .13 .07 
All When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .38 .36 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not .44 .53 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their .47 .52 
A14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .36 .37 
A15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done .20 .16 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .31 .36 
A17 We have patient safety problems in this unit 
.18 .15 
A18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .42 .41 
Bl My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees ajob done .60 .69 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving .63 .76 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work .38 .45 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over .42 .39 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .42 .41 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect .46 .50 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .44 .44 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more .41 .58 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .56 
.57 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .28 
.28 
D 1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the .54 .55 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often .66 .89 
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D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how .54 .55 
Fl Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety ,41 ,40 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other ,45 ,45 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from .15 .11 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together ,47 .55 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .39 ,42 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .37 .38 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units ,42 ,46 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority ,45 ,46 
F9 Hospital managernnet seems interested in patient safety only after an .36 .34 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .53 .53 
FIl Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .34 .36 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 37 Total variance explained of the nine factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation Sums of Squared 
Factor 
Total %of Cumulative % Total %of Cumulative % Total %of Cumulative % 
1 9.930 23.6 23 .6 9.421 22.4 22.4 4.235 10.0 10.0 
2 2.413 5.7 29.3 1.841 4.3 26.8 2.957 7.0 17.1 
3 2.227 5.3 34.6 1.812 4.3 31.1 2.167 5.1 22.2 
4 1.869 4.4 39.1 1.348 3.2 34.3 1.993 4.7 27.0 
5 1.626 3.8 43.0 1.161 2.7 37.1 1.835 4.3 31.3 
6 1.516 3.6 46.6 .998 2.3 39.4 1.590 3.7 35.1 
7 1.288 3.0 49.6 .782 1.8 41.3 1.566 3.7 38.9 
8 1.188 2.8 52.5 .642 1.5 42.8 1.443 3.4 42.3 
9 1.095 2.6 55.1 .588 1.3 44.2 .808 1.9 44.2 
10 1.086 2.5 57.7 
11 1.057 2.5 60.2 
12 .961 2.2 62.5 
13 .913 2.1 64.6 
14 .847 2.0 66.6 
15 . 
.786 1.8 68.5 
16 .761 1.8 70.3 
17 .737 1.7 72.1 
18 .731 1.7 73 .8 
19 .698 1.6 75 .5 
20 .661 1.5 77.1 
21 .634 1.5 78.6 
22 .619 1.4 80.0 
23 .612 1.4 81.5 
24 .598 1.4 82.9 
25 .579 1.3 84.3 
26 .561 1.3 85.6 
27 .519 1.2 86.9 
28 .491 1.1 88.0 
29 .472 1.1 89.2 
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30 .460 1.0 90.3 
31 .436 1.0 91.3 
32 .431 1.0 92 .3 
33 .412 .9 93.3 
34 .396 .9 94.2 
35 .370 .8 95.1 
36 .351 .8 96.0 
37 .342 .8 96.8 
38 .325 .7 97 .6 
39 .284 .6 98 .2 
40 .278 .6 98.9 
41 .251 .5 99.5 
42 
.194 .4 100 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
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Appendix 38 Ro tated Factor Matrix of the 9 factors solution 
Safety cl imate items (n=42) Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effecti veness .67 
F8 The action of hospital management show that patient afety is a top priority .57 
A6 We are acti vely doing things to improve patient care .56 
CS In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .55 .37 
C3 We are infonned about errors that happen in this unit .59 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .48 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place ba ed on event reports .47 
A9 Mistakes have led to posit ive changes here .46 
F I 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .44 -.42 
FI Hospi tal management provides a work climate that promote patient safety .38 -.35 
64 My supcrvi or/manager ignores patient afety problem that happen over and over -.34 
A 15 Patient safety never take second place to get more work done 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of info rmation across hospita l units .65 
F5 Important patient care inforrnati n is often 10 t during hi ft changes .56 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with sta ff from other ho pital units .55 
F2 Hospillll units do not coordinate well with each other .50 
FII Shift changes c:luse problems for patients in this hospital .50 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens -.35 .36 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in this unit 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one unit to another 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to haml the patient, how often is this reported? .91 
D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .70 
I 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this .68 
A4 In this unit , people treat each other with respect .76 
A I Staff support one another in th is unit .67 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done .39 .57 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .74 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .65 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .51 
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A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for pati ent care 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up , my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care 
AI4 We work in a hurry, tryi ng to do too much, too quickly 
A2 We have enough sta ff to handle the workload 
AI I When one area in this unit gets rea lly busy, others help out 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions o f those with more authori ty 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care 
C6 Staff are a fraid to ask questions when something does not seem right 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers sta ff suggestions fo r improving pati ent safety 
81 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
A I 0 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here 
Extractton Method: Prmclpal AxIS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 10 iterations 
A-91 
.48 
.44 .33 
.4 1 
.36 .40 
-.36 
.30 -.35 
.68 
.36 .52 
-.37 
.30 .71 
.36 .69 
-.34 40 
Appendix 39 Communalities of the 8 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=42) Initial Extraction 
A I Staff support one another in this unit .52 .60 I A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload .25 .24 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done .50 
.54 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .50 .63 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .25 
.28 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .41 .41 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .25 
.25 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .46 
.62 11 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .35 .33 I 
AI0 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here .13 
.06 
A 11 When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out .38 
.36 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .44 
.53 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .47 
.51 
A 14 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly .36 
.37 
A 15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done .20 
.15 
A 16 Staff worry that mistake they make are kept in their personnel file .31 
.35 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in thi unit .1 8 
.15 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .42 
.41 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established .60 
.50 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety .63 
.61 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means .38 
.43 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over .42 
.39 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .42 
.37 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care .46 
.49 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .44 
.41 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority .41 
.60 
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .56 
.56 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .28 
.27 
01 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .54 
.55 
I f 
02 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? .66 
.88 
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D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .54 .53 
Ft Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety .4 t .37 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other 
.45 .45 
F3 Some things do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one unit to another .15 .10 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .47 .45 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .39 .4 1 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .37 .3 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .42 .46 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .45 .46 
F9 Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens .36 
F 1 0 Hospita l units work well together to provide the best care for patients .53 .5 
Fit Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .34 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 40 Total variance explained of the 8 factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation Sums of Squared 
%of %of %of Cumulative 
Factor Total Variance Cumulative % Total Variance Cumulative % Total Variance % 
I 9.930 23.6 23.6 9.3 22.3 22.3 4.402 10.4 10.4 
-
2 2.413 5.7 29.3 1.834 4.3 26.7 2.837 6.7 17.2 
3 2.227 5.3 34.6 1.796 4.2 31.0 2.173 5.1 22.4 
4 1.869 4.4 39.1 1.336 3.1 34.1 2.1 5.0 27.4 
5 1.626 3.8 43 .0 1.123 2.6 36.8 1.820 4.3 31.8 
6 1.516 3.6 46.6 .981 2.3 39.2 1.641 3.9 35 .7 
7 1.288 3.0 49.6 .745 1.7 40.9 1.452 3.4 39.1 
8 1.188 2.8 52.5 .632 1.5 42.4 1.393 3.3 42.4 
9 1.095 2.6 55.1 
10 1.086 2.5 57.7 
11 1.057 2.5 60.2 
12 .961 2.2 62.5 
13 .913 2.1 64.6 
14 .847 2.0 66.6 
15 .786 1.8 68.5 
16 .761 1.8 70.3 
17 .737 1.7 72.1 
18 .731 1.7 73.8 
19 .698 1.6 75.5 
20 .661 1.5 77.1 
21 .634 1.5 78.6 
22 .619 1.4 80.0 
23 .612 1.4 81.5 
24 .598 1.4 82.9 
25 .579 1.3 84.3 
26 .561 1.3 85.6 
27 .519 1.2 86.9 
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28 .491 1.1 
29 .472 1.1 
30 .460 1.0 
31 .436 1.0 
32 .431 1.0 
33 .412 .9 
34 .396 .9 
35 .370 .8 
36 .351 .8 
37 .342 .8 
38 .325 .7 
39 .284 .6 
40 .278 .6 
41 .251 .5 
42 .194 .4 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
Factoring. 
88.0 
89.2 
90.3 
91.3 
92.3 
93 .3 
94.2 
95 .1 
96.0 
96.8 
97.6 
98.2 
98 .9 
99.5 
100 
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Appendix 41 Rotated Factor Matrix of the 8 factors solution 
Safety elimate items (n=42) Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .65 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .59 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .50 
CS In this un it, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .53 .37 
A 18 Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening .51 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .48 
FIO liospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .48 -.46 
C3 Wc are infonned about errors that happen in thi unit .48 
FI Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety .44 -.33 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place ba ed on event report .43 
F4 TIlere is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .36 -.32 .33 
A 15 Patient safety never takes second place to get more work done 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units .65 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .56 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with taff from other hospital units .55 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in th is hospital .50 
F2 Ho pital units do not coordinate well with each other -.3 1 .50 
F9 Hospital managcmnct seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens -.34 .36 
A 17 We have patient safety problems in this unit 
F3 Some thing do not happen or get missed when transferring patients from one unit to another 
D2 When a mi take is made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reported? .90 
D3 When I1 mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .69 
DI When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is .68 
A4 In th is unit, people treat each other with rL'Spect .71 
A I Staff support onc another in this unit .70 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done .37 .57 
A8 Staff feel like thei r mistakes are held against them .74 
A 12 When an event is reported, it fee ls like the person is being written up, not the problem .65 
A 16 Staff wony that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .51 
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C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negati vely a ffect pati ent care 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right 
AS Staff in thi s unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for pati ent care 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient ca re 
B3 Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even ifit means 
AI4 We work in a hurry, trying to do too much, too quickly 
A2 We have enough sta ff to handle the workload 
A II When one area in thi s unit gets really busy, others help out 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient sa fety 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to 
B4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient sa fety problems that happen over and over 
A I 0 It is just by chance that more serious mistakes do not happen around here 
ExtractIOn Method: Pnnclpal Axis Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 14 iterations 
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.70 
.34 .5 1 
-.37 
049 
41 
AI - 40 
.36 .40 
-.34 
.32 .33 -.33 
.37 .54 
.43 47 
-.3 1 • -12 
Appendix 42 Pattern Matrix of the 8 factors solution 
Safely climule ilems (n- 42) Faclor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
AI3 After we make changes 10 improve patient safely. we evaluate their effectiveness .60 
F8 TI,e aClions ofh ospilal managemenl show Ihal palienl safely is a lOp priorily .50 
A6 We are aClively doing Ih ings 10 improve palienl care .49 
A9 Mistakes have led 10 positive changes here .44 
A 18 Our procedures and syslems are good al preventing errors from happening .39 
FI Hospilal managemenl provides a work climate Ihal promoles pat ient safety .30 
A8 51afT feel like their mistakes are held against them .76 
A 12 Wben an evenl is reponed, it feels like Ihe person is being wrinen up, nOllhe problem .66 
AI6 lafT worry Ihat mistakes they make are kepI in their personnel file .49 
D2 When a mislake is made, bUI has no polenliallo hann Ihe palienl , how oil en is Ihis reponed'l -.98 
03 When a mislake is m.de Ih. , could harm Ihe palienl , bUI does not. how ollen is Ihis reponed'l -.74 
0 1 When a mlslake is made, bUI is caughl and correcled be fore afTecling Ihe palienl, how often is this reponed? -.74 
F7 Problems onen occur in Ihe exchange of In fonnal ion ucross hospilal unils .67 
1'6 II is onen unpleasanl 10 work with slafT from other hospital unils .56 
F5 Impananl pal ienl care in formal ion is ollen lost during shin changes .54 
FII Shin changes clluse problems for paliellls In Ihis hospilal .47 
F2 Hospil I unils do nOI coordin. 'e well wilh ench olher .45 
FI O Hospital units work welllogether 10 provide Ihe besl care for palienls .31 -.35 
1'9 Hospilal managemenl seemS inleresled in palient sa fely only 8ner an adverse evenl happens .30 
F3 Ome things do not happen or get missed when transfcrring palients fro m onc unillO rulolher 
A 17 We have patient safelY problems in th is un it 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other wilh respecl -.76 
Al lafT suppol1 onc another in this un it -.74 
A3 When A 101 of work needs 10 be done quickly, we work logelher as .'eam 10 gel the work done -.S4 
F4 There is good cooperalion among hospital units thal need to work together 
C4 Staff fcel free 10 queslion Ihe decisions or actions of Ihose wilh more aulhorily .82 
C2 taff will frecly speak up iflhcy see somelhing Ihal may negalively afTecl palienl care .59 
COS In Ih is unit, we discuss ways 10 prevent errors from happening again .31 .44 
1:('6 Slaff are afraid 10 ask questions when something does nol seem right -.39 
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C3 We are infonned about errors that happen in th is unit 
C I We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers stafT suggestions for improving patient safety 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient s..1fcty 
8 4 My supervisor/manager ignores patient sa fety problems that happen over and over 
A I 0 It IS Just by chance that 1110re serious mistakes do not happen around here 
A5 Starr in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care 
A 7 We use more temporary starrthan we should, which is not good for patient care 
83 Whenever pressure builds uP. my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster. even if it means taking 
A2 We have enough starrto handle the workload 
AI4 We work in a hurT)', trying to do too much, 100 quickly 
A 11 When one area in Ihis unit gets really busy, others help out 
A I S Patient safelY never takes second place la get morc work done 
Extraction Method: Pnnclpal AxiS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Obl imin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 46 iterations 
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Appendix 43 Communalities of the step eight 
Safety climate items (n=25) Initial Extraction 
Al Sta ff support one another in this unit .48 .64 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team .42 .52 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .46 .63 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good .17 .31 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .38 .45 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for .17 .23 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .42 .61 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .31 .34 
A 12 When an event is reported, it fee ls like the person is being written up, .41 .54 
A13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their .39 .49 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .27 .34 
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done .57 .66 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for .6 1 .82 
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect .42 .50 
C4 Staff fee l free to question the decisions or actions of those with more .36 .64 
CS In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .50 .55 
01 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the .52 .56 
02 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how .64 .89 
03 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how .50 .52 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .35 .37 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .35 .43 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .31 .38 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .37 .54 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top .32 .36 
F 11 Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .31 .39 
Extraction Method: Principal Axi Factoring. 
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Appendix 44 Total variance explained of the step eight 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Rotation 
%of Cumulative %of Cumulative 
Factor Total Variance % Total Variance % T tal 
I 6.404 25.6 25.6 5.948 23.7 23.7 3.3 
2 2.053 8.2 33.8 1.681 6.7 30.5 3.0 
3 1.963 7.8 41.6 1.462 5.8 36.3 2.7 
4 1.521 6.0 47.7 1.040 4.1 40.5 2.0 
5 1.331 5.3 53.0 .927 3.7 44.2 2.7 
6 1.203 4.8 57.8 .679 2.7 46.9 2.9 
7 l.033 4. 1 62.0 .603 2.4 49.3 3. 1 
8 .986 3.9 65.9 .481 1.9 51.2 1.5 
9 .801 3.2 69.1 
10 .746 2.9 72.1 
11 .717 2.8 75.0 
12 .663 2.6 77.6 
13 .597 2.3 80.0 
14 
.566 2.2 82.3 
15 .545 2.1 84.5 
16 .520 2.0 86.5 
17 .472 1.8 88.4 
18 .470 1.8 90.3 
19 .445 l.7 92.1 
20 .417 1.6 93.8 
21 .395 l.5 95 .3 
22 .348 1.3 96.7 
23 .33 1 1.3 98.1 
24 .255 1.0 99.1 
25 .217 .8 100 
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Appendix 4S Pattern Matrix of the 8 factors solution 
Factor 
Sa fety climate items (n=25) 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient sa fety, we evaluate their effectiveness .60 
A6 Wc are acti vely doing things to improve patient care .56 , 
F8 The actions of hospital management how that patient safety is a top priority .45 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .434 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? .98 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this .73 I 
D3 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .72 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of infonnation acro s hospital units .74 
F6 11 is oft en unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .56 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .54 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .47 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .38 
A Stafr feel like their mistakes are held against them -. 73 
A 12 When an event i reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem -.65 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel fi le -.48 
A I StH rf support onc another in th i unit 
-.76 
A4 In this unit , people treat e.1ch other wi th respect -.73 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done 
-.57 
C4 Sta ff feci free to question the deci ions or actions of those with more authority 
.80 
C2 Staff wi ll freely spe.1k up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care 
.54 
CS In this uni t, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again .30 
.4 1 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
-.84 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established 
-.74 
A5 Staff in thi unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care 
.5'1 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which i not good for patient care 
.41 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations 
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Appendix 46 EF A of each scale of the optimal model (8 factors) 
Factor one Item loadings 
A6: 
.699 
A9: 
.563 
A13: 
.672 
F8: 
.583 
Factor two Item loadings 
01: 
.730 
02: 
.953 
03 : 
.725 
Factor three Item loadings 
A8: 
.805 
A12: 
.707 
A16 : 
.541 
Factor four Item loadings 
F5: 
.639 
F6: 
.548 
F7: 
.706 
FII : 
.5 81 
Factor five Item loadings 
AI : 
.818 
A3: 
.662 
A4: 
.709 
Factor six Item loadings 
C2: 
.694 
C4: 
.994 
Factor seven Item loadings 
Bl 
.846 
B2 
.846 
Factor eight Item loadings 
AS: 
.510 
A7: 
.510 
The table above shows that each set of items was loaded in one factor as they were structured 
in the optimal model. The overall of all items (23 items) and 8 factors satisfactori ly 
explained by a single factor. 
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Appendix 47 Extra factor analysis investigations 
In order to explore potential improvements and because exploratory factor analysis is based 
on exploration approach another investigation was performed by exploring the conclusion of 
the comparison between 11-12-10-9-8 factors solutions that produced the common factor 
structure which consists 10 factors. The summary of the conclusion indicated that the 
common factor structure consisted of 10 factors. In addition 10 factor solution was suggested 
by scree plot (see page 12) and also it was suggested by 11 and 12 factors solution. Items 
number AlO-A1S-AI7-F3 did not load upon any factor. Items number A2-AS-AIO-AI5-
A17-F3 had low communalities. Items number FI-F3-F9-AII-AI4-AI8-A2-CS-B3 had low 
loadings. Therefore, Items numbers A10-A1S-A17-F3-A2-All-A14-A18-B3-C5-Fl-F9 
were removed in the next step. 
Step 1: 
Run EFA exclude AlO-A1S-A17-F3-A2-All-A14-A18-B3-CS-Fl-F9 and number of factors 
(10) with using oblique rotation to aid interpretation of the items in each factor of the 
solution. The following tables show the communalities, Total Variance Explained and 
Pattern Matrix of this step. 
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Table 1 Communalities of the 10 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=30) Initial Extraction 
A 1 Staff support one another in this unit .494 .653 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done .433 .526 
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with respect .468 .622 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care .187 .290 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care .392 .595 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care .196 .3 18 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .432 .620 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here .3 16 .365 
A 12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem .424 .55 1 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness .453 .552 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file .278 .345 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established .591 .827 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety .619 .698 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over .313 .327 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .399 .450 
C2 Staff wilI freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care .436 .529 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .400 .489 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority .364 .591 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right .262 .345 
D 1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this 
.535 .586 
reported? 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? .656 .887 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? .524 .552 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other .436 .472 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together .424 .531 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes .366 .446 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units . . 323 .377 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units .397 .575 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority .392 .422 
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Table I (continued) 
F I 0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients .514 .649 
F II Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .323 .384 
I' 
I. 
ExtractIon Method: Pnnclpal AxIS Factonng. 
Table 2 Total Variance Explained of the 10 factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
Factor 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 7.707 25 .692 25 .692 7.253 24.176 24.176 2.329 
2 2.069 6.897 32.589 1.709 5.695 29.871 3.387 
3 2.044 6.813 39.402 1.546 5.155 35.026 2.955 
4 1.623 5.409 44.810 1.171 3.905 38.931 2.285 
5 1.388 4.627 49.438 .995 3.317 42 .248 3.288 
6 1.282 4.272 53 .710 .778 2.592 44.840 2.483 
7 1.161 3.871 57.581 .714 2.380 47.220 3.938 
8 1.112 3.705 61.287 .555 1.850 49.070 1.552 
9 .975 3.250 64.537 .5 13 1.709 50.779 4.175 
10 .847 2.825 67.362 .340 1.132 51.911 2.903 
11 .781 2.603 69.965 
12 .755 2.517 72.482 
13 .695 2.318 74.799 
14 .631 2.102 76.901 
15 .600 1.999 78 .900 
16 .591 1.971 80.871 
17 .565 1.883 82.754 
18 .533 1.776 84.530 
19 .500 1.666 86.196 
I 
20 .491 1.638 87.834 
21 .463 1.543 89.377 
I ' 
22 .444 1.478 90.855 
23 .430 1.432 92.288 
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Table 2 (continued) 
24 .428 1.426 93 .714 
25 .392 1.306 95.020 
26 .367 1.224 96.244 
27 .340 1.133 97 .377 
28 .328 1.092 98.469 
29 .255 .85 1 99.320 
30 .204 .680 100.000 
Extraction Method : Principal Axis Factoring. 
Table 3 Pattern Matrix of the 10 factors solution 
Safety climate items (n=30) 
Factor 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
C3 Wc are infonned about errors that happen in this unit .488 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports .444 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effecti veness .418 
02 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to hann the patient, how often is this reponed? .968 
03 When a mistake is made that could hann the patient, but does not, how often is this reponed? .734 
01 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this .732 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of infonnation across hospital units I, .741 
F6 It i often unpleasant to work with sta fT from other hospital units .534 
F5 Important patient care infonnation is often lost during shift changes .5 13 
FII Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .462 
A8 StafT fcellike thei r mistakes are held aga inst them -.755 
A 12 When an event is reported , it feels li ke the person is being written up, not the problem -.664 
AI6 StafTworry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel fil e -.506 
A I StafT support one another in this unit .773 
A4 In thi s unit, people treat each other with respect .72 1 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as a team to get the work done .569 
C4 StafT fecI free to question the decisions or actions oftho e with more authority .679 
C2 StafTwill freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care .490 
C6 StafT are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right -.4 10 
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Table 3 (continued) 
8 I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
82 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
84 My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over and over 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care 
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient eare 
F 10 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
F2 Ho pitalunits do not coordinate well with each other 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
A6 We are acti vely doing things to improve patient care 
A9 Mi takes have led to positive changes here 
Extraction Method. Pnnclpal AxIS Factonng. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
a. Rotation converged in 46 iterations. 
-.926 
-.704 
.31 1 
The pattern matrix above showed that B4 had low loading 0.311. Therefore this item was 
excluded in the next step. 
Step 2: 
Run EFA exclude AIO-A1S-A17-F3-A2-AII-A14-A18-B3-CS-FI-F9-B4 with using oblique 
rotation and number of factors (10). The following tables show the communalities, Total 
Variance Explained and Pattern Matrix of this step. 
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.521 
.478 
.714 
.637 
-.458 
.440 
-.671 I 
-.44 
Table 4 Communalities of the 10 factors solution 
ISafety climate items (n=29) 
AI Sta ff support one another in this unit 
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done 
A4 In thi unit, people treat each other with respect 
A5 Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not good for patient care 
A6 We are actively doing things to improve patient care 
A 7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good for patient care 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them 
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
A12 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem 
AI3 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file 
B I My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
C2 Staff wi ll freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit 
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right 
D 1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? 
F2 Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units 
F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
FI0 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
Fll Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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[nitial Extraction 
.490 .645 
.433 .532 
.465 .621 
.186 .3 15 
.391 .591 
.183 .283 
.430 .628 
.316 .370 
.423 .549 
.453 .553 
.277 .343 
.578 .808 
.619 .706 
.393 .444 
.436 .531 
.400 .492 
.362 .585 
.262 .347 
.535 .59 1 
.654 .882 
.523 .553 
.436 .472 
.424 .529 
.365 .449 
.322 .375 
.396 .577 
.391 .422 
.513 .654 
.322 .390 
Table 5 Total Variance Explained of the 10 factors solution 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
Factor 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
I 7.442 25.662 25.662 6.995 24.120 24.120 2.232 
2 2.068 7.13 I 32.793 1.704 5.876 29.996 3.325 
3 2.034 7.013 39.806 1.538 5.304 35.300 2.861 
4 1.619 5.583 45 .389 1.170 4.036 39.336 2.270 
5 1.386 4.779 50.168 .985 3.398 42 .734 3.132 
6 1.239 4.274 54.441 .736 2.537 45 .271 2.454 
7 1.138 3.926 58.367 .709 2.445 47.716 3.686 
8 1.100 3.793 62.160 .552 1.903 49.619 1.451 
9 .973 3.354 65.515 .509 1.756 51.375 4.048 
10 .846 2.918 68.432 .335 1.156 52.531 2.843 
11 .755 2.605 71.037 
12 .731 2.521 73 .558 
13 .690 2.378 75.936 
14 .623 2.148 78 .084 
15 .598 2.063 80.147 
16 .567 1.955 82.102 
17 .536 1.847 83 .949 
18 .500 1.724 85.673 
19 .491 1.694 87.367 
20 .464 1.600 88 .968 
21 .444 1.530 90.498 
22 .434 1.496 91.994 
23 .428 1.476 93.470 
24 .395 1.363 94.833 
25 .368 1.270 96.103 
26 .340 1.172 97.275 
27 .328 1.130 98.405 
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Table 5 (continued) 
28 .255 .880 99.285 
29 .207 .715 100.000 
Table 6 pattern matrix of the fina l solution (10 factors) 
Safety climate items (n=29) Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in this unit .490 
Cl We are given feedback about changes put into place based on .439 
A 13 After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate .416 
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, .963 
D I When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before .736 
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, .734 
F7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across .738 
F6 It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units .529 
F5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift .518 
F 11 Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital .468 
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them .762 
AI2 When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being .657 
A 16 Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel .502 
A 1 Staff support one another in this unit -
A4 In this urut, people treat each other with respect -
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quikly, we work together as -
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with .675 
C2 Staffwill freely speak up if they see something that may .488 
C6 Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem -
B 1 My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job -
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for -
AS Staff in this unit work longer hours than they should, which is not .511 
A7 We use more temporary staff than we should, which is not good I ' .477 
FIO Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for .7 19 
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work .628 
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F2 H pital unit do not coordinate we ll wi th each other 
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The Cl 11 wing tab le h ws the tructure of the 10 factor solution and its loadings. 
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Tahle 8 Comparison of the three final solutions 
Solution Number of factors Structure Items Total Variance 
(number of items) excluded Explained (%) 
Onc 11 factors FI: 01-02-03 AIO-AIS- 52.9 
(31 items) F2: A8-AI2-AI6 A17-F3-Fl-
F3: AI-A3-A4 F9-CS-A2-
F4: FS-F6-F7-FII AII-AI4-
FS: A6-A9 Al8 
F6: C2-C4-C6 
F7:AS-A7 
F8:DI-D2 
F9: CI-C3-AI3 
FIO:F2-F4-FS-FIO 
FII: Tl3-Tl4 
Two 10 factors FI: 01-D2-D3 AIO-AIS- 52.5 
(29 items) F2: A8-A12-AI6 AI7-F3-FI-
F3: AI-A3-A4 F9-CS-A2-
F4: FS-F6-F7-FlI AII-AI4-
1"5: A6-A9 AIS-D3-D4 
F6: C2-C4-C6 
F7:AS-A7 
F8:B1-D2 
F9: CI-C3-AI3 
FIO:F2-F4-F8-FIO 
-
Three 8 factors FI: 01-02-03 AIO-AIS- 51.5 
(23 items) F2: A8-AI2-AI6 AI7-F3-FI-
F3: AI-A3-A4 F9-CS-A2-
F4: FS-F6-F7-FII AII-AI4-
FS: A6-A9-AI3-F8 AI8-D3-B4-
F6: C2-C4 F4-FIO-F2-
F7: AS-A7 C6-C3 
F8: RI-B2 
-
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Step J: Testing the fit of optimal models 
This step aimed to test, using the validation half of the data, the fit of the resulting models 
that emerged from the EF A that was performed on the construction hal f of the data. These 
models included 11, 10, and 8 factor solutions. 
11 factor41 solution 
The process of CF A of the 11 factor solution was perfonned (as practical steps that descrihed 
in the process ofCFA of the original 12 factors in page 2) 
AMOS Graphics was used to open up a blank diagram window 
2 Opening the data (The validation hal f of the data, 431 questionnaires) 
3 Duilding the model (Drawing thell factors hy using model drawing area in step onc) 
4 Adding the variable names to the model 
5 Checking the diabYfam and running the model and using the output window 
Tahle 4 shows the output ofCFA of 11 factors solution. 
Tahlc 9 Output of CFA of 11 factors solution 
!\Iodel Chi- nF Cl\II~fI)F C .... H:\ISEA H:\II{ SI{:\II{ TU 
square 
11 922 381 2.4 0.881 0.678 0.057 0.01)3 0.H55 
Factors 
The output ahove shows the value of CMIN/DF was greater than 2 (good model ~2). 111c 
value of CH < 0.90 (good model> 0.90). The value of SRMR > 0.08 (good model <0.05). 
The value of RMSEA > 0.06 (good model :S0.06). Thus, the values of the fit indices from 
CF A of 11 factors are outside the general abYfeed parameters in table one and this model lit 
was deemed not satisfactory. Consequently this model was rejected. 
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10 factors solution 
The process of CF A of the 10 factors solution was as follows: 
1 AMOS Graphics was used to open up a blank diagram window 
2 Opening the data (The validation half of the data, 431 questionnaires) 
3 Building the model (Drawing thel0 factors by using model drawing area in step one) 
4 Adding the variable names to the model 
5 Checking the diagram and running the model and using the output window 
Table 5 shows the output of CF A of 10 factors solution. 
Table 10 Output of CFA of 10 factors solution 
Model Chi- DF CMIN/DF CFI RMSEA RMR SRMR TLI 
square 
10 716 332 2.1 0.90 0.52 0.046 0.052 0.88 
Factors 
The output above shows the value of CMINIDF was greater than 2 (good model ::::;2). The 
value of CFI=0.90. The value of SRMR <0.08. The value of RMSEA <0.06. Overall, the 
values of the fit indices from CF A of 10 factors indicated that this model fit was not 
satisfactory. 
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Eight factors solution 
The process of CF A analysis of the eight factors solution was followed: 
1 AMOS Graphics was used to open up a blank diagram window 
2 Opening the data (The validation half of the data, 431 questionnaires) 
3 Building the model (Drawing the eight factors by using model drawing area in step 
one) 
4 Adding the variable names to the model 
5 Running the model and using the output window 
Table 6 shows the output of CF A of 8 factors solution. 
Table 11 Output of CFA of 8 factors solution' 
Model Chi- DF CMINIDF CFI RMSEA 
square 
8 407 202 2 0.93 0.049 
Factors (good) 
. (good) koodl (good) Jgooc!l 
Rl\tR SRMR TU 
0.044 0.047 0.916 
(goodl kooc!l Jgood) 
The output above shows the value of CMIN/DF was 2 (good model ::;;2). The value of CFI 
>0.90. The value of SRMR <0.08. The value of RMSEA <0.06. Overall, the fit indices 
from CF A of eight factors indicated that this model fit was good. 
The values of the fit indices of the Saudi data (8 factors) meet the general agreed parameters 
in table one. Therefore, this model fit was a good fit. Consequently this model was 
acceptable as the optimal model. 
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Table 7 shows the comparison of CF A between USA and UK models and the three solutions 
of the current study (11, 10 and 8 factor solutions). 
Table 12 Comparison of CFA of USA and UK models and the current study 
Model Chi- DF CMINffiF CFI RMSEA RMR SRMR TLI 
square 
USA data 2064 746 
-
0.94 0.040 
-
- -(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
UK data 1906 674 - 0.91 0.045 
- 0.046 -
(original 
model) 
(Waterson et 
al,2009) 
UK data 9 587 288 - 0.94 0.043 - 0.043 0.93 
factors, 27 
items(Waterson 
et aI, 2009) 
Current study 
12 Factors 4995 805 6.2 0.642 0.678 0.178 0.1931 0.617 
(original 
model) 
11 Factors 922 381 2.4 0.881 0.678 0.057 0.093 0.855 
10 Factors 716 332 2.1 0.90 0.52 0.046 0.052 0.88 
8 Factors 407 202 2 0.93 0.049 0.044 0.047 0.916 
It is clear that the optimal model that fitting the Saudi data is the eight factor solutions 
because of the value of the fit indices indicate that this model meets the general agreed 
parameters. 
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Appendix 48 Actual texts of answers of open question in the HSOPSC questionnaire 
N ID Job Actual text 
1 6 Nurse Shortcuts still been practised in the hoSJlital. Difficult to ask some medical sta ff. 1-) 2 
2 10 Nurse Polices and producers are excellent. Feedbacks on reports are almost available. 
Reporting system is effectivel+13 
3 14 Doctor Many patients left in pediatric emergency. Many days for transfer to wards. 1-5 days 
4 
waiting in very crowded atmosphere. (-}l 
15 Doctor The only thing affect the patient safety in emergency is crowded and no bed available in 
5 
the wards. Patients stay for two to five days in the emerxen9'-
21 Nurse No cooperation between staff. The staff are not helping in problems. (-21 
6 22 Nurse I believe when you take care of patients you have to be oriented to your work place and 
with people you work with them.1+1 1 
7 23 Nurse We always talk about patient safety, patient comfort and patient rights. Management 
never helped the staff and their safety and welfare. Shift staff without giving them 
enough time to orient themselves. Nurses having basic knowledge on nursing nurses 
fear to speak. Management is not helpful and supportive the staff. 
8 24 Nurse If we will maintain patient safety we should in the first place maintain staff safety, so 
when they come to work, their mind will be concentrated on safe patient care e.g. if the 
staff living outside the hospital compound with family and no medical and education 
coverage all these so how the staff is going to concentrate and provide safe care to the 
patients (-) one 
9 26 Nurse We are not familiar with staff from other area. (-) one 
10 27 Doctor The questionnaire concentrated on patient safety in patient not outpatient. We see more 
problems with patient safety due to short time spent with patient. Lack of cooperation 
between different specia lities. (-) 3 
11 34 Nurse Our hospital following international~atient safety goals as we are JCIA ho~ital. (+) I 
12 35 Doctor Thi hospital is probably is the best hospital in the KSA regarding this issue. Good 
research (+) 2 
13 36 Nurse Sometimes we are concentrating more with paper works than patient care. Honestly they 
should decrease paper work and we should concentrate on patient care and safety. Thank 
you. (-) 2. 
14 45 Doctor I feel that patient safety in our hospitals depend on the physician himself; I mean his own 
15 53 Nurse 
rules and beliefs not on the hospital regulations. 
Patient safety i the first and ultimate goal in this unit and we as nurse are really 
16 58 Nurse 
practicing it in an excellent way. (+) 2 
We have electronic incident reporting system. In the past it was a paper based. Patient 
safety has been made number one priority by senior management. Quali~ management 
is effectively striving to enhance patient safetY thrOU~l its leadership. (+) 3 themes 
17 62 Doctor Encourage staff to disclose his/her medical errors to others for learning purpo e. 
Holding regular session to present morbidity/mortality ca es to all staff in each units for 
18 63 Doctor 
learning. Thanks (+) 2 
They are working on good patient safety maintaining. (+) L 
19 65 Doctor Easy and clear to complete--'luestionnaire. (+) 1 
20 67 Doctor They have excellent reporting system. (+1 1 
21 71 Doctor Good survey we would be interested in seein~the results. (+) 1 
22 72 Doctor My hospital is a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia in which patient all over Saudi Arabia 
come plus international patients. I believe in such hospital are efficient number of 
medical staff should work especially in critical area but it is not the case in my hospital. 
I believe there is no respect to junior staff opinion although sometimes it is important and 
true. I think sometimes patient care is sometimes missed when di charged from ho pital. 
I mean the outpatient follow up is not optimal. Many patients are lost between clinics. 
Many patients do not know why to visit the clinics. Last point is patient education is sti ll 
need more to do. I wish your study will help us. God bless you. (-) 6 
23 77 Doctor With environment of working when everybody concentrates on patient safety the e 
action affect patient treatment, because everybody wants to protect himsel f Ulan patients 
(-) I 
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24 96 Doctor We still need further improvement of patient safety system although it is better than 
other hospital. Reporting the physician who made the mistakes need more confidential. 
Thankyou for your effort. (-) 3 
25 97 Doctor There is no justice in the working hours, load of the work, and position of physicians. 
Even there is no balance in the salary. Emergency department is not large. Some 
departments are supported by their head; even if they did mistake nobody care. (:l4 
26 lOO Doctor I wish you all luck. This questionnaire is too long and some questions are reported in 
other with same idea (-) 2 
27 106 Doctor This is a good hospital but the problem here, it is from the patient contact, and 
knowledge and contact with their relative it is difficult. Thank you. (:l3 
28 111 Doctor Wish you best research good luck (+) 1 
29 112 Doctor We hope that we can share patient safety so we can learn from the ~eople mistakes. (+) 2 
30 116 Doctor I hope we will receive feedback 
31 117 Doctor Clear to patient safety research no comments thank you so much. (+) 
32 138 Nurse Science our department personnel involved a multi disciplinary team from different 
culture patient safety is always our priority. Our scope of practice must be reported 
mistakes even near miss. Reporting system. In behalf of our department we wish you 
good luck, doctor + our congratulations.l+14. 
33 144 Nurse Blame on what happened rather than what caused the problem. H 1 
34 148 Nurse My observation is those critical incidences are not freely reported. Professionals 
continue to cover up mistakes, I believe will continue until individuals are no longer 
blamed, punished for incidents in which they are involved. 
35 146 Nurse Patient safety is number issue in the hospital. Event reporting is good tool to improve 
patient safety (+) 2 
36 140 Nurse The hospital setting is good. The structure is good. Programs some are good but most 
very unnecessary and stressful for the staff on the floor. Every unit is doing its own 
thing that may be good or bad but at least there is competition on trying to get better. 
Staff on the floor is overworked, overloaded with patients. Nobody is taking care of the 
staffon the floor. (-) 6 
37 166 Nurse Patient safety precautions program have been presented by means of posters, conference 
and workshop that provides full information to staff. ~+) I 
38 170 Nurse Theory practice gap still exist. It is difficult at times to practice what is being taught in 
clinical areas. Too much paper work more than patient care. Staffing problems (in 
balance of staffing) (-) 3 
39 171 Nurse The hospital focuses on patient safety. ]CIA put policy and regulations and guidelines 
related what should be implemented and too many checklists abou~patient saf~-lJ 2 
40 181 Nurse We are very much focus on patient safety (+) I 
41 192 Nurse Patient safety should be our priority. We should be careful about all things related to 
patient care (+) 2 
42 191 Nurse I grateful to inform you that the hospital I am working with has a high regard when it 
comes to patient safety. (+) I 
43 190 Nurse Our hospital is currently implementing measures to ensure quality patient care for 
patients. The responsibilities of all healthcare worker to work together to ensure safety to 
all patients. Polices are being put in place to facilitate patient safety. Errors or events 
affect patient safety reported and reviewed by the quality assurance management team. 
44 197 Nurse Communication problems sometimes lead to patient safety problem because the patient 
difficult to understand physicians instructions. (-) I 
45 202 Nurse I personally think the issues regarding patient safety are of utmost importance in this 
organisation. ( +) I 
46 205 Nurse More on paper works which delay patient care. (-) I 
47 204 Nurse Too many paper works to be done, less direct patient care. Patient safety here is our 
priority. (-) 2 
48 206 Nurse An event reported becomes essential and important. (-) 1 
49 207 Nurse Reporting events is common helpful factor in patient care and safe~. (+) I 
50 210 Nurse For patient safety staff play an vital part for that the staff welfare must be taken care. 
Nurse mangers and supervisors must attend consulting course regarding how to 
communicate to staff. Stress for staff will cause more damage in patient safety. Staff 
satisfaction is important and giving a better safety environment for patients. Patient 
safety depends on staff satisfaction. Staff with h!gh~ stress will causil!8 more harm for 
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patient and affected patient safety. 
51 212 Nurse Patient safety becomes a focus at accreditation times. 
52 239 Nurse More information on how to enhance patient safety in this hospital. 
53 247 Nurse Patient safety is the number one priority in this hospital in relation to thi s all taffshould 
adhere with the international patient safety goa ls. Identify patient correctl y using two 
unique identities. Improve staff communication using SBAR. Correct site of surgery a 
time out. Reduce risk of infection by hand hygiene. Do necessary action to correct 
mistakes. 
54 248 Nurse Patients' awareness is important. Communication between staff and between patients a 
well is very important to decrease errors. 
55 249 Nurse Honestly, this hospital is very particular in patient safety focus in improvement toward 
patient care. Mistakes happened yes but there is always room for improvement. Patient 
safety is the top priority can be achieved through teamwork of excellent staff. 
56 274 nurse Our goal ispatient and their family rights first which include them to be safe. 
57 280 Nurse The head nurse is not held accountable for her behaviour and very poor treatment of the 
staff. Despite numerous reports to the management through the chain of command 
nothing has been done. She does not lesson to the staff. Lack of communication 
between and preventing discussion all these lead to unsafe practice. 
58 283 Nurse Visitors could easily come and go towards there is on security guard at the doors. 
59 292 Nurse More time is spent on documentation than bedside care. 
60 304 Nurse Babies should not bring to mothers during visiting hours for safety reason. 
61 303 Nurse Patient safety measures only be taken after event ha bappened. I am very happy to be 
given this opportunity to fill up this questionnaire. Thank you. 
62 306 Nurse Patient sa fety is definitely a priority but due to workload ometime it become 
practically impossible to ensure safety. The high turnover of patients make it 
di fficultlimpossible to ensure safety of patients because you discharge one patient when 
you have not even fini shed the discharge procedure another patient i being tran ferred to 
your care. As much as the safety of patient is important sometimes the practicality 
becomes impossible. 
63 310 Nurse Top management speaks about patient safety but physically not too much i done. 
Patient safety should not only be on papers, it should be Qracticed. 
64 312 Nurse Feedback of this survey would be strongly appreciated. We work Witllout any Arabic 
speaking. We do not have unit assistance. 
65 313 Nurse I feel nurse want to report near misses but they think it 's not worth because of the head 
of department. People take reporting as an insult instead of something po itive for 
patient outcomes. I do not view reporting as a make against anyone because I came from 
my country that encouraging reporting so that we can put better systems in place to 
prevent it from happening again. 
66 314 Nurse A feedback on this survey will beneficial to the staff. Patient afety is a priority in this 
hospital but is compromised due to the workload that they have. Too much time spent 
on electronic and written documentation and limited time given to direct patient care. 
Directives are given to nurses to do things but the problems encountered by the nursing 
staff are not heard. 
67 322 Nurse Management is active in trying to implement patient safety as one of focu . There eems 
to be resistance from some staff regarding change and patient afety. Tt seems that 
whatever is fastest is the method they will use. They cover each other regarding 
mistakes that are made. I fmd alot of problems with compliance to ho pital policy's. 
There is little respect shown to each other and I find manner of staff to be unprofes ional 
at time. 
68 334 Nurse Staff support depends on who one is? Teamwork: people still find themselve leaving 
the unit at 9:00 or 10:00 especially if the work is not completed. People till do not feel 
free to ask question 
69 341 Nurse The most patient safety issue as the nurse that employed in intensive care unit not ICU 
bored nurses (not qualified) . 
70 350 Nurse I would like to suggest for enforcement in the effort to create a non balanced culture in 
managing event reporting related to patient safety. The system failure should be focused 
on when there is event reporting such as medication errors, patient safety issue. 
71 358 Nurse Pressure time, when we work faster errors can easily happen. But now a days lots of 
things are treated by policies and procedures that can help us to work better to prevent 
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errors and more safe environment for patients. 
72 360 Nurse As part of member of this hospital I found the hospital and management are working 
hard in order to keep patient safety continuously. 
73 368 Nurse I think I was just lucky enough working here in KAMC, Riyadh. All programs related 
and with positive effect to patient are updated. These institution prioritize their patients 
safety by encourage and support staff who work very well. Thanks for KF NG. 
74 369 Nurse Documentation takes a lot of time than providing patient care because the system 
emphasise more importance on paper works. There is no enough staff for work therefore 
the ~ressure increase because of workload. 
75 372 Nurse Nursing staff are the first person in direct contact with patient. They are potentially 
hazardous to patient health and life physically and mentally exhausted nurse due to staff 
shortage, compensated by mandatory overtime, eventually result in compromised patient 
safety. More errors done than prevented and not being reported. Healthy nurse can 
actively prevent medico legal or health hazards only if they are given time to rest and do 
paper work once than many times. Errors should be reported. 
76 385 Nurse No comments thank ~ou. 
77 392 Nurse I think safety for patient is very good in this hospital. Thanks 
78 395 Nurse I did not see much positive changes or action or improvement after near miss incident 
79 396 Nurse 
bein~ re~orted . This will make staff are rarely willing to report any incident any more. 
Patient safety is number one priority in this hospital. 
80 399 Nurse I find my nurse manager in supportive, open, honest and team player. Due to the 
leadership skills as a staff nurse I have improved my nursing care and patient safety has 
improved almost 95% I love coming to work now. 
81 422 Nurse Patient safety is our top priority, circumstances like patients with sitter put risk in patient 
safety. For example patient going to O.R, sitter instructed not to give patient by oral, 
they_ cannot resist to ~ve water. 
82 424 Nurse Double up of patients in one cubic. Taking care of 2-3 critically ill patients. 1:3 nursing. 
Short cuts in doing nursing care. Not checking medication by two nurses. Un 
experienced nurses in the department. Lack of knowledge and skills 
83 426 Nurse I feel that staff still has misconception of reporting of errors. Fair from reporting system 
because th~ feel it k~E.t in their file . 
84 437 Nurse What the hospital says and does are two different things. I feel a big part of good quality 
care is looking after staff. We do not have temporary staff in times of crisis so all staff 
work overtime. And the hospital issued a memo saying staff are not allowed to refuse 
the allocated overtime shifts. Staff therefore are overworked and patient care is at risk. 
Workload is real problem for patient safety and still no problem solving. Double check 
procedure for patients is absent i.e. there is no question of elective surgery or elective 
admission about patient identifications. Under these conditions staff take short cut in 
practice to c~e with the increase workload. Basic practicel'rinciples are lost. 
85 447 Nurse Patient safety is the first top priority. Reporting immediately about errors. Provide good 
quality. 
86 453 Nurse No comments and thank you 
87 468 Nurse Patient safety is one of our major goals in the hospital. We have policies and procedures 
regarding all aspects regarding patient safety. (+) 2 themes 
88 469 Nurse We often write errors because that is not used for punching people it is for improving 
and teaching staff member thus improving safety. (+) one theme (report errors and 
learning from errors (organisational learning not punching peo~lt!). 
89 473 Nurse Any type of report incident is not regarding as punitive in my hospital. Some of the staff 
still get worried that the reported mistakes they made go to their files for future response. 
Reporting incidents is only for correction and improvement purpose not carried over to 
any staff evaluation. (+) 4 themes. 
90 477 Nurse Patient safety should be first top priority. Reporting immediately any medication errors. 
Provide good quality of patient care. (+) 3 themes. 
91 482 Nurse Workload effect~atient care negatively. 
92 491 Nurse Patient safety awareness has recently only become an important issue as we are being 
accredited 
93 495 Nurse Most of the errors have been reported but most of staff are taking reporting errors in 
negative way not in positive one. We should continue reporting errors 
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94 498 Nurse Patient safety is number one priority. Supervisors enhance staff to protect patient afety. 
Thank you. 
95 500 Nurse Do not have good reporting system. No feedback given. Focus on individual rather than 
systems. No quick response. Communication breakdown. Blame culture exist. Thank 
you. (-) 7 themes. 
96 502 Nurse I believe patient safety should be maintained a ll the time. There is workload too many 
admissions of patients with limited bed capacity. More papers work than nur ing your 
patients. 
97 536 Nurse It does not seem to help if we spoke up onset any problems, our supervisors li ten to us 
nut there is not too much action taken, honestly they will print out on specific person and 
they will not see that there is too much pressure put in nu~ 
98 543 Nurse All the staff waking together with management to improve patient care. Hospital ha 
good training for staff to upgrade their knowledge. Hospital has new program for the 
new staff which is very good. All the staff had very high level of confidence when they 
work in unit. Staff can get latest information from intemet. 
99 551 Nurse The management /supervisor must dial with issue with more sensitive of staff who i 
involved with mistakes/errors in the unit. Majority of the staff feels threaten and fear of 
punishment in their wol'igJlace. Errors should be investi_gated rather than blame of staff. 
100 553 Nurse The most common error that we are not reporting the near miss errors. It is very 
important for next time to know how to avoid errors. Thank..i'9u Allah he!E_..l'ou. 
101 560 Nurse When a mistake or error happens in the unit it is sometimes or most of the time blamed 
on the nurses, the person is the one being written up and talked about rather than the 
problem. It should be about the problem or th.e ~stem and not the..,£e~on involved. 
102 571 Doctor Thank you for this survey. I think in our institution the patient safety is con idering top 
priority in comparison to other local hospitals. One of disadvantage of reporting errors is 
that most of staff of the hospital think that is considering personnel and will be recorded 
in the personnel file. 
103 594 Doctor There is a chance for analysing errors which help to imjJrove..,£atient safe.!l: 
104 601 Nurse Some times staff are not working for improving patient safety. There i no proper 
communication and cooperative between~taff 
105 609 Nurse We do more paper works than providing good and safety care forpatients. 
106 614 Nurse Reporting system is important that enable us to give feedback an incident r~ort. 
107 620 Nurse Patient safety is our aim but it is important to activate reporting y tern and avoid blame 
and fear from reporting errors. Also mangers role should be supportive to provide afe 
and good care for patients. 
108 635 Nurse Patient safety education is important for staff and for....Qatients as well. 
109 650 Doctor I hope when the researcher is done the results it becomes start on real life to make it 
useful for patient safety im~ovement. 
110 658 Nurse Patient safety is one of the major objectives that every member of the taffin this 
hospital is aiming to achieve. There are a lots of patient safety program about patient 
safety that are followed working towards ensuring patient safety. Error and event are 
reported. 
I11 680 Nurse Patient identification is very important issue to prevent errors. 
112 710 Doctor I remember one patient who was admitted by mi takes to isolated room for RSV+VE 
bronchitis patient while the patient was RSV-VE bronchiti . The patient condition was 
getting worse more respiratory distress, required 02 therapy review by paec!. 
Pulmonary service who discovered this mistakes, because patient got RSV+ VE 
bronchitis direct contact e RSV+VE bronchitis patient in isolated room in hospital and 
the patient stayed long time in hospital unit improved (high risk patient). This event wa 
reported. 
11 3 720 Nurse All is well. 
114 721 Doctor Every individual in medical team must work for patient safety which is goal of our 
profession. 
115 736 Nurse When problems occur in our area it is solving urgent away to prevent future damage. 
Good luck with your research. 
116 756 Nurse Enough staff to prevent any errors. 
117 763 Nurse Thank you. fai ling down the most common risk for the patient in my hospital, so we 
hope to increase the safety_ to all£atients in the hospital. 
118 769 Nurse The utilisation of opportunity report in our unit is very essentia l as an excellent tool in 
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